Paul Goble
Staunton, July 22 – Most Russian commentators have suggested that the bombing this week of a hydroelectric dam in the North Caucasus was either simply a continuation of the activities of anti-government groups in that region or was specifically directed against the leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria or Presidential Plenipotentiary Aleksandr Khloponin.
All those factors could be at work, Aleksandr Krylov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of International Economics and International Relations, acknowledges, but he argues that the bombing may in fact be part of a broader effort by Circassian groups and others to derail plans for the Sochi Olympics in 2014 (www.nakanune.ru/articles/14789).
Krylov specifically notes that “there is an intensification now in the North Caucasus of the Circassian problem, which is directly connected with the upcoming Olympiad, and certain forces are actively attempting to play the Circassian card for their own purposes,” an effort that has found “mass support in local society” there.
In support of his argument, Krylov points to what happened in the lead up to the Beijing Olympics. It was no accident, he suggests, that “on the eve of the Chinese Olympics the theme of Tibet and the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous district sounded to strongly. This was not a simple coincidence; there are influential forces in the world who strive to use ethnic games.”
Krylov’s suggestion is important for at least three reasons. First, it reflects a continuing lack of consensus in the Russian capital not only over the source of violence in the North Caucasus but also on how best to counter it, with officials divided between those who favor force and those who believe only economic change will lead to an improvement, albeit over time.
Second, it is yet another indication that those Circassians who seek the formation of a single republic for their nationality in the North Caucasus and demand official recognition of the genocide carried out against them nearly 150 years ago by tsarist authorities have gotten the attention of Moscow, albeit perhaps not the kind of attention they seek.
And third, and perhaps most important, Krylov’s argument highlights the growing tendency of officials in the Russian capital to view all issues in the North Caucasus through the prism of preparations for the Sochi Olympics, the 2014 games that Vladimir Putin has indicated he views as a major part of his legacy.
On the one hand, such a perspective suggests that Moscow may be prepared to use even more force against those like the Circassians it suspects of trying to undermine Russia’s ability to prepare for and stage the games and that the center will adopt an even harder line against the Circassians now than it has in the past.
And on the other, Krylov’s linkage of the Circassians and the question of the Sochi Games could simultaneously lead Moscow to devote more attention to the ethnic dimension of conflicts in the region, aspects of the conflict there which many in Moscow and elsewhere have discounted because of the rise of Islamist politics.
In response to questions put by Nakanune.ru, Krylov made a number of additional points about Russian policy in the North Caucasus in the wake of the latest attack. He said that the decision of anti-Russian forces to attack something as major as a dam shows that “the local underground has become more active” and that “the situation will continue to get worse.”
Indeed, he says, “it is completely possible that those forces which are striving toward the destabilization [of the region] want to push the situation there to the level of Chechnya a decade ago.” Given the likelihood of such plans, Krylov continues, “that is the chief cause” behind the dam explosion, and not “some kind of contradictions in the local elite.”
Asked directly what forces might be interested in such an outcome, Krylov responds that “there are many such forces both locally and abroad,” including Al Qaeda, “criminal groups, various foreign states who in some fashion want to put pressure on Russia in their interests and are using for this the Circassian factor and the unstable situation.”
Local elites, Krylov says, are exploiting all this, seeking to “shift responsibility” for everything onto Moscow and “receive from the federal center concessions and what is most important financial means.” And consequently in the years leading up to the Sochi Games, “we will have an extremely complex situation in this [Circassian] part of the Caucasus.”
According to Krylov, the most important thing Moscow can do is to define the problem correctly and “foresee threats.” Up to now, he says, “our powers that be have been reacting to what happens.” As a result, the initiative belongs not to the powers that be but rather to those who oppose them.
Fighting terrorism is hard for everyone, Krylov concedes, but it seems harder for Russia than for others. “Our western ‘allies’ learn from their mistakes and do not have repeats of the explosions which have occurred. With us, on the other hand, is observed a certain psychological freeze: terrorist acts take place with regularity and quite frequently. This is very disturbing.”
Asked whether the new law on the FSB will change the situation, Krylov says that only the future will tell. But he notes that “we have a large number of ideas and various documents, but then somehow this all is very poorly followed in the real work of the organs,” institutions that for all their shortcomings are nonetheless doing a great deal.
“If they were not effective,” the IMEMO analyst suggests, “the situation would be much worse, but up to now they have functioned insufficiently effectively in order to block the majority of threats which are arising for the security of the state.”
Friday, July 23, 2010
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Window on Eurasia: FSB Seeks Even Greater Voice in Control of Russian Border Areas
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 21 – In yet another indication that the FSB is regaining ever more of the powers the KGB had in Soviet times, officials at the Russian security service are seeking the inclusion of a provision in a law under preparation that would give them an effective veto over economic activities in a five kilometer deep zone along the Russian state border.
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” journalist Ivan Rodin reports that as Russian officials are finalizing a draft on a new law governing the country’s borders because the current one, adopted in 1993, is now out of date, the FSB is working to increase its role in this area of Russian life (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-07-21/3_fsb.html).
The existing border law was adopted prior to the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993, and Russian leaders since that time repeatedly have called for new legislation. In 2005, FSB Border Service Chief Vladimir Pronichev presented a draft, and in 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin set up a new federal agency to deal with border issues.
But these actions took place without the support new laws would provide, and as a result, various groups now view the drafting of a replacement border law as a chance to maximize their powers. That is certainly what the FSB is trying to do, Rodin says, and it has focused on the question of land use, traditionally the most sensitive issue in Russian legislation.
