Paul Goble
New York, March 26 – In the latest test of the old notion that those in power can survive almost anything except being laughed at, environmental activists in Moscow and St. Petersburg plan to collect toilet paper for Vladimir Putin since he apparently feels Russia has too little of it and is prepared to allow Lake Baikal to be contaminated in order to produce more.
Tomorrow, “For Baikal,” a coalition of Russian public organizations that seek to defend that environmental wonder from being contaminated by the restarting of the Baikalsk paper mill on its shores, will stage demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg to call attention to this issue (www.aquaexpert.ru/news/2010/03/26/baykal/).
The demands the group will raise are not new. They seek to prevent the Baikalsk plant from sending waste products into Lake Baikal, to find alternative jobs for any workers displaced if the plant is closed permanently, and to prevent the burial of nuclear wastes in the region under the terms of a plan approved by Putin earlier this year.
But in order to attract attention to their demands, organizers are calling on all those who will take back to bring not only “a good attitude” and posters or banners in defense of Lake Baikal but also “a roll of toilet paper” because Putin and his regime have suggested that the Baikalsk plant must be allowed to operate because Russia lacks enough of that essential product.
The organizers say that, in the course of the demonstrations, they will collect the toilet paper and hand it over to the powers that be so that the latter will not be “forced” to “destroy Baikal” in order to produce what Putin and his associates continue to insist Russians so badly need.
This use of humor to call attention to a very serious problem calls attention to two aspects of the current upsurge of protests in the Russian Federation that are often overlooked. On the one hand, Russians are going into the streets for a wide variety of issues (For a useful survey of the last week alone, see www.liberty.ru/Themes/Gnevnyj-den-.-Protestnaya-Rossiya-vse-akcii-protesta-za-proshedshuyu-nedelyu-15-21-marta).
And on the other, they are becoming increasingly creative in the ways in which they are pressing their demands. In addition to the toilet paper campaign, Russians angry at the powers that be in Moscow in general and at Vladimir Putin’s policies in particular have employed two interesting tactics.
In the first case, opponents of the continued exploitation of the Sayano-Shushen hydro-electric dam have sent Putin an open letter in which they have proposed among other things that since he is so confident of the safety of that dam, he should commit himself to live in area that would be flooded if the dam broke (anvictory.org/index.php?name=news&op=view&id=1934).
And in the second, supporters of jailed Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky have opened an exhibit of political cartoons about his incarceration and jail, cartoons that opposition leaders like Garri Kasparov and Boris Nemtsov say can spark laughter over “the theater of the absurd quality” of his case (www.sobkorr.ru/news/4BABA46915C61.html).
Whether laughter will be sufficient to force the Russian powers that be to change their policies remains to be seen, but once people begin to see such people as figures of fun, that alone will go a long way to transforming the political atmosphere into one in which the possibilities for the future will be different.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Ukraine Needs a Russia that is a Country like Any Other – and so Do the Russians, Kyiv Analyst Says
Paul Goble
New York, March 26 – Both in the course of the Ukrainian elections and following the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, Russian commentators have discussed what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs, commentaries that have not only implied that only Ukraine needs to change but also have defined how many analysts elsewhere see the issue.
But in an essay posted online yesterday, Olesya Yakhno, a commentator for the Ukrainian portal Glavred, argues that this is the wrong or at least not the only question. And she insists that an equally or even more important issue for Ukrainians and Russians alike is “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” (glavred.info/archive/2010/03/25/185832-7.html).
Her answer is that both need Russia to become for Ukraine a country like any other rather than revisionist state which seeks to dominate or even absorb its neighbors, thus threatening not only more conflicts in the future but rendering it almost impossible for Russia itself to make the transition to a modern, free and democratic country.
Since Yanukovich’s victory, she notes, “Russia has hurried to make a number of acts of obeisance of a public character toward the new Ukrainian leadership” in order to show that “the period of Russian-Ukrainian alienation is in the past,” that these past difficulties were the fault of President Viktor Yushchenko, and that “life is becoming better, life is becoming happier.”
At the same time, she notes, Russian commentators have hurried to specify “what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs,” arguing that Moscow needs a Ukraine which is “predictable” both at home and abroad, “semi-authoritarian” for whom “’stability’ is a euphemism for reform, and which makes Russian the second state language and the Moscow Patriarchate the main church.
Moreover, these Russian commentators have said, Russia needs a Ukraine which will not join NATO but will allow Russia’s fleet to remain in Crimea after 2017 and will meet the “business needs” of the Russian political elite, needs, which remain largely “outside of the framework of public discussions.”
And at the most general level, the Glavred commentator says, Russians “consider (or give the impression they do) that for effective cooperation and the conduct of a friendly policy between Russia and Ukraine, the preeminent factor is the level of loyalty of the Ukrainian president to Moscow.”
But in all these discussion, Yakhno continues, one question is missing: “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” And behind that question, for which Russian commentators have failed to provide any answer, is “another question,” one that if anything is more fateful: “What kind of Russia does Russia itself need?”
It is clear, the Glavred writer says, that “the format of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations depends more on Russia than it does on Ukraine,” something that is not a source for optimism because “even with friendly countries” like Belarus and Kazakhstan, Russia has difficulties maintaining close ties.
The situation with Ukraine in this regard is especially important, she says. While relations between Russia and Ukraine under Yushchenko were not especially good, “however paradoxical it may sound, his presidency despite all the anti-Yushchenko rhetoric of Russian politicians, had its benefits for the ruling Russian tandem.”
Ukraine, second only to Georgia, played the chief “anti-hero in the Russian public space.” And the existence of that image obviated the need for “real policy” and even “allowed the Russian powers that be to hide Russia’s lack of a serious strategy relative to the CIS countries in general and Ukraine in particular.”
In fact, Yakhno continues, it allowed Moscow the chance to “project Russia on a blank screen as a giant of geopolitics.”
There is no doubt that relations between Moscow and Kyiv will improve now that Yanukovich is president. But “in order that cooperation bear a real and not exclusively declarative character, it is obvious that there will have to developed an integral and internally consistent philosophy of these relations,” a challenge above all for Russia.
That is because, Yakhno suggests, “the position of Ukraine through the period of independence was and is unchanged.” Yanukovich has “reaffirmed that the strategic goal of the foreign policy of Ukraine is European integration, alongside effective cooperation with Russia and the US.”
Given that “multi-vector approach,” she writes, “where Europe is conceived of as a political partner and model of the future, and Russia as above all an economic counter-agent and ‘reliable rear,’ inherited from the past,” Kyiv’s choice will remain with the future, and “therefore, there will not be a cardinal turn of Ukraine toward the Russian Federation.”
And what that means, Yakhno says, is that “the real test for Russian-Ukrainian relations did not end with the departure of Yushchenko but only began with the installation of Yanukovich in office” because Moscow can no longer avoid facing the need to develop a real policy toward Kyiv rather than hide behind denunciations of the Orange Revolution.
Whether Moscow is up to that task is unclear, she writes. Not only does Russia face a broad range of economic and political problems at home, but the regime itself is divided about what it wants and will do next. President Dmitry Medvedev clearly wants to see some kind of modernization, although “today few people in modernization Kremlin-style.”
