Paul Goble
Vienna, December 24 -- If Mary and Joseph showed up in today’s Moscow rather than in Bethlehem as they did two millennia ago, the residents of the Russian capital would likely treat them as despised “persons of the Caucasus” with all the negative consequences that could entail, according to a Russian minister.
Joseph would likely be beaten by skinheads, Sergei Sosedkin suggested recently, and Mary, having been arrested for violating passport rules, would have had to give birth to Jesus not in a manger but in a Moscow militia substation where she should be kept alongside real criminals (http://www.baznica.info/index.php?name=Pages&op=page&pid=4640).
Sosedskin’s bitter conclusions about his fellow countrymen were triggered by a conversation he had with a young Venezuelan woman named Maria who had been an exchange student in Belgorod for six years when the two were sitting next to each other on a recent flight between Frankfurt and Moscow.
Asked two of the standard questions Russians often pose to foreigners -- how difficult do you find our language and what do you think of our weather -- Maria responded in lightly accented Russian that like everyone else she had had difficulties learning the language but now spoke it sufficiently well to make friends.
But her comments about the weather were more interesting. “Your winters are cold,” she said, “there is snow and the days are short. But during the summer, drunken skinheads roam the streets. They can harass you. As a result, I like winters in Russia more than I do summers.”
Maria went on to acknowledge that her fellow Venezuelans did not relate especially well to the many foreigners now coming to her homeland or even living there, but at least there, she said, no one ever beats them just because of how they look or the way they speak Spanish.
Over the last few years, Sosedskin commented, “we [Russians] have gotten used to militant xenophobia,” something few acknowledge given how much pride Russians have in their reputation for hospitality. But however much Russians believe that still to be true, the pastor added, “I haven’t heard about it from [our] foreign guests for a long time.”
Instead, he continued, like Maria, such visitors have told him “ever more often” about their fears of coming into contact with Russians who will treat them badly simply because they look different or speak a different language -- or in some cases speak Russian less perfectly than the typically uneducated skinheads think they should.
Recently, Sosedskin said, everyone has “been hearing about [the rise of] a proud Russia.” And there is evidence of this: “the incomes of the population are rising, new homes are going up, the army is getting new weapons, and stock and bond markets are breaking new records…”
“This is all very well,” Sosedkin continued, “but from a Christian point of view, if you will, that is not the main thing. Much more important is what is going on in our souls. Is it love that is growing there or hatred? What kind of a people and society do we imagine ourselves to be?”
A truly great country, he concluded, “ought not be build on the foundation of force.” And he added that he personally would “be proud of the achievements of the new Russia when a Venezuelan girl like Maria will be able to walk with her friends along our streets without fear of being beaten only because she has dark hair and a ‘non-Russian’ accent.”
Until that day, no one can be sure that many Russians would in fact treat a returning Mary and Joseph as “persons of Caucasus nationality,” an ugly term covering an ugly reality that far too few governments or ordinary people in either Russia or the West have condemned whenever and wherever it is invoked or acted upon.
On this Christmas eve, one can hope along with Sosedkin that everyone in Russia and elsewhere will find it in our hearts to meet the challenge posed by yet another victim of this kind of hatred, the great Russian memoirist Nadezhda Mandelstam, in her book Hope Against Hope.
There, she suggested, all people must come to recognize that “happy is that country where the despicable will at least be despised.” Many times, of course, no one has the possibility to do more, but no one should ever do less -- as Sosedskin’s stories about the experience of Maria and the possible fate of revenant Mary demand.
Monday, December 24, 2007
Friday, December 21, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Long Winter Holidays Breaking Up Russian Families, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 21 -- The extended holiday season Russians now celebrate at the turn of the year, with its round of corporate parties, heavy drinking and tensions over gifts, is putting enormous strains on families there and leading to a significant increase in the number of divorces during the first three months of each new year.
Unlike in Soviet times when communist officials kept the New Years holiday relatively brief lest Christians have the opportunity to celebrate either Western or Eastern Christmas, in recent years, Russian officials have allowed the winter holidays to extend from Western Christmas on December 25 to the Eastern calendar New Years on January 14th.
Such a lengthy time off from work now involves the kind of partying, drinking, and gamesmanship over gifts that imposes strains on the entire society, and psychologists, sociologists and others warn that it will have some very negative consequences for a society already facing serious demographic difficulties.
But if such problems are widely recognized, few politicians seem prepared to back away from this lengthy winter vacation, and consequently, the problems it has produced since the “long” holidays became the norm across the country three years ago seem certain to continue and possibly grow in the future.
An article in today’s Novyye izvestiya surveys expert opinion on how this extended holiday is, in the words of sociologist Olga Torina, “introducing serious arguments and conflicts into every third Russian family” and contributing to the breakup of “every fifth one” (http://newizv.ru/news/2007-12-21/82023/).
The first challenge to the stability and even survival of Russian families, the paper suggested, comes even before the holidays formally begin at the increasingly widespread practice of company parties. The informality of such gatherings, the large amount of alcohol consumed, and “the common interests” of the people involved often leads to adultery.
Aleksandr Poleyev, a psychotherapist who specializes on relations between the sexes, said that “75 percent of all sexual liaisons” arise in the workplace, with the increasingly common end-of-the-year parties increasing the risk of infidelity and betrayal “several times over” what it is the rest of the year.
But the second challenge to marital stability, the paper said, is far more significant: a dramatic increase in the sustained consumption of large amounts of alcohol. Because only about three percent of all Russian families travel far from home over these holidays, both husbands and wives have time to drink heavily not just once but over a week or more.