According to the FSB proposal now circulating in the government, the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” journalist says, there would be established a five kilometer deep border zone, in which local officials would not be able to approve any land use without the approval of the FSB, something that would give the security service an effective veto over the border.
First of all, the journalist reports, the draft law would not allow the establishment of any businesses in zones along borders where the state border had not been defined by treaty. Among the borders that would affect most profoundly is the one between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
Second, the FSB draft would prohibit any land use that would interfere with border security, a provision so undefined and potentially expansive that the FSB would take near total control of all activities in the Russian Federation’s enormously long border zones much as the KGB had in Soviet times.
And third, the FSB proposals would prohibit, in ways that recall “the totalitarian past rather than the modernized future,” the presence in such zones of any firms where more than 50 percent of the ownership belonged to foreign citizens or foreign companies or to “people without citizenship.”
A staffer at the Duma security committee suggested that this last proposal looked “quite strange” given that unless one assumes that a firm with 51 percent foreign ownership is somehow more likely to be engaged in espionage or subversive activities than one in which 40 percent of the shares belong to foreigners.
Gennady Gudkov, deputy chairman of that committee, agreed, and he pointed to another shortcoming in the FSB proposals. A universal five kilometer border zone doesn’t make sense everywhere, he said. “It is one thing in Siberia, there perhaps it should be 50 kilometers, and quite another in Kaliningrad.”
Just what will emerge, of course, is far from clear, but Gudkov undoubtedly speaks for many legislators and those concerned about Constitutional rights when he says that he “would like to see in the text of the law a more precise listing of criteria, on the basis of which businessmen all the same could obtain agreement from the border services.”
If the new legislation retains the general language the FSB prefers, Gudkov and those who share his fears clearly believe, the risk is great that the Russian intelligence service will use such a new “law” to subvert the Russian Constitution and push Russia not forward to modernization but backward to some of the features of the Soviet past.
Staunton, July 21 – In yet another indication that the FSB is regaining ever more of the powers the KGB had in Soviet times, officials at the Russian security service are seeking the inclusion of a provision in a law under preparation that would give them an effective veto over economic activities in a five kilometer deep zone along the Russian state border.
In today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta,” journalist Ivan Rodin reports that as Russian officials are finalizing a draft on a new law governing the country’s borders because the current one, adopted in 1993, is now out of date, the FSB is working to increase its role in this area of Russian life (www.ng.ru/politics/2010-07-21/3_fsb.html).
The existing border law was adopted prior to the adoption of the Russian Constitution in December 1993, and Russian leaders since that time repeatedly have called for new legislation. In 2005, FSB Border Service Chief Vladimir Pronichev presented a draft, and in 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin set up a new federal agency to deal with border issues.
But these actions took place without the support new laws would provide, and as a result, various groups now view the drafting of a replacement border law as a chance to maximize their powers. That is certainly what the FSB is trying to do, Rodin says, and it has focused on the question of land use, traditionally the most sensitive issue in Russian legislation.
According to the FSB proposal now circulating in the government, the “Nezavisimaya gazeta” journalist says, there would be established a five kilometer deep border zone, in which local officials would not be able to approve any land use without the approval of the FSB, something that would give the security service an effective veto over the border.
First of all, the journalist reports, the draft law would not allow the establishment of any businesses in zones along borders where the state border had not been defined by treaty. Among the borders that would affect most profoundly is the one between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
Second, the FSB draft would prohibit any land use that would interfere with border security, a provision so undefined and potentially expansive that the FSB would take near total control of all activities in the Russian Federation’s enormously long border zones much as the KGB had in Soviet times.
And third, the FSB proposals would prohibit, in ways that recall “the totalitarian past rather than the modernized future,” the presence in such zones of any firms where more than 50 percent of the ownership belonged to foreign citizens or foreign companies or to “people without citizenship.”
A staffer at the Duma security committee suggested that this last proposal looked “quite strange” given that unless one assumes that a firm with 51 percent foreign ownership is somehow more likely to be engaged in espionage or subversive activities than one in which 40 percent of the shares belong to foreigners.
Gennady Gudkov, deputy chairman of that committee, agreed, and he pointed to another shortcoming in the FSB proposals. A universal five kilometer border zone doesn’t make sense everywhere, he said. “It is one thing in Siberia, there perhaps it should be 50 kilometers, and quite another in Kaliningrad.”
Just what will emerge, of course, is far from clear, but Gudkov undoubtedly speaks for many legislators and those concerned about Constitutional rights when he says that he “would like to see in the text of the law a more precise listing of criteria, on the basis of which businessmen all the same could obtain agreement from the border services.”
If the new legislation retains the general language the FSB prefers, Gudkov and those who share his fears clearly believe, the risk is great that the Russian intelligence service will use such a new “law” to subvert the Russian Constitution and push Russia not forward to modernization but backward to some of the features of the Soviet past.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow City Plans to Plan for an End to Communal Apartments by 2020
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 21 – The Moscow city government has announced that it plans to discuss in October steps that would finally allow the nearly 300,000 Muscovites still living in some 70,000 communal apartments – the notorious “kommunalkas” of Soviet times – to move into separate ones by 2016 under an “optimistic” scenario and by 2020 in a more “realistic” one.
Such housing arrangements were the product of the rapid urbanization of the Russian population during Soviet times and the inability and unwillingness of the Soviet powers that be to provide adequate housing for people moving from the often devastated villages to industrial centers in the city.