As for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Yakhno continues, he has talked about three “possible variants of the development of the political system on the post-Soviet space:” Ukrainianization, which Russians understand to mean “political instability and a lack of control,” “harsh authoritarianism” (Turkmenistan), and semi-authoritarian Putinism as in Russia.
Putin clearly wants the third to continue in Russia, “even if this directly contradicts modernization,” as it almost certainly does. That is because, Yakhno insists, “modernization is possible only under conditions of ‘Ukrainianization’ or ‘authoritarianism,” the one allowing messy competition and the other marching forward under tight control.
The tension between the requirements of modernization and the needs of the members of the current set of powers that be in Moscow to remain in office, the Ukrainian analyst continues, are creating conditions for the rise of “subjectivism in politics,” a term taken from the Khrushchev period.
It refers, Yakhno says, to an approach which rejects “institutional forms of control” and thus opens the way for actions “which do not take into account the objective patterns of history and the real circumstances of the contemporary development of the country.” In short, it leads to decisions “based on faith in the all powerful nature of administrative and force decisions.”
Such an approach, now very much in evidence in Moscow, does not create the kind of Russia that Ukraine needs, Yakhno says. She then gives a list of six qualities that she argues Russia needs to develop if it is to have good relations with its neighbors and to develop and modernize at home.
First, she writes, Ukraine needs a Russia “which clearly understands its place in the contemporary world: a major, economically powerful and rich country with enormous natural resources and human potential but not a global or even a regional power.”
Second, Ukraine needs a Russia which “is not an empire but a contemporary nation state.” Third, it needs a Russia which “at least approximately believes in what it officially proclaims.” Fourth, it needs a Russia “which thinks in the categories of politics and not business camouflaged as politics.
Fifth, it needs a Russia which “decides above all its state tasks and not the tasks of big business.” And sixth, it needs a Russia “which can once and for all formulate an exhaustive list of its expectations from Ukraine,” thus allowing Kyiv to respond positively to those it agrees with and negatively to those it does not.
In sum, Yakhno says, “Ukraine needs a Russia will simply be another country, important and strong to be sure, but one of the other countries and not the boss, not the elder brother, and what is the most important thing, not an eternal factor in Ukrainian domestic politics.”
That will benefit both countries because “when the policy of Ukraine in the Russian direction finally becomes a foreign and not a domestic manner, then will take place the psychological liberation of Ukraine and its elite from Russia, and Ukraine finally will acquire its independence.”
New York, March 26 – Both in the course of the Ukrainian elections and following the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, Russian commentators have discussed what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs, commentaries that have not only implied that only Ukraine needs to change but also have defined how many analysts elsewhere see the issue.
But in an essay posted online yesterday, Olesya Yakhno, a commentator for the Ukrainian portal Glavred, argues that this is the wrong or at least not the only question. And she insists that an equally or even more important issue for Ukrainians and Russians alike is “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” (glavred.info/archive/2010/03/25/185832-7.html).
Her answer is that both need Russia to become for Ukraine a country like any other rather than revisionist state which seeks to dominate or even absorb its neighbors, thus threatening not only more conflicts in the future but rendering it almost impossible for Russia itself to make the transition to a modern, free and democratic country.
Since Yanukovich’s victory, she notes, “Russia has hurried to make a number of acts of obeisance of a public character toward the new Ukrainian leadership” in order to show that “the period of Russian-Ukrainian alienation is in the past,” that these past difficulties were the fault of President Viktor Yushchenko, and that “life is becoming better, life is becoming happier.”
At the same time, she notes, Russian commentators have hurried to specify “what kind of a Ukraine Russia needs,” arguing that Moscow needs a Ukraine which is “predictable” both at home and abroad, “semi-authoritarian” for whom “’stability’ is a euphemism for reform, and which makes Russian the second state language and the Moscow Patriarchate the main church.
Moreover, these Russian commentators have said, Russia needs a Ukraine which will not join NATO but will allow Russia’s fleet to remain in Crimea after 2017 and will meet the “business needs” of the Russian political elite, needs, which remain largely “outside of the framework of public discussions.”
And at the most general level, the Glavred commentator says, Russians “consider (or give the impression they do) that for effective cooperation and the conduct of a friendly policy between Russia and Ukraine, the preeminent factor is the level of loyalty of the Ukrainian president to Moscow.”
But in all these discussion, Yakhno continues, one question is missing: “what kind of Russia does Ukraine need?” And behind that question, for which Russian commentators have failed to provide any answer, is “another question,” one that if anything is more fateful: “What kind of Russia does Russia itself need?”
It is clear, the Glavred writer says, that “the format of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations depends more on Russia than it does on Ukraine,” something that is not a source for optimism because “even with friendly countries” like Belarus and Kazakhstan, Russia has difficulties maintaining close ties.
The situation with Ukraine in this regard is especially important, she says. While relations between Russia and Ukraine under Yushchenko were not especially good, “however paradoxical it may sound, his presidency despite all the anti-Yushchenko rhetoric of Russian politicians, had its benefits for the ruling Russian tandem.”
Ukraine, second only to Georgia, played the chief “anti-hero in the Russian public space.” And the existence of that image obviated the need for “real policy” and even “allowed the Russian powers that be to hide Russia’s lack of a serious strategy relative to the CIS countries in general and Ukraine in particular.”
In fact, Yakhno continues, it allowed Moscow the chance to “project Russia on a blank screen as a giant of geopolitics.”
There is no doubt that relations between Moscow and Kyiv will improve now that Yanukovich is president. But “in order that cooperation bear a real and not exclusively declarative character, it is obvious that there will have to developed an integral and internally consistent philosophy of these relations,” a challenge above all for Russia.
That is because, Yakhno suggests, “the position of Ukraine through the period of independence was and is unchanged.” Yanukovich has “reaffirmed that the strategic goal of the foreign policy of Ukraine is European integration, alongside effective cooperation with Russia and the US.”
Given that “multi-vector approach,” she writes, “where Europe is conceived of as a political partner and model of the future, and Russia as above all an economic counter-agent and ‘reliable rear,’ inherited from the past,” Kyiv’s choice will remain with the future, and “therefore, there will not be a cardinal turn of Ukraine toward the Russian Federation.”
And what that means, Yakhno says, is that “the real test for Russian-Ukrainian relations did not end with the departure of Yushchenko but only began with the installation of Yanukovich in office” because Moscow can no longer avoid facing the need to develop a real policy toward Kyiv rather than hide behind denunciations of the Orange Revolution.
Whether Moscow is up to that task is unclear, she writes. Not only does Russia face a broad range of economic and political problems at home, but the regime itself is divided about what it wants and will do next. President Dmitry Medvedev clearly wants to see some kind of modernization, although “today few people in modernization Kremlin-style.”
As for Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Yakhno continues, he has talked about three “possible variants of the development of the political system on the post-Soviet space:” Ukrainianization, which Russians understand to mean “political instability and a lack of control,” “harsh authoritarianism” (Turkmenistan), and semi-authoritarian Putinism as in Russia.