That leads to fights and those in turn often start couples on the road to divorce. Indeed, according to one recent poll, more than half of all divorces in Russia occur because one or both partners in a marriage drink too much. The extended holidays guarantee that the number of husbands and wives who do so is larger than in the past.
In addition, such widespread consumption of alcohol, combined with the increasingly intense holiday rush often leads to a decline in interest in sex among married couples, Russian sociologists told Novyye izvestiya. And that too can spark conflicts that often end up in the courts.
And finally, given both the number of holidays over this period might be expected to present gifts and the increasing spread of incomes that leads some to compete over who can give the most expensive present, there is often either anger over what someone bought -- “how could you waste money on that?” -- or a letdown if the gift is not what was expected.
None of these problems is new, of course, but as the newspaper points out, the relatively new longer holiday period has intensified all of them. And in a country already suffering from a high divorce rate and a low birthrate, some officials and politicians have begun to think about reducing the number of days off Russians have at this time of year.
Much of the pressure for such a reduction comes from those who represent rural areas, where residents have fewer things to do and may be even more inclined to drink. But the dominant mood in the Russian parliament was summed up by Duma deputy Andrei Isayev who said cutting one or two days might be possible but cutting more would not.
Consequently, as all the experts Novyye izvestiya surveyed pointed out, Russia will undoubtedly see another increase in the divorce rate during the first months of 2008, a development that will make the realization of President Vladimir Putin’s demographic plan even more difficult than would otherwise be the case.
Vienna, December 21 -- The extended holiday season Russians now celebrate at the turn of the year, with its round of corporate parties, heavy drinking and tensions over gifts, is putting enormous strains on families there and leading to a significant increase in the number of divorces during the first three months of each new year.
Unlike in Soviet times when communist officials kept the New Years holiday relatively brief lest Christians have the opportunity to celebrate either Western or Eastern Christmas, in recent years, Russian officials have allowed the winter holidays to extend from Western Christmas on December 25 to the Eastern calendar New Years on January 14th.
Such a lengthy time off from work now involves the kind of partying, drinking, and gamesmanship over gifts that imposes strains on the entire society, and psychologists, sociologists and others warn that it will have some very negative consequences for a society already facing serious demographic difficulties.
But if such problems are widely recognized, few politicians seem prepared to back away from this lengthy winter vacation, and consequently, the problems it has produced since the “long” holidays became the norm across the country three years ago seem certain to continue and possibly grow in the future.
An article in today’s Novyye izvestiya surveys expert opinion on how this extended holiday is, in the words of sociologist Olga Torina, “introducing serious arguments and conflicts into every third Russian family” and contributing to the breakup of “every fifth one” (http://newizv.ru/news/2007-12-21/82023/).
The first challenge to the stability and even survival of Russian families, the paper suggested, comes even before the holidays formally begin at the increasingly widespread practice of company parties. The informality of such gatherings, the large amount of alcohol consumed, and “the common interests” of the people involved often leads to adultery.
Aleksandr Poleyev, a psychotherapist who specializes on relations between the sexes, said that “75 percent of all sexual liaisons” arise in the workplace, with the increasingly common end-of-the-year parties increasing the risk of infidelity and betrayal “several times over” what it is the rest of the year.
But the second challenge to marital stability, the paper said, is far more significant: a dramatic increase in the sustained consumption of large amounts of alcohol. Because only about three percent of all Russian families travel far from home over these holidays, both husbands and wives have time to drink heavily not just once but over a week or more.
That leads to fights and those in turn often start couples on the road to divorce. Indeed, according to one recent poll, more than half of all divorces in Russia occur because one or both partners in a marriage drink too much. The extended holidays guarantee that the number of husbands and wives who do so is larger than in the past.
In addition, such widespread consumption of alcohol, combined with the increasingly intense holiday rush often leads to a decline in interest in sex among married couples, Russian sociologists told Novyye izvestiya. And that too can spark conflicts that often end up in the courts.
And finally, given both the number of holidays over this period might be expected to present gifts and the increasing spread of incomes that leads some to compete over who can give the most expensive present, there is often either anger over what someone bought -- “how could you waste money on that?” -- or a letdown if the gift is not what was expected.
None of these problems is new, of course, but as the newspaper points out, the relatively new longer holiday period has intensified all of them. And in a country already suffering from a high divorce rate and a low birthrate, some officials and politicians have begun to think about reducing the number of days off Russians have at this time of year.
Much of the pressure for such a reduction comes from those who represent rural areas, where residents have fewer things to do and may be even more inclined to drink. But the dominant mood in the Russian parliament was summed up by Duma deputy Andrei Isayev who said cutting one or two days might be possible but cutting more would not.
Consequently, as all the experts Novyye izvestiya surveyed pointed out, Russia will undoubtedly see another increase in the divorce rate during the first months of 2008, a development that will make the realization of President Vladimir Putin’s demographic plan even more difficult than would otherwise be the case.
Window on Eurasia: Putin Enthusiasts in West Not Ready to Live Under Him
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 22 -- “Putin Mania” is sweeping Western countries, Moscow media outlets have insisted this week following “Time” magazine’s selection of the Russian president as its “man of the year.” But one Moscow paper suggests that there are some real limits to this affection, even among the most devoted.
According to Moskovskiy Komsomolets, there are now dozens of Putin fan clubs and websites in Europe and North America, but few of their organizers want their friends to find out from the media about just how far their passion for the Russian leader goes and thus many insist on anonymity (http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2007/12/21/society/330161/).
And one of the three Putin enthusiasts the paper talked to said that she, a Bulgarian now studying abroad, could not imagine having Putin running her country -- such an arrangement would be “funny” -- and added that she would never be “crazy” enough to think about moving to the Russian Federation so she could live under his rule
The founder of the Putin Mania Fan Club in Ireland -- unnamed -- said that he was interested in everything about Putin but added that “if my fellow classmates were to find out about my interest, at a minimum, they would not understand [this extreme passion], and some would laugh at me.”
