Paul Goble
Staunton, July 19 – Massive corruption means, a Moscow economist says, means that road in Russia “cost four times as much, last one quarter as long, and require repairs costing four times as much as roads in countries with similar climatic conditions,” a situation that both threatens future construction and undermines chances for economic modernization.
In today’s “Novaya gazeta,” Nikita Krichevsky, a scholar at the Moscow Institute of National Strategy, says that because officials are interested in stealing as much as they can from the budget and because highway funds are an easy target, Russia currently has some of the most expensive and poorest roads in the world (www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/077/00.html).
In Russia, the average cost of building one kilometer of hard surface roads is 17.6 million US dollars, compared to an average figure of 6.9 million US dollars in the European Union, 5.9 million in the United States, and 2.2 million in China. And these discrepancies are not significantly reduced if one compares Russia with countries having a similar climate.
One of the reasons that corruption is so easy in this sector of Russian life, Krichevsky suggests, is that there is so much dishonesty about it. Rosstat reported that in 2009, Russia built 42,000 kilometers of roads of all sorts, an impressive figure but almost certainly an invented one he concludes.
According to the statistical agency, the situation regarding paved roads was worse: there was no increase at the federal level, there was a decrease in the size of the network of regional and municipal roads, but the agency reported, “roads of local importance increased by 23,000 kilometers.”
That figure, Krichevsky says, is “nonsense.” This year, 65 of the 83 regions of Russian can’t make ends meet. Consequently, the figure of 23,000 km in new roads is at the very least improbable and more likely an invention. Expert estimates of the real total range from 2700 km downward.
“Someone is prettying up reality with statistics, and this isn’t Rosstat,” the economist continues. The data comes to the statistics agency from various ministries and administrations, and Rosstat’s summation of these data first elicits “a nervous laugh and then a sense of shame” because they “produce distrust in all other indicators Rosstat provides.”
The level of corruption in the highway construction and repair sector and the reasons many officials aren’t interested in any change, Krichevsky suggests, is shown in the following story told by a businessman who won a highway construction contract in one of the regions near Moscow.
When the businessman went in to sign the contract, the bureaucrat in charge “reminded him that there are certain rules of the game, and said these were 70/30.” The businessman replied he “agreed” and would give the 30 percent kickback. “But the official responded: ‘You didn’t understand me correctly: you give me 70 percent, and 30 percent remains with you.’”
That is a major reason why Russian highways are so expensive to build and why so few of them in fact are, Krichevsky argues. But there is another problem: Russian roads are built not to last but to require repairs, often just after the road is opened. That offers officials yet another opportunity for theft and corruption.
What makes the decision to use outdated construction technologies, the economist says, is that “our natural situation not simply permits but dictates the need of using” iron-reinforced concrete as do other countries in the north where there are better and longer-lasting roads and far less corruption.
If Russia is to modernize, Krichevsky continues, Moscow must work to reduce the level of corruption from the nearly 50 percent of GDP it constitutes now to the three to ten percent of GDP it forms in most countries. Eliminating it entirely is not a realistic goal, however nice that sounds.
But given the current Russian system of administration, it will be impossible to achieve that because the motivation of the bureaucrat and of the businessman is “identical.” They both want to make money for themselves, and no one will be able to change that overnight even with the introduction of draconian punishments.
In the highway sector, Krichevsky continues, these “corrupt appetites” each up “from 50 to 70 percent of the cost of roads,” far more than the 40 percent corruption consumes in the case of housing construction. And what that means, if nothing else is done, is that more money for roads will simply mean more corruption.
And Russia needs more roads. Krichevsky says the network should “at a minimum” be twice as large as it is now, something that could be achieved by building 7,000 to 8,000 kilometers of paved roads every year for the next 20 to 25, a reasonable goal if somehow corruption can be cut back.
Monday, July 19, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow has ‘At Least 50’ Convicted Spies in Reserve for Future Exchanges
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 19 – The recent exchange between Moscow and Washington of 11 Russian spies for four people under arrest in the Russian Federation has prompted one Moscow journalist to explore whether his government has more people in custody that it might use in some future exchange.
In an article in “Novaya versiya” today, investigative journalist Ruslan Gorevoy says that sources in “the competent organs” have told him “confidentially” that there are “at a minimum 50 more candidates for exchange, among whom are both [Russian Federation] citizens and those holding foreign passports” (versia.ru/articles/2010/jul/19/obmen_zakluchennymi).
That more such people, both Russian and foreign nationals, are held in Russian penal institutions, the journalist says, is suggested by the fact that President Dmitry Medvedev pardoned 16 additional people at the time that he pardoned the four who were involved in the exchange with the United States.
According to Gorevoy, the people in the reserve fall into three categories. The first includes foreign nationals, some of whom have been convicted of espionage but many of whom have been sentenced for other crimes, even though they may have been engaged in spying. There are approximately two dozen of them.
The second category includes about 15 Russian scholars who have been convicted of engaging in espionage. And the third includes real “traitors” from the FSB, the GRU, and the SVR, who have been “neutralized.” The exact number of these is “a state secret, but experts in open sources mention on the order of ten names.”
Gorevoy describes the case of four Israelis who were arrested for spying but were ultimately convicted of diamond smuggling, apparently because, he continues, Moscow had not tried foreigners for espionage for some time and was concerned “about the possible reaction abroad” of doing so in that case.
But they became part of Russia’s “exchange fund,” as it were and as one of their number complained in an open letter to the Israeli media, even though Tel Aviv ultimately rejected Moscow’s offer to free them in exchange for Leonid Nevzlin, a colleague of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Another source for this “fund” comes from arrests in other CIS countries. Sometimes this works, Gorevoy says, but not always. Emmanuil Zeltser, a US lawyer specializing in corruption investigations, was arrested in Belarus on spy charges, and Moscow reportedly hoped to exchange him for Boris Berezovsky. But that plan fell through, officials say, when Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka changed his mind.