Putin clearly wants the third to continue in Russia, “even if this directly contradicts modernization,” as it almost certainly does. That is because, Yakhno insists, “modernization is possible only under conditions of ‘Ukrainianization’ or ‘authoritarianism,” the one allowing messy competition and the other marching forward under tight control.
The tension between the requirements of modernization and the needs of the members of the current set of powers that be in Moscow to remain in office, the Ukrainian analyst continues, are creating conditions for the rise of “subjectivism in politics,” a term taken from the Khrushchev period.
It refers, Yakhno says, to an approach which rejects “institutional forms of control” and thus opens the way for actions “which do not take into account the objective patterns of history and the real circumstances of the contemporary development of the country.” In short, it leads to decisions “based on faith in the all powerful nature of administrative and force decisions.”
Such an approach, now very much in evidence in Moscow, does not create the kind of Russia that Ukraine needs, Yakhno says. She then gives a list of six qualities that she argues Russia needs to develop if it is to have good relations with its neighbors and to develop and modernize at home.
First, she writes, Ukraine needs a Russia “which clearly understands its place in the contemporary world: a major, economically powerful and rich country with enormous natural resources and human potential but not a global or even a regional power.”
Second, Ukraine needs a Russia which “is not an empire but a contemporary nation state.” Third, it needs a Russia which “at least approximately believes in what it officially proclaims.” Fourth, it needs a Russia “which thinks in the categories of politics and not business camouflaged as politics.
Fifth, it needs a Russia which “decides above all its state tasks and not the tasks of big business.” And sixth, it needs a Russia “which can once and for all formulate an exhaustive list of its expectations from Ukraine,” thus allowing Kyiv to respond positively to those it agrees with and negatively to those it does not.
In sum, Yakhno says, “Ukraine needs a Russia will simply be another country, important and strong to be sure, but one of the other countries and not the boss, not the elder brother, and what is the most important thing, not an eternal factor in Ukrainian domestic politics.”
That will benefit both countries because “when the policy of Ukraine in the Russian direction finally becomes a foreign and not a domestic manner, then will take place the psychological liberation of Ukraine and its elite from Russia, and Ukraine finally will acquire its independence.”
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Efforts to Improve Russia’s Image Abroad a Costly Failure, Experts Say
Paul Goble
New York, March 25 – Despite spending “significant sums” in recent years to promote a positive image of Russia abroad, participants in a Moscow roundtable say, the Russian government has largely failed to achieve its goal because it has forgotten that while a country may be possible “to purchase ‘an image,’” its “reputation” will usually reflect reality.
Yesterday at a roundtable on “Images of Russia: Stereotypes, Paradoxes and Reality,” Nikolay Levichev, the head of the Just Russia fraction in the Duma and chair of this meeting, said bluntly that Moscow’s efforts in recent years to “create a positive image of Russia” have not succeeded (novopol.ru/text82775.html).
Russia missed a chance at the Vancouver Olympics to improve its image, he said, adding that Russia’s victory in the follow-on Para-Olympics has not been presented as a cause for pride but rather become a source of jokes on the Internet, with various bloggers now making fun of Russia’s “para-shield,” “para-democracy,” and “para-economy.”
Levichev noted that “certain countries in general do not have any idea where Russia is located or what our country represents.” They associate the words “’Russian’ and ‘Russia’ not with the cosmos, ballet or hockey but with disasters, the absence of democracy, and Moscow’s failure to eliminate the death penalty.
And that should not be the case, he continued. Not only have Russian oligarchs “bought up over recent years quite significant foreign media outlets” – although he noted that as a condition of these purchases, they had to promise not to interfere editorially – but the government itself has also been pushing its “Russia Today” electronic and print media efforts.
Igor Yevdokimov, deputy head of the foreign ministry’s information and press department, said that Moscow was not spending that much. He said that “less than 1.5 million dollars” is currently allotted each year. But others at the session suggested he must be talking only about the foreign ministry’s own operation and not that of the entire Russian government.
Following Yevdokimov’s intervention, Levichev remarked that “as a rule, ‘image’ is something that one can buy, but ‘reputation’ is something that is the product of what is in fact the case,” a view that was supported by Valentina Fedotova, a senior scholar at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy.
She urged those taking part “not to put their hopes only on an external, specially formed image of Russia.” Indeed, she continued, she “does not consider effective the application of the comparatively new term ‘imageology’ as a recipe for improving the way in which others view Russia.”
Those who use the term, Fedotova continued, almost always are concerned “only” about image and not about reality. “After the collapse of the USSR, [the country’s] ideology and social conceptions suffered a defeat. Nothing remained in place of them.” But now, unfortunately, “imageology is trying to occupy this space.”
A much more productive approach, she argued, was to use the ideas of “’soft power,’” something that focuses on such traditional sources of Russian influence as literature, art and science. Worrying about image alone is another example, she suggested of the rise of imported “mass culture” into Russia, a trend she suggested that was bringing much harm.
Mikhail Starshinov, another Just Russia Duma deputy, said the problem may be even deeper. Russia can hardly promote an image of itself until the country decides what that image should be and until there is the creation of an institution like the former CPSU Central Committee’s Propaganda Department that ensures a single message.
At present, Starshinov continued, “no one” is performing that role, and the results are all too obvious.
But it will be hard to reach an agreement over what “image” Russia should promote. Archpreist Aleksandr Makarov of the Russian Orthodox Church said that the country needs to position itself as a powerful Orthodox country, but Maksim Shevchenko, a television host and convert to Islam, said that “Russia must not be considered an Orthodox country” alone.
Other speakers at the roundtable provided additional perspectives. Lyudmila Adilova, a professor at Moscow’s Russian State Humanitarian University, called for the creation of new and “recognizable” brand” and “more effective propaganda media instruments.” That is necessary in work with foreign countries, because “the population has no common values.”
Aleksey Mitrofanov, a leader of Just Russia, agreed. At present, Russians are divided into a wide variety of interest groups, united only by “the struggle for ‘cash,’” a struggle that if it continues without change will not only further undermine Russia’s image abroad but condemn the country to “disintegration.”
Antero Airola, a Moscow correspondent for Finland’s YLE broadcasting company, acknowledged that “for Finns, such a ‘new’ country as Russia still does not exist. ‘When they say the word ‘Russia,’ they have in mind the USSR, and no one remembers that such a country has not existed already 20 years.”
Aleksandr Denisov, the deputy editor of “Azia i Afrika,” sharply criticized the Russia Today television channel for programming, including the beating of Blacks in Moscow, that shows the country in a bad light and thus reinforces negative images of Russia in the minds of many rather than replaces them with positive ones.
And finally, in a tone that likely upset some at this session, Vincente Barrientus, a scholar from Brazil’s Ibero-Latin Institute, went even further and called the leadership of Russia Today and the channel’s “style,” an enterprise in which Russians have placed so much hope, “juvenile” and “unprofessional.”
New York, March 25 – Despite spending “significant sums” in recent years to promote a positive image of Russia abroad, participants in a Moscow roundtable say, the Russian government has largely failed to achieve its goal because it has forgotten that while a country may be possible “to purchase ‘an image,’” its “reputation” will usually reflect reality.