Naidel Neim, a Canadian citizen whose mother is Russian, said he had founded the VVP Fan Club because Putin “had made Russia into an influential state” and given Russians a higher standard of living. He said he favored changing the Russian constitution so that Putin could remain in office because that is what Russians want.
Neim added that Western countries were objecting to such a step not because they cared about legal niceties but rather because they wanted “Russia to be [their] slave” and therefore were interested in Putin’s exit from office and the appearance of those “prepared to serve” the interests of the West rather than the interests of Russia.
Asked by the Moscow paper whether he would favor having Putin become “president of the world,” Neim said that he was against that because “such a talented individual [as Putin] should serve only the interests of Russia. If he became president of the world, then he would not be able to focus on the interests of the Russian Federation.”
And that country, he insisted, “needs the full attention of its leader.”
The third Putin enthusiast the paper interviewed was a Bulgarian student now enrolled at university somewhere in Europe. Like her counterpart in Ireland, she was reluctant to talk about her passion and said that she “would not like any of her fellow students or professors to study encounter my name in an article about Putin.”
The Bulgarian, one of 823 people who currently takes part in the Putin Facebook page, said that she like the Russian president “in the first instance” more as a man than as a politician. But she added that she was certain that “he had done more for Russians than anyone else,” although she noted that there was a lot more to be done.
As far as Western accusations that Putin was moving away from democracy, violating human rights, or killing journalists and other opponents, the Bulgarian student said that she considered all of this “untrue,” claims that “no one has yet been able” to provide evidence for.
And she noted that one Russian student had told her that the Western hatred for Putin was a good thing “because it means that he is doing good for Russia.” And because “all of them hate Russia,” they thus hate him. She said that she “entirely agreed with this assertion.”
The paper then asked her for her reaction about reports that Putin had rigged the recent parliamentary elections in Russia. That was nonsense, she said,, and while acknowledging that no voting was ever “100 percent free,” the results of this poll accurately reflected the will of the Russian people.
“Why can’t the Americans believe that Russians voted for United Russia?” she asked rhetorically. “After all, they voted for Bush.”
The Moskovskiy Komsomolets journalist concluded with two questions about her willingness to live under Putin’s rule. Asked whether she would like to see him become president of Bulgaria, the student said absolutely not. If he were, that would be simply “funny,” something like Saakashvili in Georgia.
And asked by the Russian newspaper if she would be willing to move to the Russian Federation in order to be “closer to Putin,” the Bulgarian student answered that she “would not be so crazy as to immigrate to the Russian Federation only because of sympathy for your president.”
Vienna, December 22 -- “Putin Mania” is sweeping Western countries, Moscow media outlets have insisted this week following “Time” magazine’s selection of the Russian president as its “man of the year.” But one Moscow paper suggests that there are some real limits to this affection, even among the most devoted.
According to Moskovskiy Komsomolets, there are now dozens of Putin fan clubs and websites in Europe and North America, but few of their organizers want their friends to find out from the media about just how far their passion for the Russian leader goes and thus many insist on anonymity (http://www.mk.ru/blogs/MK/2007/12/21/society/330161/).
And one of the three Putin enthusiasts the paper talked to said that she, a Bulgarian now studying abroad, could not imagine having Putin running her country -- such an arrangement would be “funny” -- and added that she would never be “crazy” enough to think about moving to the Russian Federation so she could live under his rule
The founder of the Putin Mania Fan Club in Ireland -- unnamed -- said that he was interested in everything about Putin but added that “if my fellow classmates were to find out about my interest, at a minimum, they would not understand [this extreme passion], and some would laugh at me.”
Naidel Neim, a Canadian citizen whose mother is Russian, said he had founded the VVP Fan Club because Putin “had made Russia into an influential state” and given Russians a higher standard of living. He said he favored changing the Russian constitution so that Putin could remain in office because that is what Russians want.
Neim added that Western countries were objecting to such a step not because they cared about legal niceties but rather because they wanted “Russia to be [their] slave” and therefore were interested in Putin’s exit from office and the appearance of those “prepared to serve” the interests of the West rather than the interests of Russia.
Asked by the Moscow paper whether he would favor having Putin become “president of the world,” Neim said that he was against that because “such a talented individual [as Putin] should serve only the interests of Russia. If he became president of the world, then he would not be able to focus on the interests of the Russian Federation.”
And that country, he insisted, “needs the full attention of its leader.”
The third Putin enthusiast the paper interviewed was a Bulgarian student now enrolled at university somewhere in Europe. Like her counterpart in Ireland, she was reluctant to talk about her passion and said that she “would not like any of her fellow students or professors to study encounter my name in an article about Putin.”
The Bulgarian, one of 823 people who currently takes part in the Putin Facebook page, said that she like the Russian president “in the first instance” more as a man than as a politician. But she added that she was certain that “he had done more for Russians than anyone else,” although she noted that there was a lot more to be done.
As far as Western accusations that Putin was moving away from democracy, violating human rights, or killing journalists and other opponents, the Bulgarian student said that she considered all of this “untrue,” claims that “no one has yet been able” to provide evidence for.
And she noted that one Russian student had told her that the Western hatred for Putin was a good thing “because it means that he is doing good for Russia.” And because “all of them hate Russia,” they thus hate him. She said that she “entirely agreed with this assertion.”
The paper then asked her for her reaction about reports that Putin had rigged the recent parliamentary elections in Russia. That was nonsense, she said,, and while acknowledging that no voting was ever “100 percent free,” the results of this poll accurately reflected the will of the Russian people.
