Paul Goble
Vienna, July 9 – For entirely understandable reasons, there has been much speculation but little serious discussion about the specific role Moscow’s intelligence services have played in relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics in the internal politics of these states, and in the relationship between these countries and the outside world.
A notable exception to this dearth of discussions is provided in an article by Moscow State University expert Aleksandr Karavayev entitled “Methods of Adopting Political Decisions and the Role of the Special Services in Russian Policy in the CIS” that was posted online this week (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/5181/).
But an even more intriguing if necessarily more narrowly focused consideration of this question was offered by Moses Fishbein, a Jewish Ukrainian poet, in a commentary entitled “The Jewish Card in Russian Operations against Ukraine” that was published by the “Kyiv Post” ten days ago (www.kyivpost.com/opinion/44324).
Karavayev begins his discussion by noting that under Vladimir Putin, officials from the special services rose to senior positions in the Russian government but that their rise did not in many cases always lead to an increase in the role of the institutions from which they came, at least with respect to Moscow’s dealings with the Commonwealth of Independent States.
This “paradox,” he suggests, reflects the specific nature of that organization: It is a closed club of presidents, and relations among its members are more a reflection of personal friendships or antagonisms than about the interests of one or another country toward the others, something that the special services could affect.
But despite that, Karavayev continues, it is worth asking whether the “methods and practices” of the Russian special services could be employed in a useful fashion on the territory of the CIS, specifically in Ukraine. And he asks “do there exist untapped reserves of the FSB and SVR relative to Ukraine and in what continues could they be ‘made use of’?”
“For the foreseeable future,” the Moscow analyst says, “Russia will not see a ‘Ukrainian Nazarbayev,’ that is, a president who not just by style but in reality will be ready to work on integration projects with Russia. That means conflicts are inevitable. The difference will only be in their intensity.”
In that situation, the special services can play a role and are certainly active, Karavayev implies when he writes that “for some unclear reasons, [Ukrainian President Viktor] Yushchenko has not expressed his opinion concerning the infiltration of the Russian special services in the organs of power of Ukraine at various levels, even though he understands this perfectly well.”
But the Ukrainian leader “has refrained from launching a campaign of spy mania in Ukraine. Is that because to do so would be to play his last card? Or are there no forces” on which he could rely if he were to do so? Or – and this is a possibility Karavayev does not mention – is the penetration so great that calling attention to it would be an act of suicide?
If Yushchenko is not willing to do so, Fishbein certainly is. And in his article, he argues that “Russia’s special services are seeking to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, undermine its sovereignty and independence, create a negative image of this country, block its integration into [Western] structures, and turn Ukraine into a dependent and manipulated satellite.”
The Jewish Ukrainian poet and translator and winner of the Vasyl Stus Prize focuses on the specific ways the Russian special services have been seeking to play “the Jewish card” in Ukraine, in the hope of “set[ing] the Ukrainians and Jews against each other,” blackening Ukraine’s reputation abroad, and undermining its chance to become a member of NATO.
Fishbein takes as his point of departure Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s statement last January that Moscow’s desire to block the extension of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine “required precise and well-coordinated work on the part of all special security, defense and law enforcement structures and quite a high level of coordination among them.”
“I must say straight away,” the Russian president said, “on the whole the Federal Security Service [FSB] successfully carried out all its tasks.”
In making that statement, Fishbein argues, Medvedev not only declared that blocking Ukraine’s admission to NATO was “the work of Russian special services, the result of special operations that they had put into motion” but also acknowledged that “the Russian special services are conducting special ops against Ukraine, aimed at undermining its sovereignty.”
That is “a brutal violation not just of international law,” the Ukrainian writer says. It is “also a brutal violation of Russian laws,” given that the latter do not authorize the FSB “to conduct such special operations” either generally or particularly against a neighboring country like Ukraine.
According to Fishbein, the Russian special services continue their actions even now, with the number of people employed in FSB structures overseeing Ukraine up 150 percent, a trend that as the Ukrainian writer suggests “is reminiscent of the 1950s, when the underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was active in Ukraine.”
Of particular concern to Fishbein is the way Moscow is using “the so-called ‘Jewish card’” against Ukraine. Instead of acknowledging as Fishbein has that there have been anti-Semites among Ukrainians as among other peoples but that most Ukrainians are as outraged by and opposed to anti-Semitism as anyone else, Russian writers often portray all Ukrainians and all Ukrainian history as blighted by that plague.
Not surprisingly, given his outrage at Moscow’s falsification of Ukrainian history and of the Ukrainian people, Fishbein devotes most of his article to a discussion of the facts of the case, including denunciations of anti-Semitism by people Russian authors routinely classify as anti-Semites and outright falsification of the historical record in Ukraine by Moscow.
But most interesting in the current context are the various examples he gives of the ways in which the Russian special services “continue to play the ‘Jewish card’ in their special operations against Ukraine.” All are instructive, but one is particularly noteworthy because it exactly parallels the methods the KGB widely used in Soviet times.
In April 2008, Fishbein reports, the Russian news agency Regnum carried a report that “an Israeli historian named Yury Vilner had published a book entitled Andrii Yushchenko: The Person and the ‘Legend.’” Its research “proves that during the Second World War, the father of the president of Ukraine may have been a camp policeman and Nazi informer.”
“Few people paid any attention to the stylistic shortcoming of the phrase ‘proves that … he may have been,’” or to other aspects of this work that subsequently was posted on the Internet. As posted, Fishbein continues, it was dedicated “To the humanist Aron Shneer,” a researcher and scholar at Yad Vashem in Israel.
Fishbein reports that he spoke with Shneer on the telephone but while the Israeli scholar had read Vilner’s text on the Internet, he “had no idea who Yury Vilner was.” And it quickly became apparent, Fishbein says, that “no one either in Israel or in Russia – or anywhere else for that matter – neither scholars nor journalists knew about the existence of this ‘Israeli.’”
The Kyiv poet said that in an effort to find out more, he looked at the ISBN number, which is “a unique numeric commercial identifier” for a book. In the case of Vilner’s text, that number was 969-228-292-5. Because the first three numbers identify the country of publication, Vilner’s book should have been published in Pakistan.
But a search in the ISBN data bank showed that “such a book did not exist,” Fishbein continues. And that “means that the ISBN was fabricated, and hence the ‘book’ itself and its ‘author’ are fabrications created and launched into circulation by means of anti-Ukrainian special operations” intended to “create difficulties” for Ukraine.
