Paul Goble
Vienna, December 28 -- Viktor Volodarskiy, the Supreme Ataman of the Union of Cossack Hosts of Russia and Abroad and a newly-elected member of the Duma, has announced that he is organizing a Cossack caucus in the Russian legislature to promote the interests of his community and the traditional values of the Russian nation.
Such a group, he told journalists this week, will have 57 members, making it equal to the representation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), far larger than the fractions of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democrats (LDPR) and Just Russia faction and exceeded in size only by the pro-Kremlin United Russia bloc.
When he and several senior Cossacks first appeared in the Duma in full dress uniform, Volodarskiy said, many other members approached them and said “We are Cossacks: too: put us down on your list.” And so he decided to formalize that by creating a “stanitsa” in the State Duma (http://www.rusk.ru/vst.php?idar=174905).
As a deputy, Volodarskiy said, he will seek to amend the Russian legal code so that Cossack communities will be able to contribute to “the resolution of those problems which the state has,” changes that he said others had proposed but that the Duma had not considered in the past.
In his press conference, the Cossack leader did not specify what these changes might be, but he and other Cossacks often have called on the government to allow them to play a more active role in promoting their version of law and order against those, including ethnic and religious minorities, whose activities they say threaten the country.
Indeed, in the last week alone, Volodarskiy and other Cossacks have specifically urged that their communities be given the charge of fighting “religious sectarians,” a term that many in Russia now employ to mean almost every group that the Russian Orthodox Church does not consider a “traditional” Russian faith.
Given the reputation the Cossacks have for violence and repression and the often vicious comments of some contemporary Cossack leaders, the possibility that the Russian state might allow them to act more independently or serve as adjuncts to the country’s law enforcement officials is frightening.
But despite that, some Russian news outlets have treated Volodarskiy’s announcement as a wonderful year end story, while others, including one close to the Russian Orthodox Church and the military (http://www.pobeda.ru/content/view/7390/131/) appear to have welcomed it as an important step in the right direction.
On the one hand, of course, with only 57 members out of 450, the Cossack deputies, however much attention their colorful uniforms may attract, are unlikely to be able to achieve much on their own but then neither are the other small parties. Indeed, the Cossack caucus might assume the role of court jester that Zhirinovskiy has so often played.
But on the other hand, the Cossack deputies are certain to have allies among the more than 40 senior military officers -- including Gen. Igor Puzanov of the Leningrad Military District, Lt. Gen. Khamit Kamalov of the railway forces, and Col. Gen. Vladimir Kolesnikov who now works as deputy justice minister -- who also are in the new Duma.
And both the Cossacks and the siloviki deputies are likely to enjoy the backing of the increasingly authoritarian Kremlin and its political front, United Russia, thereby guaranteeing that some if not all of the new legal arrangements Volodarskiy wants will in fact become law.
As a result, this new Cossack caucus, however small a role Volodarskiy and the others may in fact play on their own, is above all a disturbing sign of the times, one that highlights the increasing authoritarianism of the Russian government and the Kremlin’s willingness to rely on some of the least responsible members of Russian society to maintain order.
Friday, December 28, 2007
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Window on Eurasia: How Central Asian Countries Have Become More Muslim
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 27 -- Many analysts have focused on the rapidly increasing indigenous populations of the five Central Asian countries and the departure of ethnic Russians from them over the last two decades, but a new study highlights how these trends are transforming the balance between Islam and Christianity there.
In an article posted online yesterday, Aleksandr Shustov surveys the ways in which these demographic shifts have dramatically reduced the presence of Christianity as a faith and as a cultural definer in Central Asia and equally dramatically increased the role of Islam as both (http://www.fondsk.ru/print.php?id=1140).
Members of Christian nationalities -- the so-called “ethnic Christians” -- and others who were converted to that faith formed “an absolute majority” of the population in Kazakhstan at the end of the 1980s, Shustov points out. But by the time of the 1999 census there, “ethnic Muslims” had displaced the them as the predominant culture.
Elsewhere in Central Asia, “ethnic Muslims” constituted a majority of the population already at the end of Soviet times, but their proportion of the population has significantly increased, at least according to the available data. And that in turn changes the way in which these countries and their leaders view the world.
In Kyrgystan, the percentage of “ethnic Christians” fell from 26.7 percent in 1989 to 14 percent ten years later, with the percentage of “ethnic Muslims” rising from 71 percent to 84 percent over the same period. Intriguingly, Shustov points out, the fraction of “ethnic Christians” there identifying as Russian Orthodox rose from 91 to 97 percent.
In Uzbekistan, over the same period, the number of “ethnic Muslims” increased by 29 percent while the number of “ethnic Christians” declined by 28 percent. As a result, the “ethnic Muslims” increased their share of the population from 86 to 92 percent, while the “ethnic Christians” saw theirs decline from 9.6 percent to 5.8 percent.
In Turkmenistan, reliable data are lacking, Shustov said, but “ethnic Muslims” certainly now constitute at least 90 percent of the population. And in Tajikistan, the share of “ethnic Muslims” has risen from 89.5 percent in 1989 to 98.5 percent now, with the percentage of “ethnic Christians” falling from 9.6 to 1.2.
