Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – A report last week that a group of Circassians from the North Caucasus had written to Libyan strongman Muammar Qaddafi and offered to come to fight on his side in the civil war there attracted a fair amount of media attention in the Russian Federation, Turkey and the West.
But the next stage in this story has attracted far less and yet it is in many ways more instructive of what is going on in the Circassian movement. After hearing from Circassians in Libya that Qaddafi is in fact a murder of Circassians and after being urged by Circassian leaders in the North Caucasus and elsewhere not to interfere, the original group has changed its mind.
The original offer to serve as volunteers in Qaddafi’s forcdes came from a group in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was published on the Internet and also sent formally to the Libyan embassy in Moscow. The letter spoke about “the full and unqualified support” of this group of Circassians of Qaddafi’s position (kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184203/ ).
“We ask You,” the letter continued, “to allow us to come to Your country in order with arms in our hands to stand in defense of the independence of Libya. Many years ago, Libya became a refugee for our fellow Circassians, the descendents of whom live there up to now. And we would like in a small play to pay back Your country for its good relations to the Circassians.”
But a few days after this letter became public, a letter came from Libya asking the group to reconsider. Written by Musbakh Shirksi, a Circassian living in the city of Misurat, it said that “Qaddafi is a murder … [who is] killing innocent Libyan Muslims, including Circassians” and suggesting that “if you really want to come to Libya, come to help” Qaddafi’s opponents.
A second letter came from Kazbek Soobzokov, a Circassian now living in California. He urged the group to think again as well. “Qaddafi,” he wrote, “is someone like Stalin who is well known to you. Your good intentions toward Qaddafi are based on a false feeling.” And those letters had their effect.
The original group announced that it had reconsidered its plans and would decide what to do next on the basis of information from the Circassians of Libya. Among the ideas being discussed is “the question of their return to their historical motherland, based on the precedent of the return of the Circassians of Kosovo during the war in Yugoslavia.”
Other Circassian leaders have weighed in as well. Ruslan Kesh, the leader of the Circassian Congress, said that Circassians “respect democratic values and the opinion of the international community and consider that the conflict msut be resolved above all by the Libyans themselves.”
“Circassian interference in the Libyan conflict,” Kesh suggested, “could complicate the international direction of the policy of the national Circassian movement.” At the same time, however, he expressed understanding for the authors of the original appeal: They are “people who do not accept the policy of double standards.”
Moreover, “the traditional readiness of the Circassians to come to the help of those in need shows that the people is alive and that it is capable of reacting to the challenges of the times. As for the Circassian diaspora living in Libya, it is necessary to develop the question about its repatriation to its historical Motherland.”
Unlike many Circassians in the Middle East who trace their origins to the expulsion and partial genocide of their people by the Russian authorities in the 1860s, the Circassians of Libya came to that area with the Mamluks in the 14th century. They do not speak Circassian, but they “remember that they are descendents of the Circassians and call themselves al-Jerkesi.”
In 1998, one Circassian from Libya came to the congress of the International Circassian Association in Krasnodar. He spoke Arabic and had a translator, but he “expressed the desire of the Libyan Circassians to restore their historical ties” with other Circassians.” In this roundabout way, that is now happening.
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Demographic Realities Forcing Moscow to Boost Draft Intake from North Caucasus
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Staunton, April 26 – Even as some Moscow officials suggest the Russian army would be better off with fewer North Caucasian soldiers or even none at all, the demographic decline among the ethnic Russians at a time of continued growth in many Muslim nationalities has forced the military to dramatically boost draft calls in the North Caucasus.
The current issue of the Daghestani weekly “Nastoyashcheye vremya” reported that Moscow had increased the draft quota from an initial 420 people to 5980 and, adding insult to injury, noted that draft officials in that North Caucasus republic say that they could easily send “up to 20,000” if that were required (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5919/109/).
Three weeks ago, the Daghestani weekly noted, “in a number of Russia media outlets appeared the declaration of the military commissary of Chelyabink oblast Nikolay Zakharov to the effect that residents of the Caucasus would not be called into the army because as the media put it, ‘the growth of ethnic tensions’” caused by their appearance in military units.
In the North Caucasus, such assertions “have generated anger both among draftees and also among the higher military command.” In the Daghestan military commissariat, the weekly said, officers said that they “consider such assessments to be an attempt at exacerbating inter-ethnic hostility” and that the courts should take up the matter.
And they noted that the draft quota for Daghestan had been increased from an initial 420 to the final 5980 after Makhachkala asked Moscow to increase it because so many young people from that republic want to serve. But even that number, Yavnus Dzhambalayev, who oversees the draft in Daghestan, said “is not the limit” for his republic.
