Paul Goble
Fairfax, April 1 — The 1993 Constitution made Russia a presidential republic, but the addition of 469 new powers to that office in the 17 years since has transformed it into a “super-presidential” with negative consequences for all other political institutions in the country, according to a senior specialist on constitutional law at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics.
Mikhail Krasnov conclusions on this point add weight to the arguments of politicians like KPRF head Gennady Zyuganov who has repeatedly said that the Russian president has more power than “did the tsar, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chingiz Khan taken together” (www.nr2.ru/rus/325959.html and www.kommersant.ru/doc-y/1610440).
According to Krasnov’s calculations, the Russian president has been given 469 new powers as a result of the adoption of 115 laws concerning that office. But what is important, the constitutional law scholar suggests, “is not the quantity but the character of the powers thathave been thus acquired.”
The Russian constitution, the scholar argues, specifies that “the president can act but he cannot define the rules.” But subsequent legislation has changed that by handing over to the president the power to do just that, thus opening the way to almost unlimited power in many spheres and undermining the authority of all other government centers and bodies.
This expansion of presidential powers, Krasnov finds, has occurredunder all three Russian presidents. “Boris Yeltsin received 168 such authorities between 1993 and 1999.” Vladimir Putin got 234 between 2000 and 2008, and Dmitry Medvedev has obtained “only 67” between 2008 and 2010.
But if the per year numbers have been relatively similar, the areas in which the Russian president has been given additional powers have changed over time, Krasnov says. Yeltsin’s expanded powers dealt with the areas of his constitutional competence, although such expansion began “the degradation” of “all remaining institutions.”
Under Putin, in contrast, the president was given and in fact seized powers which “directly violate the meaning of the constitution,” such as the appointment of governors, the naming of the chairman of the highest courts, and of the accounting chamber. As a result, Putin and his successor have “the chance to influence all branches of power.”
Friday, April 1, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Moscow to Take Siberian Identity into Account in Nationality Policy, United Russia Deputy Says
Paul Goble
Fairfax, April 1 – In what many Siberians see as a recognition of their status as a separate nationality and in a move with potentially far reaching consequences for other groups in the Russian Federation, a United Russia Duma deputy says that Moscow “will consider the Siberians” when it is developing and carrying out nationality-related policies.
Valery Draganov, the first deputy chairman of the Duma industrial committee, noted that “according to the results of the last census, the word ‘Siberian’ in the nationality line has broken all records,” with significant numbers of residents in Tyumen, Omsk, and other cities east of the Urals identifying themselves that way (globalsib.com/10029/; www.pnp.ru/extnews/1494.html).
“Under conditions when the sense of being cut off is growting among residents of the regions, when they do not feel themselves as part of the large country,” Draganov said in words posted on the United Russia Party website, “the question of nationality policy acquires an unprecedented sharpness.”
Rosstat has not yet released nationality figures from the 2010 census, but clearly the number of people in Siberia who identified as Siberians was large – and would have been larger still had it not been the widely reported actions of census takers who illegally refused to enter such declarations on the census forms.
Draganov noted that there are currently “many challenges on the path of strengthening the multi-national unity of Russia,” including differences in religion, culture and way of life of people living in various parts of the country. “Under communism, this question was regulated by political-administrative methods,” but now “such an approach is unacceptable.”
“What is necessary,” the United Russia deputy said, “is a consensus, one when on the one hand is formed a tolerant milieu, with all conditions established for the preservation of the national traditions of peoples of Russia, and on the other, is developed in citizens a spirit of unity and a feeling of belonging to one great country.”
“A wise nationality policy can assist in the adoption of balanced decisions directed at the economic development of the regions … the stimulation of a favorable investment climate in the regions, and the formation of conditions for the development of business,” Draganov continued, focusing on the specific areas of his responsibility.
“In particular,” Draganov said, in all such programs” must be considered not only economic and social indicators but also their cultural and national peculiarities.” Doing so, he added, “will more correctly direct resources, assess risks, and create conditions for the strengthening of the institutions of democracy.”
And he said that in his view, “decisions in the area of nationality policy mustbe taken not only on the basis of the opinion of the international expert community but also on that of administrative-political structures,” something that would open the way to various subgroups within existing nations.
For Siberians, both regionalists and nationalists, this represents an important victory in their drive for recognition as a self-standing community. But for other subgroups of ethnic Russians and other nationalities, it may be even more important, opening the way for an unpacking of the definitions of nationality the Russian Federation inherited from Soviet times.
And that shift from an objective to a subjective definition of nationality, one that the 1993 Constitution promised but that Russian Federation officials have often ignored or resisted, could dramatically change how the citizens of that country define themselves and hence what kind of political units are likely to emerge in that part of Eurasia.
Fairfax, April 1 – In what many Siberians see as a recognition of their status as a separate nationality and in a move with potentially far reaching consequences for other groups in the Russian Federation, a United Russia Duma deputy says that Moscow “will consider the Siberians” when it is developing and carrying out nationality-related policies.