Obviously, as Shustov notes, many of those who are members of groups traditionally identified with one or another faith do not practice the faith. In Kazakhstan, for example, only one or two percent of ethnic Russians actively participate in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church. And only a relatively small number of Muslims go to mosques regularly.
The same situation is true elsewhere, but these shifts in the make up of the population do have an effect, reducing the influence of Christianity on the thinking of many people there and increasing that of Islam on both the population as a whole and the political leadership of the five countries.
Indeed, Shustov says, these population shifts help to explain not only the growing interest of many “ethnic Muslims” in the historical faith of their nations. One measure of that has been an increase in the number of mosques over the last decade in all of these countries.
Shustov reports that in Uzbekistan alone, some 3,000 mosques and 21,000 prayer rooms had been opened by the mid-1990s. In Kazakhstan by 1993 there were some 500 major mosques; in Tajikistan, some 130 major and 2,000 smaller mosques, and in Kyrgyzstan, approximately 1,000 major mosques, almost all of them opened after 1991.
Such growth, both demographic and organizational, has also contributed to an increase in the amount of influence of political Islam, which sometimes has taken the form of the radical Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement across Central Asia and at others in more nationally defined parties.
Given that there is no indication that the demographic trends of the last two decades will be reversed and that Central Asian countries thus seem certain to become more Muslim in a cultural and political if not always religious sense, it is entirely likely that the influence of such radical groups will grow.
And thus Shustov’s examination of the region in terms not of changes in the relative size of ethnic groups as has been the normal practice but instead with regard to religious shifts may be a more reliable indicator of where things are heading in a region whose peoples already face a broad variety of challenges.
Vienna, December 27 -- Many analysts have focused on the rapidly increasing indigenous populations of the five Central Asian countries and the departure of ethnic Russians from them over the last two decades, but a new study highlights how these trends are transforming the balance between Islam and Christianity there.
In an article posted online yesterday, Aleksandr Shustov surveys the ways in which these demographic shifts have dramatically reduced the presence of Christianity as a faith and as a cultural definer in Central Asia and equally dramatically increased the role of Islam as both (http://www.fondsk.ru/print.php?id=1140).
Members of Christian nationalities -- the so-called “ethnic Christians” -- and others who were converted to that faith formed “an absolute majority” of the population in Kazakhstan at the end of the 1980s, Shustov points out. But by the time of the 1999 census there, “ethnic Muslims” had displaced the them as the predominant culture.
Elsewhere in Central Asia, “ethnic Muslims” constituted a majority of the population already at the end of Soviet times, but their proportion of the population has significantly increased, at least according to the available data. And that in turn changes the way in which these countries and their leaders view the world.
In Kyrgystan, the percentage of “ethnic Christians” fell from 26.7 percent in 1989 to 14 percent ten years later, with the percentage of “ethnic Muslims” rising from 71 percent to 84 percent over the same period. Intriguingly, Shustov points out, the fraction of “ethnic Christians” there identifying as Russian Orthodox rose from 91 to 97 percent.
In Uzbekistan, over the same period, the number of “ethnic Muslims” increased by 29 percent while the number of “ethnic Christians” declined by 28 percent. As a result, the “ethnic Muslims” increased their share of the population from 86 to 92 percent, while the “ethnic Christians” saw theirs decline from 9.6 percent to 5.8 percent.
In Turkmenistan, reliable data are lacking, Shustov said, but “ethnic Muslims” certainly now constitute at least 90 percent of the population. And in Tajikistan, the share of “ethnic Muslims” has risen from 89.5 percent in 1989 to 98.5 percent now, with the percentage of “ethnic Christians” falling from 9.6 to 1.2.
Obviously, as Shustov notes, many of those who are members of groups traditionally identified with one or another faith do not practice the faith. In Kazakhstan, for example, only one or two percent of ethnic Russians actively participate in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church. And only a relatively small number of Muslims go to mosques regularly.
The same situation is true elsewhere, but these shifts in the make up of the population do have an effect, reducing the influence of Christianity on the thinking of many people there and increasing that of Islam on both the population as a whole and the political leadership of the five countries.
Indeed, Shustov says, these population shifts help to explain not only the growing interest of many “ethnic Muslims” in the historical faith of their nations. One measure of that has been an increase in the number of mosques over the last decade in all of these countries.
Shustov reports that in Uzbekistan alone, some 3,000 mosques and 21,000 prayer rooms had been opened by the mid-1990s. In Kazakhstan by 1993 there were some 500 major mosques; in Tajikistan, some 130 major and 2,000 smaller mosques, and in Kyrgyzstan, approximately 1,000 major mosques, almost all of them opened after 1991.
Such growth, both demographic and organizational, has also contributed to an increase in the amount of influence of political Islam, which sometimes has taken the form of the radical Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement across Central Asia and at others in more nationally defined parties.
Given that there is no indication that the demographic trends of the last two decades will be reversed and that Central Asian countries thus seem certain to become more Muslim in a cultural and political if not always religious sense, it is entirely likely that the influence of such radical groups will grow.
