Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Roman Silantyev, a specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state, says that there are currently “hundreds of thousands of Wahhabis and their sympathizers” among the Muslim communities of the republics in the North Caucasus.
Given Silantyev’s track record, one that has often infuriated Muslims who see him as an enemy of their faith and leaders, this figure and the others he offers should not be viewed as definitive. Indeed, as the Russian specialist acknowledges, there is no way to know such things with real precision.
But there are three reasons why his words in this regard are nonetheless important. First, they suggest that many in Moscow are very worried about the growth of Islamic extremism which Silantyev and they often lump together under the term “Wahhabis,” even though the followers of that trend do not call themselves that.
Second, his remarks and the coverage they are receiving suggest that the Wahhabis as Russians understand them may be becoming more active despite all the claims to the contrary that Russian officials and pro-Moscow political and social figures in the North Caucasus have claimed over the last year.
And third, Silantyev’s words suggest that some in Moscow, including leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, are pressing for a new crackdown against Muslim groups not only in the North Caucasus but more generally, an effort that would be likely to provoke a sharp reaction from Muslims and could serve to unify them even more than they are now.
Silantyev told Interfax that Wahhabis form “about five percent” of all Muslims in the Russian Federation, with their share rising to 10 to 15 percent in the North Caucasus. “When there will be more than 40 percent,” he continued, “one can calculated that they have already won” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=40864).
In the North Caucasus, he continued, Daghestan has the largest number of Wahhabis with some 30,000 people being followers of that trend. In Ingushetia, Silantyev suggested, there are “approximately 10,000. Among “the most problematic republics” is Kabardino-Balkaria, and there are also “a large percentage of radicals” among the Muslims in Stavropol kray.
In Chechnya, the specialist said, Ramzan Kadyrov has done a lot to improve the situation, “but [despite his efforts] the problem remains.” As for supporters and sympathizers, he continued, their numbers are in “the hundreds of thousands,” a large share of the total population in that troubled region.
Asked about the level of Wahhabist penetration of mullahs and imams in the Russian Federation, Silantyev said that “there is no separate statistic on this,” but in the words of Interfax, he “expressed the opinion that it is ‘much less than half,’” leaving it to his listeners to determine just how much less.
“At the same time,” Silantyev continued, “there is an opinion that among the religious leaders, the percent of radicalization is higher than among ordinary Muslims ‘because Wahhabis in the first instance work with spiritual leaders and there is thus a high percentage of imams who sympathize with them.’”
But it is impossible to know just how many of these are showing sympathy or open support for the Wahhabis are actual converts because many of them “being subject to pressure from the side of the bandits,” speak in favor of the Wahhabis “out of a feeling of fear for their own lives,” something the Russian authorities should try to remedy.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Kyiv Urged to Declare 1944 Deportation of Crimean Tatars an Act of Genocide
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Staunton, May 25 – The Georgian parliament’s decision last week to declare the Russian repression of the Circassians 150 years ago a genocide, a decision that has infuriated Moscow, could have a far broader impact than even its critics have suggested. Indeed, it could lead other groups victimized in the past to seek similar declarations from governments in the region now.
That possibility is suggested by the proposal of the Ukrainian Peoples Party this week that the Ukrainian government declare the deportation of the Crimean Tatars by Stalin in 1944 “an act of genocide and a crime against humanity,” something for which international law specifies that there is no statute of limitations (http://www.qha.com.ua/haber2.php?id=6511).
Oleg Fomushkin, the head of the Crimean section of that party, said that “at the moment [of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in May 1944], “51 percent of Crimean Tatar men had ben mobilized and were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army and [an additional] 11 percent fought in partisan units.”
As a result, the Ukrainian Peoples Party continued, Stalin’s deportation of the Crimean Tatars in the first instance involved “older people, women and children” rather than those who might as Moscow then charged have collaborated with the invading German forces against the Soviet Union.
“In this way, the actions of the Communist powers, in terms of the UN Convention ‘On the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide and Punishment for It’ falls under the definition of genocide since for the Crimean Tatars were intentionally created conditions which were calculated to lead to the full or partial destruction” of that people.
According to researchers, during “only the first years” of exile in Central Asia, Siberia and the Urals, “almost half” of the Crimean nation was lost” to premature deaths. Moreover, that exile continued for almost all until the end of 1989 and continues for more than 150,000 to this day, making genocide charges in this case especially explosive.
Moreover, for almost half a century, the Crimean Tatars were “deprived of the rights of ethnic self-identification” by the Soviet authorities who refused to allow them to call themselves Crimean Tatars and who prohibited the use of the Crimean Tatar language in schools and kindergartens as part of an effort to destroy any future for that nation.
Over the last week, Russian media outlets have been full of attacks on the Georgian decision. (See, among others, www.fondsk.ru/news/2011/05/25/mifologija-genocida-cherkesskij-vopros-i-plany-saakashvili.html, novopol.ru/-saakashvili-razyigral-cherkesskuyu-kartu--text101859.html, www.win.ru/school/7268.phtml and www.politcom.ru/12010.html).
But almost all of them have focused only on the impact of Tbilisi’s decision on the North Caucasus rather than discussing the ways in which the Georgian Parliament’s declaration that the Russian Empire committed a genocide against the Circassians has broader implications for the Russian Federation and indeed for Eurasia as a whole.