Today, he continued, there are 27,000 people in the prime draft cohort in Daghestan, “and in fact we could send 20,000 draftees” to the armed forces. “We have many who want to serve and those 7,000 which wer called in by the commission have already passed through the process without any excesses.”
As to where the Daghestani draftees will serve, he said, they will be in units in the Central, Southern, Eastern and Western districts. They won’t serve in their home republic, however; there “only professional soldiers” are used, at least according to the existing rules of the Russian defense ministry.
What makes this Makhachkala report so striking is that in many predominantly ethnic Russian regions around the country, military commissariats are facing a difficult time in meeting much lower draft quotas because the current prime draft cohort, men born 18 to 20 year ago, is so small.
As a result, commissariats there are being forced to go after students in university and to round up people whose health or criminal backgrounds make them poor candidates for military service, a pattern that is likely to intensify if the current demographic trends continue as scholars now predict.
Many military officers would prefer to have fewer people from the Caucasus in their units believing that such people either cause or trigger ethnic conflicts with soldiers of other ethnic groups and thus reduce unit cohesion and military effectiveness. But they face serious opposition in taking the steps necessary to make that happen.
On the one hand, many Russian parents actively resent the idea that their children should be at greater risk of being called to military service than the parents of Muslim nationality youth. And on the other, the Russian government cannot easily avoid draft Muslim youth unless it is willing to have a smaller army or to accept serious consequences for the economy,
Moreover, and this may be the most powerful argument against reducing draft quotas in Muslim areas in general and in the North Caucasus in particular. If the Russian military does not take Muslim draftees in ever greater numbers, unemployment and discontent in the North Caucasus will only increase, with some of those not drafted likely choosing to fight another way.
Window on Eurasia: Kadyrov has ‘Terrorized’ Chechens into Silence, Alekseyeva Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
Staunton, April 26 – The human rights situation in Chechnya has not gotten dramatically worse under Ramzan Kadyrov because it was already bad when he came to office, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says, but it has changed in a dramatic way, she notes, with the population so terrorized that people are afraid to say anything Kadyrov might not like.
If a Chechen dares to do so, Lyudmila Alekseyeva told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru in an interview posted online today, the powers that be will come down hard “not only on that individual but also on all his relatives and friends,” a “Stalnistpractice which is totally illegal and unique above all to Chechnya (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/184361/).
As a result, there is very little information coming out about what is actually going on, a situation that allows Kadyrov to claim that things are fine and improving in Chechnya in much the same way that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin managed to conceal from most outsiders the crimes he was committing against the people of the Soviet Union.
Alekseyeva says that there are no independent human rights organizations remaining in Chechnya. “They cannot work normally to the extent that they are under the full control of the Plenipotentiary for human rights in Chechnya Nurdi Nukhazhiyev,” who summons those he is displeased with and “demands that they disown their own words.”
Nukhazhiyev, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru notes, “has not infrequently criticized the activity of Russian human rights activits in Chechnya and especially the work of the Memorial Human Rights Center. He says that this group, “which is financed from abroad is pursuing political goals” by disseminating “negative information” about Chechnya.
According to Alekseyeva, the situation that Kadyrov and Nukhazhiyev have created means that “the only organization which is in a position to operate in Chechnya is the combined group of human rights activists from other regions.” But even they suffer restrictions because Nukhazhiyev says they are “absolutely not needed” in that republic.
Chechen political scientist Ruslan Martagov expands on Alekseyeva’s point. He told Kavkaz-Uzel.ru that those who know the region only from the media have the wrong impression on what is taking place in Chechnya and why. The Russian media suggests Kadyrov is winning the war against the Islamists, but Martagov says the facts are otherwise.
The militants have not left Chechnya for other North Caucasian republics because Kadyrov has frightened them. Instead, they have done so because he is doing what they would like to see the powers do: promote the imposition of Islam on all aspects of political and social life in the North Caucasus.
“In Chechnya,” Martagov points out, “is taking place the clericalization of the republic; the muftiates are becoming an inalienable structure of production, and an official dress code has been introduced. “We are called to give up many of the achievements of a free society” and return to the society of the past, the political scientist continues.
Although hidden from the public media, Kadyrov and his regime are making an attempt at “legalized feudalism and the construction of a theocratic state. This is equivalent to what the Wahhabis want to do.” But there is one difference: Kadyrov’s system would collapse in one day if the money stopped flowing, and he would be swept away by those more radical than he or by those who want a freer future.
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