There are also Russian citizens in this reserve exchange group, Gorevoy points out. “And they are more serious” than the four who were released in the latest exchange. Among them is former GRU Colonel Aleksandr Sypachyov, who confessed to providing information to Western intelligence services on Russian military spies abroad.
“Although the Americans would have liked to obtain namely him and not Sutyagin and his colleagues” – they supposedly proposed trading all 10 of the Russians detained for Sypachyov alone – he is “a real diamond” for such exchanges, Russian intelligence officials say, and would be traded only in exchange for someone or even several people of equivalent value.
And Gorevoy notes that President Medvedev did not pardon other scholars accused of espionage, including Valentin Danilov, Igor Reshetin, Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Rozhkin, Sergey Vizir, and Ivan Pitkov. People like them, he suggests, “will possibly be exchanged for more important people than those whom the Americans offered.”
Staunton, July 19 – The recent exchange between Moscow and Washington of 11 Russian spies for four people under arrest in the Russian Federation has prompted one Moscow journalist to explore whether his government has more people in custody that it might use in some future exchange.
In an article in “Novaya versiya” today, investigative journalist Ruslan Gorevoy says that sources in “the competent organs” have told him “confidentially” that there are “at a minimum 50 more candidates for exchange, among whom are both [Russian Federation] citizens and those holding foreign passports” (versia.ru/articles/2010/jul/19/obmen_zakluchennymi).
That more such people, both Russian and foreign nationals, are held in Russian penal institutions, the journalist says, is suggested by the fact that President Dmitry Medvedev pardoned 16 additional people at the time that he pardoned the four who were involved in the exchange with the United States.
According to Gorevoy, the people in the reserve fall into three categories. The first includes foreign nationals, some of whom have been convicted of espionage but many of whom have been sentenced for other crimes, even though they may have been engaged in spying. There are approximately two dozen of them.
The second category includes about 15 Russian scholars who have been convicted of engaging in espionage. And the third includes real “traitors” from the FSB, the GRU, and the SVR, who have been “neutralized.” The exact number of these is “a state secret, but experts in open sources mention on the order of ten names.”
Gorevoy describes the case of four Israelis who were arrested for spying but were ultimately convicted of diamond smuggling, apparently because, he continues, Moscow had not tried foreigners for espionage for some time and was concerned “about the possible reaction abroad” of doing so in that case.
But they became part of Russia’s “exchange fund,” as it were and as one of their number complained in an open letter to the Israeli media, even though Tel Aviv ultimately rejected Moscow’s offer to free them in exchange for Leonid Nevzlin, a colleague of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
Another source for this “fund” comes from arrests in other CIS countries. Sometimes this works, Gorevoy says, but not always. Emmanuil Zeltser, a US lawyer specializing in corruption investigations, was arrested in Belarus on spy charges, and Moscow reportedly hoped to exchange him for Boris Berezovsky. But that plan fell through, officials say, when Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka changed his mind.
There are also Russian citizens in this reserve exchange group, Gorevoy points out. “And they are more serious” than the four who were released in the latest exchange. Among them is former GRU Colonel Aleksandr Sypachyov, who confessed to providing information to Western intelligence services on Russian military spies abroad.
“Although the Americans would have liked to obtain namely him and not Sutyagin and his colleagues” – they supposedly proposed trading all 10 of the Russians detained for Sypachyov alone – he is “a real diamond” for such exchanges, Russian intelligence officials say, and would be traded only in exchange for someone or even several people of equivalent value.
And Gorevoy notes that President Medvedev did not pardon other scholars accused of espionage, including Valentin Danilov, Igor Reshetin, Mikhail Ivanov, Aleksandr Rozhkin, Sergey Vizir, and Ivan Pitkov. People like them, he suggests, “will possibly be exchanged for more important people than those whom the Americans offered.”
Window on Eurasia: Russia Sending Politicians as Ambassadors to CIS Countries Just as the USSR Sent CPSU Officials to Soviet Bloc States
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 19 – What had appeared to be a trend is now becoming a policy: Moscow will be sending political ambassadors to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a reflection of their multi-level relationships, much as the USSR dispatched CPSU officials to Soviet bloc countries a generation or more ago.
In an article in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Andrey Molchanov, the chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on CIS Affairs, argues that the high level of “mutual understanding” of the leaders of the CIS countries “does not require the participation of professional diplomats for the resolution of important intergovernmental questions.”
And the assignment of senior Russian politicians to these posts, he continues, has the additional virtue in that “they act and are viewed not only as bureaucrats and diplomats but more as public politicians.” As a result, “frequently the level of their independence and at the same time responsibility is much higher than a career diplomat.”
It would have been “a counterproductive” mistake to set up a special “Russian Ministry for the Affairs of the Post-Soviet Space,” Molchanov says, because, according to him, “paternalism as an instrument of Russian foreign policy was sent to the archives a long time ago” (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-07-19/3_kartblansh.html).
But at the same time, he continues, “no one would deny that the relations of the Russian Federation with other former republics of the USSR for many reasons have a special and historically established character,” reflecting the fact that they were within “one state for many decades or even centuries.”
Moreover, “the infinite number of ties, the powerful stratum of Russian-language culture, education and science, the common sufferings and losses during the war and the common Great Victory, the close trade and production cooperation, which has not been destroyed completely even with the appearance of new state borders” all make this relationship special.
Much of this has been preserved by the CIS which despite all its shortcomings, Molchanov says, has slowed centrifugal tendencies in the region and made “the divorce process” more “civilized.” If the CIS did not exist, he argues, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security, and the Tariff Union would not have arisen.
But the CIS has “not exhausted its potential” even now. A major reason for that conclusion, Molchanov insists, is “the close personal association of the leaders of the highest levels which arose as a rule long before the collapse of the USSR” as a result of similar careers in the party-political and economic sectors.
This common past, of course, “does not mean there will be agreement on all questions,” the Federation Council committee chairman says, “but it makes the achievement of agreements much easier.” Moreover, “the presence of such mutual understanding often does not require the participation of professional diplomats.”
