Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – As many as 40 percent of all immigrant workers in the Russian Federation would like to regularize their status and become full members of the community there, an expert on migration says, but neither the Russian state nor most members of Russian society are prepared to take the steps needed to meet them half way.
In part, this reflects a reaction to demagogic commentaries which have dramatically overstated the size of the problem Russia now faces, Vladimir Mukomel, a sociologist who is part of the Strategy 2020 expert group, but in part, it represents an unwillingness to pursue what he calls “Rossianization” rather than “Russificaiton” (svpressa.ru/society/article/43689/).
In an interview with “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist Kirill Zubkov, Mukomel comments first of all on some of the figures which have prompted Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov and other politicians to call for parliamentary hearings on the influx of people they suggest “do not have Russian memory” and “for whom the Russian land is something alien.”
According to Mukomel, “migration is not a problem with which one must struggle but it also is not a panacea for all problems.” It may solve some problems but only at the cost of creating others. And consequently, any discussion of how to address migration must consider both costs and benefits.
By 2030, he points out, Russia is “threatened by something worse than depopulation.” It is threatened by a decline of more than 12 million people of working age, even as the total decline of the population will be only 2.8 million. That means workers increasingly will have to support more non-workers, mostly the elderly, than in the past.
It is thus not clear, Mukomel says, “on whose account Russian pensions will live, given that the percent that they will form in the population is growing while the percentage of workers is falling.” And that will be even more true in the future, when after 2018, the current relative stabilization of Russia’s population ends and a new and more rapid decline begins.
Putting things in the simplest terms, the sociologist continues, “Russia needs new workers immediately, and Russia needs new citizens over time if Russia wants to have a future for itself.”
Many suggest that the solution is to be found in the mass influx of immigrants, but “migration is not a panacea.” And what is necessary is finding a way that allows for “the adaptation of migrants to Russian society – at least in the case of those migrants who want to settle in Russia and become equal citizens of the country.”
The total number of them, like the total number of migrants in the Russian Federation, is often exaggerated, Mukomel insists. There are about 160,000 who seek permanent residence, while something on the order of four million come for seasonal or temporary work and then return home.
The figures politicians toss about are far too large unless one counts all those now in the Russian Federation who were born elsewhere. “For the post-Soviet space, sucha method of accounting is unacceptable. Hundreds of thousands if not millions of citizens of Russia were born and for a long time lived in the former Soviet republics.
“If one follows the logic” of those who invoke the larger figure, Mukomel says, then one has to include in it such people as “Minister of Internal Affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev, who was born on the territory of what is now independent Kazakhstan. Moreover, the younger daughter of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Ekaterina, who was born in Dresden, also is an immigrant.”
While exact statistics are not available, the expert says, sociologists believe that “on average from 25 to 40 percent of the labor migrants who have come to Russia for work are prepared to be integrated” into Russian society.” In fact, many of them already have done so, although they are not in a position to regularize themselves legally.
The reasons for that, he suggests, lie in “the most complete lack of preparedness of [Russian] state structures” to do so as well as the unfortunate reality that “Russian society itself is not ready for the integration of immigrants,” despite the fact that most come from former Soviet areas and speak Russian.
As a result, Mukomel continues, “words about ‘the lack among those who come of Russian memory’ are also untrue: across the entire post-Soviet space, the Russian language is taught up to now and enjoys, for example in Tajikistan, serious demand” because “everyone understands” that one needs Russian if one is to work in Russia.
In other words, his interviewer says, “one is speaking about a certain variant of Russification?” To which Mukomel replies: “I would prefer the term ‘Rossification.’ In the final analysis, the entire history of Russia is the history of Russification, the integration into Rusian society of immigrant masses.”
“Karamzin, Chaadayev, Dal, even Pushkin,” Mukomel oints out, “are all descendents of migrants,” something that “should not be forgotten.” And as far as suggestions that new arrivals supposedly “will not defend the motherland,” one should remember such figures as Barklay de Tolli, Bagration, Totleben and tens of thousands of others” who nobly fought for it.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Once Proud River Fleet Near Collapse
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Russia’s river fleet on which Moscow in the past has relied to move bulk cargo given the shortage of reliable highways and rail lines is near a state of collapse, threatening the country’s economy and, because of the ecological problems its aging ships present, ability to export many things to European markets.
The Russian Federation has more than 100,000 kilometers of internal waterways deep enough for barge and other shipping traffic, but, Vladimir Rechmensky writes in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli,” the use of this network over the last 20 years has only fallen” and now involves less than two percent of all bulk transport (www.argumenti.ru/society/n290/108373).
According to the calculations of the Volga State Academy of Water Transport, shipping bulk cargo by water is 30 to 40 percent cheaper than moving the same amount by railway or highway, but because the amount now being carried is so small a percentage, Rechmensky says, “globally thinking manager-bureaucrats are not turning their attention” to the rivers.
Russia’s river fleet has always faced problems, experts say, because “in the best case,” the rivers are open for traffic only five months a year, meaning that they must make a profit for the entire year based on less than half a year’s operation. In addition, fuel costs have risen dramatically, and the lack of dredging has reduced the size of the available water network.
