Paul Goble
Staunton, February 28 – Russians living east of the Urals “no longer want to be Russians,” many there say, and Moscow commentators are beginning to consider the possibility that these Siberians may be a greater threat to the center’s control of that region with its enormous reserves of natural resources than the Chinese will ever represent.
Although the results of the last census have not yet been officially published, officials in Rosstat’s regional adminsitraitons have acknowledged that a significant number of residentsof “Tyumen, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Barnaul, and Yakutsk have declared themselves to be “Siberians” rather than Russians (rusrep.ru/article/2011/02/22/sibir/).
Such declarations, especially given that only eight years earlier, few if any of the ethnic Russians there declared that nationality, reflect a reality which can be seen with the unaided eye, a Russky reporter journalist says, and “form a threat which five to ten years from now may declare itself more loudly than the Caucasus.”
During the 2002 census, a Rosstat official said, “the majority of these people considered themselves to be Russian” by nationality. But “after only eight years, they have become Siberians,” adding that there “really are a lot of them!” Moreover, the Rosstat official noted, there would have been more if the census had been conducted honestly.
In many cases, he said, the census takers did not do their jobs properly. They did not go anywhere and simply “filled the forms using data from housing books [and] there were in general no Siberians in those books,” only ethnic Russians or some other nationality. Moreover, officials actively discouraged people from calling themselves something other than Russians.
“It is indicative,” the journalist said, “that initially the idea of writing down ‘Siberian’ was born in the Internet, and thiswasviewedby many as the latest flashmob action of young people, but unexpectedly for the initiatorsitquickly passed beyond the limits of virtual space and began to win over the masses.”
Aleksandr Konovalov, a Krasnoyarsk blogger, who helped organize the effort, said that he “feels himself to be a Siberian … we are different [that Russians]. This is difficult to explain but it’s so. In general, I consider that we do not know what Russians are. During the Soviet period, we lost Russian culture and became ‘the Soviet people.’”
As a result, the blogger continued, “a Russian is some kind of an abstraction. Even our country is Russia not Rus. Siberian is more concrete.” Moreover, Konovalovsaid, “the image of Russians both in the country and abroad is very poor. But this negative attitude does not extend to Siberians.”
Konovalov explained why the Siberians had chosen to use the census to announce themselves to the world. “Meetings today are in fact prohibited, and the census becameth eonly all-national possibility to express protest.” Moreover, people in Siberia are moremistreated than those in the Caucasus who at least are showered with budget funds.
According to the report in “Russky reporter,” when Siberians talk about Muscovites, they are referring “not to the residents of Moscow but to a certain evil community, therepresentatives of which conduct themselves the way the British administrationdid in colonial America” – taking away as much of value as possible and leaving as little to the residents.
Many in Moscow see the Siberian movement as “laughable” because they are certain that “no one will ever leave Russia.” But some Siberians say that even if they don’t seek independence – and many of them deny that as a goal – their self-identification as Siberians is important because it helps them overcome self-destructive Russian behaviors.
And Russians in the region say that if the Siberians change their minds and do pursue separatist goals, arguing that they are victims of “colonialism and imperialism,” then beyond any doubt, Moscow will use armed force to restrain them. “Any state would resolve such a problem with force,” they say.
Monday, February 28, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Kremlin's Approach Making Disorders in Russia ‘Inevitable,’ Ganapolsky Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, February 28 – Disorders in Russia have become “inevitable,” an Ekho Moskvy commentator argues, because the country’s leadership has deprived the people of a choice in the elections. As a result, Matvey Ganapolsky says, the regime in Moscow is “closer to falling” than Mikhail Saakashvili’s in Tbilisi despite all Russia has done to destabilize Georgia.
Certainly the Georgian government has its problems, the Moscow analyst acknowledges, but at least it is the initiator of reforms. In the Russian capital, however, the only thing that matters is doing what Vladimir Putin wants be it the continuing incarceration of Khodorkovsky or the suppression of dissent (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/ganapolsky/753605-echo/).
Indeed, Ganapolsky says, the situation in Russia has deteriorated to the point that today Russians “do not curse the Kremlin, they laugh about it, and in the Internet, the leaders are recalled only with foul language” – and that is because no one believes that those in power can do anything they promise.
In this situation, those in power may be able to hold on for a time, Ganapolsky says, but they will not be able to do so forever – and they know it. The powers that be “understand that this business is coming to an end, but power is too sweet to give it up.” But by holding on in the way they are, he suggests, those in power now are only making the future of the country worse.
By failing to open up the political system, by reducing the citizenry to the status of “slaves,” and by simply clinging to power and control over the country’s wealth, Ganapolsky says, “the suicides in the Kremlin are leading the country precisely to the ‘senseless and pitiless’ revolt” so many have warned about for so long.