And thus Shustov’s examination of the region in terms not of changes in the relative size of ethnic groups as has been the normal practice but instead with regard to religious shifts may be a more reliable indicator of where things are heading in a region whose peoples already face a broad variety of challenges.
Window on Eurasia: FEOR Says Xenophobia Ebbed in Russia in 2007 But Rights Groups Disagree
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 27 -- The Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR) says that there was a decline in the number of cases of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Russia in 2007 compared to the year before, but other human rights groups there dispute that, arguing that the number of such incidents in fact rose by a third over 2006.
Yesterday, Borukh Gorin, the head of FEOR’s external relations department, said that statistics gathered by his organization about manifestations of anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the Russian Federation over the last several years “show that happily such phenomena are in decline” (http://www.regions.ru/news/2117063).
The FEOR expert said that during there year, his organization had identified 16 anti-Semitic publications, 34 cases of threatening behavior against Jews and other minorities, five cases of the use of force, and 11 attacks on synagogues and other religious sites, a clear reduction in all categories except that of the number of publications.
Not only did these numbers reverse earlier trends, he continued, but they “completely contradicted predictions” made earlier that the election campaign would lead to an increase in the number of such incidents in 2007. He credited the actions of the Russian special services and law enforcement agencies for these positive developments.
Gorin added that he was pleased that during the course of the year, the government had published “for the first time” and now “regularly updates the list of nationalist extremist publications that are banned from distribution on the territory of Russia,” a process that he said was “the common practice in very many civilized countries.”
At the same time, however, Gorin cautioned against any relaxation of these efforts. The reduction in the number of incidents in 2007 was only “a first victory,” and he expressed the hope that the authorities will now seek to bring to justice many of the participants in these and earlier anti-Semitic and xenophobic attacks.
Human rights activists expressed surprise at FEOR’s conclusions. Alla Gerber, the president of the Holocaust Foundation, told Novyye izvestiya that she had “precise data that confirm that the level of xenophobia in the country has not fallen but on the contrary, is growing every day” (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=print&div=7491).
She added that “the picture as before is very serious and even threatening,” although she acknowledged that Russian prosecutors “had begun to react to nationalist crimes” more often than they had in the past. “Not always,” she said, but at least they had made some steps in the right direction.
Aleksandr Vinnikov, who heads the “For Russia Without Racism” organization, also disagreed with the FEOR findings. He said that according to the information he had, “xenophobia is growing very quickly” in Russia both among the population at large and among the country’s political elite.
And Aleksandr Brod, the director of the Moscow Human Rights Bureau, added that “with each year, the number of attacks on people” in Russia on an ethnic or religious basis “has been increasing 10-15 percent.” Last year was no exception, he said, adding that “only the blind cannot see this.”
According to a report by his organization featured in today’s Gazeta, “the number of attacks and conflicts rooted in xenophobia in Russia in 2007 compared with the previous year grew by a third,” with the number of deaths going up 20 percent and the number of wounded “almost doubling” (http://gzt.ru/society/2007/12/27/120331.html).
Most of the reason for the differences between the conclusions of FEOR and those of the other groups, of course, reflects the way in which these organizations define xenophobia and gather information about it. FEOR naturally directs its attention to incidents of anti-Semitism and relies heavily on information provided by others with a similar focus
The other groups not only tend to tend to consider xenophobia more broadly but in at least some cases draw on a wider variety of sources, thus picking up more cases. Brod’s Moscow Human Rights Group, for example, pointedly noted that this year ethnic Russians had suffered more deaths from xenophobic attacks than any other ethnic or religious group.
But these contrasting points of view regrettably are likely to fuel suspicions on the part of some that FEOR’s leaders may be trying to curry favor with the Kremlin and on the part of others -- including some in the government itself -- that the human rights groups are seeking to blacken the image of Russia in order to attract attention from the West.
Vienna, December 27 -- The Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR) says that there was a decline in the number of cases of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Russia in 2007 compared to the year before, but other human rights groups there dispute that, arguing that the number of such incidents in fact rose by a third over 2006.
Yesterday, Borukh Gorin, the head of FEOR’s external relations department, said that statistics gathered by his organization about manifestations of anti-Semitism and xenophobia in the Russian Federation over the last several years “show that happily such phenomena are in decline” (http://www.regions.ru/news/2117063).
The FEOR expert said that during there year, his organization had identified 16 anti-Semitic publications, 34 cases of threatening behavior against Jews and other minorities, five cases of the use of force, and 11 attacks on synagogues and other religious sites, a clear reduction in all categories except that of the number of publications.
Not only did these numbers reverse earlier trends, he continued, but they “completely contradicted predictions” made earlier that the election campaign would lead to an increase in the number of such incidents in 2007. He credited the actions of the Russian special services and law enforcement agencies for these positive developments.
Gorin added that he was pleased that during the course of the year, the government had published “for the first time” and now “regularly updates the list of nationalist extremist publications that are banned from distribution on the territory of Russia,” a process that he said was “the common practice in very many civilized countries.”
At the same time, however, Gorin cautioned against any relaxation of these efforts. The reduction in the number of incidents in 2007 was only “a first victory,” and he expressed the hope that the authorities will now seek to bring to justice many of the participants in these and earlier anti-Semitic and xenophobic attacks.
