WindowonEurasia: Majority of RF’s Non-Russians Now Identify as ‘Russkiye’

Paul Goble

Vienna, March 12 – More than half of the Russian Federation’s non-Russians by nationality now use the historically ethnic term “russkiye” to describe themselves, but both they and a large percentage of ethnic Russians say that they prefer to be addressed as “Rossiyane,” the noun deriving from the historically political term “rossiiskiy.”
The first of these shifts is certain to be greeted by Russian nationalists who hope to absorb into the Russian nation the more than one RF resident in five who is not ethnically Russian, and the second will be welcomed by those who argue that the Russian Federation must promote a form of civic nationalism if it is to become a modern society.
But the findings of a poll on which these conclusions are drawn are in fact far more troubling because they suggest that there has been a blurring of this linguistic distinction among RF residents, a trend that calls into question both the possibility of creating a genuine civic nationalism and the meaning of “Russianness” for Russians.
The poll conducted at the end of February asked 1500 RF adults across the country whether they considered themselves to be ethnically Russian, what being an ethnic Russian means to them, and which form of appeal to citizens of Russia pleases them more (http://www.bashkirova-partners.ru/res.php?id=5&show=865).
In response to the first question, 92.6 percent of the sample indicated that they did consider themselves to be “russkiye” people, with only 5.5 percent saying they did not and 1.9 percent indicating that they found it hard to answer.
Because non-Russians in ethnic terms make up more than 20 percent of the population of the Russian Federation, these findings indicate that a significant share and probably more than half of the members of this group are prepared to accept the ethnic Russian designator.
In response to the second question, however, the meaning of such self-identifications is shown to be more problematic: 61.4 percent of the sample said that to be “russkiye” meant to be citizens of the Russian Federation, 49.5 percent said that it meant to live in Russia.
At the same time, 43.1 percent of this sample said it meant to belong to the Russian nation “by blood,” 42.6 percent said that it meant to know Russian culture, and 33.7 percent said that it meant to be Orthodox by religion. (Because respondents could give more than one answer, the sum of the answers is greater than 100 percent.)
And in response to the third question, how they preferred that citizens of Russia be addressed, 62.9 percent of the sample said as [non-ethnic] “Rossiyane” while 30.2 percent as [ethnic] “Russkiye.” The remainder gave other answers or said they found it difficult to answer.
Commenting on the results, Aleksandr Muzafarov, who heads the research unit at the Moscow Agency of Political News, suggested that they pointed to the convergence of the two terms, the ethnic “russkiye” and the political “rossiskiy,” that historically have been considered different things (http://www.apn.ru/news/print11620.htm).
But he argued that the emergence of a “political nation” in the Russian Federation would take some time because, “we are dealing with the consequences of the nationality policy of bolshevism which in many regards had an anti-Russian character and was directed at the wiping out of Russian self-identification in a single ‘Soviet’ people.”
Two other Moscow commentaries on the relationship between the two Russian terms for “Russian” – typically translated into English without this distinction being marked -- some additional arguments about what this convergence of the ethnic and the political may mean for the future of the Russian Federation.
In one posted earlier this month on the “Peoples of Russia” website, Aleksandr Gorshkolepov and Dmitriy Matyash argue that “the question of the national self-identification of Russia” has become “a question of survival for our state” (http://www.narodnu.ru/article7421.html).
Indeed, “without a successful answer to this question,” they insist, the Russian Federation will have no chance for “political stability, the flowering of the country, or the well-being of its citizens.”
Unfortunately, the two analysts note, the citizens of the Russian Federation remain deeply split on just what their country should be, with some seeking a return to the “golden age” of the USSR, others desirous of a “rebirth” of the Russian empire,” and still others seeking the development of purely ethnic Russian state.
But the advocates of each of these positions, Gorshkolepov and Matyash say, almost in every case forget that “with the ‘rebirth’ of the past will be reborn the problems of the past.”
Consequently, they argue, the Russian Federation must move toward the development of a supra-national political identity, common for all citizens, and shift from the current formula of “a multi-national people of the Russian Federation” to “a single Russian civil political nation.”
Unfortunately, they point out, the current Russian government has not taken the admittedly difficult steps necessary to push this idea forward, preferring instead to root “the ‘blood principle’ in social-economic, societal-political and cadre policy” throughout the country.
An even more thoroughgoing analysis of the implications of the identity shifts between “russkiy” and “rossiiskiy” and the actions of the Kremlin was provided last week by Sergei Markedonov, one of the most thoughtful commentators on ethnic issues in the Russian Federation (http://www.polit.ru/author/2007/03/07/rusproj.html).
Like Gorshkolepov and Matyash, Markedonov argues that the question of “national self-identification” is “without exaggeration a question of survival for the state,” even though he notes that the Kremlin and its supporters often fail to recognize that fact.
“Today’s Russia,” he continues, “is a country with a “conglomerate identity,” in which coexist Soviet internationalism and double-dyed ethno-nationalism, imperialism, radical Orthodoxy and other ideas of religious extremism.”
Given that complexity and the problems that such diversity entails, he says, it should come as no surprise that the pro-Kremlin United Russia party has launched its “Russian Project,” one apparently intended to bridge the divide between the political and ethnic that continues to bedevil the Russian Federation.
But given the unserious way in which it has been conducted at least so far, Markedonov suggests, the Russian Project seems certain to anger both significant numbers of the non-Russian fifth of the Russian Federation and to call into question what it means for ethnic Russians to be Russians.
“By proclaiming [ethnic] Russians all the citizens of Russia (and at the same time by requiring from them to share its language and culture), the inventors of the ‘Russian Project’ are striking first of all on the ethnic identification of the [ethnic] Russians themselves,” Markedonov points out.
“For if there are ‘[ethnic] Russian Yakuts,’ ‘[ethnic] Russian Bashkirs’ and ‘[ethnic] Russian Tatars,’ then how will things stand with the genuinely [ethnic] Russians? Will they become ‘[ethnic] Russian Russians or [ethnic] Russians of the first category?” Markedonov asks.
And he suggests that the Kremlin’s current push via United Russia party for an “[ethnic] Russian civic nationalism,” however successful it may appear, represents a commitment to what is in fact a contradiction in terms: “[ethnic] Russian civic nationalism is just as impossible as “sausage tea or wooden iron or electrical gas.”
Consequently any attempt such as the one Moscow is now making to promote it will ultimately generate a reaction among non-Russians even if for the moment at least some of them are prepared to go along and give the proper answers to pollsters.
But Markedonov concludes, it is easy to see why the Kremlin and its minions are doing what they are, promoting the very divisions they claim to be overcoming because “it is much easier to rule people divided along ethnic, social and religious lines” than it is to govern a more homogeneous citizenry.