This “Russian revolt” is be “a revolt because there will not be an alternative force which would organize the crowd – the Kremlin has devoted all its efforts in order to declare any alternative to be madness,” apparently convinced that this is “some kind of amulet against disorders.”
“But this is a profound misconception,” Ganapolsky says, something leaders often do not recognize until the crowds have stormed the television station and the leaders themselves have fled abroad, “bitterly reflecting about their own ungrateful people and about Saakashvili who apparently has organized this revolt.”
Ganapolsky’s words may strike many as extreme, but in fact, they reflect a large and growing trend among commentators in the Russian capital, and their arguments and conclusions are being picked up ever more frequently by mainstream publications, itself an indication of some of the problems that the Ekho Moskvy host points to.
An example of that is provided by lead article in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta.” The editors of that paper argue that the Russian powers that be “must learn to speak to society the truth about the war” that is going on in their country rather than to assume that they can ignore what Russian citizens are feeling (http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-02-28/2_red.html).
Russians have become accustomed to living with ever more restrictions on their activities, the paper says, but they have been willing to do so in the expectation that the powers will be able to protect them from violence. And now, it is clear, “the police state cannot defend [them] from terrorist actions,” in the North Caucasus or even in Moscow.
Moreover, the paper adds, Russians “understand that the longstanding government optimism concerning the stabilization in the North Caucasus does not have any basis in fact.” But “the government refuses to recognize” either the problem in the south of the country or the problem the absence of a solution there has created for itself elsewhere.
“The atrophying of civil society [in Russia] is the result of the intentional activity of the state.” It eliminated elections to many posts and competition in elections to others, and “people become accustomed to the idea that the powers don’t need them.” In addition, opposition figures were “converted into marginals” and “party construction frozen.”
As a result, there was no way within the system for the anger an increasing number of Russians feel, and consequently, as polls show, ever more of them are prepared “to take part in street actions.” Such “an internal emigration is not constructive e for the powers,” the editors note.
“With such a level of protest attitudes, [Russia] will not shift toward modernization” because the state will have to spend its time trying to prevent “social explosions.” But that is just the problem, “Nezavisimaya” says. “The status of slaves” to which Moscow has reduced Russians leaves them “capable only of revolt.”
“The restoration of freedom,” which Russia so desperately needs, the paper conditions, “could begin with an honest conversation. But restoration efforts could proceed according to another scenario,” all the more so “when de facto on the territory of Russia a war is taking place.”
Tragically, many are seeking to give the impression that the whole country is absorbed with choosing a mascot for the Sochi Olympics. “If that were really so, then it would be better not to be clear about just what kind of a country this is—or who needs an Olympics in a land where every day citizens are being shot and blown up.”
Staunton, February 28 – Disorders in Russia have become “inevitable,” an Ekho Moskvy commentator argues, because the country’s leadership has deprived the people of a choice in the elections. As a result, Matvey Ganapolsky says, the regime in Moscow is “closer to falling” than Mikhail Saakashvili’s in Tbilisi despite all Russia has done to destabilize Georgia.
Certainly the Georgian government has its problems, the Moscow analyst acknowledges, but at least it is the initiator of reforms. In the Russian capital, however, the only thing that matters is doing what Vladimir Putin wants be it the continuing incarceration of Khodorkovsky or the suppression of dissent (http://echo.msk.ru/blog/ganapolsky/753605-echo/).
Indeed, Ganapolsky says, the situation in Russia has deteriorated to the point that today Russians “do not curse the Kremlin, they laugh about it, and in the Internet, the leaders are recalled only with foul language” – and that is because no one believes that those in power can do anything they promise.
In this situation, those in power may be able to hold on for a time, Ganapolsky says, but they will not be able to do so forever – and they know it. The powers that be “understand that this business is coming to an end, but power is too sweet to give it up.” But by holding on in the way they are, he suggests, those in power now are only making the future of the country worse.
By failing to open up the political system, by reducing the citizenry to the status of “slaves,” and by simply clinging to power and control over the country’s wealth, Ganapolsky says, “the suicides in the Kremlin are leading the country precisely to the ‘senseless and pitiless’ revolt” so many have warned about for so long.
This “Russian revolt” is be “a revolt because there will not be an alternative force which would organize the crowd – the Kremlin has devoted all its efforts in order to declare any alternative to be madness,” apparently convinced that this is “some kind of amulet against disorders.”
“But this is a profound misconception,” Ganapolsky says, something leaders often do not recognize until the crowds have stormed the television station and the leaders themselves have fled abroad, “bitterly reflecting about their own ungrateful people and about Saakashvili who apparently has organized this revolt.”