Few people have been as dogged as Fishbein in tracking down this and other Russian falsifications and slanders against Ukraine, but his work in this area deserves to be better known not only because it provides an answer to the question Karavayev posed but also because it explains why so many Ukrainians want to gain the protection of Western institutions like NATO.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Special Services Again Play the ‘Jewish Card’ against Ukraine, Kyiv Writer Says
Window on Eurasia: Central Asia’s Uyghur Problems Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 9 – The violence in Xinjiang has highlighted the plight of the Uyghurs living under often brutal Chinese rule and called attention to the broader Uyghur problem across Central Asia, where many Uyghurs live and whose regimes must now find ways to maintain close ties with Beijing while not further alienating their own peoples.
Most Uyghurs, as the world now knows, live in Eastern Turkestan, what the Chinese call Xinjiang or “the New Territory,” a reflection of its relatively recent occupation by China. But many Uyghurs live in Central Asia: roughly 300,000 in Kazakhstan, 60,000 in Kyrgyzstan and three to four thousand in Turkmenistan, according to censuses there.
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been watching the situation carefully over the last few days, not only because of these ethnic and religious ties, which are strengthened by the presence of more than a million Kazakhs in Xinjiang, and have evacuated more than a 1,000 of their own nationals from that violence-plagued region.
At the same time, the two governments have been extremely careful not to anger Beijing by criticizing what the Chinese have been doing. On the one hand, both countries have a long history of being subjected to Chinese pressure, as during the Olympics, on the question of cross-border ethnic ties.
And on the other, these regimes have an interest in maintaining and developing ties with the Chinese government, both as a counterweight to Russian power and as a means of developing their own economies. Only eight days ago, for example, Kazakhstan and China announced the completion of a new oil pipeline between the two.
But these governments, and especially that of Kazakhstan, are being pushed by the Uyghurs in their own population and by ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang to stand up to China. Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev, the leader of the Uyghurs of Kazakhstan, for example, has called for “solidarity” with his co-ethnics in Xinjiang (http://www.politcom.ru/8476.html).
And on Kazakh Internet sites, a document had surfaced entitled “An Open Letter of the Kazakh Youth of the City of Urumchi” to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev which asks him to direct the attention of his government to “the resolution of the existing problems of the Kazakhs living in China.”
That letter says that the Kazakhs living in China are “seriously concerned about “the future of their culture,” that the Chinese discriminate against them, and that the Chinese have printed textbooks for schools which show China extending into “the lands of independent Kazakhstan,” a report that will undoubtedly infuriate many Kazakhs in Kazakhstan.
The Uyghurs, however, have a special reason to believe they have some closet allies within the Kazakhstan government. The prime minister of Kazakhstan, Karim Masimov, is, as an article on Moscow’s Politcom.ru pointed out, “not only a Uyghur by nationality but at one time graduated from the Beijing Institute of Languages and the Wuhan Law School.
In the short term, neither Central Asian government is likely to criticize China or given in to these popular demands. After all, both of these regimes are not only authoritarian but adept at deflecting popular anger at other targets. But one Moscow commentator has suggested that the situation could ultimately change.
In a note posted on Evrazia.org today, Dmitry Popov who follows Central Asian affairs for Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianist movement, said that it is possible that the violence in Xinjiang could spark a “flood” of refugees, and that these refugees, combined with the indigenous Uygur groups, could become a problem (evrazia.org/news/9004).
The situation could develop in the following way, Popov writes. First, as a result of the arrival of refugees, there would be “innocent” protests in front of Chinese embassies” in Astana or Bishkek, and if the situation deteriorated in Xinjiang, these could spread, a possibility that he argues the two governments must be “worried” about.
Meanwhile, on his blog, Moscow journalist Aleksandr Baunov offered a counter-factual history of Xinjiang as an introduction to the broader discussion as to whether the disintegration of China along ethno-national or regional lines would be good or bad for the Russian Federation
(www.slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/83797/).
Communist China copied many things from the USSR, including the creation of ethnic territories. But unlike the USSR, which created a union, intended to be “for all times” but that has proved not to be “forever,” the Chinese did not organize these territories in a way that could suggest to anyone the possibility of departure.
A major reason for that, Baunov says, is that as recently as 60 years ago, “the country of China was only a set of lines on a map.” In fact, there were several independent states on what it claimed belonged to Beijing. Among these were Tibet, which “rose up last spring,” and Eastern Turkestan or Xinjiang “which rose up last Sunday.”
Related to that pattern is yet another reason: “There is now more than one China” – the mainland and Taiwan, an arrangement that the late Vasily Aksyonov used as the conceit for his novel, “The Island of Crimea,” in which pre-1917 Russia survived and developed alongside the Soviet Union.
And there is a third: From the 1930s until 1949, an Eastern Turkestan Republic existed, a state recognized by no one but in fact controlled by the Soviet government, except for a period during World War II. “If Stalin had annexed [this territory at that time], then the Uyghurs after 1991 would have had an independent state,” the Russian journalist points out.
Whether that state would have been democratic or dictatorial will never be known and whether it would have been a good thing or bad for Moscow is uncertain. But the existence of these alternatives almost certainly informs the thinking not only of those on both sides of the divide in Urumchi this week but also of those in capitals further afield.
Vienna, July 9 – The violence in Xinjiang has highlighted the plight of the Uyghurs living under often brutal Chinese rule and called attention to the broader Uyghur problem across Central Asia, where many Uyghurs live and whose regimes must now find ways to maintain close ties with Beijing while not further alienating their own peoples.
Most Uyghurs, as the world now knows, live in Eastern Turkestan, what the Chinese call Xinjiang or “the New Territory,” a reflection of its relatively recent occupation by China. But many Uyghurs live in Central Asia: roughly 300,000 in Kazakhstan, 60,000 in Kyrgyzstan and three to four thousand in Turkmenistan, according to censuses there.
The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been watching the situation carefully over the last few days, not only because of these ethnic and religious ties, which are strengthened by the presence of more than a million Kazakhs in Xinjiang, and have evacuated more than a 1,000 of their own nationals from that violence-plagued region.
At the same time, the two governments have been extremely careful not to anger Beijing by criticizing what the Chinese have been doing. On the one hand, both countries have a long history of being subjected to Chinese pressure, as during the Olympics, on the question of cross-border ethnic ties.
And on the other, these regimes have an interest in maintaining and developing ties with the Chinese government, both as a counterweight to Russian power and as a means of developing their own economies. Only eight days ago, for example, Kazakhstan and China announced the completion of a new oil pipeline between the two.
But these governments, and especially that of Kazakhstan, are being pushed by the Uyghurs in their own population and by ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang to stand up to China. Kakharman Kozhamberdiyev, the leader of the Uyghurs of Kazakhstan, for example, has called for “solidarity” with his co-ethnics in Xinjiang (http://www.politcom.ru/8476.html).