While “kommunalkas” represented a step forward from the barracks in which many Russians were initially confined in the course of this urbanization, they were, because people had to share kitchens and bathrooms, often the breeding grounds of all kinds of social pathologies, as Regis Wargnier brilliantly showed in his 1999 film “East-West.”
According to official statistics, in Moscow at the present time, there are 141,894 families with some 295,744 members living in 71,433 communal apartments at the present time, despite the economic growth that the Russian powers that be constantly celebrate and that Western observers focus on (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=230938).
But quite obviously, the rising tide in Russia has not lifted all boats, and Moscow city officials are currently focusing on what might be done to help those who remain in “kommunalkas.” “We expect,” one city housing official said, “that a program will be considered in the first half of October.”
Moscow officials say that “according to an ‘optimistic’ scenario,” kommunalkas will be eliminated in the Russian capital by 2016. But for the achievement of that goal, the city will have to add 656,000 square meters of housing for those living in the communal apartments, something that would cost 34.25 billion rubles (1.1 billion US dollars).
A more “realistic” projection, officials say, would have the current residents of “kommunalkas” moving into private apartments only by 2020, something that would require the construction of 754,000 square meters of housing at a cost of 25.4 billion rubles (800 million US dollars).
Given the track record of the Moscow city government and the Russian powers that be, even that “realistic” view is likely to prove overly “optimistic,” and consequently a kind of second class housing situation is likely to remain the fate of many Muscovites, even as the city’s average income continues to rise.
Staunton, July 21 – The Moscow city government has announced that it plans to discuss in October steps that would finally allow the nearly 300,000 Muscovites still living in some 70,000 communal apartments – the notorious “kommunalkas” of Soviet times – to move into separate ones by 2016 under an “optimistic” scenario and by 2020 in a more “realistic” one.
Such housing arrangements were the product of the rapid urbanization of the Russian population during Soviet times and the inability and unwillingness of the Soviet powers that be to provide adequate housing for people moving from the often devastated villages to industrial centers in the city.
While “kommunalkas” represented a step forward from the barracks in which many Russians were initially confined in the course of this urbanization, they were, because people had to share kitchens and bathrooms, often the breeding grounds of all kinds of social pathologies, as Regis Wargnier brilliantly showed in his 1999 film “East-West.”
According to official statistics, in Moscow at the present time, there are 141,894 families with some 295,744 members living in 71,433 communal apartments at the present time, despite the economic growth that the Russian powers that be constantly celebrate and that Western observers focus on (www.annews.ru/news/detail.php?ID=230938).
But quite obviously, the rising tide in Russia has not lifted all boats, and Moscow city officials are currently focusing on what might be done to help those who remain in “kommunalkas.” “We expect,” one city housing official said, “that a program will be considered in the first half of October.”
Moscow officials say that “according to an ‘optimistic’ scenario,” kommunalkas will be eliminated in the Russian capital by 2016. But for the achievement of that goal, the city will have to add 656,000 square meters of housing for those living in the communal apartments, something that would cost 34.25 billion rubles (1.1 billion US dollars).
A more “realistic” projection, officials say, would have the current residents of “kommunalkas” moving into private apartments only by 2020, something that would require the construction of 754,000 square meters of housing at a cost of 25.4 billion rubles (800 million US dollars).
Given the track record of the Moscow city government and the Russian powers that be, even that “realistic” view is likely to prove overly “optimistic,” and consequently a kind of second class housing situation is likely to remain the fate of many Muscovites, even as the city’s average income continues to rise.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarchate Forced to Ask Russian Government for Help in ‘Liquidating’ Independent Orthodox
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 21 – Russia’s procurator general has dispatched a special commission to Vladimir oblast in order to consider “all possible variants of the final liquidation of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic Church,” an indirect confirmation of the failure of both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be to close that church down up to now.
In a commentary on Portal-credo.ru, Viktor Kroshechkin says that he has heard about this latest Moscow plan “from unofficial sources” but is certain that it is true and that it reflects both the failure of the Moscow Patriarch’s effort to close down independent Orthodox groups and the increasing support the Russian regime is prepared to provide in support of that effort.
While the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be have already confiscated a significant portion of the churches of the Apostolic Church, the religious affairs analyst says, this latest effort is “an indirect confirmation” that all these efforts have “not brought any particular results” (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=78904).
Despite all the ideological campaigns against the Apostolic Church and moves by Russian courts to seize property belonging to it, Kroshechkin says, “not a single priest or a single community has left the [Apostolic] Church during this period or transferred its allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
It is clear, he continues, that “such is the nature of the Orthodox faith that repression only strengthens it and unifies the believers.” And consequently, despite the ability of the Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be, the Apostolic Church continues to function even though it has fewer and fewer physical locations it can call its own.
“The authority of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic church among simple people in those regions where its parishes operate has been maintained, and Metropolitan Valentin does not want to enter into negotiations with the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” despite the efforts of the latter to start such talks.
Instead, Kroshechkin says, the metropolitan has been “brave enough to complain about the Russian ‘sovereign democratic’ powers that be to the Congress and Administration of the President of the United States.” That has prompted the Russian powers that be to launch “an analysis of the situation” and to ask about the health of Metropolitan Valentin.
The Russian “organs” have frequently told priests of the Apostolic Church that “they must ‘change the leadership’” of their church and either “joint the Moscow Patriarchate or for a start ‘remove Valentin’ from the post of head of the Church.” In some cases, they have been told that the only way to keep their parishes is to do one or the other.
