Paul Goble
Vienna, February 24 – Moscow’s drive to hold the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014 has transformed the question of the recognition of the Circassian genocide from a narrowly local to an international one by attracting the attention of intellectuals around the world to a subject they had known little about before, according to a Circassian scholar.
During a roundtable at Russia’s Social Chamber earlier this month, Samir Khotko, a researcher at the Adygey Republic Institute of Humanitarian Research, underlined what many suspect but few will say: the Russian leader badly miscalculated by ignoring the Circassian factor in this case (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/181466/).
As Khotkov pointed out, “the Caucasus is one of the few regions where the ethnic composition of the population was almost entirely changed” as the result of human actions, in this case because of the Caucasus wars, the end of which was “extraordinarily tragic” because it was “connected with unbelievably enormous humanitarian losses.”
During the course of those wars, he continued, Russian forces used almost all available weapons against the North Caucasians in general and the Circassians in particular and then at the end of that conflict, the Russians deported, with enormous loss of life, almost the entire Circassian population, most of it through Sochi.
For many Russians, Sochi, where Russia plans to hold the Winter Olympiad in 2014, is a symbol of “the sweet life,” but for Circassians, it is “a symbol of a lost country, of a lost Circassia which disappeared from the map of the world.” It is indeed “a symbol of the Adyg tragedy, the Ubykh tragedy, and the Ubykh-Abaza tragedy.”
For most of the last 150 years, the Circassians have remembered what was done to them as the greatest tragedy in their national lives and in recent times, they have talked about it as a genocide. But “precisely thanks to the upcoming Olympiad, Khotko said, “the recognition of a genocide of the Circassian people has been transformed into an international issue.”
Moreover, the Adygey scholar says, Moscow has compounded the problem for itself by insisting, whenever anyone brings up what happened to the Circassians in Sochi in1864, that “there was nothing” to talk about. In short, “it was proposed that the people stop talking about their own history.”
“But we cannot fail to speak about this, Khotko said. “If we will be silent about this, then we as historians will not fulfill our responsibilities before society.” That is all the more so, he suggested, because the Russian mass media present such a one-sided story of the Caucasus wars, praising people who behaved in a bestial fashion.
Some of those Russian military men have been transformed into history, he noted. In Armavir, for example, there is a monument to a certain Zass, “who paid ten rubles to his soldiers for each head [of a Circassian] they had cut off. This was done for years,” and both Russians and Circassians deserve to know the truth.
In the audience when Khotko made these remarks, Kavkaz-Uzel.ru reported today, were scholars from the Academy of Sciences, Moscow State University, MGIMO, the foreign ministry, the State Humanitarian University, “and also representatives of the Plenipotentiary representation for the North Caucasus, the Presidential Administration and the Duma.”
Other speakers took a somewhat different line than Khotko. Maksim Shevchenko,the head of the Center for Strategic Research on Religion and Policy and a member of the Social Chamber, said that all too often those on both sides of this issue were guided by overheated passions rather than sober analysis.
It is certainly true, Shevchenko noted, that “an enormous population of Circassians” were killed or removed from their homelands by the tsarist authorities. But the religious specialist said, that was hardly unusual in the 19th century when imperial powers often behaved brutally to strengthen their borders.
To try to connect present-day Russia with this, he continued, is “simply absurd.” Turkey used the Caucasus wars too in the pursuit of its foreign and domestic goals, he points out, and they even “purchased Circassians as slaves” and behaved in other ways that were beyond any doubt wrong.
Because of all that, Shevchenko said, to call for the international community to label what was done to the Circassians a genocide is to engage in “political pressure” against Moscow, something which he suggested, he was completely against, although he said he believed the Circassians should “receive moral satisfaction” by the acknowledgement of history.
A third speaker, Barasbi Bgazhnokova, a senior scholar at the Kabardino-Balkaria Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said such compensation might take the form of the restoration of the Shapsug National District, which was suppressed by Moscow in 1945.
“We now talk about national-cultural autonomies, about the support of national minorities. Let us take this as an act of good will,” she continued, rather than feeling under any compulsion or pressure to do so. If Moscow did so, Bgazhnokova argued, that would close the Circassian dispute for many if not most Circassians.