Yesterday at a roundtable on “Images of Russia: Stereotypes, Paradoxes and Reality,” Nikolay Levichev, the head of the Just Russia fraction in the Duma and chair of this meeting, said bluntly that Moscow’s efforts in recent years to “create a positive image of Russia” have not succeeded (novopol.ru/text82775.html).
Russia missed a chance at the Vancouver Olympics to improve its image, he said, adding that Russia’s victory in the follow-on Para-Olympics has not been presented as a cause for pride but rather become a source of jokes on the Internet, with various bloggers now making fun of Russia’s “para-shield,” “para-democracy,” and “para-economy.”
Levichev noted that “certain countries in general do not have any idea where Russia is located or what our country represents.” They associate the words “’Russian’ and ‘Russia’ not with the cosmos, ballet or hockey but with disasters, the absence of democracy, and Moscow’s failure to eliminate the death penalty.
And that should not be the case, he continued. Not only have Russian oligarchs “bought up over recent years quite significant foreign media outlets” – although he noted that as a condition of these purchases, they had to promise not to interfere editorially – but the government itself has also been pushing its “Russia Today” electronic and print media efforts.
Igor Yevdokimov, deputy head of the foreign ministry’s information and press department, said that Moscow was not spending that much. He said that “less than 1.5 million dollars” is currently allotted each year. But others at the session suggested he must be talking only about the foreign ministry’s own operation and not that of the entire Russian government.
Following Yevdokimov’s intervention, Levichev remarked that “as a rule, ‘image’ is something that one can buy, but ‘reputation’ is something that is the product of what is in fact the case,” a view that was supported by Valentina Fedotova, a senior scholar at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy.
She urged those taking part “not to put their hopes only on an external, specially formed image of Russia.” Indeed, she continued, she “does not consider effective the application of the comparatively new term ‘imageology’ as a recipe for improving the way in which others view Russia.”
Those who use the term, Fedotova continued, almost always are concerned “only” about image and not about reality. “After the collapse of the USSR, [the country’s] ideology and social conceptions suffered a defeat. Nothing remained in place of them.” But now, unfortunately, “imageology is trying to occupy this space.”
A much more productive approach, she argued, was to use the ideas of “’soft power,’” something that focuses on such traditional sources of Russian influence as literature, art and science. Worrying about image alone is another example, she suggested of the rise of imported “mass culture” into Russia, a trend she suggested that was bringing much harm.
Mikhail Starshinov, another Just Russia Duma deputy, said the problem may be even deeper. Russia can hardly promote an image of itself until the country decides what that image should be and until there is the creation of an institution like the former CPSU Central Committee’s Propaganda Department that ensures a single message.
At present, Starshinov continued, “no one” is performing that role, and the results are all too obvious.
But it will be hard to reach an agreement over what “image” Russia should promote. Archpreist Aleksandr Makarov of the Russian Orthodox Church said that the country needs to position itself as a powerful Orthodox country, but Maksim Shevchenko, a television host and convert to Islam, said that “Russia must not be considered an Orthodox country” alone.
Other speakers at the roundtable provided additional perspectives. Lyudmila Adilova, a professor at Moscow’s Russian State Humanitarian University, called for the creation of new and “recognizable” brand” and “more effective propaganda media instruments.” That is necessary in work with foreign countries, because “the population has no common values.”
Aleksey Mitrofanov, a leader of Just Russia, agreed. At present, Russians are divided into a wide variety of interest groups, united only by “the struggle for ‘cash,’” a struggle that if it continues without change will not only further undermine Russia’s image abroad but condemn the country to “disintegration.”
Antero Airola, a Moscow correspondent for Finland’s YLE broadcasting company, acknowledged that “for Finns, such a ‘new’ country as Russia still does not exist. ‘When they say the word ‘Russia,’ they have in mind the USSR, and no one remembers that such a country has not existed already 20 years.”
Aleksandr Denisov, the deputy editor of “Azia i Afrika,” sharply criticized the Russia Today television channel for programming, including the beating of Blacks in Moscow, that shows the country in a bad light and thus reinforces negative images of Russia in the minds of many rather than replaces them with positive ones.
And finally, in a tone that likely upset some at this session, Vincente Barrientus, a scholar from Brazil’s Ibero-Latin Institute, went even further and called the leadership of Russia Today and the channel’s “style,” an enterprise in which Russians have placed so much hope, “juvenile” and “unprofessional.”
Window on Eurasia: Daghestanis Call for Repeal of Republic’s 1999 Ban on Wahhabism
Paul Goble
New York, March 25 – After the appearance of an open letter from a union leader denouncing the republic’s 1999 law banning Wahhabism, Daghestani parliamentarians have lined up to demand the repeal of this legislation which they view as discriminatory but which has helped to demonize that trend in Islam across Russia.
Taking advantage of changes at the top of the Daghestani political pyramid, Isalmagomed Nabiyev, who often prepares commentaries for the Makhachkala media, dispatched an open letter to the new leader Magomedsalam Magomedov denouncing the 1999 republic law as a counterproductive mistake (dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/166907/).
Nabiyev wrote in his missive that “one of the main problems of Daghestan” is the intensification of conflict among various segments of the Muslim community. “Such a situation,” he continued, “was created thanks to the father of the current leader of the republic, the former chairman of Daghestan’s State Council Magomedali Magomedov.”
Under Magomedali Magomedov, Nabiyev said, “the Daghestani powers that be began to use force in order to root out one of the ideological directions in Islam. Not by the path of countering to this ideology other forms but by the path of the physical removal of the bearers of this ideology.”
That approach was both encouraged and accelerated by the adoption in September 1999 of the republic law “On the ban of Wahhabi and other types of extremist activity,” on the basis of which, the powers that be declared those who disagreed with them to be “enemies of the people” and thus allowed the force structures to persecute them “to the point of physical destruction.”
Nabiyev told the Caucasus Knot news agency that this law “contains in itself aggressive and discriminatory provisions” and that Makhachkala “using the right of initiative, devoted a great deal of efforts in order that such a law would be adopted at the federal level. However,” he said, “Moscow turned out to be more far-sighted.”
The union leader-commentator said that he had frequently called on former Daghestani procurator, Imam Yaraliyev, to do something about this unfortunate act, “but the procurator did not have the courage and decisiveness to suspend the implementation of the law.” Now that the republic has a new prosecutor (Andrey Nazarov), Nabiyev said, the situation could change.
In his letter, Nabiyev said that as a result of this law and its consequences, “the people have become a hostage of a civil war between representatives of two different trends in Islam.” In order to get out of this “dead end,” he continued, Makhachkala’s new leaders must take several steps in addition to overturning the 1999 law.
The republic powers that be must “decisively” shut down the activity of “the death squadrons” and end “the practice of extra-judicial executions.” They must “legalize the position of the Salafi leaders, and they must “take measure of an organizational character” to bring them into conversation with the leaders of other Islamic trends.
Other Daghestani leaders rushed to support Nabiyev’s call. Sayfullakh Isayev, the chairman of the legal affairs committee of the Daghestani parliament, said that the 1999 law must be repealed. “The adoption of the law,” he said, “was a big mistake. Now the time has come to correct it,” and he promised that his committee will hold hearings.