“Why can’t the Americans believe that Russians voted for United Russia?” she asked rhetorically. “After all, they voted for Bush.”
The Moskovskiy Komsomolets journalist concluded with two questions about her willingness to live under Putin’s rule. Asked whether she would like to see him become president of Bulgaria, the student said absolutely not. If he were, that would be simply “funny,” something like Saakashvili in Georgia.
And asked by the Russian newspaper if she would be willing to move to the Russian Federation in order to be “closer to Putin,” the Bulgarian student answered that she “would not be so crazy as to immigrate to the Russian Federation only because of sympathy for your president.”
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Muslim Websites Uniting Russia’s Islamic Community
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 20 -- Islamic websites now serve not only as a common and independent source of news and information for Russia’s more than 20 million Muslims but also as a collective organizer far more powerful than the traditional Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) with their links to the Russian state.
That was the basic message delivered by speaker after speaker at a conference in Moscow yesterday on “The Internet in the Life of Muslims of Contemporary Russia,” a meeting organized to mark the fifth anniversary of the IslamNews.ru site and that attracted the editors of other sites, scholars, and politicians.
Yesterday, Islam.ru, the most frequently visited Muslim news and information site published an extensive report on the meeting (http://www.islam.ru/rus/2007-12-19/#19036). And today, other Muslim sites, including Islamic Inheritance are providing additional details and the texts of speeches (http://www.islamnasledie.ru/news.php?id=822).
Organizers promise to publish in the near future a full version of yesterday’s discussions both online and in hard copy, but the reports just listed suggest that Russia’s Muslims view the Internet as one of the most important forces in helping to revive their community in post-Soviet times.
(One place where coverage of this meeting and indeed of the Muslim Runet more broadly -- including comments from individual Muslim bloggers -- will be found is in the weekly summaries now being posted on the Islam in the Russian Federation website at http://www.islamrf.ru.)
For many of Russia’s Muslims, one speaker said, “the Internet today is almost the only window on the world of Islam.” And paraphrasing Lenin, he suggested that Muslim websites collectively are “not only an informer but a systematic organizer” of the umma in the Russian Federation.
Lacking a significant presence in the traditional Russian media and widely dispersed territorially, many Muslims in the Russian Federation rely the Internet to find out about their faith and learn what is going on with their fellow believers not only within the borders of the Russian Federation but more generally.
Indeed, another participant said, the Internet now “is unifying the umma by allowing it to overcome borders, conflicts and disagreements.” He viewed that as a positive contribution, but both some Russian officials and more than a few of the traditional MSD leaders are not so sure that this is an entirely good thing.
On the one hand, many Russian officials appear concerned that the Internet has promoted the integration of the Muslims of their country into the worldwide Islamic community, a process that has reduced the influence of Moscow on this community and allowed it to adopt a more independent position.
And on the other, some MSD leaders are unhappy that websites often have more influence than they do and report criticism of the traditional leadership rather than simply singing its praise. Increasingly, of course, MSD leaders are operating their own sites, although many of these are relatively inactive.
But perhaps the most important speech to this gathering was delivered by Shamil Sultanov, who was a member of the fourth Duma. Arguing that the next five to seven years are likely to be extremely difficult for the Russian Federation as a whole, he said that Muslim sites must help prepare their visitors for that.
At present, he added, Russia’s Muslims are neither sufficiently politically active as a group nor in possession of “a picture of the world” on which to base their actions. If the Internet can provide that picture, then it will not only integrate Russia’s Muslims as a community but allow them to play a vastly expanded role in the life of the country.
Vienna, December 20 -- Islamic websites now serve not only as a common and independent source of news and information for Russia’s more than 20 million Muslims but also as a collective organizer far more powerful than the traditional Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) with their links to the Russian state.
That was the basic message delivered by speaker after speaker at a conference in Moscow yesterday on “The Internet in the Life of Muslims of Contemporary Russia,” a meeting organized to mark the fifth anniversary of the IslamNews.ru site and that attracted the editors of other sites, scholars, and politicians.
Yesterday, Islam.ru, the most frequently visited Muslim news and information site published an extensive report on the meeting (http://www.islam.ru/rus/2007-12-19/#19036). And today, other Muslim sites, including Islamic Inheritance are providing additional details and the texts of speeches (http://www.islamnasledie.ru/news.php?id=822).
Organizers promise to publish in the near future a full version of yesterday’s discussions both online and in hard copy, but the reports just listed suggest that Russia’s Muslims view the Internet as one of the most important forces in helping to revive their community in post-Soviet times.
(One place where coverage of this meeting and indeed of the Muslim Runet more broadly -- including comments from individual Muslim bloggers -- will be found is in the weekly summaries now being posted on the Islam in the Russian Federation website at http://www.islamrf.ru.)
For many of Russia’s Muslims, one speaker said, “the Internet today is almost the only window on the world of Islam.” And paraphrasing Lenin, he suggested that Muslim websites collectively are “not only an informer but a systematic organizer” of the umma in the Russian Federation.
Lacking a significant presence in the traditional Russian media and widely dispersed territorially, many Muslims in the Russian Federation rely the Internet to find out about their faith and learn what is going on with their fellow believers not only within the borders of the Russian Federation but more generally.
Indeed, another participant said, the Internet now “is unifying the umma by allowing it to overcome borders, conflicts and disagreements.” He viewed that as a positive contribution, but both some Russian officials and more than a few of the traditional MSD leaders are not so sure that this is an entirely good thing.
On the one hand, many Russian officials appear concerned that the Internet has promoted the integration of the Muslims of their country into the worldwide Islamic community, a process that has reduced the influence of Moscow on this community and allowed it to adopt a more independent position.