And on Kazakh Internet sites, a document had surfaced entitled “An Open Letter of the Kazakh Youth of the City of Urumchi” to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev which asks him to direct the attention of his government to “the resolution of the existing problems of the Kazakhs living in China.”
That letter says that the Kazakhs living in China are “seriously concerned about “the future of their culture,” that the Chinese discriminate against them, and that the Chinese have printed textbooks for schools which show China extending into “the lands of independent Kazakhstan,” a report that will undoubtedly infuriate many Kazakhs in Kazakhstan.
The Uyghurs, however, have a special reason to believe they have some closet allies within the Kazakhstan government. The prime minister of Kazakhstan, Karim Masimov, is, as an article on Moscow’s Politcom.ru pointed out, “not only a Uyghur by nationality but at one time graduated from the Beijing Institute of Languages and the Wuhan Law School.
In the short term, neither Central Asian government is likely to criticize China or given in to these popular demands. After all, both of these regimes are not only authoritarian but adept at deflecting popular anger at other targets. But one Moscow commentator has suggested that the situation could ultimately change.
In a note posted on Evrazia.org today, Dmitry Popov who follows Central Asian affairs for Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianist movement, said that it is possible that the violence in Xinjiang could spark a “flood” of refugees, and that these refugees, combined with the indigenous Uygur groups, could become a problem (evrazia.org/news/9004).
The situation could develop in the following way, Popov writes. First, as a result of the arrival of refugees, there would be “innocent” protests in front of Chinese embassies” in Astana or Bishkek, and if the situation deteriorated in Xinjiang, these could spread, a possibility that he argues the two governments must be “worried” about.
Meanwhile, on his blog, Moscow journalist Aleksandr Baunov offered a counter-factual history of Xinjiang as an introduction to the broader discussion as to whether the disintegration of China along ethno-national or regional lines would be good or bad for the Russian Federation
(www.slon.ru/blogs/baunov/post/83797/).
Communist China copied many things from the USSR, including the creation of ethnic territories. But unlike the USSR, which created a union, intended to be “for all times” but that has proved not to be “forever,” the Chinese did not organize these territories in a way that could suggest to anyone the possibility of departure.
A major reason for that, Baunov says, is that as recently as 60 years ago, “the country of China was only a set of lines on a map.” In fact, there were several independent states on what it claimed belonged to Beijing. Among these were Tibet, which “rose up last spring,” and Eastern Turkestan or Xinjiang “which rose up last Sunday.”
Related to that pattern is yet another reason: “There is now more than one China” – the mainland and Taiwan, an arrangement that the late Vasily Aksyonov used as the conceit for his novel, “The Island of Crimea,” in which pre-1917 Russia survived and developed alongside the Soviet Union.
And there is a third: From the 1930s until 1949, an Eastern Turkestan Republic existed, a state recognized by no one but in fact controlled by the Soviet government, except for a period during World War II. “If Stalin had annexed [this territory at that time], then the Uyghurs after 1991 would have had an independent state,” the Russian journalist points out.
Whether that state would have been democratic or dictatorial will never be known and whether it would have been a good thing or bad for Moscow is uncertain. But the existence of these alternatives almost certainly informs the thinking not only of those on both sides of the divide in Urumchi this week but also of those in capitals further afield.
Window on Eurasia: Hackers Assume Larger Role in Russia’s Online ‘Religious Wars’
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 9 – Hacker attacks against sites maintained by political opponents of the Russian government have received a great deal of attention, but increasingly, hackers are turning their attention to Runet sites operated by religious groups, a reflection of the importance of the Internet in Russian religious life and of the ability of hackers to get away with such crimes.
In an article in today’s “Novya izvestiya,” Mikhail Pozdnyaev says that among those who have suffered from hacker attacks are “representatives of all confessions, official and independent information agencies which write about religious news, and popular missionaries” (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-09/111589/).
Because of the diversity of sites and the difficulties involved in determining why a site may have failed and in tracking down those responsible, there are no reliable statistics available on just how widespread this trend is. And consequently, the “Novaya izvestiya” journalist describes some of the more high profile cases of this particular plague.
Pozdnyaev begins with the hacker attack on the official site of the Maykop and Adygey eparchate of the Russian Orthodox Church this past Sunday. For several hours, he reports, visitors to the site found a page that had nothing to do with religious affairs, but the eparchate’s technical staff was able to restore the site more or less quickly.
Officials in the eparchate told Pozdnyaev that they believe that this attack happened when it did because at least some of the faithful are unhappy that Archbishop Panteleimon has been replaced as head of the see by Bishop Tikhon. The hackers, these officials believe, were supporters of Panteleimon.
But exactly who carried out the hacking remains unknown in this case, as in others even when the hackers declare themselves, as happened earlier this year, to be representatives of the “ Free Radical Society of Atheists of Bobruisk” or the “Atheist from Shenkursk,” names that after all are only screen names that conceal more than they reveal.
A much larger hacking scandal occurred during the controversy over now dethroned Bishop Diomid and his challenge to the Moscow Patriarchate. Twice the “Orthodoxy in the Far East” portal that featured information on his case was hacked, once with the attackers posting pornographic pictures and another time with foul language.
The priest who oversees that portal said that the hackers were people who supported Diomid and had enough resources to overcome the portal’s defenses. Since then the Interior Ministry’s Bureau of Special Technical Measures has tracked down the individual involved: he is a citizen of one of the CIS countries, it reports.
Russian prosecutors are seeking to bring this person to justice, the journalist says, but they have not had much luck. And that highlights a serious problem: because hackers can act with impunity, ever more of them are likely to get involved in “religious internet wars.” After all, Pozdnyaev notes, “catching a hacker is harder that restoring a site that has been attacked.”
Other victims of religious hacking have been the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the official site of the Patriarchate itself following the death of Aleksii II, and Portal-Credo.ru, an independent religious news portal that is often highly critical of the Orthodox Church.
Hacker attacks against websites maintained by the Russian Orthodox Church, its various subdivisions and even individual clerics like Archdeacon Andrey Kurayev are a relatively new phenomenon, but such attacks have been taking place against Islamic sites on a regular basis for a decade.
At the end of June, hackers took off line for a brief period two of the most important Russian-language Islamic news sites, Islam.ru and IslamNews.ru, both of whom have been subject to similar attacks in the past. Pozdnyaev says that it is possible the hackers are people who “do not share the loyal attitude” of these sites to the government.
That is certainly possible, but given the nature of the Internet, it is also possible that these attacks and others like them are either the result of the spread of a hacker subculture in Russia as Internet use increases or the consequence of decisions by government bodies there or institutions beyond Russia’s borders that do not approve of something a particular site has posted.
Vienna, July 9 – Hacker attacks against sites maintained by political opponents of the Russian government have received a great deal of attention, but increasingly, hackers are turning their attention to Runet sites operated by religious groups, a reflection of the importance of the Internet in Russian religious life and of the ability of hackers to get away with such crimes.