But now, in support of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian powers that be have increased the threat: they have told Apostolic Church priests that they must choose to leave the ranks of the independent Orthodox church or “’receive a sentence’ for extremism or for ‘something worse.’”
At the very least, the Apostolic Church clergy have been told by Russian officials, they must enter into talks with the Moscow Patriarchate or “lose their state registration,” a step that would mean that any meeting of independent Orthodox believers would be “prohibited” not just by the Patriarchate but by the Russian authorities.
The Apostolic Orthodox leadership has no interest in talking to the Moscow Patriarchate and had concluded that the powers that be have decided to pursue “the complete liquidation of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic church by the methods of the Bolsheviks, not sparing anyone or anything.”
And those methods, Kroshechkin says, are “well known: to destroy or compromise the hierarchy, to seize churches, to drive believers into the catacombs, to declare them ‘sectarians’ and ‘enemies of Russia’ or to force priests to purchase their freedom by paying the price of cooperation in order to destroy the Church from the inside.”
The Suzdal bishopric of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic Church is now prepared to “the most unhappy scenarios,” all the more so because the Moscow Patriarchate has succeeded in enlisting the power of the civil powers that be, thereby sorrowing confusion among those who are concerned about the freedom of religion that the Russian Constitution promises.
Staunton, July 21 – Russia’s procurator general has dispatched a special commission to Vladimir oblast in order to consider “all possible variants of the final liquidation of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic Church,” an indirect confirmation of the failure of both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be to close that church down up to now.
In a commentary on Portal-credo.ru, Viktor Kroshechkin says that he has heard about this latest Moscow plan “from unofficial sources” but is certain that it is true and that it reflects both the failure of the Moscow Patriarch’s effort to close down independent Orthodox groups and the increasing support the Russian regime is prepared to provide in support of that effort.
While the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be have already confiscated a significant portion of the churches of the Apostolic Church, the religious affairs analyst says, this latest effort is “an indirect confirmation” that all these efforts have “not brought any particular results” (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=78904).
Despite all the ideological campaigns against the Apostolic Church and moves by Russian courts to seize property belonging to it, Kroshechkin says, “not a single priest or a single community has left the [Apostolic] Church during this period or transferred its allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
It is clear, he continues, that “such is the nature of the Orthodox faith that repression only strengthens it and unifies the believers.” And consequently, despite the ability of the Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be, the Apostolic Church continues to function even though it has fewer and fewer physical locations it can call its own.
“The authority of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic church among simple people in those regions where its parishes operate has been maintained, and Metropolitan Valentin does not want to enter into negotiations with the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,” despite the efforts of the latter to start such talks.
Instead, Kroshechkin says, the metropolitan has been “brave enough to complain about the Russian ‘sovereign democratic’ powers that be to the Congress and Administration of the President of the United States.” That has prompted the Russian powers that be to launch “an analysis of the situation” and to ask about the health of Metropolitan Valentin.
The Russian “organs” have frequently told priests of the Apostolic Church that “they must ‘change the leadership’” of their church and either “joint the Moscow Patriarchate or for a start ‘remove Valentin’ from the post of head of the Church.” In some cases, they have been told that the only way to keep their parishes is to do one or the other.
But now, in support of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian powers that be have increased the threat: they have told Apostolic Church priests that they must choose to leave the ranks of the independent Orthodox church or “’receive a sentence’ for extremism or for ‘something worse.’”
At the very least, the Apostolic Church clergy have been told by Russian officials, they must enter into talks with the Moscow Patriarchate or “lose their state registration,” a step that would mean that any meeting of independent Orthodox believers would be “prohibited” not just by the Patriarchate but by the Russian authorities.
The Apostolic Orthodox leadership has no interest in talking to the Moscow Patriarchate and had concluded that the powers that be have decided to pursue “the complete liquidation of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic church by the methods of the Bolsheviks, not sparing anyone or anything.”
And those methods, Kroshechkin says, are “well known: to destroy or compromise the hierarchy, to seize churches, to drive believers into the catacombs, to declare them ‘sectarians’ and ‘enemies of Russia’ or to force priests to purchase their freedom by paying the price of cooperation in order to destroy the Church from the inside.”
The Suzdal bishopric of the Russian Orthodox Apostolic Church is now prepared to “the most unhappy scenarios,” all the more so because the Moscow Patriarchate has succeeded in enlisting the power of the civil powers that be, thereby sorrowing confusion among those who are concerned about the freedom of religion that the Russian Constitution promises.
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Return of Realpolitik Portends Horrors for North Caucasus, Russia and the West, Kovalyev Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 20 – The root of the problems in the North Caucasus, Sergey Kovalyev argues, is the result of a broader shift in the paradigms governing politics today away from a commitment to universal human values to a Machiavellian Realpolitik that threatens not only the peoples of the North Caucasus but Russia as a whole and the West as well.
In a discussion on Moscow’s current approach to Chechnya, the prominent human rights activist argues that “Moscow is seeking to extend to the entire North Caucasus the political model which has taken shape in Chechnya where the bandits serve as a prop for the federal powers that be” (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2010-07-20/mir-po-makiavelli.html).
There as elsewhere, the longtime human rights defender says, “the root of all misfortunes lies in the lack of correspondence between declared universal values” and “the Machiavellian” approach that governments have adopted, an approach “based on the principle of a war of all against all,” conducted “with loud words about civic and political freedoms.”