And on the other, some MSD leaders are unhappy that websites often have more influence than they do and report criticism of the traditional leadership rather than simply singing its praise. Increasingly, of course, MSD leaders are operating their own sites, although many of these are relatively inactive.
But perhaps the most important speech to this gathering was delivered by Shamil Sultanov, who was a member of the fourth Duma. Arguing that the next five to seven years are likely to be extremely difficult for the Russian Federation as a whole, he said that Muslim sites must help prepare their visitors for that.
At present, he added, Russia’s Muslims are neither sufficiently politically active as a group nor in possession of “a picture of the world” on which to base their actions. If the Internet can provide that picture, then it will not only integrate Russia’s Muslims as a community but allow them to play a vastly expanded role in the life of the country.
Window on Eurasia: Neo-Soviet Rhetoric Said ‘Disorienting’ Moscow, Western Elites
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 20 -- References to some kind of Soviet restoration are becoming ever more frequent in both Moscow and Western capitals, a dangerous trend that threatens to “disorient” elites in both places and lead to decisions that are disconnected with reality, according to a leading Moscow specialist on nationalism in the post-Soviet world.
In an essay posted online yesterday with the significant title, “The Neo-Soviet Myth,” Sergei Markedonov says that both those in Moscow who hope for a return of the Soviet Union as well as those in the West who fear it are deluding themselves in potentially dangerous ways (http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=5505).
The reasons the current Russian leadership employs such language, the Moscow analyst says, are not hard to specify. The Putin regime sees the Soviet past as “a powerful legitimating resource” because it hopes to present itself as “the continuer of the policy of ‘a great power’” rather than as the inheritor of the weakness of the 1990s.
But the reasons Western elites are using this language are more complicated, if not more justified. First of all, many in the West see the growing income of the Russian Federation as the basis for a restoration of Moscow’s role across the former Soviet space., a view Russian analysts have typically been all too willing to invoke as well.
Second, Markedonov says, many in Western capitals apparently believe that the restoration of Russian power over this region in some way could result in greater stability and predictability in international affairs, again a view that many in Moscow express and are only too willing to take from their Western interlocutors.
Indeed, on this the 90th anniversary of the formation of the Cheka, many Russian commentators are celebrating Time magazine’s decision to name Vladimir Putin its man of the year because of his role, however authoritarian and undemocratic, in ending “the time of troubles” ushered in by the end of the Soviet Union.
One Moscow article on the American magazine’s decision, in fact, was entitled Stabil’nost’ uber Alles, an elegant and highly symbolic combination of a Russian term with a German one (http://www.izbrannoe.ru/22767.html).
And third, Markedonov suggests, at least some in the West have concluded that the invocation of a possible Soviet restoration as an all-purpose excuse to explain to domestic audiences their own failures in promoting democratization not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East.
But if this rhetoric has its uses to political elites in both Moscow and Western capitals, he continues, it is extremely dangerous because it is being used by people who either do not recognize or will not admit in public that there is no possibility for its realization any time soon.
On the one hand, these political elites forget, the Soviet Union was a state based on an ideology. Despite the essentially esthetic arguments of the original Eurasians, Markedonov points out, “the imperial idea did not win out on the territory of the former USSR.” It died along with the White Movement Wrangel and Denikin by 1922.
The way in which the Soviet regime implemented its “proletarian internationalism,” building up “national-territorial” units like the union republics, promoting Soviet-defined national identities, and even contributing to the notion of ethnic property meant that the regime was in Marxist terms, its own grave digger, Markedonov argues.
But none of those things meant, he insists, that the USSR was in any way simply an updated version of the Russian Empire that had existed before.
However much some may want or others fear, there is absolutely no support for a new supra-national ideology in the post-Soviet states. “Nostalgia for the USSR” is found “only in Russia: Even Belarus uses [such emotions] instrumentally” rather than as an expression of its core values.
And on the other hand, Markedonov points out, the idea that a restored Soviet Union could be some “soft form” of the USSR is nonsense. That country “was possible only under the harshest dictatorship with the preservation of a definite level of ethno-administrative freedom for regional dictators and a planned-distribution economy.”
Once the Soviet state under Mikhail Gorbachev loosened up in order to try to get the economy moving in the 1980s, the entire edifice came down around him because “a liberal USSR’ cannot be -- [because] at the very least this would not be the USSR.”
At present, Markedonov notes, “there is not a single force in Russia or in the other countries of the CIS prepared to propose to the population a program based on state plans and the dictatorship of a single party.” Such planning does not exist even in Belarus, and “’forced modernization’” does not correspond to the needs of an information society.
Indeed, any effort to move in that direction, one possibly fueled by Russia’s income from the sale of oil and gas and a belief that some Western leaders might support it would guarantee not only the isolation of this region but its continued backwardness, something neither Russian nor non-Russian elites are at all interested in seeing.
Indeed, even those Russians who talk about restoring the USSR use their VISA cards and travel abroad, Markedonov notes, something that an ideologically based and totalitarian regime would almost certainly not allow them the opportunities to do so that they have today.
None of this means, of course, that there are not some Russians who want to restore the Soviet Union, but rather it suggests that any effort by them to do so will fail, a process and an outcome elites in Moscow and the West now employing neo-Soviet rhetoric for their own and very different purposes need to recognize in order to avoid some terrible errors.
Vienna, December 20 -- References to some kind of Soviet restoration are becoming ever more frequent in both Moscow and Western capitals, a dangerous trend that threatens to “disorient” elites in both places and lead to decisions that are disconnected with reality, according to a leading Moscow specialist on nationalism in the post-Soviet world.