An exception to this is an article by a pro-Russian journalist in Ukraine who in an article posted online today explicitly considers the ways in which the Circassian decision may have an impact on the Crimean Tatars and through the Crimean Tatars on other groups inside the borders of the Russian Federation and other post-Soviet states.
In an essay posted on the Materik.ru portal, Vladislav Gulyevich, a commentator for Kyiv’s “Chas Pik” weekly, argues that “Crimea and the project of Greater Circassia are steps along the path to the conquest of the entire Caucasus region” by the Western powers with Russian influence there being excluded (www.materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=12688).
The success of such an enterprise, he argues, would hurt “not only Russia but also Turkey which would find itself in the position of ‘a loser who had not fought.’” And that, Gulyevich argues, makes the ideas of Ismail Gasprinsky “about the unity of Slavs and Turks“ especially important and a possible barrier to the further unraveling of Russia and its neighbors.
Gasprinsky’s name and works may not be widely known in many quarters, but that appears likely to change in the coming weeks, given his ideas on this point which Gulyevich outlines with approval and given a conference this week in Moscow on the great Crimean Tatar thinker on his 160th birthday (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusanons/16178/).
That conference as well as Gasprinsky’s ideas are likely to make the issue of the Soviet genocide of the Crimean Tatars not only the focus of political debates in Kyiv and Moscow but also lead other peoples, themselves victimized by Russian imperialism, to seek recognition from other governments of what was done to them.
Window on Eurasia: Historical Analogies Matter in Russia Because Lessons Aren’t Learned, Crimes Aren’t Punished and Mistakes Aren’t Overcome, Pavlova Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
Staunton, May 25 – Unlike in Western countries which have law-based states, historical analogies are particularly important and suggestive in Russia because there “the lessons of the past are not learned, crimes by the state are not punished, and mistakes are not overcome,” according to Grani.ru commentator Irina Pavlova.
That reality, she argues in her latest commentary, makes especially worrisome “the essential similarity” between what is going on in the Russian political system now and what took place in Stalin’s Soviet Union in 1937, the year that opened the way to what is often called “the great terror” (grani.ru/opinion/m.188681.html).
In advance of the December 1937 elections to the Supreme Soviet, Pavlova notes, Andrey Zhdanov, then a candidate member to the Politburo, said it was necessary to achieve “the furthest most strengthening of the political activity of the masses and the inclusion of new strata of the toilers in the work of the administration of the state,” adding that the Bolshevik Party must “guarantee its leading role in the front of ‘social organizations and the society of the toilers.”
Two weeks ago, in advance of the Duma elections scheduled for December 2011, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced the establishment of an All-Russian Peoples Front and said in Volgograd [formerly Stalingrad] that “namely the United Russia Party must lead the preparation of the masses for the elections.”
Several days later, Putin said that “we are creating the All-Russian Peoples Front in order that there will be a demand for all constructive ideas” from various parts of society and that there will be “an additional chance for the immediate direct participation [of the masses] in the development of the most important government decisions.”
In 1937, Pavlova continues, “only ‘social organizations and societies of toilers’ could nominate candidates for the Supreme Soviet, and the chief jurist of the USSR at that time, Andrey Vyzhinsky, said that these groups are those which put “as their task the active participation in socialist construction of the USSR and also the support of the strengthening of the defense of the country.”
Those qualities at the time deprived groups like religious parishes “which were permitted to exist only for ‘the satisfaction of their religious requirements,” of a similar right to nominate candidates.
At present, Pavlova says, citizens “inclined toward opposition” are similarly excluded. Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s press secretary, said that opposition figures like Eduard Limonov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov could not join the new peoples front because “as far as I am aware, these persons do not share either the strategic or tactical goals of United Russia.”
“In 1937,” Pavlova continues, “mass popular enthusiasm was observed.” That enthusiasm was then directed against Stalin’s opponents. Indeed, it was at the same party plenum that a decision was approved to “transfer the cases of Bukharin and Ryzhkov to the NKVD” and to go after regional leaders who displayed “a cult of personality.”
During the 1937 election campaign, there was much talk about “wreckers” and “enemies of the people.” Now, the “main” subject, according to President Dmitry Medvedev is “the struggle with corruption,” a struggle that is supposed to involve, just like its predecessor, “the most varied forces” and be directed at those viewed as the opponents of the Kremlin.
Pavlova points out that as a result, “in 1937, the mass election campaign became a cover for the conduct of a government policy of repression.” Today, there are differences, but the current situation “ever more recalls one before a storm” that must “somehow or other” break out as part of a resolution.
Obviously historical analogies do not explain everything, Pavlova says, but she asks a series of pointed questions on the basis of her comparison: “Will the struggle with corruption turn out to be a new edition of the cadres reform of 1937?” Will the current leadership which is riddled with thieves be replaced by “young ‘nashists,’ ready to struggle for modernization?”
And even more seriously, “will ‘a cadres reform’ of the 2011 model develop in such a way, if it does take place, that it will lead to a broad struggle with ‘extremists,’ ‘extra-systemic liberals’ and other citizens” the regime’s leaders view as “disloyal.” The danger is real enough, she suggests, to justify real alarm.
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