Valery Draganov, the first deputy chairman of the Duma industrial committee, noted that “according to the results of the last census, the word ‘Siberian’ in the nationality line has broken all records,” with significant numbers of residents in Tyumen, Omsk, and other cities east of the Urals identifying themselves that way (globalsib.com/10029/; www.pnp.ru/extnews/1494.html).
“Under conditions when the sense of being cut off is growting among residents of the regions, when they do not feel themselves as part of the large country,” Draganov said in words posted on the United Russia Party website, “the question of nationality policy acquires an unprecedented sharpness.”
Rosstat has not yet released nationality figures from the 2010 census, but clearly the number of people in Siberia who identified as Siberians was large – and would have been larger still had it not been the widely reported actions of census takers who illegally refused to enter such declarations on the census forms.
Draganov noted that there are currently “many challenges on the path of strengthening the multi-national unity of Russia,” including differences in religion, culture and way of life of people living in various parts of the country. “Under communism, this question was regulated by political-administrative methods,” but now “such an approach is unacceptable.”
“What is necessary,” the United Russia deputy said, “is a consensus, one when on the one hand is formed a tolerant milieu, with all conditions established for the preservation of the national traditions of peoples of Russia, and on the other, is developed in citizens a spirit of unity and a feeling of belonging to one great country.”
“A wise nationality policy can assist in the adoption of balanced decisions directed at the economic development of the regions … the stimulation of a favorable investment climate in the regions, and the formation of conditions for the development of business,” Draganov continued, focusing on the specific areas of his responsibility.
“In particular,” Draganov said, in all such programs” must be considered not only economic and social indicators but also their cultural and national peculiarities.” Doing so, he added, “will more correctly direct resources, assess risks, and create conditions for the strengthening of the institutions of democracy.”
And he said that in his view, “decisions in the area of nationality policy mustbe taken not only on the basis of the opinion of the international expert community but also on that of administrative-political structures,” something that would open the way to various subgroups within existing nations.
For Siberians, both regionalists and nationalists, this represents an important victory in their drive for recognition as a self-standing community. But for other subgroups of ethnic Russians and other nationalities, it may be even more important, opening the way for an unpacking of the definitions of nationality the Russian Federation inherited from Soviet times.
And that shift from an objective to a subjective definition of nationality, one that the 1993 Constitution promised but that Russian Federation officials have often ignored or resisted, could dramatically change how the citizens of that country define themselves and hence what kind of political units are likely to emerge in that part of Eurasia.
Window on Eurasia: Young Russians Often ‘Nostalgic’ for a Country They Never Knew
Paul Goble
Fairfax, April 1 – While most of the 59 percent of the Russian population which says that it regrets the disintegration of the Soviet Union is made up of people old enough to have lived in that country, many Russians too young to do so are nonetheless showing a nostalgia for a country they are too young to have known.
The reasons for this, Moscow commentator Yuliya Yakusheva argues, are not far to seek because they reflect both the problems that many young people now face in the Russian Federation and the images both justified and otherwise that the young generation has of the Soviet past (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10137/).
Few of the polls concerning Russian attitudes about the Soviet past present age-specific data, Yakusheva says, it is “obvious that the majority of those calling for a return to the Soviet past are representatives of that generation who experienced both the flowering and the collapse of the last empire of the 20th century.”
For many of these older generations, there are both political and psychological explanations for this phenomenon, the Moscow commentator says. On the one hand, many of them see some of the values of Soviet times as better than those now on offer. And on the other, such people cannot recall their youth without a certain nostalgia.
But “ever more often,” she points out, “the Soviet system is becoming popular among young people of the post-Soviet countries,” a trend that needs to be examined to determine whether it is simply a matter of “passing fashion” or whether such attitudes reflect some deeper reworking and revival of Soviet ideology.
Given the importance of Internet-based social networks among this cohort, Yakusheva says, they represent a useful way in to this issue. She points out that “if one searches for ‘USSR’ on ‘In Contact,’ one of the more popular of these networks in the post-Soviet states, then one is given as a result of 19,000 groups around this theme.”
These consist of several types but “the most popular” based on the number of participants are those one can call “nostalgia groups on the USSR” which unite people who are interested in Soviet values, worldview, and way of life “ranging from Pioneer scarves to Vostok refrigerators.”
One group describes itself as a place which “gives the opportunity” to everyone who “wants to see how those born in the USSR lifed, what surrounded them in their childhood and youth.” Yakusheva notes that “it is interesting” but not surprising that among the subjects attracting attention are the numerous music groups of the last years of Soviet power.
Closely related to these nostalgia groups are what can be called “patriotic” ones, “which are devoted to the most prominent achievements of the USSR, events and phenomenon with which are associated the success of the Soviet Union in the world,” including the 1980 Olympics, the space program, and the like.