Another deputy, Akhmed Azizov, agreed. “Wahhabism,” he pointed out, “is an ideology. There are no problems arising from one or another individual following it. [And] if someone considers that this worldview is not suitable for Daghestan and Russia, he must find more convincing arguments than repression.”
That is because, Azizov continued, “all the history of humanity shows that it is impossible to defeat an ideology by force,” an ancient observation that the ongoing struggle with “Wahhabism” in Daghestan has simply confirmed.
Gadzhi Makhachev, a former Daghestani and Russian parliamentarian who now serves as the republic’s permanent representative to the Russian President, said that the1999 law had been pushed through by then-speaker and recent republic president Mukhu Aliyev and that he, Makhachev, was “categorically an opponent of the adoption of the law.”
Many other deputies at the time felt the same way, Makhachev added, “but Aliyev, using his own resources, was able to push through the measure.” At the same time, Makhachev said, the law should be retained on the books but not enforced so that future generations “will see how a highly placed official should not work.”
Although neither the republic procuracy nor the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Daghestan have reacted yet, it appears that Daghestan, far and away the most Islamic republic of the North Caucasus, is likely to annul the law, a step that may or may not have a major impact on developments there and elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, such a revision would certainly send a powerful signal to Daghestanis that attacks on Wahhabis and the followers of other Salafi trends in Islam no longer will have the blessing of law, a development that will undoubtedly affect other people far beyond the border of the most Islamic republic of the Russian Federation.
But on the other hand, repealing this law alone is unlikely to end Moscow’s demonization of the Wahhabis or end the views of many among the siloviki who have little interest in promoting social concord and who view force rather than persuasion as their weapon of choice against those with whom they do not agree.
New York, March 25 – After the appearance of an open letter from a union leader denouncing the republic’s 1999 law banning Wahhabism, Daghestani parliamentarians have lined up to demand the repeal of this legislation which they view as discriminatory but which has helped to demonize that trend in Islam across Russia.
Taking advantage of changes at the top of the Daghestani political pyramid, Isalmagomed Nabiyev, who often prepares commentaries for the Makhachkala media, dispatched an open letter to the new leader Magomedsalam Magomedov denouncing the 1999 republic law as a counterproductive mistake (dagestan.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/166907/).
Nabiyev wrote in his missive that “one of the main problems of Daghestan” is the intensification of conflict among various segments of the Muslim community. “Such a situation,” he continued, “was created thanks to the father of the current leader of the republic, the former chairman of Daghestan’s State Council Magomedali Magomedov.”
Under Magomedali Magomedov, Nabiyev said, “the Daghestani powers that be began to use force in order to root out one of the ideological directions in Islam. Not by the path of countering to this ideology other forms but by the path of the physical removal of the bearers of this ideology.”
That approach was both encouraged and accelerated by the adoption in September 1999 of the republic law “On the ban of Wahhabi and other types of extremist activity,” on the basis of which, the powers that be declared those who disagreed with them to be “enemies of the people” and thus allowed the force structures to persecute them “to the point of physical destruction.”
Nabiyev told the Caucasus Knot news agency that this law “contains in itself aggressive and discriminatory provisions” and that Makhachkala “using the right of initiative, devoted a great deal of efforts in order that such a law would be adopted at the federal level. However,” he said, “Moscow turned out to be more far-sighted.”
The union leader-commentator said that he had frequently called on former Daghestani procurator, Imam Yaraliyev, to do something about this unfortunate act, “but the procurator did not have the courage and decisiveness to suspend the implementation of the law.” Now that the republic has a new prosecutor (Andrey Nazarov), Nabiyev said, the situation could change.
In his letter, Nabiyev said that as a result of this law and its consequences, “the people have become a hostage of a civil war between representatives of two different trends in Islam.” In order to get out of this “dead end,” he continued, Makhachkala’s new leaders must take several steps in addition to overturning the 1999 law.
The republic powers that be must “decisively” shut down the activity of “the death squadrons” and end “the practice of extra-judicial executions.” They must “legalize the position of the Salafi leaders, and they must “take measure of an organizational character” to bring them into conversation with the leaders of other Islamic trends.
Other Daghestani leaders rushed to support Nabiyev’s call. Sayfullakh Isayev, the chairman of the legal affairs committee of the Daghestani parliament, said that the 1999 law must be repealed. “The adoption of the law,” he said, “was a big mistake. Now the time has come to correct it,” and he promised that his committee will hold hearings.
Another deputy, Akhmed Azizov, agreed. “Wahhabism,” he pointed out, “is an ideology. There are no problems arising from one or another individual following it. [And] if someone considers that this worldview is not suitable for Daghestan and Russia, he must find more convincing arguments than repression.”
That is because, Azizov continued, “all the history of humanity shows that it is impossible to defeat an ideology by force,” an ancient observation that the ongoing struggle with “Wahhabism” in Daghestan has simply confirmed.
Gadzhi Makhachev, a former Daghestani and Russian parliamentarian who now serves as the republic’s permanent representative to the Russian President, said that the1999 law had been pushed through by then-speaker and recent republic president Mukhu Aliyev and that he, Makhachev, was “categorically an opponent of the adoption of the law.”
Many other deputies at the time felt the same way, Makhachev added, “but Aliyev, using his own resources, was able to push through the measure.” At the same time, Makhachev said, the law should be retained on the books but not enforced so that future generations “will see how a highly placed official should not work.”
Although neither the republic procuracy nor the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Daghestan have reacted yet, it appears that Daghestan, far and away the most Islamic republic of the North Caucasus, is likely to annul the law, a step that may or may not have a major impact on developments there and elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, such a revision would certainly send a powerful signal to Daghestanis that attacks on Wahhabis and the followers of other Salafi trends in Islam no longer will have the blessing of law, a development that will undoubtedly affect other people far beyond the border of the most Islamic republic of the Russian Federation.
But on the other hand, repealing this law alone is unlikely to end Moscow’s demonization of the Wahhabis or end the views of many among the siloviki who have little interest in promoting social concord and who view force rather than persuasion as their weapon of choice against those with whom they do not agree.
Window on Eurasia: Pavlovsky Reveals ‘Unconstitutional’ and ‘Dictatorial’ Nature of Current Russian Regime, Pavlova Says
Paul Goble
New York, March 25 – By tolerating a certain limited amount of discussion and debate, Russian commentator Irina Pavlova says, the current powers that be have effectively concealed from many in the West both just how dictatorial the regime has become and how unwilling it is ever going to be to share or cede power to anyone else.
And because of that smokescreen, the Grani.ru commentator says, the recent exchange of opinions between Vladislav Inozemtsev and Gleb Pavlovsky in the current issue of “New Times” (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/17621) provides confirmation of “just how “unconstitutional” and “illegal” the regime now is (grani.ru/opinion/m.176288.html).
In their debate on “will Putin leave?” Inozemtsev, the head of the Moscow Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society, approaches that issue, Pavlova says, “like a typical Russian intelligent, loyal to the powers that be and up to now seeing an answer from them on ‘where the country should be headed.’”