In an article in today’s “Novya izvestiya,” Mikhail Pozdnyaev says that among those who have suffered from hacker attacks are “representatives of all confessions, official and independent information agencies which write about religious news, and popular missionaries” (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-09/111589/).
Because of the diversity of sites and the difficulties involved in determining why a site may have failed and in tracking down those responsible, there are no reliable statistics available on just how widespread this trend is. And consequently, the “Novaya izvestiya” journalist describes some of the more high profile cases of this particular plague.
Pozdnyaev begins with the hacker attack on the official site of the Maykop and Adygey eparchate of the Russian Orthodox Church this past Sunday. For several hours, he reports, visitors to the site found a page that had nothing to do with religious affairs, but the eparchate’s technical staff was able to restore the site more or less quickly.
Officials in the eparchate told Pozdnyaev that they believe that this attack happened when it did because at least some of the faithful are unhappy that Archbishop Panteleimon has been replaced as head of the see by Bishop Tikhon. The hackers, these officials believe, were supporters of Panteleimon.
But exactly who carried out the hacking remains unknown in this case, as in others even when the hackers declare themselves, as happened earlier this year, to be representatives of the “ Free Radical Society of Atheists of Bobruisk” or the “Atheist from Shenkursk,” names that after all are only screen names that conceal more than they reveal.
A much larger hacking scandal occurred during the controversy over now dethroned Bishop Diomid and his challenge to the Moscow Patriarchate. Twice the “Orthodoxy in the Far East” portal that featured information on his case was hacked, once with the attackers posting pornographic pictures and another time with foul language.
The priest who oversees that portal said that the hackers were people who supported Diomid and had enough resources to overcome the portal’s defenses. Since then the Interior Ministry’s Bureau of Special Technical Measures has tracked down the individual involved: he is a citizen of one of the CIS countries, it reports.
Russian prosecutors are seeking to bring this person to justice, the journalist says, but they have not had much luck. And that highlights a serious problem: because hackers can act with impunity, ever more of them are likely to get involved in “religious internet wars.” After all, Pozdnyaev notes, “catching a hacker is harder that restoring a site that has been attacked.”
Other victims of religious hacking have been the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the official site of the Patriarchate itself following the death of Aleksii II, and Portal-Credo.ru, an independent religious news portal that is often highly critical of the Orthodox Church.
Hacker attacks against websites maintained by the Russian Orthodox Church, its various subdivisions and even individual clerics like Archdeacon Andrey Kurayev are a relatively new phenomenon, but such attacks have been taking place against Islamic sites on a regular basis for a decade.
At the end of June, hackers took off line for a brief period two of the most important Russian-language Islamic news sites, Islam.ru and IslamNews.ru, both of whom have been subject to similar attacks in the past. Pozdnyaev says that it is possible the hackers are people who “do not share the loyal attitude” of these sites to the government.
That is certainly possible, but given the nature of the Internet, it is also possible that these attacks and others like them are either the result of the spread of a hacker subculture in Russia as Internet use increases or the consequence of decisions by government bodies there or institutions beyond Russia’s borders that do not approve of something a particular site has posted.
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Window on Eurasia: North Caucasus Situation Much Worse than Moscow Thinks, Russian Expert Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 8 – Most Russian and Western critics of Moscow’s policies in the North Caucasus have focused either on the center’s counterproductive reliance on force to solve political problems or its willingness to cede effective control of the situation to local leaders in exchange for declarations of loyalty, neither of which has reduced violence there.
But in fact, Aleksey Malashenko, a leading specialist on Islamic societies, argues in this week’s “New Times,” “the problem of the North Caucasus is today broader than is imagined in Moscow. It is “not simply instability;” rather what is taking place there is “the systemic degradation of the region,” especially in its eastern sections (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/4408/).
The region, he argues, is being “transformed into an enclave, living by its own laws, where shootings, explosions and attacks on the representatives of the powers that be and terror in response are in the order of things,” toward a system not of this century or the past one but toward a more distant time.
In these republics, there is “practically no economy in the generally accepted meaning of this word,” and there has been the complete collapse of the educational system, with “Russian instructors having [already] left and the local intelligentsia now fleeing.” As a result, what is taking place today is “the second wave of Islamization of the region.”
“In the 1990s,” the Moscow scholar says, “the rebirth of Islam was the inevitable reaction to Soviet atheism. But now Islam is becoming the regulator of social relations” in the region, a regular which “the local civil elites use everywhere.” Indeed, he argues, what is occurring in Chechnya and Daghestan is “the fusion [‘sliyaniye’] of civil power and religious leaders.”
That development, Malashenko says, is “an obvious step backwards,” one that inevitably complicates Moscow’s relationship with the regimes both individually and collectively, all the more so, the Moscow specialist on Islam argues, because so few in the Russian capital appear to understand this change.
In the first instance, by solidifying these societies around those in power locally, this will exacerbate the problem of borders. As Malashenko points out, there are already border disputes between Chechnya and Daghestan, between Chechnya and Ingushetia, and between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, not to mention within some of these republics.
Leaders like Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov are ready to exploit this fused identity, and that alone makes the suggestions that “the Kremlin will play the ‘Ramzan card’ … in Ingushetia extraordinarily dangerous.” If Moscow does so, he warns, that will likely provoke other regional leaders to play their “cards” against their neighbors.
Of course, there are good reasons for Moscow to be pleased with much of what Kadyrov has achieved inside Chechnya. In contrast to only a few years ago, he has won over many of the militants and restored Grozny. And while that “façade looks better” than the reality behind it, one must not dismiss it as simply the latest edition of “a Potemkin village.”
But if Kadyrov has been a net plus for Moscow up to now, he is rapidly “transforming himself into a problem.” Not only has he made himself an absolute and uncontrolled power there, but his program of Islamization split society, with the older age groups who grew up in Soviet times are against and the younger people are all in favor.
Among the younger residents of Chechnya, Malashenko says, there is the widespread view that Ramzan Kadyrov is “fulfilling the mission which Dudayev proved incapable of.” That is a complete misreading of Kadyrov’s intentions and of the very different situation that exists in Chechnya now as opposed to 20 years ago when it was far more secular.
But Malashenko continues, “the decisive argument that ought to stop those in Moscow who support Ramzan in his political expansion [into Ingushetia] is that ‘greater Chechnya’ will lead to a greater interethnic war,” one in which Moscow will inevitably be drawn into but may not be in a position to contain.
All these observations, the Russian scholar says, reflect “the absolute lack” of any serious Moscow policy toward the region, one that is based on an understanding that what Russia has in that region now is “a feudal, semi-traditional society,” one that cannot be governed by the interests of Gazprom and Rosneft.
