Paul Goble
Vienna, February 17 – The Russian government’s decision to ban the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) as extremist, a step that organization’s leaders say reflects Moscow’s fear that an Egyptian-style revolt could happen in Russia, will only serve to unify the broader Russian nationalist movement.
Vladimir Yermolayev, the chairman of DPNI’s national council, says that the ban reflects the fears of Moscow leaders in the wake of the December 11 Manezh demonstration and the revolts shaking the Arab world that “the [Russian] crowd will acquire a sense of itself and that there will emerge leaders and organizations that will assume responsibility and lead it.”
Consequently, he said yesterday, the powers that be have decided to cleanse the field” of anyone who might oppose them. But Yermolayev suggested, both the timing and the motivations of the authorities in fact highlight the strength of Russian nationalism, attract more people to its banners and lead to its radicalization (www.nr2.ru/moskow/320798.html).
Charges that DPNI is extremist are something many ordinary Russians would agree with. The organization routinely issues statements about immigrants which most fair-minded observers would describe as xenophobic or worse. But at the same time, many of the same people are concerned about official suppression of yet another “independent Russian social organization.”
That is an attitude DPNI leaders have been playing to, arguing that they are one of the few voices speaking out on behalf of “the oppressed” ethnic Russian majority of the country at a time when “inter-ethnic problems in the Russian Federation are growing and conflicts and terrorist actions are becoming ever more numerous with each passing year.”
According to Yermolayev, “the leadership of Russia does not want to consider the realities of the situation, does not want to correct [its] errors] and does not want to recognize the failure of its policy in the North Caucasus.” The DPNI, whose leaders are “normal, healthy people,” Yermolayev argues, simply wants to pressure the regime to change.
But if the organization is banned, he continues, “there will appear new, radically inclined and aggressive autonomous groups whom no one will control. And in the case of mass risings which are inevitable if the current course remains unchanged, then there will not be anyone to negotiate with.”
Moreover, he adds, “in the case of a ban, members and supporters of DPNI have formulated the view that the existing regime must be changed as quickly as possible and by any available means,” an indication that the group, never the most moderate at the best of times, is itself being radicalized by what officials are doing.
According to Dmitry Demushkin, a leader of the Slavic Force movement, there is little chance that the authorities will back off or that the courts will fail to agree to their demands that DPNI be banned as extremist. Indeed, he said, there is no reason to offer a defense: “the charges [will be] so absurd that even the special forces guarding the courtroom [will] laugh” just as they did in his case last year.”
Konstantin Krylov, the president of the Russian Social Movement (ROD), agreed. “Over the course of many years, Russia justice has been destroyed. Now things are normal that five years ago would have been impossible. And what will follow next is difficult to predict. Russia is not a democratic state and this must be recognized.”
Krylov said that “the powers think that if they ban [the DPNI], then the Russian movement will disappear somewhere.” But that won’t happen, he insisted. “The Russian movement is not only and not so much the ROD, the DPNI and other organizations. [Instead, as recent events have shown,] it has become a mass and popular one.”
The ROD leader added that official moves against DPNI may lead to proposals for the formation of a new “union of nationalists,” something that he suggested makes sense in the current environment and that he and his colleagues would “all participate in.” Consequently, banning DPNI may have just the opposite effect the powers in Moscow appear to be hoping for.
But this latest move by the authorities to try to rein in Russian nationalists may have yet another result, one that could prove even more important politically. Yermolayev said that now “nationalists are prepared to cooperate not only with those who share their views” but “more actively work with all political forces which seek regime change.”
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Nationalism Didn’t Destroy the Soviet Union and Won’t Destroy the Russian Federation, Kholmogorov Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 17 – The opponents of Russian nationalists often assert that the rise of Russian nationalism will generate anti-Russian nationalism among the country’s increasingly numerous minorities and lead to the disintegration of the country, just as these analysts say the rise of Russian nationalism contributed to the destruction of the USSR.