He was, she continues, a part of “that [outsider] elite which in 1999 [nonetheless] welcomed the behind the scenes decision of Boris Yeltsin on the selection of his successor as president of Russia and then saw in Vladimir Putin a modernizer.” After his initial enthusiasm, Inozemtsev became disappointed, and now “wants Putin to go.”
Pavlovsky, head of Moscow Effective Politics Foundation, approaches the issue entirely differently, having “the view of an insider who all these years has been working for the powers that be,” Pavlova continues. And she suggests that his remarks are especially revealing about the nature of the Russian state now.
First, she points out, Pavlovsky “confirmed that real power in Russia is unconstitutional and consequently illegal.” According to him, “Putin is ‘that informal institution which the Constitution does not have … He is the supreme authority of this system,” something that is enshrined in no document at all.
Second, when he discussed “’the keyboard’ by which Putin ‘works with the bureaucracy, [Pavlovsky] in essence confirmed the presence in the powers that be of a secret infrastructure, a network of paid and unpaid employees of the special services and force organs,” a network that “operates by the rules of conspiracy,” just as the “real power” did in Soviet times.
Many people, Pavlova notes, had already concluded that this is the case, and some of them look back to the August 1995 law Yeltsin signed that opened the way for the post-Soviet force structures and special services to operate in a “conspiratorial” fashion because that measure called for them to obtain information informally that threatened the state.
With the rise of Putin and exploiting both this law and the subsequent legislation on the FSB, the Russian powers that be began to exploit these opportunities in violation of the Constitution and to the detriment of the Russian people, Pavlova says. And she asks, “what kind of apolitical arrangement is this if not a dictatorship?”
“Such ‘a consolidated power’ is precisely a dictatorship,” she argues, although “true, one of a new, post-modern type. It uses not mass repressions but targeted murders, lies, bribery, corruption, provocations, and political technologies for the manipulation of social consciousness both inside the country and also abroad.”
Pavlovsky confirmed that, she says, when he observed that “20 years ago we thought that Soviet power was the CPSU Central Committee plus the party plus the soviets. It turned out that we were idiots and that Soviet power could exist with freedom of travel abroad, with free trade, and with ‘Playboy.’”
Pavlova continues that “it would be strange if this political technologist who serves the powers that be were to propose to free Russia” from these arrangements. Instead, she suggests, “he has different task in principle: he is seeking means to strengthen and modernize ‘the political façade’ of this unseen but real power.”
His casting about for a way to do that is shown by the three different ways he talks about Putin and the system. In one place, he says Putin should work with Medvedev to consolidate power. In another, he decries the way in which the tandemocracy limits Putin’s freedom of action. And in a third, he says Putin needs to be “in fact the master” and “vozhd’” of the system.
“One thing,” Pavlova concludes, is absolutely clear. “The current leadership in the Kremlin simply is not going to give up its place to anyone else.” That is something those who want Russia to become a constitutional state need to remember, she argues, and it is something that the current opposition must never allow itself to forget.
New York, March 25 – By tolerating a certain limited amount of discussion and debate, Russian commentator Irina Pavlova says, the current powers that be have effectively concealed from many in the West both just how dictatorial the regime has become and how unwilling it is ever going to be to share or cede power to anyone else.
And because of that smokescreen, the Grani.ru commentator says, the recent exchange of opinions between Vladislav Inozemtsev and Gleb Pavlovsky in the current issue of “New Times” (newtimes.ru/articles/detail/17621) provides confirmation of “just how “unconstitutional” and “illegal” the regime now is (grani.ru/opinion/m.176288.html).
In their debate on “will Putin leave?” Inozemtsev, the head of the Moscow Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society, approaches that issue, Pavlova says, “like a typical Russian intelligent, loyal to the powers that be and up to now seeing an answer from them on ‘where the country should be headed.’”
He was, she continues, a part of “that [outsider] elite which in 1999 [nonetheless] welcomed the behind the scenes decision of Boris Yeltsin on the selection of his successor as president of Russia and then saw in Vladimir Putin a modernizer.” After his initial enthusiasm, Inozemtsev became disappointed, and now “wants Putin to go.”
Pavlovsky, head of Moscow Effective Politics Foundation, approaches the issue entirely differently, having “the view of an insider who all these years has been working for the powers that be,” Pavlova continues. And she suggests that his remarks are especially revealing about the nature of the Russian state now.
First, she points out, Pavlovsky “confirmed that real power in Russia is unconstitutional and consequently illegal.” According to him, “Putin is ‘that informal institution which the Constitution does not have … He is the supreme authority of this system,” something that is enshrined in no document at all.
Second, when he discussed “’the keyboard’ by which Putin ‘works with the bureaucracy, [Pavlovsky] in essence confirmed the presence in the powers that be of a secret infrastructure, a network of paid and unpaid employees of the special services and force organs,” a network that “operates by the rules of conspiracy,” just as the “real power” did in Soviet times.
Many people, Pavlova notes, had already concluded that this is the case, and some of them look back to the August 1995 law Yeltsin signed that opened the way for the post-Soviet force structures and special services to operate in a “conspiratorial” fashion because that measure called for them to obtain information informally that threatened the state.
With the rise of Putin and exploiting both this law and the subsequent legislation on the FSB, the Russian powers that be began to exploit these opportunities in violation of the Constitution and to the detriment of the Russian people, Pavlova says. And she asks, “what kind of apolitical arrangement is this if not a dictatorship?”
“Such ‘a consolidated power’ is precisely a dictatorship,” she argues, although “true, one of a new, post-modern type. It uses not mass repressions but targeted murders, lies, bribery, corruption, provocations, and political technologies for the manipulation of social consciousness both inside the country and also abroad.”
Pavlovsky confirmed that, she says, when he observed that “20 years ago we thought that Soviet power was the CPSU Central Committee plus the party plus the soviets. It turned out that we were idiots and that Soviet power could exist with freedom of travel abroad, with free trade, and with ‘Playboy.’”
Pavlova continues that “it would be strange if this political technologist who serves the powers that be were to propose to free Russia” from these arrangements. Instead, she suggests, “he has different task in principle: he is seeking means to strengthen and modernize ‘the political façade’ of this unseen but real power.”
His casting about for a way to do that is shown by the three different ways he talks about Putin and the system. In one place, he says Putin should work with Medvedev to consolidate power. In another, he decries the way in which the tandemocracy limits Putin’s freedom of action. And in a third, he says Putin needs to be “in fact the master” and “vozhd’” of the system.
“One thing,” Pavlova concludes, is absolutely clear. “The current leadership in the Kremlin simply is not going to give up its place to anyone else.” That is something those who want Russia to become a constitutional state need to remember, she argues, and it is something that the current opposition must never allow itself to forget.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Demographic Problems, Budgetary Limitations Block Russian Army from Maintaining Planned Force Levels, Expert Says
Paul Goble
New York, March 24 – Russia cannot maintain its military at current staffing levels through the draft because of the country’s demographic decline, and it cannot build an entirely professional one because of budgetary limitations, unless Moscow makes major changes, according to a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights.