And Malashenko concludes with words certain to anger many in Russia’s powers that be: “How can one struggle with corruption in Ingushetia and Daghestan if Russian society is penetrated by corruption? How can one end the rule of clans there if it is cultivated here? [And] how can one demand obedience to the laws there,” when Moscow doesn’t here?
“In the final analysis,” the Moscow expert says, “what is the difference between Putin and Kadyrov?” Ramzan seeks to destroy his opponents, just as Putin does his regardless of the rules. And consequently, despite everything else, “Ramzan is not a Caucasian politician [as most appear to think] but a Russian one of ‘Caucasian nationality.’”
Vienna, July 8 – Most Russian and Western critics of Moscow’s policies in the North Caucasus have focused either on the center’s counterproductive reliance on force to solve political problems or its willingness to cede effective control of the situation to local leaders in exchange for declarations of loyalty, neither of which has reduced violence there.
But in fact, Aleksey Malashenko, a leading specialist on Islamic societies, argues in this week’s “New Times,” “the problem of the North Caucasus is today broader than is imagined in Moscow. It is “not simply instability;” rather what is taking place there is “the systemic degradation of the region,” especially in its eastern sections (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/4408/).
The region, he argues, is being “transformed into an enclave, living by its own laws, where shootings, explosions and attacks on the representatives of the powers that be and terror in response are in the order of things,” toward a system not of this century or the past one but toward a more distant time.
In these republics, there is “practically no economy in the generally accepted meaning of this word,” and there has been the complete collapse of the educational system, with “Russian instructors having [already] left and the local intelligentsia now fleeing.” As a result, what is taking place today is “the second wave of Islamization of the region.”
“In the 1990s,” the Moscow scholar says, “the rebirth of Islam was the inevitable reaction to Soviet atheism. But now Islam is becoming the regulator of social relations” in the region, a regular which “the local civil elites use everywhere.” Indeed, he argues, what is occurring in Chechnya and Daghestan is “the fusion [‘sliyaniye’] of civil power and religious leaders.”
That development, Malashenko says, is “an obvious step backwards,” one that inevitably complicates Moscow’s relationship with the regimes both individually and collectively, all the more so, the Moscow specialist on Islam argues, because so few in the Russian capital appear to understand this change.
In the first instance, by solidifying these societies around those in power locally, this will exacerbate the problem of borders. As Malashenko points out, there are already border disputes between Chechnya and Daghestan, between Chechnya and Ingushetia, and between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, not to mention within some of these republics.
Leaders like Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov are ready to exploit this fused identity, and that alone makes the suggestions that “the Kremlin will play the ‘Ramzan card’ … in Ingushetia extraordinarily dangerous.” If Moscow does so, he warns, that will likely provoke other regional leaders to play their “cards” against their neighbors.
Of course, there are good reasons for Moscow to be pleased with much of what Kadyrov has achieved inside Chechnya. In contrast to only a few years ago, he has won over many of the militants and restored Grozny. And while that “façade looks better” than the reality behind it, one must not dismiss it as simply the latest edition of “a Potemkin village.”
But if Kadyrov has been a net plus for Moscow up to now, he is rapidly “transforming himself into a problem.” Not only has he made himself an absolute and uncontrolled power there, but his program of Islamization split society, with the older age groups who grew up in Soviet times are against and the younger people are all in favor.
Among the younger residents of Chechnya, Malashenko says, there is the widespread view that Ramzan Kadyrov is “fulfilling the mission which Dudayev proved incapable of.” That is a complete misreading of Kadyrov’s intentions and of the very different situation that exists in Chechnya now as opposed to 20 years ago when it was far more secular.
But Malashenko continues, “the decisive argument that ought to stop those in Moscow who support Ramzan in his political expansion [into Ingushetia] is that ‘greater Chechnya’ will lead to a greater interethnic war,” one in which Moscow will inevitably be drawn into but may not be in a position to contain.
All these observations, the Russian scholar says, reflect “the absolute lack” of any serious Moscow policy toward the region, one that is based on an understanding that what Russia has in that region now is “a feudal, semi-traditional society,” one that cannot be governed by the interests of Gazprom and Rosneft.
And Malashenko concludes with words certain to anger many in Russia’s powers that be: “How can one struggle with corruption in Ingushetia and Daghestan if Russian society is penetrated by corruption? How can one end the rule of clans there if it is cultivated here? [And] how can one demand obedience to the laws there,” when Moscow doesn’t here?
“In the final analysis,” the Moscow expert says, “what is the difference between Putin and Kadyrov?” Ramzan seeks to destroy his opponents, just as Putin does his regardless of the rules. And consequently, despite everything else, “Ramzan is not a Caucasian politician [as most appear to think] but a Russian one of ‘Caucasian nationality.’”
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s First Lady Promotes Orthodox Family Values
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 8 – Russia’s first lady, Svetlana Medvedeva, said that the simultaneous celebration of the secular Day of the Family, which Moscow declared a state holiday last year, and of the Orthodox Day of Sts. Peter and Fevroniya today is intended to revive the traditional Russian respect for the family that is the basis of a strong society and a strong state.
In an interview published in the Russian Orthodox Church’s “Foma” magazine, Medvedeva, who serves as one of the patrons and organizers of this holiday, said she had been gratified to see growing popular response to this holiday and the ideas for which this joint secular-religious commeoration stands (www.foma.ru/article/index.php?news=36170).
Russia’s first lady has been publicly associated with a variety of Orthodox causes, including the restoration of the New Jerusalem Monastery, and with various senior Russian Orthodox clerics. But her involvement with and remarks about this holiday represent the clearest indication yet of the way in which she sees Orthodoxy and Russian state interests converging.
At the same time, however, she showed political finesse during the interview, noting that “despite the fact that this is a day of memory of Orthodox saints, representatives of the other traditional religions of Russia as well as non-religious people were willingly accepting it,” with the Inter-Religious council “immediately supporting our initiative.”
But at the same time, Medvedeva did not say, although she certainly knows, that the Council and the idea of “traditional” faiths it embodies were the work of Patriarch Kirill. And she is certainlyaware many religious traditions are excluded from it – including Catholicism and Protestantism – and even some which are not often view that body as an Orthodox enterprise.
In addition to promoting strong families in the Russian tradition, Medvedeva said, today’s holiday is intended to teach young people about the importance of marriage and children and to oppose abortion. Indeed, when asked about the specific measures this holiday involved, she pointed to plans for a “Week against Abortions” beginning tomorrow.
Many people, the Russian first lady said, now talk about “the collapse of the traditional family” as some kind of “natural” trend. But she argued that one should oppose that trend with all the resources available. On the one hand, she said, when women enjoy equal rights, “the importance of the family is only growing.”
