Paul Goble
Vienna, February 23 – Russian military aircraft struck targets in Kabardino-Balkaria where battles between the militants who killed a group of tourists last week and Russian forces have intensified, even as President Dmitry Medvedev promised that Moscow will continue to promote the development of tourism in that republic in advance of the Sochi Olympics.
Over the past week, following an attack on tourists visiting the republic, violence in Kabardino-Balkaria has escalated to the point that yesterday, Russian officials said that they not only had introduced additional forces to try to hunt down and eliminate the militants but had called in airstrikes against them (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/181424/).
Given the worsening of conditions there --for a chronology, see kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/172027/ -- that came as no surprise, but this action had the unintended consequence of highlighting Medvedev’s visit to Vladikavkaz and his statement that Moscow would continue to promote the development of tourism in KBR and across the region.
According to the Russian president, “the implementation of the program of the development of the Caucasus republics and of its touristic component will be continued, despite the bandit attacks,” a measure necessary both to combat extremism and to reassure everyone that the Sochi Games will be held in 2014 (www.islamrf.ru/news/russia/rusnews/15204/).
Indeed, Medvedev said, developing the tourist industry will “give work places which is sespecially important for young people that the extremists recruit and then zombify.” And that along with social and educational programs and promoting traditional Russian Islam is the best way to overcome the terrorist threat.
While the president’s aides suggested that the expanded use of military power and the introduction of a counter-terrorist regime in KBR was not an act of revenge, Medvedev himself was blunt: Thos among the militants “who are prepared to change must get the chance [but] those who want blood must drown in their own … No other approaches are possible.”
In a comment on these latest developments in the KBR, Sergey Markedonov, one of Russia’s most thoughtful commentators on the North Caucasus, argues that the situation in that previously quiet republic “with each day ever more recalls the situation in Daghestan or in Ingushetia,” two traditionally more unstable places (www.politcom.ru/11484.html).
And he observes that “while the series of crimes in the KBR has received incomparably less time in the federal channesl than did the terrorist act at [Moscow’s] Domodedovo, by their importance, the explosions and murders [in KBR] completely compare with the tragedy in the very largest Russian airport.”
The KBR events, he points out, “drive people to one and the same conclusion … Russia as a country is dangerous for tourism and for the movement about of foreigners and its own citizens,” a conclusion with obvious consequences for the scheduled Olympic games in Sochi because “one need not be a great geographer” to see how close KBR and Sochi are.
In the period since the 2005 terrorist incident in Nalchik, officials in KBR have adopted a variety of measures to try to rein in the militants, but the latest events show, Markedonov argues, that this approach has not worked either and that problems, ethnic, economic and political, are all growing.
Especially important for an understanding of what is happening in KBR is the increasing tension between the two titular nationalities, the Kabards (a sub-group of the Circassians) and the Turkic Kabards. The latter have been protesting against the republic government for almost a year, and recently, the Balkar Elders Council accused the KBR president of fomenting terrorism.
Given their anger, the Balkars have even called on President Medvedev to introduce “direct federal rule” in KBR, something that almost certainly would make the situation in KBR even worse by transforming an intra-republic problem into a conflict between the republic and Moscow itself.
But even if that step is not taken, there is a bigger and more seirous problem, Markedonov suggests. Increasingly, “the population of the republic, observing the unleashingof a spiral of force, is beginning to understand that it can count only on itself to protect life, property, and human dignity.”
That has led some to form their own self-defense groups, including the much-ballyhooed Anti-Wahhabi Black Hawk organization, a shadowy group that nonetheless has proclaimed as its goal taking up the fight against Islamists. Carefully controlled, such a group might help the powers that be. On its own, it will further undercut their influence.
Regardless of what form an expanded federal presence takes, Markedonov concludes, “it is time ot understand that under this term must be included not only a strengthening of road blocks and check points but also systemic work toward the integration of the region into the all-Russian space.”
If that doesn’t happen – and the events of the last few days, despite Medvedev’s promises, do not give much hope, then “the atomization inside the republic will only strengthen the extremist tendencies [there] and the amount of force” that both the local people and the federal forces will have to expand.