But a fourth speaker, Akhmed Yarlykapov, a senior scholar at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, suggested that while Russia should not “stick its head in the sand” and act as if there was nothing to the Circassian argument, “we all understand that the demand to recognize this as a genocide converts it into a political question.”
“Yes, Russia could repent, but after such a repentance,” he said, he believed that “there would appeal a mass of politicians who would begin to advance new demands.” Thus, he implied, it may be best not to take even the smallest of first steps. In any case, Russia must have a clearly defined policy on this question.
What is important about this discussion is that it highlights movement in Moscow away from a simple rejection of the Circasssian call for recognition of what happened in 1864 as a genocide to a more nuanced response, an indication that the Circassian campaign in Georgia and elsewhere is having an effect.
And that in turn suggests that the Russian authorities may be planning some moves in the near future to try to divide the Circassian movement both within the Russian Federation and abroad by offering that community something in the hopes of getting it to drop these demands, at least in the run up to the Sochi Olympiad.
Whether that will work remains to be seen, but the February 14th meeting is the clearest publication yet that the drive by Circassians and their friends is having an effect, one that may lead some in Moscow to be asking themselves whether pushing for the Sochi Olympiad may in fact be proving a counterproductive enterprise.
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Yanukovich Strengthens Vertical but Loses Power, Kyiv Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 24 – President Viktor Yanukovich’s success during his first year in office in building a presidential system in Ukraine has come at a high price – the end of many of the links between the Ukrainian government and the population and the alienation of the Ukrainians from their government, according to a leading Kyiv commentator.
In the current “Zerkalo nedeli,” Vadim Karasyev describes this as “the paradox of [Yanukovich’s] first blitzkrieg” – the construction of a apparently more efficient and stable power vertical but one that exists without the active participation of the Ukrainian population (www.zn.ua/newspaper/articles/75837#article).
By setting up a presidentialist system in which he is “the dominant player,” Karasyev continues, Yanukovich has thereby ended “the coalition, pluralist and politically competitive system” that had existed under his predecessor, one that often led to political crises but that reflected the divisions within the Ukrainian population.
Parliamentary politicians have been reduced in status, along with the role of the prime minister, while Yanukovich and the administrative elite, including ministers, governors, and bureaucrats” have emerged as the new “vertical” for the president and for “major business groups.”
As Yanukovich himself has made clear, this is “the first stage” of a process, “the goal of which consists in the establishment of a stable system of administration” that guarantees those who have come to power “a strengthening of their ruling positions and the preservation of the status quo for a lengthy period of time.”
This means, Karasyev argues, that Yanukovich and his ruling elite “intend to transform the regime of competitive democracy” which Ukraine had experienced into one of “administered democracy” by establishing control “over elections and political actors” and creating a political system into one of “direct presidential rule.”
Having achieved a measure of progress in that direction, however, the Kyiv commentator continues, Yanukovich has encountered a problem: Ukrainian “society has become still more alienated from the powers that be, from elites and politicians, [indeed,] “must more alienated that was the case under the previous regime.”
Indeed, Karasyev says, “civil society has assumed a position of harsh opposition to the powers and to V. Yanukovich personally.” But because the parliament has “ceased to be a representative organ,” coalitions and parties have lost much of their former role as sements of “a system of contract obligations between the powers and society.”
As a result, Yanukovich’s promotion of “the administrative strengthening of the powers has led to their political and social weakening,” especially since personalist rule works only if the president has the support of 60 or more percent of the population as in Belarus and Russia. In Ukraine, Yanukkovich’s support has been around 30 percent and is falling.
A major reason for the decline in public support for him is that after the elections, Yanukovich has lost “the symbolic status as the leader and ideologue of the South East” and been forced to present himself as something broader but inevitably thinner with regard to many issues.
In these circumstances, Karasyev says, the question inevitably arises: “on what hidden reserves can presidential regimes operating only on an elite-oligarchic contract survive?” The answer, he suggests, is that they can do so only by pursuing “a strategy of indeterminateness,” one that allows them freedom of action but sooner or later costs them broader support.
“For the support of a system of authoritarianism [in Ukraine],” the Kyiv writer argues, “even in its soft variant, there are neither economic, force, nor ideological resources.” Moreover, the oligarchs are not going to be supporters for long because their interests and those of the state and society are at odds as well.