“With the passage of time,” Molchanov continues, “it has [nonetheless] become clear that the personal association of [the most senior] leaders is simply physically insufficient for the planned work for the resolution of a multitude of questions, especially those which bear a long-term character.”
As a result, “the logical solution, at least from the view of the Russian side has become the institution of political [ambassadors], of people whose experience of administrative and/or economic (and not just diplomatic) activity allows them to speak as intermediary heavyweights with the highest leadership of the partner states of the Russian Federation.”
This practice has already found expression in the assignment of such people as Aleksandr Surikov to Belarus, Vladimir Babichev to Kazakhstan, Valentin Vlasov to Kyrgyzstan, Ramazan Abdulatipov to Tajikistan, and most famously, Viktor Chernomyrdin and now Mikhail Zurabov to Ukraine.
Molchanov notes that the use of such political ambassadors “justified itself already in the Soviet period.” Soviet ambassadors “to the countries of the socialist camp where inter-party ties played a key role” were typically “senior party and Soviet workers, who were, as a rule, members of the CPSU Central Committee.”
Their appointments, he says, “not only sent a signal about the priorities of Soviet foreign policy but also provided the leaders of the socialist countries with a direct channel of communication with the highest Soviet leadership.”
But in post-Soviet times and in the CIS countries, the use of political ambassadors has another justification: Such people, Molchanov says, “act and are viewed not only as bureaucrats and diplomats but more as public politicians.” And because that is so, they often can act more independently and authoritatively “than a career diplomat.”
That in turn “is especially important for our policy in such post-Soviet countries as Moldova and Kyrgyzstan where there exist especially complex political situation[s].” In such places, political ambassadors can act more quickly in response to rapidly changing events because of their ties with the leaderships of both countries.
The experience of his committee shows, Molchanov concludes, that “the practice of political appointments to the posts of Russian ambassadors in the CIS countries has completely justified itself.” And he adds that “the continuation of this line will correspond to the increasing importance of the countries of the CIS in the foreign policy” of Russia.
Staunton, July 19 – What had appeared to be a trend is now becoming a policy: Moscow will be sending political ambassadors to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a reflection of their multi-level relationships, much as the USSR dispatched CPSU officials to Soviet bloc countries a generation or more ago.
In an article in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” Andrey Molchanov, the chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on CIS Affairs, argues that the high level of “mutual understanding” of the leaders of the CIS countries “does not require the participation of professional diplomats for the resolution of important intergovernmental questions.”
And the assignment of senior Russian politicians to these posts, he continues, has the additional virtue in that “they act and are viewed not only as bureaucrats and diplomats but more as public politicians.” As a result, “frequently the level of their independence and at the same time responsibility is much higher than a career diplomat.”
It would have been “a counterproductive” mistake to set up a special “Russian Ministry for the Affairs of the Post-Soviet Space,” Molchanov says, because, according to him, “paternalism as an instrument of Russian foreign policy was sent to the archives a long time ago” (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-07-19/3_kartblansh.html).
But at the same time, he continues, “no one would deny that the relations of the Russian Federation with other former republics of the USSR for many reasons have a special and historically established character,” reflecting the fact that they were within “one state for many decades or even centuries.”
Moreover, “the infinite number of ties, the powerful stratum of Russian-language culture, education and science, the common sufferings and losses during the war and the common Great Victory, the close trade and production cooperation, which has not been destroyed completely even with the appearance of new state borders” all make this relationship special.
Much of this has been preserved by the CIS which despite all its shortcomings, Molchanov says, has slowed centrifugal tendencies in the region and made “the divorce process” more “civilized.” If the CIS did not exist, he argues, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Organization of the Treaty of Collective Security, and the Tariff Union would not have arisen.
But the CIS has “not exhausted its potential” even now. A major reason for that conclusion, Molchanov insists, is “the close personal association of the leaders of the highest levels which arose as a rule long before the collapse of the USSR” as a result of similar careers in the party-political and economic sectors.
This common past, of course, “does not mean there will be agreement on all questions,” the Federation Council committee chairman says, “but it makes the achievement of agreements much easier.” Moreover, “the presence of such mutual understanding often does not require the participation of professional diplomats.”
“With the passage of time,” Molchanov continues, “it has [nonetheless] become clear that the personal association of [the most senior] leaders is simply physically insufficient for the planned work for the resolution of a multitude of questions, especially those which bear a long-term character.”
As a result, “the logical solution, at least from the view of the Russian side has become the institution of political [ambassadors], of people whose experience of administrative and/or economic (and not just diplomatic) activity allows them to speak as intermediary heavyweights with the highest leadership of the partner states of the Russian Federation.”
This practice has already found expression in the assignment of such people as Aleksandr Surikov to Belarus, Vladimir Babichev to Kazakhstan, Valentin Vlasov to Kyrgyzstan, Ramazan Abdulatipov to Tajikistan, and most famously, Viktor Chernomyrdin and now Mikhail Zurabov to Ukraine.
Molchanov notes that the use of such political ambassadors “justified itself already in the Soviet period.” Soviet ambassadors “to the countries of the socialist camp where inter-party ties played a key role” were typically “senior party and Soviet workers, who were, as a rule, members of the CPSU Central Committee.”
Their appointments, he says, “not only sent a signal about the priorities of Soviet foreign policy but also provided the leaders of the socialist countries with a direct channel of communication with the highest Soviet leadership.”
But in post-Soviet times and in the CIS countries, the use of political ambassadors has another justification: Such people, Molchanov says, “act and are viewed not only as bureaucrats and diplomats but more as public politicians.” And because that is so, they often can act more independently and authoritatively “than a career diplomat.”
That in turn “is especially important for our policy in such post-Soviet countries as Moldova and Kyrgyzstan where there exist especially complex political situation[s].” In such places, political ambassadors can act more quickly in response to rapidly changing events because of their ties with the leaderships of both countries.