This is obvious in the North Caucasus, he argues. There, the following is taking place: the prop of the powers that be are the bandits -- the prop indeed of our Moscow federal powers that be,” who do not see the violence as a problem but as the justification for their approach not only in that region but more generally.
The powers that be in the center have decided, Kovalyev continues, that “that stability which exists in Chechnya now is a model for the entire North Caucasus. And what does this Chechen stability mean? It means murders and hands drenched in blood.” But it does bring a kind of surrogate stability.
According to Kovalyev, “part of the population supports [these arrangements] out of fear, and another part does so lest things become even worse.” Among the latter are people who are prepared to put up with these horrors because they say those involved in them are at least addressing the immediate day to day concerns of the population.
Such an approach “can work throughout the North Caucasus,” he says, “and it is absolutely acceptable for the Kremlin. [The powers that be in Moscow] are not such fools that they do not understand that they will not be able to achieve anything wonderful in the North Caucasus.” Consequently, they are willing to make this calculation.
But the problem is worse than that, Kovalyev continues. “Alas,” he says, “[he] is speaking not only about the Caucasus but about the country as a whole. And even more: this is a question not about the country but about our international political situation,” because Russia is profoundly affected by changes in what is acceptable in the world.
And at present, he suggests, Russia and the rest of the world are “experiencing a moral, historical and legal crisis of global proportions. That shameful line which is called political correctness dominates. Unworthy compromises dominate.” And he points to “a newly minted Nobel Prize laureate” who has entered into such compromises with Russia.
“What does this mean?” Kovalyev asks rhetorically. “It means that one is prepared to pay for the comfortable resolution of private, absolutely petty private problems with the lives and freedoms of other. That is all. And it is acceptable in the world” as it has developed over the last decade.
For “more than ten years,” Russia has been developing its own approach in the Caucasus, Kovalyev writes. For most of that period, the West, “to put it mildly, did not approve. Then the August 2008 war happened.” That should have been an occasion for more than just an expression of disapproval.
“But what did they do? They decided that ‘the reset must not suffer from this. And what did the United States win from this? A somewhat more comfortable interaction with Moscow on a whole number of disputed questions.” And that sets the new norm, one in which governments can trade principles for short term gains while saying they are not doing so.
One “simply cannot mask contemporary political hypocrisy any more. It is evident and obvious to all.” And attacks on extreme cases like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein are an exception to the new rule rather than evidence that the older commitment to the principles of universal human values is being maintained.
Unlike the ideas of Academician Andrey Sakharov, which helped change the world but which are now being ignored, the political crisis that infects the world, one informed by “a new Machiavellianism,” will spread for some time, undermining the possibilities in which so many earlier placed so much hope.
“One should not speak about universal values if we immediately put them in the marketplace and trade them,” Kovalyev says. “Let’s say honestly that the Machiavellian world completely satisfies us. Another world, alas, is not on offer. It is impossible. This at least would be honest.”
Staunton, July 20 – The root of the problems in the North Caucasus, Sergey Kovalyev argues, is the result of a broader shift in the paradigms governing politics today away from a commitment to universal human values to a Machiavellian Realpolitik that threatens not only the peoples of the North Caucasus but Russia as a whole and the West as well.
In a discussion on Moscow’s current approach to Chechnya, the prominent human rights activist argues that “Moscow is seeking to extend to the entire North Caucasus the political model which has taken shape in Chechnya where the bandits serve as a prop for the federal powers that be” (www.specletter.com/obcshestvo/2010-07-20/mir-po-makiavelli.html).
There as elsewhere, the longtime human rights defender says, “the root of all misfortunes lies in the lack of correspondence between declared universal values” and “the Machiavellian” approach that governments have adopted, an approach “based on the principle of a war of all against all,” conducted “with loud words about civic and political freedoms.”
This is obvious in the North Caucasus, he argues. There, the following is taking place: the prop of the powers that be are the bandits -- the prop indeed of our Moscow federal powers that be,” who do not see the violence as a problem but as the justification for their approach not only in that region but more generally.
The powers that be in the center have decided, Kovalyev continues, that “that stability which exists in Chechnya now is a model for the entire North Caucasus. And what does this Chechen stability mean? It means murders and hands drenched in blood.” But it does bring a kind of surrogate stability.
According to Kovalyev, “part of the population supports [these arrangements] out of fear, and another part does so lest things become even worse.” Among the latter are people who are prepared to put up with these horrors because they say those involved in them are at least addressing the immediate day to day concerns of the population.
Such an approach “can work throughout the North Caucasus,” he says, “and it is absolutely acceptable for the Kremlin. [The powers that be in Moscow] are not such fools that they do not understand that they will not be able to achieve anything wonderful in the North Caucasus.” Consequently, they are willing to make this calculation.
But the problem is worse than that, Kovalyev continues. “Alas,” he says, “[he] is speaking not only about the Caucasus but about the country as a whole. And even more: this is a question not about the country but about our international political situation,” because Russia is profoundly affected by changes in what is acceptable in the world.
And at present, he suggests, Russia and the rest of the world are “experiencing a moral, historical and legal crisis of global proportions. That shameful line which is called political correctness dominates. Unworthy compromises dominate.” And he points to “a newly minted Nobel Prize laureate” who has entered into such compromises with Russia.
“What does this mean?” Kovalyev asks rhetorically. “It means that one is prepared to pay for the comfortable resolution of private, absolutely petty private problems with the lives and freedoms of other. That is all. And it is acceptable in the world” as it has developed over the last decade.