Yakusheva says that “judging from them commentaries of the creators and participants of such groups, their main goal is not the blind celebration of the Soviet past but in a greater degree a search for guideposts and stimuli of development for contemporary Russia.”
And finally, she says, there are the groups which are openly political and reflect leftist youth movements and organizations, groups whose values range from “the rebirth of greatpower status” to “social justice,” but who are seldom directed toward “the destruction of the existing system” in the name of the past.
The “most active” of these “In Contact” groups is one organized by the Union of Communist Youth of the Russian Federation.” But according to Yakusheva, the posts on it are not very sophisticated and seldom go beyond the principle that “if you were nota communist, then you weren’t ever young.”
That group and others like it include the most varied membership: “from radically inclined young people for whom the struggle with the existing regime is a goal in itself to young men and girls who do not have any particular principles and goals,” groups that should not be lumped together analytically.
In short, this interest in the Soviet past is less about a desire to return to it in toto and more part of a discussion of which parts of that inheritance should be supported and which parts should be jettisoned, Yakusheva concludes, in order to make Russia once again “an attractive model and a cultural and educational center.”
According to Yakusheva, this involves taking steps to stop the decline in the space occupied by Russian speakers in the post-Soviet space” and to present “the invisible borders” between Russia and the former Soviet republics from “deepening and broadening,” thereby leaving Russia alone.
.
Fairfax, April 1 – While most of the 59 percent of the Russian population which says that it regrets the disintegration of the Soviet Union is made up of people old enough to have lived in that country, many Russians too young to do so are nonetheless showing a nostalgia for a country they are too young to have known.
The reasons for this, Moscow commentator Yuliya Yakusheva argues, are not far to seek because they reflect both the problems that many young people now face in the Russian Federation and the images both justified and otherwise that the young generation has of the Soviet past (www.ia-centr.ru/expert/10137/).
Few of the polls concerning Russian attitudes about the Soviet past present age-specific data, Yakusheva says, it is “obvious that the majority of those calling for a return to the Soviet past are representatives of that generation who experienced both the flowering and the collapse of the last empire of the 20th century.”
For many of these older generations, there are both political and psychological explanations for this phenomenon, the Moscow commentator says. On the one hand, many of them see some of the values of Soviet times as better than those now on offer. And on the other, such people cannot recall their youth without a certain nostalgia.
But “ever more often,” she points out, “the Soviet system is becoming popular among young people of the post-Soviet countries,” a trend that needs to be examined to determine whether it is simply a matter of “passing fashion” or whether such attitudes reflect some deeper reworking and revival of Soviet ideology.
Given the importance of Internet-based social networks among this cohort, Yakusheva says, they represent a useful way in to this issue. She points out that “if one searches for ‘USSR’ on ‘In Contact,’ one of the more popular of these networks in the post-Soviet states, then one is given as a result of 19,000 groups around this theme.”
These consist of several types but “the most popular” based on the number of participants are those one can call “nostalgia groups on the USSR” which unite people who are interested in Soviet values, worldview, and way of life “ranging from Pioneer scarves to Vostok refrigerators.”
One group describes itself as a place which “gives the opportunity” to everyone who “wants to see how those born in the USSR lifed, what surrounded them in their childhood and youth.” Yakusheva notes that “it is interesting” but not surprising that among the subjects attracting attention are the numerous music groups of the last years of Soviet power.
Closely related to these nostalgia groups are what can be called “patriotic” ones, “which are devoted to the most prominent achievements of the USSR, events and phenomenon with which are associated the success of the Soviet Union in the world,” including the 1980 Olympics, the space program, and the like.
Yakusheva says that “judging from them commentaries of the creators and participants of such groups, their main goal is not the blind celebration of the Soviet past but in a greater degree a search for guideposts and stimuli of development for contemporary Russia.”
And finally, she says, there are the groups which are openly political and reflect leftist youth movements and organizations, groups whose values range from “the rebirth of greatpower status” to “social justice,” but who are seldom directed toward “the destruction of the existing system” in the name of the past.
The “most active” of these “In Contact” groups is one organized by the Union of Communist Youth of the Russian Federation.” But according to Yakusheva, the posts on it are not very sophisticated and seldom go beyond the principle that “if you were nota communist, then you weren’t ever young.”
That group and others like it include the most varied membership: “from radically inclined young people for whom the struggle with the existing regime is a goal in itself to young men and girls who do not have any particular principles and goals,” groups that should not be lumped together analytically.
In short, this interest in the Soviet past is less about a desire to return to it in toto and more part of a discussion of which parts of that inheritance should be supported and which parts should be jettisoned, Yakusheva concludes, in order to make Russia once again “an attractive model and a cultural and educational center.”
According to Yakusheva, this involves taking steps to stop the decline in the space occupied by Russian speakers in the post-Soviet space” and to present “the invisible borders” between Russia and the former Soviet republics from “deepening and broadening,” thereby leaving Russia alone.
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