And because of the way in which Yanukovich came to power, his ideological program ultimately will not provide much support. His predecessor Viktor Yushchenko pushed the idea of the construction of a national Ukrainian state. Yanukovich has been left with promoting the notion of “a denationalized” state in its place.
Given that goal, Yanukovich “has tried to play the role of a moderate state building, a pragmatic nationalizer,” but under Ukrainian conditions, Karasyev arues, this is “a very narrow niche” and consequently is fated to fail unless the state can “disorganize possible interest groups” that would inevitably oppose it.
“Over the course of the last 20 years,” Karasyev continues, “the political system and political regimes have changed [in Ukraine], but these changes have concerned [first and foremost] relations among elites but have not touched the state itself.” As a result, most state institutions have remained essentially “soviet and repressive.”
The events of 2004, often called the Orange Revolution, led to the installation of Yushchenko as president, but “unfortunately,” their democratic content did not succeed in institutionalizing itself. As a result, Yanukovich won election as president. But what he has done since sets the stage for more changes.
According to Karasyev, “2011 could turn out to be a strikingly political year for the future of Ukraine,” given the weakening of the regime even as it presents itself in the form of “the state machine” as stronger and more efficient. And that in turn highlights another aspect of Ukrainian life that many ignore.
“From an institutional point of view,” Karasyev writes, “democracy in Ukraine has become less, but mentally Ukrainians have become closer to democracy. Society already understands that freedom is not something ephemeral,” something that occupies “a secondary position” in the values of people.
Indeed, it may prove to be the case that the most importance aspect of the first year of Yanukovich in office may be the following: “As a result of its Soviet-renaissance policy, the contures of a real order of the take are step by step emerging. This order of the day is being formed not by political technology … but by a real social consensus.”
That consensus, the Kyiv commentator argues, revolves around “a demand from the state of an anti-corruption, liberal and legal policy and the de-monopolization of the economy” and of the promotion of “economic, social and political freedom.”
If Yanukovich and his team continue to act as they have in the past year, they will be forced to use force to control the situation “because the economic and social resources of post-Soviet statehood have exhausted themselves,” and Ukrainian society has been driven to the edge of exhaustion and patience.
Consequently, Yanukovich’s call for “a five year plan” of reforms “could become “five years of social and political instability” in Ukraine, a period in which perhaps there could emerge a constitution that creates the basis for a broader social-political contract and the limitation of what increasingly appears to be “a Hobbesian Leviathan.”
According to Karasyev, two parties are emerging: “the party of democracy and law and the party of power and privileges.” The former up to now has played the role of critic rather than opponent of the latter, thus assuming a role that is defined by the party of power. But that could change, the commentator says, and Ukraine could change as well.
Vienna, February 24 – President Viktor Yanukovich’s success during his first year in office in building a presidential system in Ukraine has come at a high price – the end of many of the links between the Ukrainian government and the population and the alienation of the Ukrainians from their government, according to a leading Kyiv commentator.
In the current “Zerkalo nedeli,” Vadim Karasyev describes this as “the paradox of [Yanukovich’s] first blitzkrieg” – the construction of a apparently more efficient and stable power vertical but one that exists without the active participation of the Ukrainian population (www.zn.ua/newspaper/articles/75837#article).
By setting up a presidentialist system in which he is “the dominant player,” Karasyev continues, Yanukovich has thereby ended “the coalition, pluralist and politically competitive system” that had existed under his predecessor, one that often led to political crises but that reflected the divisions within the Ukrainian population.
Parliamentary politicians have been reduced in status, along with the role of the prime minister, while Yanukovich and the administrative elite, including ministers, governors, and bureaucrats” have emerged as the new “vertical” for the president and for “major business groups.”
As Yanukovich himself has made clear, this is “the first stage” of a process, “the goal of which consists in the establishment of a stable system of administration” that guarantees those who have come to power “a strengthening of their ruling positions and the preservation of the status quo for a lengthy period of time.”
This means, Karasyev argues, that Yanukovich and his ruling elite “intend to transform the regime of competitive democracy” which Ukraine had experienced into one of “administered democracy” by establishing control “over elections and political actors” and creating a political system into one of “direct presidential rule.”
Having achieved a measure of progress in that direction, however, the Kyiv commentator continues, Yanukovich has encountered a problem: Ukrainian “society has become still more alienated from the powers that be, from elites and politicians, [indeed,] “must more alienated that was the case under the previous regime.”