The experience of his committee shows, Molchanov concludes, that “the practice of political appointments to the posts of Russian ambassadors in the CIS countries has completely justified itself.” And he adds that “the continuation of this line will correspond to the increasing importance of the countries of the CIS in the foreign policy” of Russia.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Window on Eurasia: With Rakhimov’s Ouster, Moscow has ‘Changed the Rules’ for Non-Russian Republics, Analyst says
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 18 – The Kremlin’s ouster of Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov sends a message to “ethnocratic” regimes in the non-Russian republics that “the rules of the game have changed” and that the central government will no longer tolerate the kind of discrimination against ethnic Russians they have practiced up to now, a Russian analyst says.
Pavel Svyatenkov argues that Rakhimov’s ouster is all the more important because he resisted so long and was then bluntly forced out thus losing the chance Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiyev ultimately seized to select his own successor, provide a place for himself in the new regime, and ensure the continuation of his policies (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/7262).
And because “the pettier ethnocratic regimes like those in Yakutia, Kalmykia, and Chuvashia, not to speak of the republics of the North Caucasus” have often taken their cues from what Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have achieved, the Russian nationalist commentator he “hopes,” the Kremlin’s actions in Rakhimov’s case should echo across the country.
During his nearly 20 years in power, Rakhimov took several steps which infuriated ethnic Russians. He falsified census returns in order to “maximally increase the number of Bashkirs and decrease the number of Russians.” He created a special passport for Bashkirs so that they could indicate their “semi-citizenship” in the republic.
And the Bashkir leader worked hard not only to drive out the use of the Russian language but also to eliminate from the republic’s political bureaucracy all ethnic Russians, thus transforming “Bashkortostan into a semi-sovereign enclave on the territory of which Russian laws in practice did not operate.”
In the early 1990s, Svyatenkov write, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan sought to gain the status of union republics, something that “would have meant the disintegration of Russia in the form in which we know it. At that time, the newspapers even publishes maps of the Russian Federation without the autonomous republics,” maps that would have left it in tatters.
Like Shaimiyev, Rakhimov did not achieve that, but he remained in office by “blackmailing” the Kremlin, “exploiting the myth that only he alone was capable of preventing ethnic conflict” in his republic. The implied message was: “Remove Rakhimov and you’ll get a new Chechnya.”
That was never the case, Svyatenkov suggests, but the threat acted as a restraint on the Kremlin. And until this year, it appeared that both Shaimiyev and Rakhimov, given their age, would succeed in living out their days in power. But Medvedev “remained true to himself and the regional barons began one after the other to go into retirement.”
Because of the attention the media devoted to Rakhimov’s departure, few paid much attention to the ouster of Nikolay Fedorov, the president of Chuvashia. He too was “an ethnocrat,” Svyatenkov says, albeit “a weaker and less obvious one than his Bashkir colleague,” even though he ruled his republic for 17 years.
The departure of the two this past week, the Russian analyst argues, means that “the Kremlin has decided to destroy the last ethnocratic regimes on the core territory of Russia.” And that in turn means that these republics will not be ruled by bosses in power for “decades” but by people routinely assigned and replaced by Moscow.
It is the case, Svyatenkov concedes, that there are three notable exceptions: Kalmykia’s Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, and Moscow’s Yuri Luzhkov. The first is likely to go soon, the analyst says; the second is a “special” case as a result of the war. And the fate of the third is thus the most intriguing question now.
On the one hand, Luzhkov has “no separatist pretensions,” but on the other, he is a nuisance, often acting like “a bandit baron who has constructed his castle directly opposite that of the king and tries to rob the caravans going to him.” Consequently, in Svyatenkov’s view, Luzhkov will soon “live his post.”
“As we see,” the Russian analyst concludes, “the retirement of Rakhimov changes the political landscape of Russia much more strongly than did Shaimiyev’s.” As in earlier times, the Kremlin “has won a victory in the collection of Russian lands and the centralization of state power.”
Moreover, it has achieved something else: it has eliminated “the asymmetric federalism” that had characterized the Russian Federation, a system in which the non-Russian republics had greater powers than the predominantly Russian oblasts and krays and which offended ethnic Russians on many occasions.
Now, he writes in words that will certainly please many ethnic Russians, “Bashkortstan is becoming an ordinary Russian region if not de jure at least de facto. And this is a wonderful result because the territorial unity of the country is being threatened, and that means the state is being strengthened as well.”
Staunton, July 18 – The Kremlin’s ouster of Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov sends a message to “ethnocratic” regimes in the non-Russian republics that “the rules of the game have changed” and that the central government will no longer tolerate the kind of discrimination against ethnic Russians they have practiced up to now, a Russian analyst says.
Pavel Svyatenkov argues that Rakhimov’s ouster is all the more important because he resisted so long and was then bluntly forced out thus losing the chance Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiyev ultimately seized to select his own successor, provide a place for himself in the new regime, and ensure the continuation of his policies (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/7262).
And because “the pettier ethnocratic regimes like those in Yakutia, Kalmykia, and Chuvashia, not to speak of the republics of the North Caucasus” have often taken their cues from what Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have achieved, the Russian nationalist commentator he “hopes,” the Kremlin’s actions in Rakhimov’s case should echo across the country.
During his nearly 20 years in power, Rakhimov took several steps which infuriated ethnic Russians. He falsified census returns in order to “maximally increase the number of Bashkirs and decrease the number of Russians.” He created a special passport for Bashkirs so that they could indicate their “semi-citizenship” in the republic.
And the Bashkir leader worked hard not only to drive out the use of the Russian language but also to eliminate from the republic’s political bureaucracy all ethnic Russians, thus transforming “Bashkortostan into a semi-sovereign enclave on the territory of which Russian laws in practice did not operate.”
In the early 1990s, Svyatenkov write, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan sought to gain the status of union republics, something that “would have meant the disintegration of Russia in the form in which we know it. At that time, the newspapers even publishes maps of the Russian Federation without the autonomous republics,” maps that would have left it in tatters.
Like Shaimiyev, Rakhimov did not achieve that, but he remained in office by “blackmailing” the Kremlin, “exploiting the myth that only he alone was capable of preventing ethnic conflict” in his republic. The implied message was: “Remove Rakhimov and you’ll get a new Chechnya.”