Human rights activists expressed surprise at FEOR’s conclusions. Alla Gerber, the president of the Holocaust Foundation, told Novyye izvestiya that she had “precise data that confirm that the level of xenophobia in the country has not fallen but on the contrary, is growing every day” (http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=print&div=7491).
She added that “the picture as before is very serious and even threatening,” although she acknowledged that Russian prosecutors “had begun to react to nationalist crimes” more often than they had in the past. “Not always,” she said, but at least they had made some steps in the right direction.
Aleksandr Vinnikov, who heads the “For Russia Without Racism” organization, also disagreed with the FEOR findings. He said that according to the information he had, “xenophobia is growing very quickly” in Russia both among the population at large and among the country’s political elite.
And Aleksandr Brod, the director of the Moscow Human Rights Bureau, added that “with each year, the number of attacks on people” in Russia on an ethnic or religious basis “has been increasing 10-15 percent.” Last year was no exception, he said, adding that “only the blind cannot see this.”
According to a report by his organization featured in today’s Gazeta, “the number of attacks and conflicts rooted in xenophobia in Russia in 2007 compared with the previous year grew by a third,” with the number of deaths going up 20 percent and the number of wounded “almost doubling” (http://gzt.ru/society/2007/12/27/120331.html).
Most of the reason for the differences between the conclusions of FEOR and those of the other groups, of course, reflects the way in which these organizations define xenophobia and gather information about it. FEOR naturally directs its attention to incidents of anti-Semitism and relies heavily on information provided by others with a similar focus
The other groups not only tend to tend to consider xenophobia more broadly but in at least some cases draw on a wider variety of sources, thus picking up more cases. Brod’s Moscow Human Rights Group, for example, pointedly noted that this year ethnic Russians had suffered more deaths from xenophobic attacks than any other ethnic or religious group.
But these contrasting points of view regrettably are likely to fuel suspicions on the part of some that FEOR’s leaders may be trying to curry favor with the Kremlin and on the part of others -- including some in the government itself -- that the human rights groups are seeking to blacken the image of Russia in order to attract attention from the West.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Window on Eurasia: ‘We’ll Always Have Paris -- and Casablanca Too,’ Moscow Officials Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 26 -- In a story headlined “We’ll always have Paris. And now we’ll have Casablanca as well,” the Russian news portal Vesti.ru yesterday reported on efforts by Moscow to provide the funds necessary to restore and maintain in good condition cemeteries abroad where Russian émigrés of various waves are buried.
Earlier this month, the Russian authorities as part of their outreach effort send the French government 700,000 euros (1,000,000 U.S. dollars) to pay for the rent on Russian graves at the St. Genevieve de Bois cemetery outside of Paris, perhaps the most notable gravesite of Russians abroad in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
That payment attracted a good deal of attention in the Russian media, almost all of it favorable. But as Vesti.ru pointed out this week, this transfer of funds is hardly unique now that Moscow has committed itself to ensuring that no grave of a Russian compatriot abroad will be forgotten or ignored (http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=154118).
On Tuesday, the Russian government oversaw the reopening of a cemetery in the Moroccan city of Casablanca which contains the graves of many officers and men from the Black Sea squadron that fled from Crimea at the time of the collapse of the White Movement there in 1920.
Vyacheslav Novoselov, Russia’s consul general there, said that until this restoration effort, “everything [in the cemetery] had been in a terrible condition,” something that he said made him “ashamed” both personally and as a representative of Russia. But now things are much better, he continued, with the gravestones carefully and lovingly restored.
This action, the Russian diplomat said, had helped to improve relations between Moscow and the host government. And he even suggested that what had been done there so far was a model of what others could do in other places to remember those millions of Russians who had died far from their native land but never forgot it.
Now, it is fair to say that their native land, however distant it certainly appeared to them at times, has not forgotten them.
Vienna, December 26 -- In a story headlined “We’ll always have Paris. And now we’ll have Casablanca as well,” the Russian news portal Vesti.ru yesterday reported on efforts by Moscow to provide the funds necessary to restore and maintain in good condition cemeteries abroad where Russian émigrés of various waves are buried.
Earlier this month, the Russian authorities as part of their outreach effort send the French government 700,000 euros (1,000,000 U.S. dollars) to pay for the rent on Russian graves at the St. Genevieve de Bois cemetery outside of Paris, perhaps the most notable gravesite of Russians abroad in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
That payment attracted a good deal of attention in the Russian media, almost all of it favorable. But as Vesti.ru pointed out this week, this transfer of funds is hardly unique now that Moscow has committed itself to ensuring that no grave of a Russian compatriot abroad will be forgotten or ignored (http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=154118).
On Tuesday, the Russian government oversaw the reopening of a cemetery in the Moroccan city of Casablanca which contains the graves of many officers and men from the Black Sea squadron that fled from Crimea at the time of the collapse of the White Movement there in 1920.
Vyacheslav Novoselov, Russia’s consul general there, said that until this restoration effort, “everything [in the cemetery] had been in a terrible condition,” something that he said made him “ashamed” both personally and as a representative of Russia. But now things are much better, he continued, with the gravestones carefully and lovingly restored.