That Moscow may be prepared to make that investment given Vladimir Putin’s commitment to holding the Sochi Games on schedule in 2014 should not be doubted, but the mere application of the kind of force that the Russian center has used up to now may be like throwing water on a grease fire.
At the very least, Markedonov’s argument suggests, the continuing application of force in response to a growing militant campaign may make ever more people in Russia and beyond doubt the wisdom of holding an Olympiad next door to such a place or -- if the games nonetheless take place -- reconsider plans to visit.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev Says Egyptian Scenario Won’t Happen in Russia, But Not Everyone Agrees
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 23 – Extremist groups have long wanted to impose on Russia “an Arab scenario” like those which are shaking the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, President Dmitry Medvedev told a meeting of the Naitonal Anti-Terrotirst Committee in Vladikavkaz yesterday.
But he assured the Russian people that “this scenario,” with all its potentially disastrous consequences, “will not take place” in their country however much these groups try to push this agenda because the Russian people and their government will be able to block such efforts (www.novopol.ru/-medvedev-dlya-rossii-gotovili-blijnevostochnyiy-stsen-text96862.htlm).
At the same time, however, he suggested that no one should avoid facing up to the real problems in the North Caucasus and elsewhere. It would be an act of “self-deception” to do that. But he concluded that he wanted “to say one thing: this is our country and our land. We are required to impose order … and we will impose order.”
The Russian president clearly meant his remarks to be reassuring, but by making them in this way, Medvedev unintentionally provoked the already ongoing discussion in the Russian Federation about the possible impact of the events in the Middle East on Russia and whether or not similar things could happen there.
One nationalist site referred to Medvedev as “the Kremlin Mubarak,” a description that probably says more about DPNI, which the authorities are trying to ban as extremist than it does about Medvedev (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/20659/). But two other more sober if no less alarming articles today merit attention.
In the first, commentator Vladimir Nadyein discusses the reasons why the kind of personalist regimes that exist in many countries of the former Soviet space are likely to fall. And in the second, sociologist Igor Eydman argues directly “why in Russia an Arab-style revolution could repeat itself.”
Writing in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Nadein says that the recent events in the Middle East have “made obvious” the ways in which personalist regimes are born, grow and ultimately fall” and that these generalities apply to many of the countries in the post-Soviet space (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10835).
Nadein begins his commentatry by observing that many thought that “with the fall of communism,” that the idea that some leader may be a bastard but at least he is “our bastard” would cease to be relevant. Indeed, he notes, there were various “scholarly works” which suggested that this term would disappear “forever.”
As events in the Middle East have shown, that did not turn out to be the case. In place of the Samosa and Trujilos” of the past have emerged “the Qaddafis, Asads and Mubaraks” whose regimes are now falling as well as “the Aliyevs and Kerimovs, Nazarbayevs and Niyazovs, Lukashenkas and Putins,” the “national leaders” of the post-Soviet space.
Such leaders, Mukhin suggests, are quite different from the dictatorships which dominated the past century. Their regimes turned out tobe “idceologically” baseless,” and the attempts to fill this gap with nationalism or patriotism “have failed.”
“The single idea,” he continues, by which the new dictators have been able to control society is personal well-being.” That creates serious problems not least of all because “at the basis of such a regime” is arbitrariness and the lack of competition which opens the way to massive corruption.
And those trends in turn lead to “an enormous gap” between the richest and the poorest segments of the population, the isolation of the elite “from the life of simple people, the destruction of the institutions of law and justice, the cynical manipulation of elections … the usurpation of the means of mass information” and hence the rule of the lie.
The “new dictators side on the needle of the lie. They lie to themselves, they lie to others, they lie to themselves about themselves and every day they need this in ever increasing narcotic doses.” All that can be seen in the countries now facing revolutions in the Middle East, but it can also be seen in the post-Soviet states.
For example, he points out, “Putin has been ruling 10 years, Lukashenka 16, the junior Aliyev in Baku 12, Nazarbayer and Kerimov (Uzbekistan) 22 years each, Ben-Ali from Tunisia 21 years, Mubarak 30 years, Qaddafi 42 years.” All of them have tried to buy themselves security, but none can be absolutely confident in that any more.