These are things that President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and most senior officials fully understand, Sergey Krivenko, who also serves as coordinator for the public initiative “Citizen and Soldier,” but that understanding leaves them with few attractive options (www.rosbalt.ru/2010/03/23/722566.html).
Although the interview Gen. Nikolay Markov, the chief of the General Staff, gave to “Rossiiskaya gazeta” attracted fare more attention, the press conference Krivenko gave together with Soldiers Mothers Committee of Moscow chief Tatyana Kuznetsova and VTsIOM sociologist Konstantin Abramov provided many more details.
Speaking first, Krivenko explicitly stated that “the failure of military reform in the form in which it has been conducted up to now is recognized by the leadership of the country.” The planned shift to a largely professional force has failed, and the draft, given the reduced length of service the government has allowed, is not working either.
Plans for contract service have failed so far “not as a result of financial causes but as a result of the incompetent administrative decisions of the Defense Ministry,” Krivenko continued, but plans to try to rescue the situation by boosting the salaries of professionals still further would bust the budget, particularly if the relative number of less-well-paid draftees continues to fall.
But their numbers appear bound to fall, at least in the next few years, given the small size of the cohort born in the troubled 1990s. If the number of soldiers is to be kept at 700,000 and if draftees are to serve only one year, then the military would have to draft 700,000 young people each year, a number far exceeding the number in the prime draft age groups.
One could address that, he says, but forcing people who avoided service earlier and who are still under 35 years of age to serve, “but for this would be necessary another kind of state, and one can imagine just what it would be like.” Such “a draconian variant” is something no one is now seriously considering.
Krivenko stressed that “the president and the government understand this. And they understand that ahead is a dead end,” one from which the country can escape either by spending more money on the military, increasing the length of service for those who are drafted, or cutting the size of the services still further.
Increasing the length of service is the easiest in some ways: after all, Moscow did it in the 1990s, boosting the requirement from 18 months to two years. But Krivenko argued that there are two reasons Moscow might not want to go in that direction. First, “the difference between one year and two” “is qualitatively different” than the earlier much-smaller increase.
And two, such an increase could exacerbate social and political tensions, possibly having an impact, he explicitly suggests, on who will occupy the position of Russian president after the 2012 election. Consequently, decisions on force structure are likely to become more not less political in the coming months.
In her comments, Kuznetsova seconded Krivenko’s suggestion that increasing the length of the draft would spark anger, especially given the continuing illegal behavior of the interior ministry in support of the draft and the equally illegal and highly offensive “dedovshchina” within the military.
But in his remarks, Abramov suggested that his polls indicate that Russian society still has not made a final judgment about military service. In 2009, 51 percent of those polled said that they favor retaining the draft, hardly an overwhelming majority but more than the 35 percent who favored such service in a 1998 poll.
Some 70 percent of those who favor a draft say they believe it is necessary to maintain the necessary reserves, while about 40 percent, Abramov continued, “consider the army ‘a good school of life,” and a slightly smaller number suggest that it is school that helps train good citizens more generally.
Asked why young Russians don’t want to serve, 70 percent mentioned dedovshchina, 29 percent pointed to the risks of internal conflicts, about 30 percent noted the difficultiesof service, 15 percent said young people were not patriotic enough, and “14 percent supposed that young people do not want to lose years” of the lives to such service.
Among the other figures Abramov offered were the following: “More than 70 percent of Russians consider increasing military spending necessary while only 25 percent favor an increase in the number of those in uniform,” with “about half of those polled offering that the number in the Armed Forces now is more or less optimal.”
A major reason for that support, the VTsIOM analyst suggested, is that the military enjoys a high and rising approval rating. The share of Russians saying they approve what the army is doing has risen from 32 percent in2006 to 56 percent in 2009, cresting at 61 percent at the time of the Georgian war.
According to Abramov, “the army and the media are the only social institutions which citizens place ‘in the positive part of the scale.’ For comparison,” he notes, “the Social Chamber of the Russian Federation is ‘at the zero point,’ with the remaining ‘social institutions’ being in an even worse position.
New York, March 24 – Russia cannot maintain its military at current staffing levels through the draft because of the country’s demographic decline, and it cannot build an entirely professional one because of budgetary limitations, unless Moscow makes major changes, according to a member of the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights.
These are things that President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and most senior officials fully understand, Sergey Krivenko, who also serves as coordinator for the public initiative “Citizen and Soldier,” but that understanding leaves them with few attractive options (www.rosbalt.ru/2010/03/23/722566.html).
Although the interview Gen. Nikolay Markov, the chief of the General Staff, gave to “Rossiiskaya gazeta” attracted fare more attention, the press conference Krivenko gave together with Soldiers Mothers Committee of Moscow chief Tatyana Kuznetsova and VTsIOM sociologist Konstantin Abramov provided many more details.
Speaking first, Krivenko explicitly stated that “the failure of military reform in the form in which it has been conducted up to now is recognized by the leadership of the country.” The planned shift to a largely professional force has failed, and the draft, given the reduced length of service the government has allowed, is not working either.
Plans for contract service have failed so far “not as a result of financial causes but as a result of the incompetent administrative decisions of the Defense Ministry,” Krivenko continued, but plans to try to rescue the situation by boosting the salaries of professionals still further would bust the budget, particularly if the relative number of less-well-paid draftees continues to fall.
But their numbers appear bound to fall, at least in the next few years, given the small size of the cohort born in the troubled 1990s. If the number of soldiers is to be kept at 700,000 and if draftees are to serve only one year, then the military would have to draft 700,000 young people each year, a number far exceeding the number in the prime draft age groups.
One could address that, he says, but forcing people who avoided service earlier and who are still under 35 years of age to serve, “but for this would be necessary another kind of state, and one can imagine just what it would be like.” Such “a draconian variant” is something no one is now seriously considering.
Krivenko stressed that “the president and the government understand this. And they understand that ahead is a dead end,” one from which the country can escape either by spending more money on the military, increasing the length of service for those who are drafted, or cutting the size of the services still further.
Increasing the length of service is the easiest in some ways: after all, Moscow did it in the 1990s, boosting the requirement from 18 months to two years. But Krivenko argued that there are two reasons Moscow might not want to go in that direction. First, “the difference between one year and two” “is qualitatively different” than the earlier much-smaller increase.
And two, such an increase could exacerbate social and political tensions, possibly having an impact, he explicitly suggests, on who will occupy the position of Russian president after the 2012 election. Consequently, decisions on force structure are likely to become more not less political in the coming months.
In her comments, Kuznetsova seconded Krivenko’s suggestion that increasing the length of the draft would spark anger, especially given the continuing illegal behavior of the interior ministry in support of the draft and the equally illegal and highly offensive “dedovshchina” within the military.
But in his remarks, Abramov suggested that his polls indicate that Russian society still has not made a final judgment about military service. In 2009, 51 percent of those polled said that they favor retaining the draft, hardly an overwhelming majority but more than the 35 percent who favored such service in a 1998 poll.