Indeed, Karasyev says, “civil society has assumed a position of harsh opposition to the powers and to V. Yanukovich personally.” But because the parliament has “ceased to be a representative organ,” coalitions and parties have lost much of their former role as sements of “a system of contract obligations between the powers and society.”
As a result, Yanukovich’s promotion of “the administrative strengthening of the powers has led to their political and social weakening,” especially since personalist rule works only if the president has the support of 60 or more percent of the population as in Belarus and Russia. In Ukraine, Yanukkovich’s support has been around 30 percent and is falling.
A major reason for the decline in public support for him is that after the elections, Yanukovich has lost “the symbolic status as the leader and ideologue of the South East” and been forced to present himself as something broader but inevitably thinner with regard to many issues.
In these circumstances, Karasyev says, the question inevitably arises: “on what hidden reserves can presidential regimes operating only on an elite-oligarchic contract survive?” The answer, he suggests, is that they can do so only by pursuing “a strategy of indeterminateness,” one that allows them freedom of action but sooner or later costs them broader support.
“For the support of a system of authoritarianism [in Ukraine],” the Kyiv writer argues, “even in its soft variant, there are neither economic, force, nor ideological resources.” Moreover, the oligarchs are not going to be supporters for long because their interests and those of the state and society are at odds as well.
And because of the way in which Yanukovich came to power, his ideological program ultimately will not provide much support. His predecessor Viktor Yushchenko pushed the idea of the construction of a national Ukrainian state. Yanukovich has been left with promoting the notion of “a denationalized” state in its place.
Given that goal, Yanukovich “has tried to play the role of a moderate state building, a pragmatic nationalizer,” but under Ukrainian conditions, Karasyev arues, this is “a very narrow niche” and consequently is fated to fail unless the state can “disorganize possible interest groups” that would inevitably oppose it.
“Over the course of the last 20 years,” Karasyev continues, “the political system and political regimes have changed [in Ukraine], but these changes have concerned [first and foremost] relations among elites but have not touched the state itself.” As a result, most state institutions have remained essentially “soviet and repressive.”
The events of 2004, often called the Orange Revolution, led to the installation of Yushchenko as president, but “unfortunately,” their democratic content did not succeed in institutionalizing itself. As a result, Yanukovich won election as president. But what he has done since sets the stage for more changes.
According to Karasyev, “2011 could turn out to be a strikingly political year for the future of Ukraine,” given the weakening of the regime even as it presents itself in the form of “the state machine” as stronger and more efficient. And that in turn highlights another aspect of Ukrainian life that many ignore.
“From an institutional point of view,” Karasyev writes, “democracy in Ukraine has become less, but mentally Ukrainians have become closer to democracy. Society already understands that freedom is not something ephemeral,” something that occupies “a secondary position” in the values of people.
Indeed, it may prove to be the case that the most importance aspect of the first year of Yanukovich in office may be the following: “As a result of its Soviet-renaissance policy, the contures of a real order of the take are step by step emerging. This order of the day is being formed not by political technology … but by a real social consensus.”
That consensus, the Kyiv commentator argues, revolves around “a demand from the state of an anti-corruption, liberal and legal policy and the de-monopolization of the economy” and of the promotion of “economic, social and political freedom.”
If Yanukovich and his team continue to act as they have in the past year, they will be forced to use force to control the situation “because the economic and social resources of post-Soviet statehood have exhausted themselves,” and Ukrainian society has been driven to the edge of exhaustion and patience.
Consequently, Yanukovich’s call for “a five year plan” of reforms “could become “five years of social and political instability” in Ukraine, a period in which perhaps there could emerge a constitution that creates the basis for a broader social-political contract and the limitation of what increasingly appears to be “a Hobbesian Leviathan.”
According to Karasyev, two parties are emerging: “the party of democracy and law and the party of power and privileges.” The former up to now has played the role of critic rather than opponent of the latter, thus assuming a role that is defined by the party of power. But that could change, the commentator says, and Ukraine could change as well.
Window on Eurasia: KBR Violence Worse for Moscow than Domodedovo Attack Was, Malashenko Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 24 – The wave of violence sweeping through Kabardino-Balkaria casts doubt on Moscow’s ability to ensure political stability in the North Caucasus and thus is “worse for the Russian leadership” than even the recent and much more publicized terrorist attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport, according to a leading Moscow analyst.