Putin’s Sechin, for example, recently told an American newspaper that Russia is one of the most politically stable countries in the world. The US journalist noted that “Mubarak certainly would have said the same,” to which Sechin replied “I don’t know; I hadn’t heard that.” But of course, Nadyein pointed out, Sechin had.
Unlike the greatest dictators of the past century, the current ones have sought to seize as much money as they can and to put it in offshore accounts which they deem reasonably to be far more secure than in their own countries. To imagine Hitler, Stalin or Mao doing that is completely “laughable,” Nadyein suggests.
Confronted with popular anger, the new dictators try to present themselves as democrats. “Yesterday they shot the opposition; today, they promise to sit down at the negotiating table. Yesterday, they declared they knew better than the others .. today they promise to change everying in a week or two.” But no one is likely to believe these new “Jeffersons,” he argues.
There is another feature the new dictators share, Nadyein concludes: “Each of the new dictators thinks that he will somehow avoid his own Egypt” and will be able to succeed where so many others have failed. Such people, the “Yezhednevny” writer says are truly children in their naivete, “bastard children” at that.
As blunt as Nadyein is, Igor Eydman in his blog of Ekho Moskvy is even more so. He argues that despite what “Russian bureaucrats” say, “an anti-bureaucratic revolution is the most probable end of the current regime” in the Russian Federation just as it has been in Egypt and elsewhere (echo.msk.ru/blog/igeid/752384-echo/).
“Like in the majority of countries which are seized now by revolution,” Eydman writes, “there is in Russia the very same system of state-bureaucratic capitalism,” the kind of system that originated in Turkey to promote national welfare but that rapidly came “to serve the narrow egotistic interests of the ruling family-clans and bourgeois-bureaucratic elite as a whole.”
Such regimes have a number of common characteristics, the sociologist says. They displace an intermixing of the bureaucracy, the force structures and business, bureaucratic control of the economy, “total systemic corruption,” “an imitative model of democracy,” and “the profanation of elections,” government control of the lading media,” “the strong influence of the force structures on political life.”
Moreover, he continues, they typically display “the authoritarian power of ‘a national leader,’” and a government-promtoed “hurrah-patriotism [as] the official ideology.” As a result, there is social and economic stagnation, a sense of hopelessness on the part of the young, and “the degrataion of a corrupt elite.”
Tragically, “the majority of these characteristics are present in many of the former Soviet republics,” including in Russia, Eydman says.
The revolutions sweeping the Middle East, the Russian sociologist continues, “testify that such regimes are experiencing a systemic crisis,” one that has arisen because of the contradiction between their way of rule and the level of technological development of their populations. They had been able to count on a monopoly of information; the Internet has made that impossible.
No one can say what the revolutions in the Middle East will lead to, nor can one predict exactly what kind of regimes will replace those now found in the former Soviet space. But those online are likely to play a key role, Eydman suggests, all the more so because Russia has far more Internet users than are to be found in many Arab states.
Vienna, February 23 – Extremist groups have long wanted to impose on Russia “an Arab scenario” like those which are shaking the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East, President Dmitry Medvedev told a meeting of the Naitonal Anti-Terrotirst Committee in Vladikavkaz yesterday.
But he assured the Russian people that “this scenario,” with all its potentially disastrous consequences, “will not take place” in their country however much these groups try to push this agenda because the Russian people and their government will be able to block such efforts (www.novopol.ru/-medvedev-dlya-rossii-gotovili-blijnevostochnyiy-stsen-text96862.htlm).
At the same time, however, he suggested that no one should avoid facing up to the real problems in the North Caucasus and elsewhere. It would be an act of “self-deception” to do that. But he concluded that he wanted “to say one thing: this is our country and our land. We are required to impose order … and we will impose order.”
The Russian president clearly meant his remarks to be reassuring, but by making them in this way, Medvedev unintentionally provoked the already ongoing discussion in the Russian Federation about the possible impact of the events in the Middle East on Russia and whether or not similar things could happen there.
One nationalist site referred to Medvedev as “the Kremlin Mubarak,” a description that probably says more about DPNI, which the authorities are trying to ban as extremist than it does about Medvedev (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/20659/). But two other more sober if no less alarming articles today merit attention.