And on the other, “even if it is not so simple to stop negative tendencies, this does not mean that one should do nothing,” a task that requires the combined efforts of state and church because “the efforts of the state alone are insufficient. No one can force people to change if they themselves do not want to.”
In order to achieve that end, Medvedeva said, the role of Russian traditions is critical. Many of the country’s current problems are the result of “the break with traditions which took place in the last century. And what is a tradition? This is the living experience of previous generations, our parents, grandparents and great grandparents.”
“And toward that tradition,” which she clearly sees as closely linked to Russian Orthodoxy, Medvedeva said, “we must show respect and attention,” a position with which many ethnic Russians will agree but one that is certain to raise questions among the increasing number of that country’s citizens who are neither Orthodox nor Russian.
That Medvedeva sees value in a convergence of Orthodox and Russian state traditions is not unimportant given the influence that she has on her husband, but there was another indication today of the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church and the powers that be in Moscow are coming together in ways that raise political and even constitutional questions.
Andrey Isayev, the deputy secretary of the presidium of the pro-government United Russia Party who is himself head of the Duma committee on labor and social policy, told Interfax that United Russia intends to consult with the Moscow Patriarchate concerning all legislation (www.interfax-religion.ru/orthodoxy/?act=news&div=30972).
“We have agreed that we will present the Patriarchate with a plan of the legislative work of the Duma both on all questions which elicit even the slightest shadow of doubt [between the state and the church] and conduct preliminary consultations in order to avoid any misunderstanding” between them.
Such an arrangement, which gives the Russian Orthodox Church a highly privileged position, one far beyond that of primus inter pares, may point to the introduction of precisely those Orthodox family values of which Medvedeva spoke. And if so, that will change the nature of Russia, on the one hand, and it will certainly anger the non-Orthodox, on the other.
Vienna, July 8 – Russia’s first lady, Svetlana Medvedeva, said that the simultaneous celebration of the secular Day of the Family, which Moscow declared a state holiday last year, and of the Orthodox Day of Sts. Peter and Fevroniya today is intended to revive the traditional Russian respect for the family that is the basis of a strong society and a strong state.
In an interview published in the Russian Orthodox Church’s “Foma” magazine, Medvedeva, who serves as one of the patrons and organizers of this holiday, said she had been gratified to see growing popular response to this holiday and the ideas for which this joint secular-religious commeoration stands (www.foma.ru/article/index.php?news=36170).
Russia’s first lady has been publicly associated with a variety of Orthodox causes, including the restoration of the New Jerusalem Monastery, and with various senior Russian Orthodox clerics. But her involvement with and remarks about this holiday represent the clearest indication yet of the way in which she sees Orthodoxy and Russian state interests converging.
At the same time, however, she showed political finesse during the interview, noting that “despite the fact that this is a day of memory of Orthodox saints, representatives of the other traditional religions of Russia as well as non-religious people were willingly accepting it,” with the Inter-Religious council “immediately supporting our initiative.”
But at the same time, Medvedeva did not say, although she certainly knows, that the Council and the idea of “traditional” faiths it embodies were the work of Patriarch Kirill. And she is certainlyaware many religious traditions are excluded from it – including Catholicism and Protestantism – and even some which are not often view that body as an Orthodox enterprise.
In addition to promoting strong families in the Russian tradition, Medvedeva said, today’s holiday is intended to teach young people about the importance of marriage and children and to oppose abortion. Indeed, when asked about the specific measures this holiday involved, she pointed to plans for a “Week against Abortions” beginning tomorrow.
Many people, the Russian first lady said, now talk about “the collapse of the traditional family” as some kind of “natural” trend. But she argued that one should oppose that trend with all the resources available. On the one hand, she said, when women enjoy equal rights, “the importance of the family is only growing.”
And on the other, “even if it is not so simple to stop negative tendencies, this does not mean that one should do nothing,” a task that requires the combined efforts of state and church because “the efforts of the state alone are insufficient. No one can force people to change if they themselves do not want to.”
In order to achieve that end, Medvedeva said, the role of Russian traditions is critical. Many of the country’s current problems are the result of “the break with traditions which took place in the last century. And what is a tradition? This is the living experience of previous generations, our parents, grandparents and great grandparents.”
“And toward that tradition,” which she clearly sees as closely linked to Russian Orthodoxy, Medvedeva said, “we must show respect and attention,” a position with which many ethnic Russians will agree but one that is certain to raise questions among the increasing number of that country’s citizens who are neither Orthodox nor Russian.
That Medvedeva sees value in a convergence of Orthodox and Russian state traditions is not unimportant given the influence that she has on her husband, but there was another indication today of the way in which the Russian Orthodox Church and the powers that be in Moscow are coming together in ways that raise political and even constitutional questions.
Andrey Isayev, the deputy secretary of the presidium of the pro-government United Russia Party who is himself head of the Duma committee on labor and social policy, told Interfax that United Russia intends to consult with the Moscow Patriarchate concerning all legislation (www.interfax-religion.ru/orthodoxy/?act=news&div=30972).
“We have agreed that we will present the Patriarchate with a plan of the legislative work of the Duma both on all questions which elicit even the slightest shadow of doubt [between the state and the church] and conduct preliminary consultations in order to avoid any misunderstanding” between them.
Such an arrangement, which gives the Russian Orthodox Church a highly privileged position, one far beyond that of primus inter pares, may point to the introduction of precisely those Orthodox family values of which Medvedeva spoke. And if so, that will change the nature of Russia, on the one hand, and it will certainly anger the non-Orthodox, on the other.
Window on Eurasia: Inter-Ethnic Violence on the Rise in Russian Military
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 8 – Russian soldiers in Altay kray beat 44 draftees from Daghestan on Sunday and Monday, the latest indication of the continuing deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in the Russian military and one that suggests that there is a very real danger that in some units command and control could be close to breaking down.
Exactly what happened in that isolated garrison remains a matter of dispute. According to the Soldiers Mothers Committee in Daghestan, the draftees from that North Caucasus republic were called out and set upon by Russian troops who beat them so severely that the Daghestanis are “afraid they will be killed” if they return to their units.
Reportedly, some of those who attacked the Daghestanis used chains to inflict injury, and in the wake of these clashes, approximately 50 Daghestani soldiers in the Altay kray garrison have declared a hunger strike, saying that they “will not eat or drink until ‘they’ are transferred to another unit” (http://islamnews.ru/news-19514.html)..
But military prosecutors in the Siberian Military District to whom the Daghestanis had complained said the violence was the result of “an argument which grew into a fight” in which “no one suffered seriously,” although they acknowledged that “several soldiers were given medical help” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/156306).