Ganapolsky’s words may strike many as extreme, but in fact, they reflect a large and growing trend among commentators in the Russian capital, and their arguments and conclusions are being picked up ever more frequently by mainstream publications, itself an indication of some of the problems that the Ekho Moskvy host points to.
An example of that is provided by lead article in today’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta.” The editors of that paper argue that the Russian powers that be “must learn to speak to society the truth about the war” that is going on in their country rather than to assume that they can ignore what Russian citizens are feeling (http://www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-02-28/2_red.html).
Russians have become accustomed to living with ever more restrictions on their activities, the paper says, but they have been willing to do so in the expectation that the powers will be able to protect them from violence. And now, it is clear, “the police state cannot defend [them] from terrorist actions,” in the North Caucasus or even in Moscow.
Moreover, the paper adds, Russians “understand that the longstanding government optimism concerning the stabilization in the North Caucasus does not have any basis in fact.” But “the government refuses to recognize” either the problem in the south of the country or the problem the absence of a solution there has created for itself elsewhere.
“The atrophying of civil society [in Russia] is the result of the intentional activity of the state.” It eliminated elections to many posts and competition in elections to others, and “people become accustomed to the idea that the powers don’t need them.” In addition, opposition figures were “converted into marginals” and “party construction frozen.”
As a result, there was no way within the system for the anger an increasing number of Russians feel, and consequently, as polls show, ever more of them are prepared “to take part in street actions.” Such “an internal emigration is not constructive e for the powers,” the editors note.
“With such a level of protest attitudes, [Russia] will not shift toward modernization” because the state will have to spend its time trying to prevent “social explosions.” But that is just the problem, “Nezavisimaya” says. “The status of slaves” to which Moscow has reduced Russians leaves them “capable only of revolt.”
“The restoration of freedom,” which Russia so desperately needs, the paper conditions, “could begin with an honest conversation. But restoration efforts could proceed according to another scenario,” all the more so “when de facto on the territory of Russia a war is taking place.”
Tragically, many are seeking to give the impression that the whole country is absorbed with choosing a mascot for the Sochi Olympics. “If that were really so, then it would be better not to be clear about just what kind of a country this is—or who needs an Olympics in a land where every day citizens are being shot and blown up.”
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev’s Innovative Leader Fails in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Markedonov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, February 28 – In a way that eerily recalls the experiences of Mikhail Gorbachev during his first years in office, President Dmitry Medvedev appointed as head of a non-Russian republic someone who was committed to promoting efficiency and modernization by ignoring the traditional division of positions according to nationality.
But just as Gorbachev’s effort exacerbated nationality tensions and forced the Soviet leader to reverse course in various union republics, so too now, Medvedev has been forced to dismiss Boris Ebzeyev, the Russian president’s first appointment in the North Caucasus and a man of whom much was expected in Moscow.
And consequently, Sergey Markedonov argues in an essay on Politcom.ru today, this change in the leadership of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic seems certain to send a shock wave not only through other non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation but also through the Moscow political elite (www.politcom.ru/11511.html).
On Saturday, Medvedev dismissed Ebzeyev as head of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic, an action that is more significant than many might assume. Ebzeyev was Medvedev’s first regional head appointment, and his advancement “was accompanied by heightened expectations,” more in Moscow, Markedonov says, than “even in the KChR itself.”
Those expectations appeared at the time to be justified. A former head of the Constitutional Court and an author of the Russian Constitution, Ebzeyev impressed many people, in the words of one journalists “as the most intelligent man who had come to the local ‘white house’ in the entire history of the existence of the republic.”
But it waqs not just a matter of “high IQ,” Markedonov continues. Ebzeyev was replacing Mustafa Batdyyev, whose time in office had been marked by corruption and scandal. Ebzeyev, whose reputation for avoiding corruption, thus was widely assumed to be just the medicine that the KChR needed.
Unfortunately, these qualities were not enough to make him a success. Indeed, the policy approaches Ebzeyev adopted appear to be responsible for his dismissal, and because those approaches are ones closely associated with Medvedev himself, Ebzeyev’s ouster is ”an event of all-Russian scale.”
From his first days in office, Ebzeyev took steps that “violated the unwritten traditions of cadre policy in the KChR” and thus set the local powers that be against him. He declared, Markedonov points out, that he said that the “ethnic division of labor – a Karachay as president, a Circassian as premier and a Russian a speaker of regional legislature” needed “correction.”
“Had he done so step by step and not in the form of a cavalry raid on the ethnocracy,” Markedonov says, “Ebzeyev could have expected great success.” But he notes, “what has been done is done” – and now Ebzeyev, “the intelligent in power,” is out of office, and his approach is discredited at least for a time.