That was never the case, Svyatenkov suggests, but the threat acted as a restraint on the Kremlin. And until this year, it appeared that both Shaimiyev and Rakhimov, given their age, would succeed in living out their days in power. But Medvedev “remained true to himself and the regional barons began one after the other to go into retirement.”
Because of the attention the media devoted to Rakhimov’s departure, few paid much attention to the ouster of Nikolay Fedorov, the president of Chuvashia. He too was “an ethnocrat,” Svyatenkov says, albeit “a weaker and less obvious one than his Bashkir colleague,” even though he ruled his republic for 17 years.
The departure of the two this past week, the Russian analyst argues, means that “the Kremlin has decided to destroy the last ethnocratic regimes on the core territory of Russia.” And that in turn means that these republics will not be ruled by bosses in power for “decades” but by people routinely assigned and replaced by Moscow.
It is the case, Svyatenkov concedes, that there are three notable exceptions: Kalmykia’s Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, and Moscow’s Yuri Luzhkov. The first is likely to go soon, the analyst says; the second is a “special” case as a result of the war. And the fate of the third is thus the most intriguing question now.
On the one hand, Luzhkov has “no separatist pretensions,” but on the other, he is a nuisance, often acting like “a bandit baron who has constructed his castle directly opposite that of the king and tries to rob the caravans going to him.” Consequently, in Svyatenkov’s view, Luzhkov will soon “live his post.”
“As we see,” the Russian analyst concludes, “the retirement of Rakhimov changes the political landscape of Russia much more strongly than did Shaimiyev’s.” As in earlier times, the Kremlin “has won a victory in the collection of Russian lands and the centralization of state power.”
Moreover, it has achieved something else: it has eliminated “the asymmetric federalism” that had characterized the Russian Federation, a system in which the non-Russian republics had greater powers than the predominantly Russian oblasts and krays and which offended ethnic Russians on many occasions.
Now, he writes in words that will certainly please many ethnic Russians, “Bashkortstan is becoming an ordinary Russian region if not de jure at least de facto. And this is a wonderful result because the territorial unity of the country is being threatened, and that means the state is being strengthened as well.”
Window on Eurasia: With Rakhimov’s Ouster, Moscow has ‘Changed the Rules’ for Non-Russian Republics, Analyst says
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 18 – The Kremlin’s ouster of Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov sends a message to “ethnocratic” regimes in the non-Russian republics that “the rules of the game have changed” and that the central government will no longer tolerate the kind of discrimination against ethnic Russians they have practiced up to now, a Russian analyst says.
Pavel Svyatenkov argues that Rakhimov’s ouster is all the more important because he resisted so long and was then bluntly forced out thus losing the chance Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiyev ultimately seized to select his own successor, provide a place for himself in the new regime, and ensure the continuation of his policies (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/7262).
And because “the pettier ethnocratic regimes like those in Yakutia, Kalmykia, and Chuvashia, not to speak of the republics of the North Caucasus” have often taken their cues from what Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have achieved, the Russian nationalist commentator he “hopes,” the Kremlin’s actions in Rakhimov’s case should echo across the country.
During his nearly 20 years in power, Rakhimov took several steps which infuriated ethnic Russians. He falsified census returns in order to “maximally increase the number of Bashkirs and decrease the number of Russians.” He created a special passport for Bashkirs so that they could indicate their “semi-citizenship” in the republic.
And the Bashkir leader worked hard not only to drive out the use of the Russian language but also to eliminate from the republic’s political bureaucracy all ethnic Russians, thus transforming “Bashkortostan into a semi-sovereign enclave on the territory of which Russian laws in practice did not operate.”
In the early 1990s, Svyatenkov write, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan sought to gain the status of union republics, something that “would have meant the disintegration of Russia in the form in which we know it. At that time, the newspapers even publishes maps of the Russian Federation without the autonomous republics,” maps that would have left it in tatters.
Like Shaimiyev, Rakhimov did not achieve that, but he remained in office by “blackmailing” the Kremlin, “exploiting the myth that only he alone was capable of preventing ethnic conflict” in his republic. The implied message was: “Remove Rakhimov and you’ll get a new Chechnya.”
That was never the case, Svyatenkov suggests, but the threat acted as a restraint on the Kremlin. And until this year, it appeared that both Shaimiyev and Rakhimov, given their age, would succeed in living out their days in power. But Medvedev “remained true to himself and the regional barons began one after the other to go into retirement.”
Because of the attention the media devoted to Rakhimov’s departure, few paid much attention to the ouster of Nikolay Fedorov, the president of Chuvashia. He too was “an ethnocrat,” Svyatenkov says, albeit “a weaker and less obvious one than his Bashkir colleague,” even though he ruled his republic for 17 years.
The departure of the two this past week, the Russian analyst argues, means that “the Kremlin has decided to destroy the last ethnocratic regimes on the core territory of Russia.” And that in turn means that these republics will not be ruled by bosses in power for “decades” but by people routinely assigned and replaced by Moscow.
It is the case, Svyatenkov concedes, that there are three notable exceptions: Kalmykia’s Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, and Moscow’s Yuri Luzhkov. The first is likely to go soon, the analyst says; the second is a “special” case as a result of the war. And the fate of the third is thus the most intriguing question now.
On the one hand, Luzhkov has “no separatist pretensions,” but on the other, he is a nuisance, often acting like “a bandit baron who has constructed his castle directly opposite that of the king and tries to rob the caravans going to him.” Consequently, in Svyatenkov’s view, Luzhkov will soon “live his post.”
“As we see,” the Russian analyst concludes, “the retirement of Rakhimov changes the political landscape of Russia much more strongly than did Shaimiyev’s.” As in earlier times, the Kremlin “has won a victory in the collection of Russian lands and the centralization of state power.”
Moreover, it has achieved something else: it has eliminated “the asymmetric federalism” that had characterized the Russian Federation, a system in which the non-Russian republics had greater powers than the predominantly Russian oblasts and krays and which offended ethnic Russians on many occasions.