For “more than ten years,” Russia has been developing its own approach in the Caucasus, Kovalyev writes. For most of that period, the West, “to put it mildly, did not approve. Then the August 2008 war happened.” That should have been an occasion for more than just an expression of disapproval.
“But what did they do? They decided that ‘the reset must not suffer from this. And what did the United States win from this? A somewhat more comfortable interaction with Moscow on a whole number of disputed questions.” And that sets the new norm, one in which governments can trade principles for short term gains while saying they are not doing so.
One “simply cannot mask contemporary political hypocrisy any more. It is evident and obvious to all.” And attacks on extreme cases like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein are an exception to the new rule rather than evidence that the older commitment to the principles of universal human values is being maintained.
Unlike the ideas of Academician Andrey Sakharov, which helped change the world but which are now being ignored, the political crisis that infects the world, one informed by “a new Machiavellianism,” will spread for some time, undermining the possibilities in which so many earlier placed so much hope.
“One should not speak about universal values if we immediately put them in the marketplace and trade them,” Kovalyev says. “Let’s say honestly that the Machiavellian world completely satisfies us. Another world, alas, is not on offer. It is impossible. This at least would be honest.”
Window on Eurasia: Pre-Soviet Past Can Become the Basis of Belarusian National Identity, Surveys Suggest
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 20 – In a week when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich has argued that the Soviet period created the basis for Ukrainian statehood, a Moscow scholar suggests that Belarusians will remain divided by the Soviet inheritance but can be united on the basis of their pre-1917 national history.
In an article in the current issue of the Levada Center’s “Vestnik Obshchestvennogo mneniya,” Aleksey Lastovsky argues that the pre-Soviet period rather than the Soviet one “has the greatest potential for the strengthening of national identity” among Belarusians today and in the future (www.polit.ru/research/2010/07/19/belorus.html).
Indeed, this scholar argues on the basis of public opinion surveys in Belarus over the last several years, “Soviet history cannot serve as a unifying factor for an integral historical memory” among Belarusians. While they may know it best, they are sharply divided on the meaning for their nation of many of its events.
And although many Belarusians know less about their nation’s pre-Soviet past, the growth of knowledge about that past has two “most important characteristics” for the future of their national identity. On the one hand, it is not completely defined, allowing “without particular difficulty, to include in it necessary content” through education.
On the other, this period, unlike the Soviet one, is already assessed positively or at least not negatively in the mass consciousness of Belarusians. Consequently, “pre-Soviet Belarusian history quite effectively can be used for the formation of a community of understanding about the past and present Belarusian nation.”
As in the case of other countries in the former Soviet space, Lastovsky writes, “the collapse of the Soviet model of history required [in Belarus] a review and redefinition of the national historical narrative and the search for unifying ways of making sense of their own histories.”
The greatest amount of public discussion of this took place at the very end of the Soviet period, but despite the ultimately unreasonable hopes of some, those discussions alone did not lead to a transformation of collective historical consciousness. And many people, especially members of the older generation not part of the educational system, retained Soviet values.
That reality, Lastovsky continues, has been highlighted by the surveys conducted by the Belarusian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology, by polls conducted by the Eurasian Monitor, and by the Novak Sociological Laboratory on “The National Identity of the Belarusians: Who We are And Whom We Will Be?”
These three efforts, the sociologist says, allow for an analysis of what Belarusians believe about the sources of Belarusian statehood, about the events in national history which generate pride as well as shame and anger, and about the most important individuals in Belarusian history of the 20th century and before.
In his 6,000-word article the sociologist provides a detailed description of the findings of these various surveys, pointing out the various positions of members of different generations of Belarusians about all these points and the ways in which they are likely to evolve over time as a result of the passing of the older generation and the education of the young.
For example, he notes that “people over 50 are more inclined to give preference to the Belarusian SSR as the first Belarusian state (15 percent) than are younger respondents (five percent). But even the older generation identifies the origins of Belarusian statehood with the Polotskian principality or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
That pattern reflects the fact, Lastovsky continues, that the pre-Soviet period of Belarusian history is “practically unknown” to members of the older generation. “The younger generation in contrast,” he says, “is extremely well informed about various events and personages of Belarusian history.”
And Lastovsky points out that the promotion of the Great Fatherland War as the signal event of the Soviet period has had the effect of putting in “the shadow other events of this period” or leaving public opinion about them very much divided, although the recent surveys show the anger many Belarusians still feel about the impact of the Chernobyl accident.
For Belarusians to complete their national consolidation and move forward, Lastovsky argues, it will be the pre-Soviet period rather than the Soviet one that will be the most effective means for doing so, a reality that highlights the historical nature of the Belarusian nation that many Russians and others continue to deny.
Staunton, July 20 – In a week when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich has argued that the Soviet period created the basis for Ukrainian statehood, a Moscow scholar suggests that Belarusians will remain divided by the Soviet inheritance but can be united on the basis of their pre-1917 national history.
In an article in the current issue of the Levada Center’s “Vestnik Obshchestvennogo mneniya,” Aleksey Lastovsky argues that the pre-Soviet period rather than the Soviet one “has the greatest potential for the strengthening of national identity” among Belarusians today and in the future (www.polit.ru/research/2010/07/19/belorus.html).
Indeed, this scholar argues on the basis of public opinion surveys in Belarus over the last several years, “Soviet history cannot serve as a unifying factor for an integral historical memory” among Belarusians. While they may know it best, they are sharply divided on the meaning for their nation of many of its events.