In the first, commentator Vladimir Nadyein discusses the reasons why the kind of personalist regimes that exist in many countries of the former Soviet space are likely to fall. And in the second, sociologist Igor Eydman argues directly “why in Russia an Arab-style revolution could repeat itself.”
Writing in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Nadein says that the recent events in the Middle East have “made obvious” the ways in which personalist regimes are born, grow and ultimately fall” and that these generalities apply to many of the countries in the post-Soviet space (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10835).
Nadein begins his commentatry by observing that many thought that “with the fall of communism,” that the idea that some leader may be a bastard but at least he is “our bastard” would cease to be relevant. Indeed, he notes, there were various “scholarly works” which suggested that this term would disappear “forever.”
As events in the Middle East have shown, that did not turn out to be the case. In place of the Samosa and Trujilos” of the past have emerged “the Qaddafis, Asads and Mubaraks” whose regimes are now falling as well as “the Aliyevs and Kerimovs, Nazarbayevs and Niyazovs, Lukashenkas and Putins,” the “national leaders” of the post-Soviet space.
Such leaders, Mukhin suggests, are quite different from the dictatorships which dominated the past century. Their regimes turned out tobe “idceologically” baseless,” and the attempts to fill this gap with nationalism or patriotism “have failed.”
“The single idea,” he continues, by which the new dictators have been able to control society is personal well-being.” That creates serious problems not least of all because “at the basis of such a regime” is arbitrariness and the lack of competition which opens the way to massive corruption.
And those trends in turn lead to “an enormous gap” between the richest and the poorest segments of the population, the isolation of the elite “from the life of simple people, the destruction of the institutions of law and justice, the cynical manipulation of elections … the usurpation of the means of mass information” and hence the rule of the lie.
The “new dictators side on the needle of the lie. They lie to themselves, they lie to others, they lie to themselves about themselves and every day they need this in ever increasing narcotic doses.” All that can be seen in the countries now facing revolutions in the Middle East, but it can also be seen in the post-Soviet states.
For example, he points out, “Putin has been ruling 10 years, Lukashenka 16, the junior Aliyev in Baku 12, Nazarbayer and Kerimov (Uzbekistan) 22 years each, Ben-Ali from Tunisia 21 years, Mubarak 30 years, Qaddafi 42 years.” All of them have tried to buy themselves security, but none can be absolutely confident in that any more.
Putin’s Sechin, for example, recently told an American newspaper that Russia is one of the most politically stable countries in the world. The US journalist noted that “Mubarak certainly would have said the same,” to which Sechin replied “I don’t know; I hadn’t heard that.” But of course, Nadyein pointed out, Sechin had.
Unlike the greatest dictators of the past century, the current ones have sought to seize as much money as they can and to put it in offshore accounts which they deem reasonably to be far more secure than in their own countries. To imagine Hitler, Stalin or Mao doing that is completely “laughable,” Nadyein suggests.
Confronted with popular anger, the new dictators try to present themselves as democrats. “Yesterday they shot the opposition; today, they promise to sit down at the negotiating table. Yesterday, they declared they knew better than the others .. today they promise to change everying in a week or two.” But no one is likely to believe these new “Jeffersons,” he argues.
There is another feature the new dictators share, Nadyein concludes: “Each of the new dictators thinks that he will somehow avoid his own Egypt” and will be able to succeed where so many others have failed. Such people, the “Yezhednevny” writer says are truly children in their naivete, “bastard children” at that.
As blunt as Nadyein is, Igor Eydman in his blog of Ekho Moskvy is even more so. He argues that despite what “Russian bureaucrats” say, “an anti-bureaucratic revolution is the most probable end of the current regime” in the Russian Federation just as it has been in Egypt and elsewhere (echo.msk.ru/blog/igeid/752384-echo/).
“Like in the majority of countries which are seized now by revolution,” Eydman writes, “there is in Russia the very same system of state-bureaucratic capitalism,” the kind of system that originated in Turkey to promote national welfare but that rapidly came “to serve the narrow egotistic interests of the ruling family-clans and bourgeois-bureaucratic elite as a whole.”