Now, he writes in words that will certainly please many ethnic Russians, “Bashkortstan is becoming an ordinary Russian region if not de jure at least de facto. And this is a wonderful result because the territorial unity of the country is being threatened, and that means the state is being strengthened as well.”
Staunton, July 18 – The Kremlin’s ouster of Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov sends a message to “ethnocratic” regimes in the non-Russian republics that “the rules of the game have changed” and that the central government will no longer tolerate the kind of discrimination against ethnic Russians they have practiced up to now, a Russian analyst says.
Pavel Svyatenkov argues that Rakhimov’s ouster is all the more important because he resisted so long and was then bluntly forced out thus losing the chance Tatarstan’s Mintimir Shaimiyev ultimately seized to select his own successor, provide a place for himself in the new regime, and ensure the continuation of his policies (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/7262).
And because “the pettier ethnocratic regimes like those in Yakutia, Kalmykia, and Chuvashia, not to speak of the republics of the North Caucasus” have often taken their cues from what Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have achieved, the Russian nationalist commentator he “hopes,” the Kremlin’s actions in Rakhimov’s case should echo across the country.
During his nearly 20 years in power, Rakhimov took several steps which infuriated ethnic Russians. He falsified census returns in order to “maximally increase the number of Bashkirs and decrease the number of Russians.” He created a special passport for Bashkirs so that they could indicate their “semi-citizenship” in the republic.
And the Bashkir leader worked hard not only to drive out the use of the Russian language but also to eliminate from the republic’s political bureaucracy all ethnic Russians, thus transforming “Bashkortostan into a semi-sovereign enclave on the territory of which Russian laws in practice did not operate.”
In the early 1990s, Svyatenkov write, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan sought to gain the status of union republics, something that “would have meant the disintegration of Russia in the form in which we know it. At that time, the newspapers even publishes maps of the Russian Federation without the autonomous republics,” maps that would have left it in tatters.
Like Shaimiyev, Rakhimov did not achieve that, but he remained in office by “blackmailing” the Kremlin, “exploiting the myth that only he alone was capable of preventing ethnic conflict” in his republic. The implied message was: “Remove Rakhimov and you’ll get a new Chechnya.”
That was never the case, Svyatenkov suggests, but the threat acted as a restraint on the Kremlin. And until this year, it appeared that both Shaimiyev and Rakhimov, given their age, would succeed in living out their days in power. But Medvedev “remained true to himself and the regional barons began one after the other to go into retirement.”
Because of the attention the media devoted to Rakhimov’s departure, few paid much attention to the ouster of Nikolay Fedorov, the president of Chuvashia. He too was “an ethnocrat,” Svyatenkov says, albeit “a weaker and less obvious one than his Bashkir colleague,” even though he ruled his republic for 17 years.
The departure of the two this past week, the Russian analyst argues, means that “the Kremlin has decided to destroy the last ethnocratic regimes on the core territory of Russia.” And that in turn means that these republics will not be ruled by bosses in power for “decades” but by people routinely assigned and replaced by Moscow.
It is the case, Svyatenkov concedes, that there are three notable exceptions: Kalmykia’s Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, and Moscow’s Yuri Luzhkov. The first is likely to go soon, the analyst says; the second is a “special” case as a result of the war. And the fate of the third is thus the most intriguing question now.
On the one hand, Luzhkov has “no separatist pretensions,” but on the other, he is a nuisance, often acting like “a bandit baron who has constructed his castle directly opposite that of the king and tries to rob the caravans going to him.” Consequently, in Svyatenkov’s view, Luzhkov will soon “live his post.”
“As we see,” the Russian analyst concludes, “the retirement of Rakhimov changes the political landscape of Russia much more strongly than did Shaimiyev’s.” As in earlier times, the Kremlin “has won a victory in the collection of Russian lands and the centralization of state power.”
Moreover, it has achieved something else: it has eliminated “the asymmetric federalism” that had characterized the Russian Federation, a system in which the non-Russian republics had greater powers than the predominantly Russian oblasts and krays and which offended ethnic Russians on many occasions.
Now, he writes in words that will certainly please many ethnic Russians, “Bashkortstan is becoming an ordinary Russian region if not de jure at least de facto. And this is a wonderful result because the territorial unity of the country is being threatened, and that means the state is being strengthened as well.”
Window on Eurasia: Amalgamated Minority Districts in Krasnoyarsk Seek Moscow’s Protection
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 18 – Representatives of the numerically small peoples of the Taymyr and Evenkia whose autonomous districts were amalgamated with Krasnoyarsk kray say they need a federal law to force the powers that be there to live up to the promises then-Russian President Vladimir Putin made to them when they agreed to become part of the kray.
At a meeting last week in Turukhansk, the Social Chamber of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of Krasnoyarsk Kray said that “the goals specified in the message of the President of the Russian Federation and in the October 14, 2005 law [concerning their amalgamation] have not been achieved.”
Moreover, the members of the Chamber said, “the positions and preliminary agreements on the basis of which the unification process took place have not been observed” (www.raipon.info/index.php/component/content/article/1-novosti/1076-krasnojarskij-kraj-obedinen-no-celi-ne-dostignuty-schitaet-aktivist-dvizhenija-korennyh-narodov-tajmyra).
As Aleksey Bolin of the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the Taymyr notes, in 2005, President Putin said that the unification of the three was being carried out “not for unification alone but for optimizing administration, enhancing the effectiveness of social-economic policy and in the final analysis for improving the well-being of the people.”
None of those things have happened. Instead, “the ‘special status’ of the former autonomous districts in fact has not been regulated and up to the present has not been defined in the norms of law and therefore is only a declaration” rather than a description of reality. And events since 2005 show just how important such steps are.
Consequently, he and his colleagues say, there is a need for “the immediate adoption at the federal law which will regulate the more important aspects of the special status of the administrative-territorial units” that the Taymyr and Evenk districts had been prior to the 2005 voting.