But according to a “Russky obozrevatel’” commentary by Yegor Kholmogorov, a leading Russian nationalist writer, this argument is false: Russian nationalists were not responsible for the demise of the Soviet Union, and they will not be responsible for any future disintegration of the Russian Federation (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/9739).
Kholmogorov notes that there is “a widely disseminated and frequently used argument against Russian nationalism” that runs more or less as follows: “At the end of perestroika, when people demanded for Russia its own communist party and its own Academy of Sciences, Valentin Rasputin [proposed] that the RSFSR leave the Union.”
“These suggestions,” the current argument runs, “destroyed the USSR and left everyone, especially the [ethnic] Russians in an even worse position. Now again, similar talk that [ethnic] Russians are nowhere represented and that the Russians have nothing is taking place.” That will lead to the disintegration of the Federation, “and worst off of all will again be the Russians.”
This argument, clearly designed to frighten Russians from supporting the nationalist cause, Kholmogorov says, is false both historically and as a description of the future. According to the writer, it wasn’t the Russian nationalists who split the USSR but rather “the Balts, Georgians and then the Ukrainian nationalists … who were protected by [Mikhail] Gorbachev.”
“By the beginning of 1991,” Kholmogorov notes, “the power of the USSR in fact did not exist on the territory of the Baltic states, the Transcaucasus and Moldova,” and “the most shameful role” was played not by the Russians but by residents of major cities who put their economic interests above ethnic ones.
During perestroika, he continues, “Russian patriots began to speak about the inequality of ethnic Russians in the USSR when it became obvious that republic nationalists were using the infrastructure of Soviet quasi-independence for the destruction of the USSR” and when the Russians turned out to be “the single major people” who lacked means to defend their interests.
Because of what he calls the deprivation of the subject status of the Russians at the end of Soviet times, “the Russians turned out to be a second class people.” Although a majority in the Soviet Union as well as in the Russian Federation, they were “deprived of their statehood” and became “a people without rights.”
Consequently, the Russian nationalist commentator argues, “when Russian nationalists speak of the need to recognize the state-forming role of the Russian people … the need to create real instruments for taking its opinions into account and the defense of its interests, we are starting from the proposition thaqt only this will represent a real guarantee against collapse.”
If “someone plans” to split apart the Russian Federation into a number of parts, he argues, it is even more important that the Russians have such instruments because otherwise, if their current country disappears, “namely the Russians will turn out to have the fewest rights, to be the most oppressed, terrorized and enslaved people” on some future newly independent states.
“In this way,” Kholmogorov says, “the [ethnic] Russian people has an interest in its strength and rights both under a scenario of the further existence of the Russian Federation and under a scenario of its collapse.” Russians must be strong “to preserve Russia” and, if the country comes apart any way, to prevent become “victims of anti-Russian terror.”
If Russians do not organize and demand their rights, he adds, “the Russian Federation will collapse because its own citizens will not be interested in its existence” and then there will take place “on the remnants of the Russian Federation an enormous genocide of Russians, a genocide of such proportions that history has never before known.”
Consequently, regardless of what the future holds, Kholmogorov argues, “the strengthening of the influence of ethnic Russians in Russia, the establishment of institutional instruments of realizing the sovereignty of the Russian people is the only means of defense not only of the worth and prestige but also the property and life of representatives of this people.”
And Kholmogorov ends with an appeal: “Russian,” he says, “if you do not become a Russian nationalist today, then tomorrow they will come to kill you!”
Kholmogorov’s argument is clearly over the top, but it is important for three reasons. First, it shows that at least some Russian nationalists are thinking about coping with a situation in which the Russian Federation may not survive in its current borders. Second, it shows that the Moscow regime is drawing on an old argument about the end of the USSR to oppose them.
And third, his words underscore just how overheated the Russian nationalist milieu has become, a development that may have exactly the opposite set of consequences he intends given that Kholmogorov’s argument is going to be heard not only by other ethnic Russians and the Russian regime but also by the non-Russians currently within the borders of that country.