In an essay posted online yesterday with the significant title, “The Neo-Soviet Myth,” Sergei Markedonov says that both those in Moscow who hope for a return of the Soviet Union as well as those in the West who fear it are deluding themselves in potentially dangerous ways (http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=5505).
The reasons the current Russian leadership employs such language, the Moscow analyst says, are not hard to specify. The Putin regime sees the Soviet past as “a powerful legitimating resource” because it hopes to present itself as “the continuer of the policy of ‘a great power’” rather than as the inheritor of the weakness of the 1990s.
But the reasons Western elites are using this language are more complicated, if not more justified. First of all, many in the West see the growing income of the Russian Federation as the basis for a restoration of Moscow’s role across the former Soviet space., a view Russian analysts have typically been all too willing to invoke as well.
Second, Markedonov says, many in Western capitals apparently believe that the restoration of Russian power over this region in some way could result in greater stability and predictability in international affairs, again a view that many in Moscow express and are only too willing to take from their Western interlocutors.
Indeed, on this the 90th anniversary of the formation of the Cheka, many Russian commentators are celebrating Time magazine’s decision to name Vladimir Putin its man of the year because of his role, however authoritarian and undemocratic, in ending “the time of troubles” ushered in by the end of the Soviet Union.
One Moscow article on the American magazine’s decision, in fact, was entitled Stabil’nost’ uber Alles, an elegant and highly symbolic combination of a Russian term with a German one (http://www.izbrannoe.ru/22767.html).
And third, Markedonov suggests, at least some in the West have concluded that the invocation of a possible Soviet restoration as an all-purpose excuse to explain to domestic audiences their own failures in promoting democratization not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Middle East.
But if this rhetoric has its uses to political elites in both Moscow and Western capitals, he continues, it is extremely dangerous because it is being used by people who either do not recognize or will not admit in public that there is no possibility for its realization any time soon.
On the one hand, these political elites forget, the Soviet Union was a state based on an ideology. Despite the essentially esthetic arguments of the original Eurasians, Markedonov points out, “the imperial idea did not win out on the territory of the former USSR.” It died along with the White Movement Wrangel and Denikin by 1922.
The way in which the Soviet regime implemented its “proletarian internationalism,” building up “national-territorial” units like the union republics, promoting Soviet-defined national identities, and even contributing to the notion of ethnic property meant that the regime was in Marxist terms, its own grave digger, Markedonov argues.
But none of those things meant, he insists, that the USSR was in any way simply an updated version of the Russian Empire that had existed before.
However much some may want or others fear, there is absolutely no support for a new supra-national ideology in the post-Soviet states. “Nostalgia for the USSR” is found “only in Russia: Even Belarus uses [such emotions] instrumentally” rather than as an expression of its core values.
And on the other hand, Markedonov points out, the idea that a restored Soviet Union could be some “soft form” of the USSR is nonsense. That country “was possible only under the harshest dictatorship with the preservation of a definite level of ethno-administrative freedom for regional dictators and a planned-distribution economy.”
Once the Soviet state under Mikhail Gorbachev loosened up in order to try to get the economy moving in the 1980s, the entire edifice came down around him because “a liberal USSR’ cannot be -- [because] at the very least this would not be the USSR.”
At present, Markedonov notes, “there is not a single force in Russia or in the other countries of the CIS prepared to propose to the population a program based on state plans and the dictatorship of a single party.” Such planning does not exist even in Belarus, and “’forced modernization’” does not correspond to the needs of an information society.
Indeed, any effort to move in that direction, one possibly fueled by Russia’s income from the sale of oil and gas and a belief that some Western leaders might support it would guarantee not only the isolation of this region but its continued backwardness, something neither Russian nor non-Russian elites are at all interested in seeing.
Indeed, even those Russians who talk about restoring the USSR use their VISA cards and travel abroad, Markedonov notes, something that an ideologically based and totalitarian regime would almost certainly not allow them the opportunities to do so that they have today.
None of this means, of course, that there are not some Russians who want to restore the Soviet Union, but rather it suggests that any effort by them to do so will fail, a process and an outcome elites in Moscow and the West now employing neo-Soviet rhetoric for their own and very different purposes need to recognize in order to avoid some terrible errors.
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
Window on Eurasia: Punitive Psychiatry Against Dissidents Returns Under Putin
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 19 -- The forcible incarceration of political dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, one of the most notorious features of the later years of the Soviet Union, has been revived in the Russian Federation of Vladimir Putin, according to Russian human rights activists.
But until very recently, these actions have not sparked the kind of outrage by foreign governments and international psychiatric and human rights organizations that forced the Soviet authorities to release some of the dissidents it had treated in this way. And as a result, Russian officials may now believe they can get away with reviving the practice.
Part of the reason for this difference in reaction, of course, arises from the end of the Cold War, but it also reflects the fact that so far, the victims of such official actions are fewer in number, live far from Western embassies and journalists in Moscow, and espouse views less sympathetic to Western audiences than many of their Soviet-era predecessors did.
And in the words of one Russian human rights activist, Moscow’s failure to denounce the Soviet practice and punish those who engaged in it, something Western governments notably have not insisted upon, plays an additional role, leading some Russian psychiatrists to believe that there is nothing wrong in going along with their political matters.
Now, however, the international organization devoted to combating torture has taken up the case of a young man who has been subjected to forcible psychiatric treatment apparently for no reason other than that he opposes the authoritarian and arbitrary actions of the Putin-installed leadership of the Middle Volga Republic of Mari El.
That groups criticism has prompted more media coverage in Moscow, including an extensive article in this week’s New Times that has been picked up by a variety of media watchdog sites, human rights groups, including Press-Attache.ru (http://www.presss-attache.ru/Article.aspx/media crime/4400).