And although many Belarusians know less about their nation’s pre-Soviet past, the growth of knowledge about that past has two “most important characteristics” for the future of their national identity. On the one hand, it is not completely defined, allowing “without particular difficulty, to include in it necessary content” through education.
On the other, this period, unlike the Soviet one, is already assessed positively or at least not negatively in the mass consciousness of Belarusians. Consequently, “pre-Soviet Belarusian history quite effectively can be used for the formation of a community of understanding about the past and present Belarusian nation.”
As in the case of other countries in the former Soviet space, Lastovsky writes, “the collapse of the Soviet model of history required [in Belarus] a review and redefinition of the national historical narrative and the search for unifying ways of making sense of their own histories.”
The greatest amount of public discussion of this took place at the very end of the Soviet period, but despite the ultimately unreasonable hopes of some, those discussions alone did not lead to a transformation of collective historical consciousness. And many people, especially members of the older generation not part of the educational system, retained Soviet values.
That reality, Lastovsky continues, has been highlighted by the surveys conducted by the Belarusian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Sociology, by polls conducted by the Eurasian Monitor, and by the Novak Sociological Laboratory on “The National Identity of the Belarusians: Who We are And Whom We Will Be?”
These three efforts, the sociologist says, allow for an analysis of what Belarusians believe about the sources of Belarusian statehood, about the events in national history which generate pride as well as shame and anger, and about the most important individuals in Belarusian history of the 20th century and before.
In his 6,000-word article the sociologist provides a detailed description of the findings of these various surveys, pointing out the various positions of members of different generations of Belarusians about all these points and the ways in which they are likely to evolve over time as a result of the passing of the older generation and the education of the young.
For example, he notes that “people over 50 are more inclined to give preference to the Belarusian SSR as the first Belarusian state (15 percent) than are younger respondents (five percent). But even the older generation identifies the origins of Belarusian statehood with the Polotskian principality or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
That pattern reflects the fact, Lastovsky continues, that the pre-Soviet period of Belarusian history is “practically unknown” to members of the older generation. “The younger generation in contrast,” he says, “is extremely well informed about various events and personages of Belarusian history.”
And Lastovsky points out that the promotion of the Great Fatherland War as the signal event of the Soviet period has had the effect of putting in “the shadow other events of this period” or leaving public opinion about them very much divided, although the recent surveys show the anger many Belarusians still feel about the impact of the Chernobyl accident.
For Belarusians to complete their national consolidation and move forward, Lastovsky argues, it will be the pre-Soviet period rather than the Soviet one that will be the most effective means for doing so, a reality that highlights the historical nature of the Belarusian nation that many Russians and others continue to deny.
Window on Eurasia: Circassians Radicalized by Moscow’s ‘Double Standards’ in Ossetia, Exiled Leader Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, July 20 – The “double standards” behind Russia’s nationality policy -- very much on view “when the Kremlin recognizes a small part of the Ossetian people as an independent state while leaving the larger part within Russia and the right to choose its future” -- are radicalizing the Circassians, according to one of their leaders in exile.
In an interview conducted by Fatima Tlisova and posted on the Kavkaz-Uzel.ru portal, Murat Berzegov argues that what Moscow has done regarding the two Ossetias is radicalizing Circassians across the North Caucasus who are now asking why they are being attacked for demanding that they be treated equally (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/171772/).
This interview is important because it provides the clearest indication yet of the ways in which Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is having an unintended and from Russia’s perspective unwelcome impact in the already troubled North Caucasus.
In the past, Berzegov, founder of the Circassian Congress who received political asylum in the United States earlier this year because of threats to his life in his homeland, has called for Moscow to acknowledge the Russian genocide of the Circassians in the 19th century and to allow the Circassians to combine the various state formations into which Stalin divided them into one.
In this interview, Berzegov reiterates those positions: “The Circassians in their current state fall under the definition of a divided people.” They are split “into five subjects” of the Russian Federation and are “artificially designated by different ethnonyms.” Abroad, “the Circassians are dispersed in more than 50 countries.”
This status, he continues, “contradicts” both the Russian Constitution and international law and must be addressed by “political methods within the framework of the legal field of the Russian Federation and the United Nations.” In so doing, the Circassians are not asking for any “exceptional rights or privileges” or the denigration of the rights of others.
“We seek,” the exiled leader said, “the realization of the right of a people to a single historical territory, to repatriation -- the right to return to the Motherland of the descendents of those forcibly deported, to a single ethnic name which reflects membership in a single people, and through these intermediate steps, we want to achieve the reestablishment of Circassia.”
“None of our demands are radical or contradict the Russian Constitution,” Berzegov stressed. But “unfortunately,” he continued, “all are actions and declarations generate in Moscow a negative reaction, even if we speak only about that which we have the right to under the Constitution of the Russian Federation, that of unity.”
For all the other peoples “who live in the Russian Federation, unity is a natural right and considered a given.” But “when the Circassians speak about unity,” Moscow treats it as “a threat to the integrity of Russia” and “our demands” as “something illegal, as if we were seeking greater rights than other peoples have.”
That simply isn’t the case, Berzegov insists. “We demand equality, but in the Kremlin, this is interpreted as a criminal striving to exclusiveness because we speak about the unity of the people and territory.” And Moscow risks making the situation worse by suggesting that there is some relationship between Circassian aspirations and political Islam, but that isn’t true either.
“Political Islam,” he continues, “has completely opposite goals to ours.” It seeks “the construction of a caliphate, based only on religious unity and completely excluding a national component. I do not think,” Berzegov says, that it is in Russia’s interests to unite Circassian social movements with structures which are involved with terrorism.”