This action, the Russian diplomat said, had helped to improve relations between Moscow and the host government. And he even suggested that what had been done there so far was a model of what others could do in other places to remember those millions of Russians who had died far from their native land but never forgot it.
Now, it is fair to say that their native land, however distant it certainly appeared to them at times, has not forgotten them.
Window on Eurasia: 38 Million Rural Russians Lack Access to Needed Medicines
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 26 -- The network of apothecary shops that had supplied Russians living in rural areas with medications in the past has almost completely disintegrated, and as a result, some 38 million Russians -- almost 30 percent of the country’s total population -- cannot easily obtain the drugs they need even when they have the money to buy them.
Not only are many of these people suffering horribly as a result, but a significant percentage of them is dying prematurely, driving down life expectancies among Russians and further complicating the resolution of the country’s much-discussed demographic difficulties.
Such a situation is especially tragic given the Russian Federation’s celebrated wealth from oil and gas, but it is even more disastrous because it appears to be in large measure the result not so much of the transition from communism to capitalism but rather of pathetically bad planning by legislators and other officials.
In the words of the Moscow newspaper Gazeta today, these officials “successfully destroyed the old system” in which often poorly trained medical workers dispensed medications in rural areas without figuring out how to put “in its place” a new and more effective one (http://www.gzt.ru/print.php?p=health/2007/12/25/220201.html).
As is often the case with such situations, there were good intentions all around. Moscow officials wanted to ensure that apothecary shops would be large and well-stocked and that these outlets would be operated by licensed pharmacists to ensure that the right medicines were dispensed.
In principle, of course, that is laudable, but such licensing requirements ignore several fundamental realities. On the one hand, most of the relatively small number of licensed pharmacists have gravitated to the cities where incomes are higher. And on the other, most villages are too small to support either one of them or a modern apothecary shop.
Moscow officials seem to have been operating on the assumption that village residents could easily travel to district or regional cities for their medicines. But that ignores two of Russia’s biggest problems: its impassable roads and its often even more horrible weather.
At the present time, approximately one-third of Russia’s villages are not connected to the outside world by roads of any kind. And even those that are find themselves in difficulty: in the spring and fall because of mud and in the winter, often very long in Russia’s northern regions, because of unplowed snow.
Of course, as the Moscow newspaper pointed out, access to medications is far from perfect even in the cities. The Russian Federation does not produce some basic medications or import enough for those who could benefit from them. And not every urban resident has the money to purchase those that may be on the shelves.
According to Gazeta, officials at the Russian Federation’s health ministry have discussed all these problems repeatedly. But they lack the funds to buy more drugs or to pay for the upkeep of pharmacies in most rural areas, and market forces Moscow now hopes to rely on are typically insufficient to address in a serious way either problem.
Unless something is done and done soon, however, many more Russians in rural areas are going to become victims of a system that may reward young people in the major cities with new wealth and opportunities. And as these rural Russians become conscious of their common status and their large number, they could become politically important.
The daily paper suggested that in many villages, the only thing such Russians could do is to pray so that they will get well without having to take any medications. But it is entirely possible that at least some of them will first focus their anger at those politicians and commentators who suggest that life is getting better in Russia with each passing year.
Vienna, December 26 -- The network of apothecary shops that had supplied Russians living in rural areas with medications in the past has almost completely disintegrated, and as a result, some 38 million Russians -- almost 30 percent of the country’s total population -- cannot easily obtain the drugs they need even when they have the money to buy them.
Not only are many of these people suffering horribly as a result, but a significant percentage of them is dying prematurely, driving down life expectancies among Russians and further complicating the resolution of the country’s much-discussed demographic difficulties.
Such a situation is especially tragic given the Russian Federation’s celebrated wealth from oil and gas, but it is even more disastrous because it appears to be in large measure the result not so much of the transition from communism to capitalism but rather of pathetically bad planning by legislators and other officials.
In the words of the Moscow newspaper Gazeta today, these officials “successfully destroyed the old system” in which often poorly trained medical workers dispensed medications in rural areas without figuring out how to put “in its place” a new and more effective one (http://www.gzt.ru/print.php?p=health/2007/12/25/220201.html).
As is often the case with such situations, there were good intentions all around. Moscow officials wanted to ensure that apothecary shops would be large and well-stocked and that these outlets would be operated by licensed pharmacists to ensure that the right medicines were dispensed.
In principle, of course, that is laudable, but such licensing requirements ignore several fundamental realities. On the one hand, most of the relatively small number of licensed pharmacists have gravitated to the cities where incomes are higher. And on the other, most villages are too small to support either one of them or a modern apothecary shop.
Moscow officials seem to have been operating on the assumption that village residents could easily travel to district or regional cities for their medicines. But that ignores two of Russia’s biggest problems: its impassable roads and its often even more horrible weather.
At the present time, approximately one-third of Russia’s villages are not connected to the outside world by roads of any kind. And even those that are find themselves in difficulty: in the spring and fall because of mud and in the winter, often very long in Russia’s northern regions, because of unplowed snow.
Of course, as the Moscow newspaper pointed out, access to medications is far from perfect even in the cities. The Russian Federation does not produce some basic medications or import enough for those who could benefit from them. And not every urban resident has the money to purchase those that may be on the shelves.
