Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – A poll of 1600 young Russians in six major cities found that as much as they dislike migrants from the North Caucasus and support nationalist groups like those who took part in the Manezh Square protests last December, they dislike bureaucrats “even more,” a pattern that may portend even larger and more violent clashes.
Yesterday, the Moscow newspaper “Kommersant” reported about a poll conducted for the Social Chamber which showed that “young [Russians] hate bureaucrats more than they hate people from the Caucasus and give preference to nationalist organizations such as the Nashi movement and Molodaya gvardiya” (www.kommersant.ru/doc/1625661?isSearch=True).
The telephone poll, conducted by the Politex Social Technologies Agency with the support of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, involved 1600 respondents aged 15 to 30 in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Chelyabinsk.
Three out of four of those answering – 76 percent – said they sympathized with those who took part in the Manezh action. Only one in five – 20 percent – condemned it. Moreover, 78 percent insisted that the December protest was not a nationalistic action, with 58 percent saying that it was a protest against corruption and “so-called” ethnic crime.
The polltakers argued that the view that the Manezh protest was not nationalistic was confirmed by “the fact that ‘the relationship to it of ethnic Russian respondents and representatives of other nationalities was practically identical.
But the situation may be more complicated than that: Sixty-nine percent of the sample said the causes of the conflict were to be found in the fact that corruption, “especially in the law enforcement organs,” is flourishing and when “militiamen release criminals for money or on orders from above.”
Two out of three of those polled are “certain that migrants, especially ‘Caucasians,’ ‘live better,’ as a result of their rapid ability to adapt to the corruption of the authorities.” As a result, while 39 percent of the sample acknowledged they had a negative attitude toward people from the Caucasus, 51 percent had a negative one toward officials, and only 27 percent like the police.
Hostility toward young Caucasians, the poll found, is widespread: 69 percent said they “do not like them because of their ‘aggressive behavior’ and their unwillingness to “live according to our rules.’” As a result, 26 percent said they would “welcome the splitting off of the North Caucasus from Russia,” but a larger number – 40 percent – doubted that would help.
“Kommersant” noted that “it is interesting that only 17 percent of the participants in the poll positively assessed the activity of the Nashi movement,” while 32 percent expressed approval of the actions of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which a Moscow court has just banned.
The poll found that 37 percent of young urban Russians said that they have “acquaintances” who “would take part in actions” like the Manezh Square clashes. And “almost none of them doubted” there would be more such events. “Where and when,” one individual polled said, “I do not know. But they will take place.”
Everything that points to that conclusion, the young Russian said, “is now taking place.”
Friday, April 22, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Karimov’s Repression Strengthening Jihadism in Uzbekistan, Memorial Report Concludes
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Staunton, April 22 – Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s “suppression of religious and political disagreements, together with extreme authoritarianism, total corruption, ineffective economics and the absence of social justice is contributing to the spread of the conviction there that positive changes in society can be achieved only by force.”
And that growing conviction, according to a 143-page study of conditions in that most populous Central Asian country, its author Vladimir Ponomarev of Memorial says, is creating the basis for the strengthening of the positions of jihadist groups” rather than weakening them as Karimov and his backers claim (www.agentura.ru/experts/vponomarev/).
Ponomarev’s report, entitled “Political Repressions in Uzbekistan in 2009-2010, was financed by the Open Society Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy and provides a wealth of detail about conditions in Karimov’s Uzbekistan. But each of his 11 conclusions deserves particular attention.
First of all, the Memorial expert says, “Uzbekistan, which has been ruled for 22 years by the former Communist leader Islam Karimov remains one of the most repressive states of the world,” a country in which there is no legal opposition or an independent media and in which “political repression is an indivisible part of state policy.”
Second, “the use of mass repression,” which Karimov began in the 1990s, “continues to this day.” There are now “several thousand political prisoners” and more than 1200 others who are being sought on the basis of such charges. Moreover, over the last two years, “the extent of repressions rose significantly and now appear to exceed even the high level of 2004-2006.”
Third, to this day, Uzbekistan’s criminal code contains various provisions that limit fundamental freedoms, including those which “criminalize any religious activity not sanctioned by the state” and others which define “terrorism” so broadly that almost anyone can be charged with that crime by Uzbek officials.
Fourth, Ponomarev writes, “a large number of [Uzbekistan’s] Muslims, whose actions do not represent a threat to public order and security as before are being condemned on the basis of fabricated accusations of terrorism and extremism.” And most of their convictions are based on confessions obtained by torture.
Fifth, according to the Memorial study, “the main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 were declared to be the Jihadists,” a term which Uzbek official employ to describe “not only the memb ers of the few terrorist groups but also members of various informal Islamic communities which supposedly express ‘radical views.’”
Sixth, despite Tashkent’s claims of a massive upsurge in terrorist activity as justification for the crackdowns, “there is no data” about any terrorist act except for three incidents in May 2009, and “there is no information [at all] about links between the local ‘Jihadists’ with such organizations as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or the Union of ‘Islamic Jihad.’”
Seventh, because Tashkent’s repressive actions touch “not only marginal groups but have become part of the daily life of Uzbekistan,” they have become themselves “an important source of social-political tension” because they appear to justify the arguments of those who say that “positive changes in society can be achieved only by means of force.”
Eighth, just as was the case after the Andijan events of 2005, the Tashkent authorities appear to be using repression against independent human rights activists and journalists because they fear that such people will be the source of “alternative” and independent information and that that in turn “can stimulate protest attitudes in society.