That article details the criminal mistreatment of 20-year-old Artem Basyrov, who two years ago was a member of the National Bolshevik Party but more recently has worked with “The Other Russia.” At the end of last month, he was confined in a psychiatric hospital against his will, to prevent him from organizing an anti-government demonstration.
Given the brutality of the Mari El government, one that various European institutions have concluded routinely beats or even kills its opponents, its decision to subject Basyrov to forcible psychiatric treatment is hardly surprising, but because it recalls a phenomenon most had thought had ended along with Soviet power, it is disturbing.
According to Roman Chorniy, the president of the St. Petersburg-based Civil Commission for Human Rights, the authorities apparently now find this practice attractive because it is easy for them to employ -- they only have to get the approval of three often tame psychiatrists and can muddy the waters via planted stories in the media.
And he notes that Basyrov is hardly the only Russian citizen against whom such vicious methods are being used. He points to the case of political activist Larisa Arap in Murmansk in Russia’s Far North and that of Vladislav Nikitenko in Blagoveshchensk near the Chinese border, both far removed from Moscow
Chorniy adds that, in his view, the authorities may ultimately use this technique against Nikolai Andrushenko, a St Petersburg journalist whose activities and whose suffering at the hands of the authorities in other ways have been far better documented and who may thus escape the worse fate of the others.
“When we see this type of situation,” Chorniy told “New Times,” we are compelled to ”think about it as a system” rather than a set of isolated instances, as many in both Russia and the West have been telling themselves. And that, he suggested, means that everyone concerned about human rights needs to reflect on why such crimes have reemerged.
“”All those psychiatrists and their pupils, who were directly involved in practicing punitive psychiatrist” never suffered legally for what they did and never even had to acknowledge in public that such actions were morally wrong. As a result, it is quite likely that many of them still believe such actions are justified.
And thus, Western indifference so far combined with the attitudes of these “survivals of the past” have created a situation where as Chorniy said “we see the revival of punitive psychiatry,” the use of an important branch of the medical profession for goals entirely at odds with the principles of the Hippocratic oath.
Vienna, December 19 -- The forcible incarceration of political dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, one of the most notorious features of the later years of the Soviet Union, has been revived in the Russian Federation of Vladimir Putin, according to Russian human rights activists.
But until very recently, these actions have not sparked the kind of outrage by foreign governments and international psychiatric and human rights organizations that forced the Soviet authorities to release some of the dissidents it had treated in this way. And as a result, Russian officials may now believe they can get away with reviving the practice.
Part of the reason for this difference in reaction, of course, arises from the end of the Cold War, but it also reflects the fact that so far, the victims of such official actions are fewer in number, live far from Western embassies and journalists in Moscow, and espouse views less sympathetic to Western audiences than many of their Soviet-era predecessors did.
And in the words of one Russian human rights activist, Moscow’s failure to denounce the Soviet practice and punish those who engaged in it, something Western governments notably have not insisted upon, plays an additional role, leading some Russian psychiatrists to believe that there is nothing wrong in going along with their political matters.
Now, however, the international organization devoted to combating torture has taken up the case of a young man who has been subjected to forcible psychiatric treatment apparently for no reason other than that he opposes the authoritarian and arbitrary actions of the Putin-installed leadership of the Middle Volga Republic of Mari El.
That groups criticism has prompted more media coverage in Moscow, including an extensive article in this week’s New Times that has been picked up by a variety of media watchdog sites, human rights groups, including Press-Attache.ru (http://www.presss-attache.ru/Article.aspx/media crime/4400).
That article details the criminal mistreatment of 20-year-old Artem Basyrov, who two years ago was a member of the National Bolshevik Party but more recently has worked with “The Other Russia.” At the end of last month, he was confined in a psychiatric hospital against his will, to prevent him from organizing an anti-government demonstration.
Given the brutality of the Mari El government, one that various European institutions have concluded routinely beats or even kills its opponents, its decision to subject Basyrov to forcible psychiatric treatment is hardly surprising, but because it recalls a phenomenon most had thought had ended along with Soviet power, it is disturbing.
According to Roman Chorniy, the president of the St. Petersburg-based Civil Commission for Human Rights, the authorities apparently now find this practice attractive because it is easy for them to employ -- they only have to get the approval of three often tame psychiatrists and can muddy the waters via planted stories in the media.
And he notes that Basyrov is hardly the only Russian citizen against whom such vicious methods are being used. He points to the case of political activist Larisa Arap in Murmansk in Russia’s Far North and that of Vladislav Nikitenko in Blagoveshchensk near the Chinese border, both far removed from Moscow
Chorniy adds that, in his view, the authorities may ultimately use this technique against Nikolai Andrushenko, a St Petersburg journalist whose activities and whose suffering at the hands of the authorities in other ways have been far better documented and who may thus escape the worse fate of the others.
“When we see this type of situation,” Chorniy told “New Times,” we are compelled to ”think about it as a system” rather than a set of isolated instances, as many in both Russia and the West have been telling themselves. And that, he suggested, means that everyone concerned about human rights needs to reflect on why such crimes have reemerged.
“”All those psychiatrists and their pupils, who were directly involved in practicing punitive psychiatrist” never suffered legally for what they did and never even had to acknowledge in public that such actions were morally wrong. As a result, it is quite likely that many of them still believe such actions are justified.
And thus, Western indifference so far combined with the attitudes of these “survivals of the past” have created a situation where as Chorniy said “we see the revival of punitive psychiatry,” the use of an important branch of the medical profession for goals entirely at odds with the principles of the Hippocratic oath.