Some 70 percent of those who favor a draft say they believe it is necessary to maintain the necessary reserves, while about 40 percent, Abramov continued, “consider the army ‘a good school of life,” and a slightly smaller number suggest that it is school that helps train good citizens more generally.
Asked why young Russians don’t want to serve, 70 percent mentioned dedovshchina, 29 percent pointed to the risks of internal conflicts, about 30 percent noted the difficultiesof service, 15 percent said young people were not patriotic enough, and “14 percent supposed that young people do not want to lose years” of the lives to such service.
Among the other figures Abramov offered were the following: “More than 70 percent of Russians consider increasing military spending necessary while only 25 percent favor an increase in the number of those in uniform,” with “about half of those polled offering that the number in the Armed Forces now is more or less optimal.”
A major reason for that support, the VTsIOM analyst suggested, is that the military enjoys a high and rising approval rating. The share of Russians saying they approve what the army is doing has risen from 32 percent in2006 to 56 percent in 2009, cresting at 61 percent at the time of the Georgian war.
According to Abramov, “the army and the media are the only social institutions which citizens place ‘in the positive part of the scale.’ For comparison,” he notes, “the Social Chamber of the Russian Federation is ‘at the zero point,’ with the remaining ‘social institutions’ being in an even worse position.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Views Climate Change as a Security Threat, Mulls Creating ‘Climatic Assistance’ Program
Paul Goble
New York, March 24 – Russia, as experts around the world agree, is likely to be more profoundly affected by climate change than any other country, and Moscow is now focusing on the security threats global warming may entail not only within the country but in its relations with its closest neighbors.
Last week, the Russian Security Council devoted its meeting to these issues, and this week, academic experts and activists discussed them at Moscow Social Forum on Energy Effectiveness and Climate change. Yury Averyanov, a Security Council official who was involved with both, spoke to the media about these issues.
In an extensive interview with “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Averyanov said that global warming would affect various parts of Russia differently. On the one hand, he said, climate change would have some positive effects on parts of the country extending the growing season, reducing fuel consumption needs, and boosting hydro-power production in some areas.
But on the other, the economist continued, its negative impact on the country both domestically and in terms of its relations with neighboring states to the south and foreign powers in the Arctic region means that the security implications of climate change must always remain at the center of Russian discussion (www.rg.ru/2010/03/19/klimat.html).
Global warming, he said, would increase the dangerous of flooding in many parts of Russia, with excessive runoff into rivers possibly leading to more accidents at hydro-electric dams and at other littoral facilities. And it will profoundly affect the two-thirds of Russian territory which is in the permafrost zone.
It will reduce the size of that zone and increase the depth of annual melting, and “over the next ten to fifteen years,” global warming will destabilize the foundations of “many cities in the zones of eternal permafrost as well as thousands of kilometers of pipelines, automobile and rail roads,” thus increasing the risk of breakdowns and accidents.
“About 80 percent of BAM passes through the permafrost zone. Its melting and the increase in snowfalls will require a review of construction norms and rules given the changes in climate,” Averyanov added. And he noted that “a quarter of the houses built in Tiksi, Yakutsk, Vorkuta, and other population centers will become completely unsuitable for habitation.”
All these developments, the Security Council official said, affect Russia’s national security, but he stressed that there were two other more immediate security challenges that global warming presents. On the one hand, he said, global warning has sparked competition for access to the Arctic, with the US and other countries seeking to limit Russia’s access to that region.
And on the other – and this is a more intriguing comment – Averyanov said that in addition, “the risk of [inter-state] conflicts connected with the deficit of water and food [arising out of climate change] is especially high to the south” of Russia, even though most discussion hitherto has focused on the Arctic instead.
At the climate forum, which took place yesterday, Averyanov said that this threat is no sufficiently great that Russia “must create its own program of ‘climatic assistance’ to its partners, above all in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Community (eco.rian.ru/business/20100323/215932642.html).
Such assistance, it appears likely, would be directed in the first instance to prevent any massive increase in outmigration from these countries to the Russian Federation as well as to reduce the chance that competition for water and food in Central Asia in particular could trigger new armed conflicts into which Russia might be drawn.
But it is also likely that the offer of such assistance or the arrangements that would be made to realize it would give Moscow a new set of levers on these countries, thus representing yet another instance in which that country like some others has transformed a national security threat into a national security opportunity.
New York, March 24 – Russia, as experts around the world agree, is likely to be more profoundly affected by climate change than any other country, and Moscow is now focusing on the security threats global warming may entail not only within the country but in its relations with its closest neighbors.
Last week, the Russian Security Council devoted its meeting to these issues, and this week, academic experts and activists discussed them at Moscow Social Forum on Energy Effectiveness and Climate change. Yury Averyanov, a Security Council official who was involved with both, spoke to the media about these issues.
In an extensive interview with “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Averyanov said that global warming would affect various parts of Russia differently. On the one hand, he said, climate change would have some positive effects on parts of the country extending the growing season, reducing fuel consumption needs, and boosting hydro-power production in some areas.
But on the other, the economist continued, its negative impact on the country both domestically and in terms of its relations with neighboring states to the south and foreign powers in the Arctic region means that the security implications of climate change must always remain at the center of Russian discussion (www.rg.ru/2010/03/19/klimat.html).
Global warming, he said, would increase the dangerous of flooding in many parts of Russia, with excessive runoff into rivers possibly leading to more accidents at hydro-electric dams and at other littoral facilities. And it will profoundly affect the two-thirds of Russian territory which is in the permafrost zone.
It will reduce the size of that zone and increase the depth of annual melting, and “over the next ten to fifteen years,” global warming will destabilize the foundations of “many cities in the zones of eternal permafrost as well as thousands of kilometers of pipelines, automobile and rail roads,” thus increasing the risk of breakdowns and accidents.
“About 80 percent of BAM passes through the permafrost zone. Its melting and the increase in snowfalls will require a review of construction norms and rules given the changes in climate,” Averyanov added. And he noted that “a quarter of the houses built in Tiksi, Yakutsk, Vorkuta, and other population centers will become completely unsuitable for habitation.”
All these developments, the Security Council official said, affect Russia’s national security, but he stressed that there were two other more immediate security challenges that global warming presents. On the one hand, he said, global warning has sparked competition for access to the Arctic, with the US and other countries seeking to limit Russia’s access to that region.
And on the other – and this is a more intriguing comment – Averyanov said that in addition, “the risk of [inter-state] conflicts connected with the deficit of water and food [arising out of climate change] is especially high to the south” of Russia, even though most discussion hitherto has focused on the Arctic instead.
At the climate forum, which took place yesterday, Averyanov said that this threat is no sufficiently great that Russia “must create its own program of ‘climatic assistance’ to its partners, above all in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Community (eco.rian.ru/business/20100323/215932642.html).
Such assistance, it appears likely, would be directed in the first instance to prevent any massive increase in outmigration from these countries to the Russian Federation as well as to reduce the chance that competition for water and food in Central Asia in particular could trigger new armed conflicts into which Russia might be drawn.
But it is also likely that the offer of such assistance or the arrangements that would be made to realize it would give Moscow a new set of levers on these countries, thus representing yet another instance in which that country like some others has transformed a national security threat into a national security opportunity.
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