Because so little new money is going into this sector, Rechmensky continues, most of the ships are not equipped with contemporary geo-positioning systems. Instead of using GLONASS and GPS, as most other shippers now do, Russian captains are forced to navigate using maps which are updated only “once every three years,” a situation that can lead to accidents.
According to academic experts, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, “at present, the state of the water arteries of the country is at the level it was at in the 1940s and 1950s. [They] and those working in this sector look with tears in their eyes at the step by step destruction of a system that was at one time capable of work.”
Except for yachts and high-end tourist vessels, the Russian river transport system is attracting ever less interest and support, and as a result, “the aging of port and hydro-technical arrangements and the river fleet itself is exceeding the rate of its rebuilding,” with many ships now beyond their projected lifespan and most “older than 30 years.”
With enough funding, these aging ships could be kept operational for several more decades, Rechmensky says, giving as an example a ship in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet which was launched in 1913. But if that is the case for domestic shipping, it is not sufficient when those barges try to carry goods to European ports.
Older ships and barges, Rechmensky points out, “do not correspond to the demands of ecological security” that European countries make and consequently they are not welcome in European ports, limiting the ability of Russia to export bulk cargoes in the most cost-efficient way.
To bring Russia’s river fleet up to international standards, the country would have to replace more than 80 percent of its vessels, some 8000 in all. Given current investment patterns, that is unlikely to happen, and as a result, Russia’s river fleet is “slowly but truly degrading” to the detriment of the country.
Staunton, May 27 – Russia’s river fleet on which Moscow in the past has relied to move bulk cargo given the shortage of reliable highways and rail lines is near a state of collapse, threatening the country’s economy and, because of the ecological problems its aging ships present, ability to export many things to European markets.
The Russian Federation has more than 100,000 kilometers of internal waterways deep enough for barge and other shipping traffic, but, Vladimir Rechmensky writes in this week’s “Argumenty nedeli,” the use of this network over the last 20 years has only fallen” and now involves less than two percent of all bulk transport (www.argumenti.ru/society/n290/108373).
According to the calculations of the Volga State Academy of Water Transport, shipping bulk cargo by water is 30 to 40 percent cheaper than moving the same amount by railway or highway, but because the amount now being carried is so small a percentage, Rechmensky says, “globally thinking manager-bureaucrats are not turning their attention” to the rivers.
Russia’s river fleet has always faced problems, experts say, because “in the best case,” the rivers are open for traffic only five months a year, meaning that they must make a profit for the entire year based on less than half a year’s operation. In addition, fuel costs have risen dramatically, and the lack of dredging has reduced the size of the available water network.
Because so little new money is going into this sector, Rechmensky continues, most of the ships are not equipped with contemporary geo-positioning systems. Instead of using GLONASS and GPS, as most other shippers now do, Russian captains are forced to navigate using maps which are updated only “once every three years,” a situation that can lead to accidents.
According to academic experts, the “Argumenty nedeli” journalist says, “at present, the state of the water arteries of the country is at the level it was at in the 1940s and 1950s. [They] and those working in this sector look with tears in their eyes at the step by step destruction of a system that was at one time capable of work.”
Except for yachts and high-end tourist vessels, the Russian river transport system is attracting ever less interest and support, and as a result, “the aging of port and hydro-technical arrangements and the river fleet itself is exceeding the rate of its rebuilding,” with many ships now beyond their projected lifespan and most “older than 30 years.”
With enough funding, these aging ships could be kept operational for several more decades, Rechmensky says, giving as an example a ship in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet which was launched in 1913. But if that is the case for domestic shipping, it is not sufficient when those barges try to carry goods to European ports.
Older ships and barges, Rechmensky points out, “do not correspond to the demands of ecological security” that European countries make and consequently they are not welcome in European ports, limiting the ability of Russia to export bulk cargoes in the most cost-efficient way.
To bring Russia’s river fleet up to international standards, the country would have to replace more than 80 percent of its vessels, some 8000 in all. Given current investment patterns, that is unlikely to happen, and as a result, Russia’s river fleet is “slowly but truly degrading” to the detriment of the country.
Window on Eurasia: Rise of Siberian Nationality a ‘Positive’ Development, Presidential Plenipotentiary Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 27 – Viktor Tolokonsky, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Siberian Federal District, says that the increasing number of residents of that region who identify as Siberians rather than Russians is “a positive and valuable phenomenon” because it is an indicator of a definite kind of patriotism.”
At the same time, he insisted, “this does not mean that Siberian wants any special status or autonomization” or that it is “a sign of separatism,” adding that he “considers himself a Siberian,” although he did not say, Siberian news outlets pointed out, whether he had identified himself in that way in the recent census (news.vtomske.ru/news/33877.html).
Tolokonsky’s remarks in Tomsk represent a second and far more significant expression of support for “Siberian” as a nationality by a senior Russian official. Earlier, Aleksandr Surinov, the head of Rosstat, the state statistics agency, said that the 2010 census could show “a new nationality – Siberian” (sibir.rian.ru/society/20110525/82087475.html).