According to Gazeta, officials at the Russian Federation’s health ministry have discussed all these problems repeatedly. But they lack the funds to buy more drugs or to pay for the upkeep of pharmacies in most rural areas, and market forces Moscow now hopes to rely on are typically insufficient to address in a serious way either problem.
Unless something is done and done soon, however, many more Russians in rural areas are going to become victims of a system that may reward young people in the major cities with new wealth and opportunities. And as these rural Russians become conscious of their common status and their large number, they could become politically important.
The daily paper suggested that in many villages, the only thing such Russians could do is to pray so that they will get well without having to take any medications. But it is entirely possible that at least some of them will first focus their anger at those politicians and commentators who suggest that life is getting better in Russia with each passing year.
Window on Eurasia: Caucasus Site Hit by Denial of Service Attack Plans a Comeback
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 26 -- The Caucasus Times portal, which was taken offline on December 22 by a denial of service attack, is not only planning to restart its coverage of human rights violations and other developments in the region but also to take the Russian officials the site’s editors believe are responsible for trying to destroy it.
Initially, Islam Tekushev, the portal’s lead editor, said yesterday, those connected with the Prague-based site feared that the attack had destroyed virtually all of its files, thus making it difficult if not impossible to serve as a media outlet of record and to continue operations. But now, they believe that they will be able to recover 80 percent of them.
That will allow the Caucasus Times to resume operation soon, although today it is still off the air. But Tekushev said that he and his colleagues also hope to identify those behind the attack and bring them to justice either in the Russian Federation or, failing that, the Czech Republic (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204462.html).
Tekushev said that he had been encouraged on both grounds by the Czech internet service provider. Officials there told him that while they could not hope to restore everything that had been posted on the site, they should be able to help him retrieve most items relatively soon.
The ISP also told him that the denial of service attack had lasted several hours, an unusually long time unless government agencies were involved. For his part, Tekushev indicated that he is sure that officials in the North Caucasus and particularly in Daghestan were behind what took place.
In the days before the attack last weekend, he said, Daghestani interior ministry officers had employed “very strong administrative measures” on the site’s correspondents, threatening them and Tekushev’s own relatives with violence unless the site changed its editorial policy or went off the air voluntarily.
Such threats are apparently an increasing feature of the media scene in the North Caucasus: Officials threatened the father of the owner of the Ingushetia.ru site to force the latter to give up editorial control of that site earlier this month.
Apparently what infuriated regional officials in this case, Tekushev continued, was the coverage the site had given to public opinion surveys and participation rates in the December 2 Russian parliamentary elections, information that cast doubt on their claims and those of their superiors in Moscow.
“The population is very dissatisfied” with the conditions in which they have been forced to live, Tekushev said, and most people in the Northern Caucasus are extremely angry about what Moscow’s “force structures” -- the army, the interior ministry forces, and the FSB -- have been doing.
Given what he and his reporters have discovered and reported, the Caucasus Times editor said, there was no possibility as both regional and central officials have insisted that 90 percent or more of the electorate there had taken part in the voting or cast overwhelming majorities for President Vladimir Putin’s party of power, United Russia.
And consequently, he personally is already certain that they were responsible for trying to take him offline. Now, Tekushev said, he is “waiting for precise information from our provider about where the attack originated.” If it confirms his suspicions, then he will call on prosecutors to bring charges -- if not in Russia then at least in the Czech Republic.
But Tekushev faces an uphill battle legally. Officials in the Russian Federation are unlikely to be willing to allow him to bring a case -- indeed, given the threats against his family, it might be dangerous for him to do so -- and prosecutors in Prague will have a difficult time in linking the attack to specific individuals or institutions.
That is because denial of service attacks like the one Caucasus Times was subjected to are typically the product of the actions of people operating many computers, sometimes with their machines ganged together, but often working independently on the basis of an official tip that it would be good to target a particular site at a particular time.
Unless such an order is found or unless someone comes forward, then, it is difficult to bring someone to justice in most cases like this one. And consequently, this virtual battlefield will continue to heat up, with attackers becoming bolder and defenders more sophisticated, but with neither side able to win any final victory.
Vienna, December 26 -- The Caucasus Times portal, which was taken offline on December 22 by a denial of service attack, is not only planning to restart its coverage of human rights violations and other developments in the region but also to take the Russian officials the site’s editors believe are responsible for trying to destroy it.
Initially, Islam Tekushev, the portal’s lead editor, said yesterday, those connected with the Prague-based site feared that the attack had destroyed virtually all of its files, thus making it difficult if not impossible to serve as a media outlet of record and to continue operations. But now, they believe that they will be able to recover 80 percent of them.
That will allow the Caucasus Times to resume operation soon, although today it is still off the air. But Tekushev said that he and his colleagues also hope to identify those behind the attack and bring them to justice either in the Russian Federation or, failing that, the Czech Republic (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204462.html).
Tekushev said that he had been encouraged on both grounds by the Czech internet service provider. Officials there told him that while they could not hope to restore everything that had been posted on the site, they should be able to help him retrieve most items relatively soon.