On Slon.ru yesterday, Aleksey Malashenko, an ethnic specialist at the Moscow Carnegie Center says that it is critical to understand that “the terrorist acts in Kabardino-Balkara are not connected with the situation in the KBR or in the North Caucasus.” Rather, he argues, “they are connected with the situation in Russia as a whole” (slon.ru/articles/537630/).
The Moscow political scientists gives five reasons for his assertion that what has been taking place in that formerly stable republic in the North Caucasus both reflects and is affecting problems “for all of Russia’s internal policy and on the situation in society” not only in that region but across the country.
First of all, Malashenko says, what has been taking place in KBR “confirms that the powers [in Moscow] are in no way capable of resolving the situation in the region” and equally are incapable of preventing what has been occurring there from having an impact on the Russian Federation as a whole.
Indeed, he continues, it is highly symbolic that “while Medvedev and Putin were skiing in Sochi and talking about the prospects of the tourism cluster in the North Caucasus, their opponents have shown that they are lying and that their talk about these things are without any basis.”
Second, the attacks in KBR hit at the heart of Moscow’s proposals for “the modernization of the North Caucasus and the normalization of the situation in that region,” especially since Medvedev and Putin have made the development of tourism a major part of this effort. But who will choose to visit somewhere “if he knows that at any moment he could be blown up?”
Third, and related to the second, the attacks represent an attack on Moscow’s plans to hold the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. “If Russian tourists will be afraid to travel to mountain resorts,” Malashenko continues, “then what does this say about the likelihood that foreigners will come to the Olympics “knowing that at any moment they could be killed?”
From the perspective of both Russians and foreigners, the Moscow analyst continues, “the very fact that Russia could ensure political stability in [that] region has finally been put under doubt.” And for the powers that be in the Russian capital, Malashenko says, that is something “much worse” than what happened in Domodedovo.
And that is especially true, he says, because the actions of the terrorists show “a certain system and are being conducted on the basis of a definite strategy.” The attacks had symbolic targets, and they have “undermined not only the authority of the Olympic Games in Sochi and also in principle the authority of Russia.”
Fourth, given that the inability of Moscow to control the activity of the terrorists in the North Caucasus is helping to generate more Russian nationalism, then “from that point of view,” it is also obvious that “the Russian leadership is not in a position to prevent the growth of Russian nationalism,” something which is at least as dangerous for Moscow and Russia.
And fifth, both the selection of the first targets, skiers from Moscow, and the timing of the attack, when Medvedev and Putin were talking about developing tourism in the North Caucasus, represent on the part of the terrorists a thumbing of their noses at Moscow: “We can kill whom we want, when we want, and you can do nothing to us.”
For Putin and Medvedev, this is “really a tragedy” precisely because of how Russians and others around the world will view it, Malashenko says. And what is most important, the current Russian leaders “cannot offer any positive solution to this problem.” What they have offered, he continues is something that “no one believe either in Russia or abroad.”
Malashenko argues that Moscow has been making “mistakes in the North Caucasus throughout the last 20 years.” It did not need to “provoke a war in Chechnya” either the first time or the second. There was no need to talk about “drowning [the bandits] in an outhouse,” or to speak about “fighting jamaats,” as Medvedev has.
Instead, what was and is needed, the Moscow expert argues, is to recognize the “religious-political opposition” in the region and conduct “systematic” albeit difficult talks with them, something especially hard and even shameful “for our ambitious politicians, especially Putin.”
“But this was the only way out,” Malashenko concludes, noting that when Putin in fact did reach an accord with Akhmat Kadyrov in Chechnya, “the war there ended.” In sum, he suggests, “when we speak about a policy of carrots and sticks, then between them, there must be a balance. If one uses only the sticks, nothing will be achieved.”
Unfortunately, Malashenko says, it appears that Moscow has missed the chance “for a serious conversation with the opposition” in the North Caucasus. And as a result, the longtime specialist concludes, “I do not see any way out of this situation,” a reality with tragic consequences not just for the region but for Russia as a whole.