Window on Eurasia: Sochi Olympics Already Casting Shadows on the North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Vienna, December 19 -- Even though the Sochi Olympics are still nearly seven years in the future, these international games which many in Russia have celebrated as an indication of the world’s increasing deference to President Vladimir Putin and themselves, are already casting three dark shadows over the North Caucasus.
First of all, they apparently lie behind a new intensification of Moscow’s efforts to suppress groups fighting against the central authorities, a linkage that one Chechen official said this week means that pro-Moscow Chechen forces are now free to cross into the territory of neighboring republics (http://www.utro.ru/articles/2007/12/18/702669shtml).
Such actions by military units loyal primarily to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and known for their brutal treatment of civilians are likely to exacerbate conflicts in that already unstable region rather than to contribute to their resolution, thereby increasing the size of the problem the Kremlin apparently believes it is reducing in this way.
Second, the upcoming Olympics are already contributing to the destruction of a national park and other fragile areas. Indeed, according to the Rosbalt.South news agency today, many officials and businessmen in their rush to get the area ready for the games are riding roughshod over Russian law, Moscow’s international obligations, and expert opinion.
Many ecologists now say that “the Sochi National Park will not survive the Games,” even though the law requires that anyone building in or near it get the blessing of expert opinion. That is not being done, and the courts are backing the government and business interests (http://www.rosbaltsouth.ru/2007/12/19/441215.html).
But it is not just Russian legislation and good sense that is being violated, the ecologists argue. Moscow is violating “the requirements of the International Convention on the Preservation of objects of the World’s Natural and Cultural Inheritance set by UNESCO,” as well as a variety of other accords the Russian government has signed.
And the actions of officials and business interests to build up for the games threatens not only the flora of the region but may lead to the extinction of a variety of animal species found nowhere else in the world. Thus, the triumph of the games will be the destruction of the values such competitions are supposed to stand for.
And third -- and this is almost certain to be the most politically problematic development from Moscow’s point of view -- the development of Sochi is contributing to the unification of Circassian groups within the Russian Federation and of the five to seven million Circassians living in the Middle East, Europe and North America.
Because it was at Sochi that the ancestors of today’s Circassians were deported by the tsar to the Ottoman Empire 150 years ago and because that tragedy not only destroyed their traditional homeland but led to the death of more than a third of them, the Sochi games are leading many Circassians to think anew about themselves and their relations to Moscow.
Given that the Circassians inside Russia -- including the Adygei, Cherkess, Kabardinians, and Shapsugs -- are already unhappy with Moscow’s policies toward them and given that many of the Circassians in Turkey and Jordan occupy high positions in the militaries of those countries, such a political coming together could create problems domestic and international.
If these three trends continue -- and Moscow gives no sign that it is willing or able to reverse its current course -- then the Sochi Olympics almost certainly will be remembered not as a personal triumph for Putin but as one of his greatest and perhaps most irreversible mistakes.
Vienna, December 19 -- Even though the Sochi Olympics are still nearly seven years in the future, these international games which many in Russia have celebrated as an indication of the world’s increasing deference to President Vladimir Putin and themselves, are already casting three dark shadows over the North Caucasus.
First of all, they apparently lie behind a new intensification of Moscow’s efforts to suppress groups fighting against the central authorities, a linkage that one Chechen official said this week means that pro-Moscow Chechen forces are now free to cross into the territory of neighboring republics (http://www.utro.ru/articles/2007/12/18/702669shtml).
Such actions by military units loyal primarily to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and known for their brutal treatment of civilians are likely to exacerbate conflicts in that already unstable region rather than to contribute to their resolution, thereby increasing the size of the problem the Kremlin apparently believes it is reducing in this way.
Second, the upcoming Olympics are already contributing to the destruction of a national park and other fragile areas. Indeed, according to the Rosbalt.South news agency today, many officials and businessmen in their rush to get the area ready for the games are riding roughshod over Russian law, Moscow’s international obligations, and expert opinion.
Many ecologists now say that “the Sochi National Park will not survive the Games,” even though the law requires that anyone building in or near it get the blessing of expert opinion. That is not being done, and the courts are backing the government and business interests (http://www.rosbaltsouth.ru/2007/12/19/441215.html).
But it is not just Russian legislation and good sense that is being violated, the ecologists argue. Moscow is violating “the requirements of the International Convention on the Preservation of objects of the World’s Natural and Cultural Inheritance set by UNESCO,” as well as a variety of other accords the Russian government has signed.
And the actions of officials and business interests to build up for the games threatens not only the flora of the region but may lead to the extinction of a variety of animal species found nowhere else in the world. Thus, the triumph of the games will be the destruction of the values such competitions are supposed to stand for.
And third -- and this is almost certain to be the most politically problematic development from Moscow’s point of view -- the development of Sochi is contributing to the unification of Circassian groups within the Russian Federation and of the five to seven million Circassians living in the Middle East, Europe and North America.
Because it was at Sochi that the ancestors of today’s Circassians were deported by the tsar to the Ottoman Empire 150 years ago and because that tragedy not only destroyed their traditional homeland but led to the death of more than a third of them, the Sochi games are leading many Circassians to think anew about themselves and their relations to Moscow.
Given that the Circassians inside Russia -- including the Adygei, Cherkess, Kabardinians, and Shapsugs -- are already unhappy with Moscow’s policies toward them and given that many of the Circassians in Turkey and Jordan occupy high positions in the militaries of those countries, such a political coming together could create problems domestic and international.
If these three trends continue -- and Moscow gives no sign that it is willing or able to reverse its current course -- then the Sochi Olympics almost certainly will be remembered not as a personal triumph for Putin but as one of his greatest and perhaps most irreversible mistakes.
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