There must be established “a federal standard,” they continued. Such “a federal law will not allow the powers that be of the current Krasnoyarsk kray to restrict the rights of the districts.” Instead, it will allow for the region as a whole to develop in ways that will work for the benefit of all.
Anticipating objections, Bolin says, “it is important to specify that the adoption of such normative acts will not threaten the national security of the Russian Federation, not contradict the geopolitical interests of the country in the Arctic,” and will block “regional separatism, local nationalism and the division of those living on the territory into ‘arrivals’ and ‘indigenous.’”
He argues that “the need for such regulation arises out the specific nature of the indigenous numerically small peoples of the North, their unique way of life, essential differences in their mentality, the vital importance for them of the land and renewable natural resources.” And it is required both by the Russian Constitution and various international treaties.
The Association of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North living in the Taymyr and Evenkia has come up with a draft which calls for setting up “administrative districts in Krasnoyarsk kray in the borders of the former autonomous districts – the Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) autonomous district and the Evenk autonomous district.”
Moreover, the draft legislation calls for transferring to them “plenipotentiary government power” in order to “guarantee the traditional way of life and carry out the traditional types of economic activity of the indigenous numerically small peoples and also the authority connected with the achievement of these goals.”
Like the districts which existed before 2005, the districts this law would set up would have full state authority, would be involved only with the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, and would be independent of the kray government as far as the realization of those powers and responsibilities are concerned.
Such an arrangement, Bolin says, “would fully correspond to the interests of the federal center” by showing Russia to be advanced on numerically small peoples. It would correspond to the interests of the numerically small peoples. But clearly, it would not correspond to the interests of the kray government or those, like Putin, who want even greater amalgamation.
Staunton, July 18 – Representatives of the numerically small peoples of the Taymyr and Evenkia whose autonomous districts were amalgamated with Krasnoyarsk kray say they need a federal law to force the powers that be there to live up to the promises then-Russian President Vladimir Putin made to them when they agreed to become part of the kray.
At a meeting last week in Turukhansk, the Social Chamber of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of Krasnoyarsk Kray said that “the goals specified in the message of the President of the Russian Federation and in the October 14, 2005 law [concerning their amalgamation] have not been achieved.”
Moreover, the members of the Chamber said, “the positions and preliminary agreements on the basis of which the unification process took place have not been observed” (www.raipon.info/index.php/component/content/article/1-novosti/1076-krasnojarskij-kraj-obedinen-no-celi-ne-dostignuty-schitaet-aktivist-dvizhenija-korennyh-narodov-tajmyra).
As Aleksey Bolin of the Association of Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the Taymyr notes, in 2005, President Putin said that the unification of the three was being carried out “not for unification alone but for optimizing administration, enhancing the effectiveness of social-economic policy and in the final analysis for improving the well-being of the people.”
None of those things have happened. Instead, “the ‘special status’ of the former autonomous districts in fact has not been regulated and up to the present has not been defined in the norms of law and therefore is only a declaration” rather than a description of reality. And events since 2005 show just how important such steps are.
Consequently, he and his colleagues say, there is a need for “the immediate adoption at the federal law which will regulate the more important aspects of the special status of the administrative-territorial units” that the Taymyr and Evenk districts had been prior to the 2005 voting.
There must be established “a federal standard,” they continued. Such “a federal law will not allow the powers that be of the current Krasnoyarsk kray to restrict the rights of the districts.” Instead, it will allow for the region as a whole to develop in ways that will work for the benefit of all.
Anticipating objections, Bolin says, “it is important to specify that the adoption of such normative acts will not threaten the national security of the Russian Federation, not contradict the geopolitical interests of the country in the Arctic,” and will block “regional separatism, local nationalism and the division of those living on the territory into ‘arrivals’ and ‘indigenous.’”
He argues that “the need for such regulation arises out the specific nature of the indigenous numerically small peoples of the North, their unique way of life, essential differences in their mentality, the vital importance for them of the land and renewable natural resources.” And it is required both by the Russian Constitution and various international treaties.
The Association of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples of the North living in the Taymyr and Evenkia has come up with a draft which calls for setting up “administrative districts in Krasnoyarsk kray in the borders of the former autonomous districts – the Taymyr (Dolgan-Nenets) autonomous district and the Evenk autonomous district.”
Moreover, the draft legislation calls for transferring to them “plenipotentiary government power” in order to “guarantee the traditional way of life and carry out the traditional types of economic activity of the indigenous numerically small peoples and also the authority connected with the achievement of these goals.”
Like the districts which existed before 2005, the districts this law would set up would have full state authority, would be involved only with the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples, and would be independent of the kray government as far as the realization of those powers and responsibilities are concerned.
Such an arrangement, Bolin says, “would fully correspond to the interests of the federal center” by showing Russia to be advanced on numerically small peoples. It would correspond to the interests of the numerically small peoples. But clearly, it would not correspond to the interests of the kray government or those, like Putin, who want even greater amalgamation.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Inter-Religious Marriages on the Rise in Russia Despite Xenophobia
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 17 – Russian Orthodox women are increasingly entering into marriages with Muslim men despite the xenophobic attitudes of the society around them, but because of the special challenges such marriages entail, a Russian psychologist argues, both government officials and religious leaders should provide these unions with special support.
During a telebridge on Thursday between specialists on this subject in Moscow and Kazan, Olga Makhovskaya, a senior specialist at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Psychology, said that “marriages with Muslim men are becoming ever more preferred by non-Muslim Russian women” (newsru.com/religy/16jul2010/ehe.html).
According to the Moscow scholar, “inter-religious marriages in Russia have no small potential for stability since not only elements of ‘the common Soviet past’ (language, education, etc.) but also ‘very similar family models’ bring people together.” Among those commonalities is “the high level of the authority of the husband” in both faiths.
But within that commonality, Makhovskaya continued, there is a distinction in that the status of the husband in the Orthodox tradition is “more formal” while in the Muslim one it is more “real.” Moreover, Orthodox husbands “are not inclined to participate in the internal affairs of the family,” but Muslims ones “in the ideal case is not just a provider.”