Vienna, February 24 – The wave of violence sweeping through Kabardino-Balkaria casts doubt on Moscow’s ability to ensure political stability in the North Caucasus and thus is “worse for the Russian leadership” than even the recent and much more publicized terrorist attack on Moscow’s Domodedovo airport, according to a leading Moscow analyst.
On Slon.ru yesterday, Aleksey Malashenko, an ethnic specialist at the Moscow Carnegie Center says that it is critical to understand that “the terrorist acts in Kabardino-Balkara are not connected with the situation in the KBR or in the North Caucasus.” Rather, he argues, “they are connected with the situation in Russia as a whole” (slon.ru/articles/537630/).
The Moscow political scientists gives five reasons for his assertion that what has been taking place in that formerly stable republic in the North Caucasus both reflects and is affecting problems “for all of Russia’s internal policy and on the situation in society” not only in that region but across the country.
First of all, Malashenko says, what has been taking place in KBR “confirms that the powers [in Moscow] are in no way capable of resolving the situation in the region” and equally are incapable of preventing what has been occurring there from having an impact on the Russian Federation as a whole.
Indeed, he continues, it is highly symbolic that “while Medvedev and Putin were skiing in Sochi and talking about the prospects of the tourism cluster in the North Caucasus, their opponents have shown that they are lying and that their talk about these things are without any basis.”
Second, the attacks in KBR hit at the heart of Moscow’s proposals for “the modernization of the North Caucasus and the normalization of the situation in that region,” especially since Medvedev and Putin have made the development of tourism a major part of this effort. But who will choose to visit somewhere “if he knows that at any moment he could be blown up?”
Third, and related to the second, the attacks represent an attack on Moscow’s plans to hold the Olympic Games in Sochi in 2014. “If Russian tourists will be afraid to travel to mountain resorts,” Malashenko continues, “then what does this say about the likelihood that foreigners will come to the Olympics “knowing that at any moment they could be killed?”
From the perspective of both Russians and foreigners, the Moscow analyst continues, “the very fact that Russia could ensure political stability in [that] region has finally been put under doubt.” And for the powers that be in the Russian capital, Malashenko says, that is something “much worse” than what happened in Domodedovo.
And that is especially true, he says, because the actions of the terrorists show “a certain system and are being conducted on the basis of a definite strategy.” The attacks had symbolic targets, and they have “undermined not only the authority of the Olympic Games in Sochi and also in principle the authority of Russia.”
Fourth, given that the inability of Moscow to control the activity of the terrorists in the North Caucasus is helping to generate more Russian nationalism, then “from that point of view,” it is also obvious that “the Russian leadership is not in a position to prevent the growth of Russian nationalism,” something which is at least as dangerous for Moscow and Russia.
And fifth, both the selection of the first targets, skiers from Moscow, and the timing of the attack, when Medvedev and Putin were talking about developing tourism in the North Caucasus, represent on the part of the terrorists a thumbing of their noses at Moscow: “We can kill whom we want, when we want, and you can do nothing to us.”
For Putin and Medvedev, this is “really a tragedy” precisely because of how Russians and others around the world will view it, Malashenko says. And what is most important, the current Russian leaders “cannot offer any positive solution to this problem.” What they have offered, he continues is something that “no one believe either in Russia or abroad.”
Malashenko argues that Moscow has been making “mistakes in the North Caucasus throughout the last 20 years.” It did not need to “provoke a war in Chechnya” either the first time or the second. There was no need to talk about “drowning [the bandits] in an outhouse,” or to speak about “fighting jamaats,” as Medvedev has.
Instead, what was and is needed, the Moscow expert argues, is to recognize the “religious-political opposition” in the region and conduct “systematic” albeit difficult talks with them, something especially hard and even shameful “for our ambitious politicians, especially Putin.”
“But this was the only way out,” Malashenko concludes, noting that when Putin in fact did reach an accord with Akhmat Kadyrov in Chechnya, “the war there ended.” In sum, he suggests, “when we speak about a policy of carrots and sticks, then between them, there must be a balance. If one uses only the sticks, nothing will be achieved.”
Unfortunately, Malashenko says, it appears that Moscow has missed the chance “for a serious conversation with the opposition” in the North Caucasus. And as a result, the longtime specialist concludes, “I do not see any way out of this situation,” a reality with tragic consequences not just for the region but for Russia as a whole.
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