Such regimes have a number of common characteristics, the sociologist says. They displace an intermixing of the bureaucracy, the force structures and business, bureaucratic control of the economy, “total systemic corruption,” “an imitative model of democracy,” and “the profanation of elections,” government control of the lading media,” “the strong influence of the force structures on political life.”
Moreover, he continues, they typically display “the authoritarian power of ‘a national leader,’” and a government-promtoed “hurrah-patriotism [as] the official ideology.” As a result, there is social and economic stagnation, a sense of hopelessness on the part of the young, and “the degrataion of a corrupt elite.”
Tragically, “the majority of these characteristics are present in many of the former Soviet republics,” including in Russia, Eydman says.
The revolutions sweeping the Middle East, the Russian sociologist continues, “testify that such regimes are experiencing a systemic crisis,” one that has arisen because of the contradiction between their way of rule and the level of technological development of their populations. They had been able to count on a monopoly of information; the Internet has made that impossible.
No one can say what the revolutions in the Middle East will lead to, nor can one predict exactly what kind of regimes will replace those now found in the former Soviet space. But those online are likely to play a key role, Eydman suggests, all the more so because Russia has far more Internet users than are to be found in many Arab states.
Window on Eurasia: Post-Soviet States Boost Arms Spending Six Times Faster than Their Economies are Growing
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 23 – Over the last year, the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States plus Georgia as a group have increased military spending by almost 25 percent, a growth almost six times that of their economies as they have emerged from the recent crisis and one that raises serious questions about stability in many parts of that enormous region.
In yesterday’s “Nezavisimay gazeta,” Vladimir Mukhin notes that defense spending by the 12 former Soviet republics has increased 23 percent over the past year and now amounts to 60.6 billion US dollars, an amount that places an increasing burden on many of these countries and points to new conflicts ahead (www.ng.ru/cis/2011-02-22/1_neoglobalizm.html).
This trend represents “a record growth in the size of military budgets over the last five years,” the paper’s military commentator says, a striking development given that “the majority of developed countries like the US, the UK, France, Germany and other NATO countries” reduced military spending because of the economic crisis.
This increased military spending, Mukhin says, reflects two things. On the one hand, “there exists on the post-Soviet space as before a large probability of the renewal and intensification of both internal and inter-state military conflicts,” something that the governments involved cannot fail to take into consideration.
And on the other, this growth reflects the fact that “several CIS countries have undertake an effort to refit their armies with new types of arms and military technology,” something none of the twelve, except Georgia and Azerbaijan, have done in a major way since the end of Soviet times.
With the assistance of the United States and NATO, Georgia has been refitting and expanding its forces for several years. And Azerbaijan, flush with oil money and interested in recovering Armenian-occupied territories, has boosted its military spending from 3.95 percent of GDP in 2010 to 6.2 percent of GDP this year.
Moreover, Mukhin notes, Azerbaijan is not just spending more on the military: Baku has boosted spending on the development of its own military industry. With that included, Azerbaijan is now spending 8.9 percent of its GDP for military purposes, far eclipsing the 4.1 percent of the much smaller Armenian GDP, Yerevan is spending.
(Armenia may be able to count on the military spending of the unrecognized state of Nagorno-Karabakh, Mukhin notes, which is currently spending “no less than 150 million US dollars a year on defense,” an amount that is somewhat less than 10 percent of that region’s estimated GDP.)
“Considering these factors,” Mukhin says, “it is completely clear that there exists a real chance of a new war in the South Caucasus.” The outcome of such a conflict “is unknown,” he says, although “it is clear that in the event of military acitons, much will depend on Russia as of course it would in the case of war in any hot spot of the post-Soviet space.”
There is also, the “Nezavisimaya” writer says, “a large probability” of the renewal of conflicts within and among the countries of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan plans to boost its military and security spending this year by 12.6 percent, but it likely lacks the fiscal resources to pay for such an expansion given the continuing economic difficulties Bishkek faces.
Tajikistan, which has also been conducting military operations over the last month against internal opponents, has increased its spending on military needs by 25 percent, and there is every likelihood, Mukhin says, that Dushanbe will be forced to continue to increase spending and will seek assistance from the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have increased their defense spending at roughly the same rate of their economic growth, with the military burden on the economy remaining where it was in the former and falling slightly in the latter. Kazakhstan meanwhile has kept its military spending at the same percentage of GDP as last year.