The ISP also told him that the denial of service attack had lasted several hours, an unusually long time unless government agencies were involved. For his part, Tekushev indicated that he is sure that officials in the North Caucasus and particularly in Daghestan were behind what took place.
In the days before the attack last weekend, he said, Daghestani interior ministry officers had employed “very strong administrative measures” on the site’s correspondents, threatening them and Tekushev’s own relatives with violence unless the site changed its editorial policy or went off the air voluntarily.
Such threats are apparently an increasing feature of the media scene in the North Caucasus: Officials threatened the father of the owner of the Ingushetia.ru site to force the latter to give up editorial control of that site earlier this month.
Apparently what infuriated regional officials in this case, Tekushev continued, was the coverage the site had given to public opinion surveys and participation rates in the December 2 Russian parliamentary elections, information that cast doubt on their claims and those of their superiors in Moscow.
“The population is very dissatisfied” with the conditions in which they have been forced to live, Tekushev said, and most people in the Northern Caucasus are extremely angry about what Moscow’s “force structures” -- the army, the interior ministry forces, and the FSB -- have been doing.
Given what he and his reporters have discovered and reported, the Caucasus Times editor said, there was no possibility as both regional and central officials have insisted that 90 percent or more of the electorate there had taken part in the voting or cast overwhelming majorities for President Vladimir Putin’s party of power, United Russia.
And consequently, he personally is already certain that they were responsible for trying to take him offline. Now, Tekushev said, he is “waiting for precise information from our provider about where the attack originated.” If it confirms his suspicions, then he will call on prosecutors to bring charges -- if not in Russia then at least in the Czech Republic.
But Tekushev faces an uphill battle legally. Officials in the Russian Federation are unlikely to be willing to allow him to bring a case -- indeed, given the threats against his family, it might be dangerous for him to do so -- and prosecutors in Prague will have a difficult time in linking the attack to specific individuals or institutions.
That is because denial of service attacks like the one Caucasus Times was subjected to are typically the product of the actions of people operating many computers, sometimes with their machines ganged together, but often working independently on the basis of an official tip that it would be good to target a particular site at a particular time.
Unless such an order is found or unless someone comes forward, then, it is difficult to bring someone to justice in most cases like this one. And consequently, this virtual battlefield will continue to heat up, with attackers becoming bolder and defenders more sophisticated, but with neither side able to win any final victory.
Monday, December 24, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Political Protests Spreading Across the North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 24 -- Even as the Kremlin continues to celebrate its military and electoral triumphs in the North Caucasus, ever more people in that region are engaging in protest actions of various kinds against the policies and practices of both the central government and its designated representatives there.
Over the last week, Ingush activists collected signatures to prove that the authorities had falsified the results of the December 2 parliamentary elections, members of the Voice of Beslan began a hunger strike to seek the reversal of a ban on their group, and Daghestanis protested against torture in prisons there and Moscow’s ban of a Turkish Muslim theologian.
The first and most interesting of these actions is taking place in Ingushetia, where the Kremlin-installed leadership reported that more than 98 percent of registered voters had taken part in the December 2 parliamentary elections and that almost as great a share had voted for President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party.
Few people there or elsewhere believed that these figures were accurate, and Ingush opposition groups a week ago began circulating petitions in which registered voters could declare that they had not taken part in the recent poll. As of Sunday night, 36 percent of them had said they had not (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1204350.html).
That figure makes it clear that the numbers the republic leadership had reported and that Putin and his regime have accepted were completely fraudulent at least for that region. And petition organizers say that more people are coming forward to declare that they did not vote, making it likely that the extent of the government’s fraud is even greater.
The second action last week also is continuing. Following a court decision to close the “Voices of Beslan” organization, which represents the interests of those who lost relatives in the September 2004 violence there, activists launched a hunger strike in an effort to force the authorities to reconsider (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204066.html).
Even if the courts and the administration in North Osetia do not do so, this level of commitment suggests that few of those who suffered such terrible losses are going to stop their activities whatever happens. And if the authorities ignore this commitment as currently seems likely, they will generate more opposition to themselves and to Moscow.
And finally, the third locale of political protest in the North Caucasus last week was in Daghestan. There activists were involved with two different cases. In the first, they were collecting signatures seeking the reversal of Moscow’s decision to ban the works of Turkish Muslim writer Said Nursi (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204128.html).
A lawyer for the group said Moscow was wrong on the facts about Nursi and discriminating against Muslims as such -- 27 of the 32 works Moscow banned in this round were from “the pen of Muslim writers” -- and that unless the Russian government reversed course, the Dahgestanis were prepared to appeal to the European Court for Human Rights.
When the pro-Nursi activists will be able to make such an appeal or be successful in winning support for their position if they do, they can be certain that such a case, along with all the other human rights cases from the Russian Federation, will prove an embarrassment for Moscow as it tries to solidify its ties with European Union leaders.
In the second Daghestani case, the “Mothers of Daghestan” group not only delivered a protest to the republic’s prosecutors about the use of torture in the republic’s penal institutions but also began a hunger strike to force the authorities to respond to their complaints and end torture.