Instead, the Muslim husband both “’deifies’ children, while devoting to them and to his wife significant attention.” Those qualities, she said, are making marriages with Muslim men ever more attractive options for Orthodox women in Russian cities, especially since the influx of migrants means there are more of them with whom they are likely to be in contact.
But such inter-religious marriages are not without problems, Makhovskaya argued. That is because women who enter into them often find it difficult to adapt to “certain limitations in their freedom,” especially since in Orthodox families, specialists have found, the dominant partner is the one, male or female “who is psychologically stronger.”
Participating in the telebridge from Kazan were Nailya Ziganshina, the president of the Union of Muslim Women of Tatarstan, and Elmira Zaripova, the republic official responsible for registering marriages. Zaripova said that inter-religious marriages there now “form 21-23 percent of all unions … and such pairs divorce only half as often as mono-ethnic ones.”
Asked about how the members of religiously “mixed” marriages deal with sensitive subjects like determining what faith the children will be raised in, Zaripova said that “everything is decided in family councils, together with grandmothers and grandfathers. But in the end, the child himself chooses his faith when he grows up.”
No one ever forces the child to choose, the Tatarstan official continued, “but as a rule when he has grown up, he chooses the religion of that part of the family which loves him more and which relates to him more warmly.”
According to Moscow’s Makhovskaya, however, the situation in Tatarstan represents “a certain oasis from the point of view of the well being of inter-cultural marriages.” The situation in Russian cities, she suggested, is “far from what has been described by the women from Kazan.”
Inter-cultural marriages are contracted there “against a background of a high level of xenophobia and the non-acceptance of ‘the alien,” as well as scandals connected with such marriages by show business stars like the Orbakaite-Baysarov case.” And these things all “harm the reputation of such unions.”
And as far as the religious choice of children is concerned, Makhovskaya continued, “then in ‘stable’ families, this question does not have a ‘dramatic’ character. But ‘if the family is heading toward a breakdown, there will be a struggle over the children in this regard and on the religious front.”
Makhovskaya called for more research on and discussion about inter-religious marriages, all the more so because such unions offer many benefits for those in them. “If your chosen partner is of another nationality,” she said, “this strengthens and enriches you, broadens your chances, and your children will grow up … learning two languages and two cultures.”
“As a rule,” she concluded, “such bi-cultural children will be more stable in society and better adapt themselves in a variegated milieu.” Consequently, Makhovskaya suggested, “it remains to be hoped that namely such an approach will be the norm” for young people of different religions who choose to get married.”
Staunton, July 17 – Russian Orthodox women are increasingly entering into marriages with Muslim men despite the xenophobic attitudes of the society around them, but because of the special challenges such marriages entail, a Russian psychologist argues, both government officials and religious leaders should provide these unions with special support.
During a telebridge on Thursday between specialists on this subject in Moscow and Kazan, Olga Makhovskaya, a senior specialist at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Psychology, said that “marriages with Muslim men are becoming ever more preferred by non-Muslim Russian women” (newsru.com/religy/16jul2010/ehe.html).
According to the Moscow scholar, “inter-religious marriages in Russia have no small potential for stability since not only elements of ‘the common Soviet past’ (language, education, etc.) but also ‘very similar family models’ bring people together.” Among those commonalities is “the high level of the authority of the husband” in both faiths.
But within that commonality, Makhovskaya continued, there is a distinction in that the status of the husband in the Orthodox tradition is “more formal” while in the Muslim one it is more “real.” Moreover, Orthodox husbands “are not inclined to participate in the internal affairs of the family,” but Muslims ones “in the ideal case is not just a provider.”
Instead, the Muslim husband both “’deifies’ children, while devoting to them and to his wife significant attention.” Those qualities, she said, are making marriages with Muslim men ever more attractive options for Orthodox women in Russian cities, especially since the influx of migrants means there are more of them with whom they are likely to be in contact.
But such inter-religious marriages are not without problems, Makhovskaya argued. That is because women who enter into them often find it difficult to adapt to “certain limitations in their freedom,” especially since in Orthodox families, specialists have found, the dominant partner is the one, male or female “who is psychologically stronger.”
Participating in the telebridge from Kazan were Nailya Ziganshina, the president of the Union of Muslim Women of Tatarstan, and Elmira Zaripova, the republic official responsible for registering marriages. Zaripova said that inter-religious marriages there now “form 21-23 percent of all unions … and such pairs divorce only half as often as mono-ethnic ones.”
Asked about how the members of religiously “mixed” marriages deal with sensitive subjects like determining what faith the children will be raised in, Zaripova said that “everything is decided in family councils, together with grandmothers and grandfathers. But in the end, the child himself chooses his faith when he grows up.”
No one ever forces the child to choose, the Tatarstan official continued, “but as a rule when he has grown up, he chooses the religion of that part of the family which loves him more and which relates to him more warmly.”
According to Moscow’s Makhovskaya, however, the situation in Tatarstan represents “a certain oasis from the point of view of the well being of inter-cultural marriages.” The situation in Russian cities, she suggested, is “far from what has been described by the women from Kazan.”
Inter-cultural marriages are contracted there “against a background of a high level of xenophobia and the non-acceptance of ‘the alien,” as well as scandals connected with such marriages by show business stars like the Orbakaite-Baysarov case.” And these things all “harm the reputation of such unions.”
And as far as the religious choice of children is concerned, Makhovskaya continued, “then in ‘stable’ families, this question does not have a ‘dramatic’ character. But ‘if the family is heading toward a breakdown, there will be a struggle over the children in this regard and on the religious front.”
Makhovskaya called for more research on and discussion about inter-religious marriages, all the more so because such unions offer many benefits for those in them. “If your chosen partner is of another nationality,” she said, “this strengthens and enriches you, broadens your chances, and your children will grow up … learning two languages and two cultures.”
“As a rule,” she concluded, “such bi-cultural children will be more stable in society and better adapt themselves in a variegated milieu.” Consequently, Makhovskaya suggested, “it remains to be hoped that namely such an approach will be the norm” for young people of different religions who choose to get married.”
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