Ebzeyev appointed an ethnic Greek to the post of republic prime minister, a step that further exacerbated the Circassian issue, which has been intensifying in advance of the Olympiad planned for Sochi in 2014. And the republic head took other steps which guaranteed that “the regional powers” would “sabotage his actions.”
One case of this took place “literally last Saturday,” Ebzeyev’s last day in office. The then republic head wanted “to convene an extraordinary sessionof the parliament under the pretext of the need to introduce some immediate changes in the budget.” In fact, Markedonov says, it appears he wanted deputies to sign a letter supporting him.
But he wasn’t able to achieve that, and his anti-ethnocratic approach had already been rejected by Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential Plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus who said last year that “by May 1,” there should be someone of Circassian nationality in the office of premier of the KChR, a directive Ebzeyev complied with.
“Consequently,” Markedonov says, “the center itself, having sent someone it dispatched to promote ‘modernization’ has recognized that you can’t fight with traditions. Instead, it is necessary to follow them if this gives the Kremlin ‘peace’ and external stability,” something the center cares far more about than modernization.
Staunton, February 28 – In a way that eerily recalls the experiences of Mikhail Gorbachev during his first years in office, President Dmitry Medvedev appointed as head of a non-Russian republic someone who was committed to promoting efficiency and modernization by ignoring the traditional division of positions according to nationality.
But just as Gorbachev’s effort exacerbated nationality tensions and forced the Soviet leader to reverse course in various union republics, so too now, Medvedev has been forced to dismiss Boris Ebzeyev, the Russian president’s first appointment in the North Caucasus and a man of whom much was expected in Moscow.
And consequently, Sergey Markedonov argues in an essay on Politcom.ru today, this change in the leadership of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic seems certain to send a shock wave not only through other non-Russian regions of the Russian Federation but also through the Moscow political elite (www.politcom.ru/11511.html).
On Saturday, Medvedev dismissed Ebzeyev as head of the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic, an action that is more significant than many might assume. Ebzeyev was Medvedev’s first regional head appointment, and his advancement “was accompanied by heightened expectations,” more in Moscow, Markedonov says, than “even in the KChR itself.”
Those expectations appeared at the time to be justified. A former head of the Constitutional Court and an author of the Russian Constitution, Ebzeyev impressed many people, in the words of one journalists “as the most intelligent man who had come to the local ‘white house’ in the entire history of the existence of the republic.”
But it waqs not just a matter of “high IQ,” Markedonov continues. Ebzeyev was replacing Mustafa Batdyyev, whose time in office had been marked by corruption and scandal. Ebzeyev, whose reputation for avoiding corruption, thus was widely assumed to be just the medicine that the KChR needed.
Unfortunately, these qualities were not enough to make him a success. Indeed, the policy approaches Ebzeyev adopted appear to be responsible for his dismissal, and because those approaches are ones closely associated with Medvedev himself, Ebzeyev’s ouster is ”an event of all-Russian scale.”
From his first days in office, Ebzeyev took steps that “violated the unwritten traditions of cadre policy in the KChR” and thus set the local powers that be against him. He declared, Markedonov points out, that he said that the “ethnic division of labor – a Karachay as president, a Circassian as premier and a Russian a speaker of regional legislature” needed “correction.”
“Had he done so step by step and not in the form of a cavalry raid on the ethnocracy,” Markedonov says, “Ebzeyev could have expected great success.” But he notes, “what has been done is done” – and now Ebzeyev, “the intelligent in power,” is out of office, and his approach is discredited at least for a time.
Ebzeyev appointed an ethnic Greek to the post of republic prime minister, a step that further exacerbated the Circassian issue, which has been intensifying in advance of the Olympiad planned for Sochi in 2014. And the republic head took other steps which guaranteed that “the regional powers” would “sabotage his actions.”
One case of this took place “literally last Saturday,” Ebzeyev’s last day in office. The then republic head wanted “to convene an extraordinary sessionof the parliament under the pretext of the need to introduce some immediate changes in the budget.” In fact, Markedonov says, it appears he wanted deputies to sign a letter supporting him.
But he wasn’t able to achieve that, and his anti-ethnocratic approach had already been rejected by Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential Plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus who said last year that “by May 1,” there should be someone of Circassian nationality in the office of premier of the KChR, a directive Ebzeyev complied with.
“Consequently,” Markedonov says, “the center itself, having sent someone it dispatched to promote ‘modernization’ has recognized that you can’t fight with traditions. Instead, it is necessary to follow them if this gives the Kremlin ‘peace’ and external stability,” something the center cares far more about than modernization.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