Ninth, given the tight lid that Karimov’s regime has put on any information about the use of force by militants in 2009, it appears, Memorial’s Ponomarev says, that “the powers are afraid also that in the case of even limited success by Jihadist actions, the latter may serve as a model for emulation by others and give an impulse to the rise of new anti-government groups.”
Tenth, Ponomarev argues, “the West (like the partners of Uzbekistan inside the CIS as well) are underestimating the seriousness and extent of the problems connected with political repressions in Uzbekistan and their possible dramatic influence on regional stability” across Central Asia.
In contrast to the situation in 2002-2003, he continues, Western representatives have focused only “about 30” cases involving civil society activists and the democratic opposition, the freeingof which is assessed by some of them as evidence of ‘positive changes’” by the Tashkent leadership.
But in fact and just like in Soviet times, Tashkent is using these people “as hostages for political trade with the West” and is arresting new groups for every one individual it may choose to free. Indeed, the Memorial expert writes, “many are convinced” that the West is “not taking sufficient steps to change the situation.”
And finally, eleventh, Ponomarev aregues, “the current Realpolitik of the US and the European Union toward Uzbekistan needs to be reviewed, especially in the context of the latest events in the Middle East which can be repeated in Central Asia as well,” with Uzbekistan being a candidate for a Libyan rather than Egyptian scenario.
“It should be remembered,” the Memorial expert writes, “that during the period of active cooperation with the United States in 2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners which not only did not create any problems regarding the stability of the domestic political situation but on the contrary made possible a reduction in the level of tensions” there.
And it is also necessary to remember, Ponomarev says, that Karimov’s “’war with Islam’ under the cover of the struggle with terrorism … can have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The use of mass repressions not only represents a clear violation of Uzbekistan’s international obligations but represents a threat to the security and stability of the region.”
Window on Eurasia: Crimean Tatars Press to Go Back to Latin Script by End of 2011
Paul Goble
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
Staunton, April 22 – The Crimean Tatars are stepping up the campaign they launched in 1991 to return to the Latin-based script in which their language was written between 1928 and 1938 and thus end the use of the Cyrillic-based script Stalin imposed on them, a step that will further set them apart from Slavic groups and bring them closer to Turkey.
On Monday, Eduard Dudakov, the chairman of the Republic Committee of Crimea for Inter-National Relations and the Affairs of Deported Citizens, told journalists that “the process of shifting the Crimean Tatar language from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to the Latin script is to be completed before the end of the year.
Discussion of this measure has gone on long enough, he continued, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine needs to adopt modifications in the country’s law on language that can “become the basis for the introduction of changes in the corresponding legal act, regulating the use of various writing systems.”
Dudakov’s comments follow proposals by Mustafa Cemilev, the president of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people who has long sought “a single alphabet for all Crimean Tatars in the world” and the publication last month of “Nenkecan,” a Crimean journal in the Latin script (e-crimea.info/2011/04/18/49428/Kryimskotatarskiy_yazyik_pereydet_na_latinitsu_do_kontsa_goda_.shtml).
Following an overwhelming vote in favor, the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea on Wednesday called on the country’s parliament to adopt “in as short a time as possible” draft legislation that would regulate the languages of all minority nationalities in Ukraine, including not just Crimean Tatar but also Russian and other groups (www.interfax.com.ua/rus/pol/66910/).
Because such legislation touches on the sensitive issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and on the policies of the incumbent Ukrainian president who earlier promised to boost the status of Russian, that aspect of debates about a new language law is likely to attract the most attention in the coming weeks.
But in fact, the effort of the Crimean Tatars to go back to the Latin script may prove more important, not only because it will set them even more apart from the others on the peninsula but also because it will serve as a model for other Turkic groups in the post-Soviet world, in the first instance the Kazan Tatars, and tighten relations between these communities and Turkey.
The impact on the Kazan Tatars is likely to be especially great given Moscow’s increasing efforts to Russianize Tatarstan and especially the Russian government’s use of an appeal by a group of Kazan parents to reduce the amount of Tatar used in the schools of that Middle Volga republic.
Those Russian efforts have prompted some Tatar and Muslim commentators to ask, in this Year of Gabdulla Tukay, a leader of the Tatar renaissance of a century ago, “whether the language of Tukay [Tatar] will survive until the end of the 21st century?” -- or whether it is fated to be overwhelmed by Russian (www.islam.ru/content/kultura/1240).
Given the historic ties between the Kazan Tatars and the Crimean Tatars, a successful move to return to Latin script among the latter will likely spark calls for a similar step among the former, the largest ethnic minority in the Russian Federation and often a bellwether for the actions of other nations inside that country.
There are three reasons this Crimean Tatar effort is important in addition of course to its impact on the future of that nation. First, it highlights the way in which over the last year the Crimean Tatars and other nations of Eurasia have reasserted their efforts in the early 1990s to recover their own histories and set themselves apart from the hitherto dominant Russians.
Second, it underscores the ways in which Turkey is gaining influence among these peoples, positioning itself as a regional leader in direct competition with Moscow, Kyiv and other capitals and giving new content to the idea of Turkic world led intellectually at least from Ankara and Istanbul.
And third, it could trigger demands among other nations in Eurasia to shift away from the Soviet-imposed Cyrillic alphabets, including for at least some of the Finno-Ugric and North Caucasian languages and thus increase still further the centrifugal forces on the territory of the former Soviet space.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