There are at least three reasons why Tolokonsky may have made this remark, any of which appears likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Russia east of the Urals. First of all, he may simply have wanted to try to put himself among the leaders of an increasingly numerous group in order to draw on its power to put pressure on Moscow.
The rising tide of Siberian anger about Moscow’s exploitation of the region and especially its failure to send enough money back to it is currently epitomized by a campaign Siberian regionalists have launched to demand more funds for building roads in the region at least relative to the amount being spent in European Russia.
Second, the presidential plenipotentiary may have made this comment as part of pre-election maneuvering, seeking to ensure that those who identify as Siberians do not, as they appear to be doing, conclude that they are no friends in the power vertical and thus decide to vote for opponents of United Russia in the upcoming elections.
Or third, Tolokonsky may have made his statement about Siberian nationality to try to weaken it by suggesting that Siberianness is limited to the Siberian Federal District rather than to all of Russia east of the Urals and that the Russian government can embrace it as part of what some might call “repressive tolerance.”
If the first of these reasons points to the way in which a political figure might use such an identification to advance his own political agenda, the second and third could in fact serve Moscow’s interests by defusing somewhat the oppositional nature of Siberian identity or even splitting the movement.
But however that may be, Tolokonsky’s remark underscores the fact that Siberian identity is not nearly as marginal a phenomenon as many in Moscow have assumed and calls attention to two realities that many analysts there pointed to when Vladimir Putin first created the federal districts.
On the one hand, these commentators noted at the time, the presidential plenipotentiaries represented a serious potential problem. If they were not given enough power to rein in those below them, they would simply represent yet another bureaucratic layer rather than a serious step toward increased bureaucratic efficiency.
And on the other, they pointed out, dividing Russia into fewer than ten federal units in place of the more than 80 that had existed up to that point could trigger the disintegration of the country. As several commentators pointed out, no country with more than 15 units had ever come apart while an increasing number with fewer have done so.
It seems unlikely that those calculations were on Tolokonsky’s mind when he made these comments, but it is almost certain that they will be on the minds both of Siberians thinking about their future and of Muscovites concerned about the evolution of the Russian Federation over the next decade.
Staunton, May 27 – Viktor Tolokonsky, the presidential plenipotentiary for the Siberian Federal District, says that the increasing number of residents of that region who identify as Siberians rather than Russians is “a positive and valuable phenomenon” because it is an indicator of a definite kind of patriotism.”
At the same time, he insisted, “this does not mean that Siberian wants any special status or autonomization” or that it is “a sign of separatism,” adding that he “considers himself a Siberian,” although he did not say, Siberian news outlets pointed out, whether he had identified himself in that way in the recent census (news.vtomske.ru/news/33877.html).
Tolokonsky’s remarks in Tomsk represent a second and far more significant expression of support for “Siberian” as a nationality by a senior Russian official. Earlier, Aleksandr Surinov, the head of Rosstat, the state statistics agency, said that the 2010 census could show “a new nationality – Siberian” (sibir.rian.ru/society/20110525/82087475.html).
There are at least three reasons why Tolokonsky may have made this remark, any of which appears likely to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Russia east of the Urals. First of all, he may simply have wanted to try to put himself among the leaders of an increasingly numerous group in order to draw on its power to put pressure on Moscow.
The rising tide of Siberian anger about Moscow’s exploitation of the region and especially its failure to send enough money back to it is currently epitomized by a campaign Siberian regionalists have launched to demand more funds for building roads in the region at least relative to the amount being spent in European Russia.
Second, the presidential plenipotentiary may have made this comment as part of pre-election maneuvering, seeking to ensure that those who identify as Siberians do not, as they appear to be doing, conclude that they are no friends in the power vertical and thus decide to vote for opponents of United Russia in the upcoming elections.
Or third, Tolokonsky may have made his statement about Siberian nationality to try to weaken it by suggesting that Siberianness is limited to the Siberian Federal District rather than to all of Russia east of the Urals and that the Russian government can embrace it as part of what some might call “repressive tolerance.”
If the first of these reasons points to the way in which a political figure might use such an identification to advance his own political agenda, the second and third could in fact serve Moscow’s interests by defusing somewhat the oppositional nature of Siberian identity or even splitting the movement.
But however that may be, Tolokonsky’s remark underscores the fact that Siberian identity is not nearly as marginal a phenomenon as many in Moscow have assumed and calls attention to two realities that many analysts there pointed to when Vladimir Putin first created the federal districts.
On the one hand, these commentators noted at the time, the presidential plenipotentiaries represented a serious potential problem. If they were not given enough power to rein in those below them, they would simply represent yet another bureaucratic layer rather than a serious step toward increased bureaucratic efficiency.
And on the other, they pointed out, dividing Russia into fewer than ten federal units in place of the more than 80 that had existed up to that point could trigger the disintegration of the country. As several commentators pointed out, no country with more than 15 units had ever come apart while an increasing number with fewer have done so.
It seems unlikely that those calculations were on Tolokonsky’s mind when he made these comments, but it is almost certain that they will be on the minds both of Siberians thinking about their future and of Muscovites concerned about the evolution of the Russian Federation over the next decade.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