But the most serious threat of the radicalization of the Circassians lies elsewhere, the exiled leader says. “Russia must move away from double standards in nationality policy. Even people far from politics are beginning to doubt the adequacy of the political course” of the Russian government in the North Caucasus.
That is because they can see such double standards very much in evidence “when the Kremlin recognizes a small part of the Ossetian people as an independent state while leaving the larger part of this people within Russia and without the right of a choice over the future” of that people.
This “unequal approach in nationality policy is too obvious,” he says, “and it is sharpening a feeling of injustice among those peoples whose rights are being violated, especially among the more politically active part of the people, its youth.” If something is not done, that could lead to some unwanted consequences.
“Moscow has not been able to develop a mechanism for reducing social tension, there are no organizations which could serve as a bridge between society and the powers that be, and the powers that be lack a will to dialogue with the people,” he says. Instead, “the powers that be prefer to ignore or minimize the Circassian problem, to distort its essence and drive it deeper.
This Russian “tactic excludes the possibility of the legal resolution of the tasks and becomes a platform for their irreversible escalation, [if and] when young people begin to go into the forest.” If Moscow doesn’t respond politically, Berzegov concludes, “then a repetition of the chaos in Ingushetia and Daghestan is unfortunately a real scenario for Circassia.”
Staunton, July 20 – The “double standards” behind Russia’s nationality policy -- very much on view “when the Kremlin recognizes a small part of the Ossetian people as an independent state while leaving the larger part within Russia and the right to choose its future” -- are radicalizing the Circassians, according to one of their leaders in exile.
In an interview conducted by Fatima Tlisova and posted on the Kavkaz-Uzel.ru portal, Murat Berzegov argues that what Moscow has done regarding the two Ossetias is radicalizing Circassians across the North Caucasus who are now asking why they are being attacked for demanding that they be treated equally (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/171772/).
This interview is important because it provides the clearest indication yet of the ways in which Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states is having an unintended and from Russia’s perspective unwelcome impact in the already troubled North Caucasus.
In the past, Berzegov, founder of the Circassian Congress who received political asylum in the United States earlier this year because of threats to his life in his homeland, has called for Moscow to acknowledge the Russian genocide of the Circassians in the 19th century and to allow the Circassians to combine the various state formations into which Stalin divided them into one.
In this interview, Berzegov reiterates those positions: “The Circassians in their current state fall under the definition of a divided people.” They are split “into five subjects” of the Russian Federation and are “artificially designated by different ethnonyms.” Abroad, “the Circassians are dispersed in more than 50 countries.”
This status, he continues, “contradicts” both the Russian Constitution and international law and must be addressed by “political methods within the framework of the legal field of the Russian Federation and the United Nations.” In so doing, the Circassians are not asking for any “exceptional rights or privileges” or the denigration of the rights of others.
“We seek,” the exiled leader said, “the realization of the right of a people to a single historical territory, to repatriation -- the right to return to the Motherland of the descendents of those forcibly deported, to a single ethnic name which reflects membership in a single people, and through these intermediate steps, we want to achieve the reestablishment of Circassia.”
“None of our demands are radical or contradict the Russian Constitution,” Berzegov stressed. But “unfortunately,” he continued, “all are actions and declarations generate in Moscow a negative reaction, even if we speak only about that which we have the right to under the Constitution of the Russian Federation, that of unity.”
For all the other peoples “who live in the Russian Federation, unity is a natural right and considered a given.” But “when the Circassians speak about unity,” Moscow treats it as “a threat to the integrity of Russia” and “our demands” as “something illegal, as if we were seeking greater rights than other peoples have.”
That simply isn’t the case, Berzegov insists. “We demand equality, but in the Kremlin, this is interpreted as a criminal striving to exclusiveness because we speak about the unity of the people and territory.” And Moscow risks making the situation worse by suggesting that there is some relationship between Circassian aspirations and political Islam, but that isn’t true either.
“Political Islam,” he continues, “has completely opposite goals to ours.” It seeks “the construction of a caliphate, based only on religious unity and completely excluding a national component. I do not think,” Berzegov says, that it is in Russia’s interests to unite Circassian social movements with structures which are involved with terrorism.”
But the most serious threat of the radicalization of the Circassians lies elsewhere, the exiled leader says. “Russia must move away from double standards in nationality policy. Even people far from politics are beginning to doubt the adequacy of the political course” of the Russian government in the North Caucasus.
That is because they can see such double standards very much in evidence “when the Kremlin recognizes a small part of the Ossetian people as an independent state while leaving the larger part of this people within Russia and without the right of a choice over the future” of that people.
This “unequal approach in nationality policy is too obvious,” he says, “and it is sharpening a feeling of injustice among those peoples whose rights are being violated, especially among the more politically active part of the people, its youth.” If something is not done, that could lead to some unwanted consequences.
“Moscow has not been able to develop a mechanism for reducing social tension, there are no organizations which could serve as a bridge between society and the powers that be, and the powers that be lack a will to dialogue with the people,” he says. Instead, “the powers that be prefer to ignore or minimize the Circassian problem, to distort its essence and drive it deeper.
This Russian “tactic excludes the possibility of the legal resolution of the tasks and becomes a platform for their irreversible escalation, [if and] when young people begin to go into the forest.” If Moscow doesn’t respond politically, Berzegov concludes, “then a repetition of the chaos in Ingushetia and Daghestan is unfortunately a real scenario for Circassia.”
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