Given the revolutionary wave shaking the Middle East, Mukhin suggests, “the powers of the countries of Central Asia where the majority of leaders have been in power more than 20 years and where authoritarian political regimes have been formed, will move toward a sharp increase in military spending” to protect themselves.
If for different reasons, the political situation in Moldova remains unstable as well. For the moment, it is spending on defense at the same rate it was last year, but that may change, especially since “NATO countries are prepared to provide military assistance to Moldova” in the future.
Vienna, February 23 – Over the last year, the 11 member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States plus Georgia as a group have increased military spending by almost 25 percent, a growth almost six times that of their economies as they have emerged from the recent crisis and one that raises serious questions about stability in many parts of that enormous region.
In yesterday’s “Nezavisimay gazeta,” Vladimir Mukhin notes that defense spending by the 12 former Soviet republics has increased 23 percent over the past year and now amounts to 60.6 billion US dollars, an amount that places an increasing burden on many of these countries and points to new conflicts ahead (www.ng.ru/cis/2011-02-22/1_neoglobalizm.html).
This trend represents “a record growth in the size of military budgets over the last five years,” the paper’s military commentator says, a striking development given that “the majority of developed countries like the US, the UK, France, Germany and other NATO countries” reduced military spending because of the economic crisis.
This increased military spending, Mukhin says, reflects two things. On the one hand, “there exists on the post-Soviet space as before a large probability of the renewal and intensification of both internal and inter-state military conflicts,” something that the governments involved cannot fail to take into consideration.
And on the other, this growth reflects the fact that “several CIS countries have undertake an effort to refit their armies with new types of arms and military technology,” something none of the twelve, except Georgia and Azerbaijan, have done in a major way since the end of Soviet times.
With the assistance of the United States and NATO, Georgia has been refitting and expanding its forces for several years. And Azerbaijan, flush with oil money and interested in recovering Armenian-occupied territories, has boosted its military spending from 3.95 percent of GDP in 2010 to 6.2 percent of GDP this year.
Moreover, Mukhin notes, Azerbaijan is not just spending more on the military: Baku has boosted spending on the development of its own military industry. With that included, Azerbaijan is now spending 8.9 percent of its GDP for military purposes, far eclipsing the 4.1 percent of the much smaller Armenian GDP, Yerevan is spending.
(Armenia may be able to count on the military spending of the unrecognized state of Nagorno-Karabakh, Mukhin notes, which is currently spending “no less than 150 million US dollars a year on defense,” an amount that is somewhat less than 10 percent of that region’s estimated GDP.)
“Considering these factors,” Mukhin says, “it is completely clear that there exists a real chance of a new war in the South Caucasus.” The outcome of such a conflict “is unknown,” he says, although “it is clear that in the event of military acitons, much will depend on Russia as of course it would in the case of war in any hot spot of the post-Soviet space.”
There is also, the “Nezavisimaya” writer says, “a large probability” of the renewal of conflicts within and among the countries of Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan plans to boost its military and security spending this year by 12.6 percent, but it likely lacks the fiscal resources to pay for such an expansion given the continuing economic difficulties Bishkek faces.
Tajikistan, which has also been conducting military operations over the last month against internal opponents, has increased its spending on military needs by 25 percent, and there is every likelihood, Mukhin says, that Dushanbe will be forced to continue to increase spending and will seek assistance from the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have increased their defense spending at roughly the same rate of their economic growth, with the military burden on the economy remaining where it was in the former and falling slightly in the latter. Kazakhstan meanwhile has kept its military spending at the same percentage of GDP as last year.
Given the revolutionary wave shaking the Middle East, Mukhin suggests, “the powers of the countries of Central Asia where the majority of leaders have been in power more than 20 years and where authoritarian political regimes have been formed, will move toward a sharp increase in military spending” to protect themselves.
If for different reasons, the political situation in Moldova remains unstable as well. For the moment, it is spending on defense at the same rate it was last year, but that may change, especially since “NATO countries are prepared to provide military assistance to Moldova” in the future.
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