The prosecutors in the region added that they were looking into the situation and that senior officers were checking to see what commanders on the scene might have done to prevent such “non-standard” relations among soldiers. Depending on what they learn, some officers may be disciplined (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/12793/).
Because of the numbers of soldiers involved and because of the media-savvy behavior of the Daghestani Soldiers Mothers Committee, this particular event, however murky and disputed the details, has attracted wide attention from Russian news agencies and Moscow media outlets over the last 48 hours.
And that has had the effect of calling attention to the way in which relations among various ethnic groups in the Russian military have deteriorated over the last few years and to the likelihood that both anger among the officer corps at downsizing and problems with the latest draft cycle are likely to make the situation far worse in the coming months.
This week, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said that the number of crimes committed by Russian officers had increased by a third over the last year, a reflection he suggested of an insufficiently high level of knowledge about the law and the effectiveness of command and control (grani.ru/Events/Crime/m.153560.html).
His subordinates pointed out that the number of soldiers who had been victims of the actions of their officers had risen to 1082, but that includes only those who suffered as a result of the actions of 280 officers who were convicted of such crimes. The actual number almost certainly was higher (www.nr2.ru/society/239718.html).
One of the reasons for this rise in crime and especially of such actions against subordinates is a sense many officers have that they will not be punished for anything that they do, but another and perhaps more immediate reason is that many officers see their future disappearing as a result of the downsizing of the military and their poor prospects outside it.
According to a survey conducted by the SuperJob portal, 34 percent of Russian firms say that they do not want to hire former officers because “the army deprives people of the ability to think and show initiative” and because former officers they have hired in the past have not worked out (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-08/111512/).
These problems are not confined to the officer corps. Not only has the current draft cycle been one of the most criminalized in recent years, but half of those drafted during it have had problems with the law. More than 100,000 of the draftees have suspended sentences, and another 50 to 70,000 have been incarcerated (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A541F2D95FF8.html).
The criminal backgrounds of the draftees, the criminalized way in which the draft itself has been conducted, and the anger of the officers are combing to create an explosive situation. The Soldiers Mothers Committees warn that conditions in the Russian army are now like those during the Chechen war (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-08/111514/).
And Kasparov.ru commentator Yuri Gladysh argues that “the contemporary Russian army has finally been transformed into a black hole,” in which a draftee “instantly loses almost all his civil rights” and thus becomes part of “an army of slaves without rights” whose behavior is unlikely to be professional (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A541F2D95FF8.html).
But perhaps the best testimony of just how dangerous this situation is becoming was provided by Dmitry Artemyev, a Russian soldier who deserted from his unit and sought refuge in Georgia. He said that he “had run away not from [his] own country but from the brutal hazing [‘dedovshchina’]” in that country’s army (grani.ru/War/Draft/m.153515.html).
Vienna, July 8 – Russian soldiers in Altay kray beat 44 draftees from Daghestan on Sunday and Monday, the latest indication of the continuing deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in the Russian military and one that suggests that there is a very real danger that in some units command and control could be close to breaking down.
Exactly what happened in that isolated garrison remains a matter of dispute. According to the Soldiers Mothers Committee in Daghestan, the draftees from that North Caucasus republic were called out and set upon by Russian troops who beat them so severely that the Daghestanis are “afraid they will be killed” if they return to their units.
Reportedly, some of those who attacked the Daghestanis used chains to inflict injury, and in the wake of these clashes, approximately 50 Daghestani soldiers in the Altay kray garrison have declared a hunger strike, saying that they “will not eat or drink until ‘they’ are transferred to another unit” (http://islamnews.ru/news-19514.html)..
But military prosecutors in the Siberian Military District to whom the Daghestanis had complained said the violence was the result of “an argument which grew into a fight” in which “no one suffered seriously,” although they acknowledged that “several soldiers were given medical help” (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/156306).
The prosecutors in the region added that they were looking into the situation and that senior officers were checking to see what commanders on the scene might have done to prevent such “non-standard” relations among soldiers. Depending on what they learn, some officers may be disciplined (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/12793/).
Because of the numbers of soldiers involved and because of the media-savvy behavior of the Daghestani Soldiers Mothers Committee, this particular event, however murky and disputed the details, has attracted wide attention from Russian news agencies and Moscow media outlets over the last 48 hours.
And that has had the effect of calling attention to the way in which relations among various ethnic groups in the Russian military have deteriorated over the last few years and to the likelihood that both anger among the officer corps at downsizing and problems with the latest draft cycle are likely to make the situation far worse in the coming months.
This week, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said that the number of crimes committed by Russian officers had increased by a third over the last year, a reflection he suggested of an insufficiently high level of knowledge about the law and the effectiveness of command and control (grani.ru/Events/Crime/m.153560.html).
His subordinates pointed out that the number of soldiers who had been victims of the actions of their officers had risen to 1082, but that includes only those who suffered as a result of the actions of 280 officers who were convicted of such crimes. The actual number almost certainly was higher (www.nr2.ru/society/239718.html).
One of the reasons for this rise in crime and especially of such actions against subordinates is a sense many officers have that they will not be punished for anything that they do, but another and perhaps more immediate reason is that many officers see their future disappearing as a result of the downsizing of the military and their poor prospects outside it.
According to a survey conducted by the SuperJob portal, 34 percent of Russian firms say that they do not want to hire former officers because “the army deprives people of the ability to think and show initiative” and because former officers they have hired in the past have not worked out (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-08/111512/).
These problems are not confined to the officer corps. Not only has the current draft cycle been one of the most criminalized in recent years, but half of those drafted during it have had problems with the law. More than 100,000 of the draftees have suspended sentences, and another 50 to 70,000 have been incarcerated (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A541F2D95FF8.html).
The criminal backgrounds of the draftees, the criminalized way in which the draft itself has been conducted, and the anger of the officers are combing to create an explosive situation. The Soldiers Mothers Committees warn that conditions in the Russian army are now like those during the Chechen war (www.newizv.ru/news/2009-07-08/111514/).
And Kasparov.ru commentator Yuri Gladysh argues that “the contemporary Russian army has finally been transformed into a black hole,” in which a draftee “instantly loses almost all his civil rights” and thus becomes part of “an army of slaves without rights” whose behavior is unlikely to be professional (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A541F2D95FF8.html).
But perhaps the best testimony of just how dangerous this situation is becoming was provided by Dmitry Artemyev, a Russian soldier who deserted from his unit and sought refuge in Georgia. He said that he “had run away not from [his] own country but from the brutal hazing [‘dedovshchina’]” in that country’s army (grani.ru/War/Draft/m.153515.html).