Specifically, the group is pressing for information about the case of Il’yas Dibirov, who was horribly beaten by masked men who the activists believe were Interior Ministry spetsnaz men or even GRU officers. That puts Makhachala in an impossible position: If it blames Moscow, it has one set of problems; it doesn’t, it has another one.
Because all of these actions were non-violent and “within system,” some in the Russian capital and elsewhere may be inclined to view them as a step forward or even a victory for the Russian authorities because they suggest the non-Russian peoples in the North Caucasus have accepted the new rules of the political game there.
But such conclusions are almost certainly overly optimistic. On the one hand, these protests focus not on relatively small issues like the mistreatment of a mullah (as in Ufa last week; see http://www.islamnews.ru/index.php?name=News&op=view&sid8765), but on the nature of the political system itself -- its elections, its courts, and its police powers.
And on the other, Putin’s decision to assume complete control over the selection of local leaders means that he and the central government he heads are no longer insulated from popular anger against local officials as Moscow to a certain extent was when these people were directly elected.
As a result, if the local officials continue on as they have, more and more people in the region will increasingly blame Moscow for shortcomings that it may be only indirectly responsible for and thus be increasingly willing to listen to those who say the only solution to their problems comes from a frontal attack on the political system Moscow has created.
Vienna, December 24 -- Even as the Kremlin continues to celebrate its military and electoral triumphs in the North Caucasus, ever more people in that region are engaging in protest actions of various kinds against the policies and practices of both the central government and its designated representatives there.
Over the last week, Ingush activists collected signatures to prove that the authorities had falsified the results of the December 2 parliamentary elections, members of the Voice of Beslan began a hunger strike to seek the reversal of a ban on their group, and Daghestanis protested against torture in prisons there and Moscow’s ban of a Turkish Muslim theologian.
The first and most interesting of these actions is taking place in Ingushetia, where the Kremlin-installed leadership reported that more than 98 percent of registered voters had taken part in the December 2 parliamentary elections and that almost as great a share had voted for President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party.
Few people there or elsewhere believed that these figures were accurate, and Ingush opposition groups a week ago began circulating petitions in which registered voters could declare that they had not taken part in the recent poll. As of Sunday night, 36 percent of them had said they had not (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/newstext/news/id/1204350.html).
That figure makes it clear that the numbers the republic leadership had reported and that Putin and his regime have accepted were completely fraudulent at least for that region. And petition organizers say that more people are coming forward to declare that they did not vote, making it likely that the extent of the government’s fraud is even greater.
The second action last week also is continuing. Following a court decision to close the “Voices of Beslan” organization, which represents the interests of those who lost relatives in the September 2004 violence there, activists launched a hunger strike in an effort to force the authorities to reconsider (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204066.html).
Even if the courts and the administration in North Osetia do not do so, this level of commitment suggests that few of those who suffered such terrible losses are going to stop their activities whatever happens. And if the authorities ignore this commitment as currently seems likely, they will generate more opposition to themselves and to Moscow.
And finally, the third locale of political protest in the North Caucasus last week was in Daghestan. There activists were involved with two different cases. In the first, they were collecting signatures seeking the reversal of Moscow’s decision to ban the works of Turkish Muslim writer Said Nursi (http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/news text/news/id/1204128.html).
A lawyer for the group said Moscow was wrong on the facts about Nursi and discriminating against Muslims as such -- 27 of the 32 works Moscow banned in this round were from “the pen of Muslim writers” -- and that unless the Russian government reversed course, the Dahgestanis were prepared to appeal to the European Court for Human Rights.
When the pro-Nursi activists will be able to make such an appeal or be successful in winning support for their position if they do, they can be certain that such a case, along with all the other human rights cases from the Russian Federation, will prove an embarrassment for Moscow as it tries to solidify its ties with European Union leaders.
In the second Daghestani case, the “Mothers of Daghestan” group not only delivered a protest to the republic’s prosecutors about the use of torture in the republic’s penal institutions but also began a hunger strike to force the authorities to respond to their complaints and end torture.
Specifically, the group is pressing for information about the case of Il’yas Dibirov, who was horribly beaten by masked men who the activists believe were Interior Ministry spetsnaz men or even GRU officers. That puts Makhachala in an impossible position: If it blames Moscow, it has one set of problems; it doesn’t, it has another one.
Because all of these actions were non-violent and “within system,” some in the Russian capital and elsewhere may be inclined to view them as a step forward or even a victory for the Russian authorities because they suggest the non-Russian peoples in the North Caucasus have accepted the new rules of the political game there.
But such conclusions are almost certainly overly optimistic. On the one hand, these protests focus not on relatively small issues like the mistreatment of a mullah (as in Ufa last week; see http://www.islamnews.ru/index.php?name=News&op=view&sid8765), but on the nature of the political system itself -- its elections, its courts, and its police powers.
And on the other, Putin’s decision to assume complete control over the selection of local leaders means that he and the central government he heads are no longer insulated from popular anger against local officials as Moscow to a certain extent was when these people were directly elected.
As a result, if the local officials continue on as they have, more and more people in the region will increasingly blame Moscow for shortcomings that it may be only indirectly responsible for and thus be increasingly willing to listen to those who say the only solution to their problems comes from a frontal attack on the political system Moscow has created.
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