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Window on Eurasia: Eastern Turkestan Violence Casts a Shadow on Russia
Paul Goble
Vienna, July 7 – As the violence in Xinjiang continues, ever more Russian analysts are focusing not just on what is going on there between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese authorities but also on the implications of the violence there for Russia both as a mirror of its own current problems and as a source of new ones.
And while many of the Moscow commentaries are as hyperbolic as those coming from Beijing – suggesting that this is a vast US conspiracy intended to block a Russia-China pipeline (www.stoletie.ru/fakty_i_kommentarii/kto_stoit_za_buntom_ujgurskih_separatistov_v_kitaje_2009-07-07.htm) -- many are more thoughtful and thus ultimately more worthy of attention.
In the view of Kasparov.ru commentator Yuri Gladysh, “the problems of China [with regard to minorities] are in large measure similar to the problems of Russia” with its non-Russian nationalities. Indeed, he says it is possible to say that in this respect, Russia and China are “’blood brothers’” (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A5312286D543.html).
On the one hand, as empires, they include among themselves “a multitude of compact ethnic and religious groups,” many of whom feel excluded from and antagonistic to the dominant community. And on the other, the governments of the two strive in most cases to resolve any problems with these communities by force.
That is made more possible by the willingness of the international community to act as if “nothing special is going on” inside these two nuclear powers, because the governments of the world “wisely decide” that it is “better not to get involved” with disputes between “eccentric” regimes of this kind and some of their populations.
And as long as these countries remain “great empires,” they enjoy a certain protection from criticism. But as soon as any country leaves that category and becomes “part of human civilization,” then the international community expects that it will display “respect to the rights of all peoples living on its territory.”
Recently, Gladysh notes, the Danes allowed the people of Greenland to approve broad autonomy for that region by means of a referendum. That action, he continues, suggests that the Danes are quite “naïve. They do not know that such questions are resolved not by referenda but by tanks,” something the Chinese and the Russians understand all too well.
Another commentary which goes beyond the sensational to address some of the serious problems that the events in Eastern Turkestan present was offered by Dmitry Kosyrev, a political observer for the Russian news agency Novosti. In his view, the Uyghur now threaten to complicate US foreign policy but represent “a threat” to Russia’s relations with Central Asia
For the Americans, what happens in Xinjiang represents an irritant given its involvement in Afghanistan. But for the Russians, the events in Urumchi and neighboring areas are far more serious, calling into question the operations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Moscow’s ties across the region (www.rian.ru/analytics/20090706/176449076.html).
But even more serious for Moscow, Kosyrev suggests, is the way in which the events in western China raise questions about the dangers the Russian government faces at home. Not only were the Urumchi riots triggered by events in a distant location in China, something possible only in the Internet age, but the Uyghur received support from their diasporas.
Consequently, the Novosti commentator continues, the violence in Xinjiang may be as disturbing for Moscow as an indication of the direction things could go in various locations inside the Russian Federation as it is for the communist authorities of the Peoples Republic of China.
If the Chinese are able to restore order by the use of massive force, many in Moscow will conclude that force works, but if the violence in Eastern Turkestan continues or even intensifies after Beijing uses more force, then at least some in the Russian government might draw a different conclusion, especially if Western governments denounce Chinese government actions.
In either case, the events that began in the streets of Urumchi, a city the Chinese authorities have sought to transform into “a modern Chinese city” and to swamp with ethnic Han Chinese, are not going to end there but rather in places far removed like the North Caucasus and other already hot spots in the Russian Federation.
Vienna, July 7 – As the violence in Xinjiang continues, ever more Russian analysts are focusing not just on what is going on there between the Uyghurs and the Han Chinese authorities but also on the implications of the violence there for Russia both as a mirror of its own current problems and as a source of new ones.
And while many of the Moscow commentaries are as hyperbolic as those coming from Beijing – suggesting that this is a vast US conspiracy intended to block a Russia-China pipeline (www.stoletie.ru/fakty_i_kommentarii/kto_stoit_za_buntom_ujgurskih_separatistov_v_kitaje_2009-07-07.htm) -- many are more thoughtful and thus ultimately more worthy of attention.
In the view of Kasparov.ru commentator Yuri Gladysh, “the problems of China [with regard to minorities] are in large measure similar to the problems of Russia” with its non-Russian nationalities. Indeed, he says it is possible to say that in this respect, Russia and China are “’blood brothers’” (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4A5312286D543.html).
On the one hand, as empires, they include among themselves “a multitude of compact ethnic and religious groups,” many of whom feel excluded from and antagonistic to the dominant community. And on the other, the governments of the two strive in most cases to resolve any problems with these communities by force.
That is made more possible by the willingness of the international community to act as if “nothing special is going on” inside these two nuclear powers, because the governments of the world “wisely decide” that it is “better not to get involved” with disputes between “eccentric” regimes of this kind and some of their populations.
And as long as these countries remain “great empires,” they enjoy a certain protection from criticism. But as soon as any country leaves that category and becomes “part of human civilization,” then the international community expects that it will display “respect to the rights of all peoples living on its territory.”
Recently, Gladysh notes, the Danes allowed the people of Greenland to approve broad autonomy for that region by means of a referendum. That action, he continues, suggests that the Danes are quite “naïve. They do not know that such questions are resolved not by referenda but by tanks,” something the Chinese and the Russians understand all too well.
Another commentary which goes beyond the sensational to address some of the serious problems that the events in Eastern Turkestan present was offered by Dmitry Kosyrev, a political observer for the Russian news agency Novosti. In his view, the Uyghur now threaten to complicate US foreign policy but represent “a threat” to Russia’s relations with Central Asia
For the Americans, what happens in Xinjiang represents an irritant given its involvement in Afghanistan. But for the Russians, the events in Urumchi and neighboring areas are far more serious, calling into question the operations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Moscow’s ties across the region (www.rian.ru/analytics/20090706/176449076.html).
But even more serious for Moscow, Kosyrev suggests, is the way in which the events in western China raise questions about the dangers the Russian government faces at home. Not only were the Urumchi riots triggered by events in a distant location in China, something possible only in the Internet age, but the Uyghur received support from their diasporas.
Consequently, the Novosti commentator continues, the violence in Xinjiang may be as disturbing for Moscow as an indication of the direction things could go in various locations inside the Russian Federation as it is for the communist authorities of the Peoples Republic of China.
If the Chinese are able to restore order by the use of massive force, many in Moscow will conclude that force works, but if the violence in Eastern Turkestan continues or even intensifies after Beijing uses more force, then at least some in the Russian government might draw a different conclusion, especially if Western governments denounce Chinese government actions.
In either case, the events that began in the streets of Urumchi, a city the Chinese authorities have sought to transform into “a modern Chinese city” and to swamp with ethnic Han Chinese, are not going to end there but rather in places far removed like the North Caucasus and other already hot spots in the Russian Federation.
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