Vienna, February 17 – The opponents of Russian nationalists often assert that the rise of Russian nationalism will generate anti-Russian nationalism among the country’s increasingly numerous minorities and lead to the disintegration of the country, just as these analysts say the rise of Russian nationalism contributed to the destruction of the USSR.
But according to a “Russky obozrevatel’” commentary by Yegor Kholmogorov, a leading Russian nationalist writer, this argument is false: Russian nationalists were not responsible for the demise of the Soviet Union, and they will not be responsible for any future disintegration of the Russian Federation (www.rus-obr.ru/day-comment/9739).
Kholmogorov notes that there is “a widely disseminated and frequently used argument against Russian nationalism” that runs more or less as follows: “At the end of perestroika, when people demanded for Russia its own communist party and its own Academy of Sciences, Valentin Rasputin [proposed] that the RSFSR leave the Union.”
“These suggestions,” the current argument runs, “destroyed the USSR and left everyone, especially the [ethnic] Russians in an even worse position. Now again, similar talk that [ethnic] Russians are nowhere represented and that the Russians have nothing is taking place.” That will lead to the disintegration of the Federation, “and worst off of all will again be the Russians.”
This argument, clearly designed to frighten Russians from supporting the nationalist cause, Kholmogorov says, is false both historically and as a description of the future. According to the writer, it wasn’t the Russian nationalists who split the USSR but rather “the Balts, Georgians and then the Ukrainian nationalists … who were protected by [Mikhail] Gorbachev.”
“By the beginning of 1991,” Kholmogorov notes, “the power of the USSR in fact did not exist on the territory of the Baltic states, the Transcaucasus and Moldova,” and “the most shameful role” was played not by the Russians but by residents of major cities who put their economic interests above ethnic ones.
During perestroika, he continues, “Russian patriots began to speak about the inequality of ethnic Russians in the USSR when it became obvious that republic nationalists were using the infrastructure of Soviet quasi-independence for the destruction of the USSR” and when the Russians turned out to be “the single major people” who lacked means to defend their interests.
Because of what he calls the deprivation of the subject status of the Russians at the end of Soviet times, “the Russians turned out to be a second class people.” Although a majority in the Soviet Union as well as in the Russian Federation, they were “deprived of their statehood” and became “a people without rights.”
Consequently, the Russian nationalist commentator argues, “when Russian nationalists speak of the need to recognize the state-forming role of the Russian people … the need to create real instruments for taking its opinions into account and the defense of its interests, we are starting from the proposition thaqt only this will represent a real guarantee against collapse.”
If “someone plans” to split apart the Russian Federation into a number of parts, he argues, it is even more important that the Russians have such instruments because otherwise, if their current country disappears, “namely the Russians will turn out to have the fewest rights, to be the most oppressed, terrorized and enslaved people” on some future newly independent states.
“In this way,” Kholmogorov says, “the [ethnic] Russian people has an interest in its strength and rights both under a scenario of the further existence of the Russian Federation and under a scenario of its collapse.” Russians must be strong “to preserve Russia” and, if the country comes apart any way, to prevent become “victims of anti-Russian terror.”
If Russians do not organize and demand their rights, he adds, “the Russian Federation will collapse because its own citizens will not be interested in its existence” and then there will take place “on the remnants of the Russian Federation an enormous genocide of Russians, a genocide of such proportions that history has never before known.”
Consequently, regardless of what the future holds, Kholmogorov argues, “the strengthening of the influence of ethnic Russians in Russia, the establishment of institutional instruments of realizing the sovereignty of the Russian people is the only means of defense not only of the worth and prestige but also the property and life of representatives of this people.”
And Kholmogorov ends with an appeal: “Russian,” he says, “if you do not become a Russian nationalist today, then tomorrow they will come to kill you!”
Kholmogorov’s argument is clearly over the top, but it is important for three reasons. First, it shows that at least some Russian nationalists are thinking about coping with a situation in which the Russian Federation may not survive in its current borders. Second, it shows that the Moscow regime is drawing on an old argument about the end of the USSR to oppose them.
And third, his words underscore just how overheated the Russian nationalist milieu has become, a development that may have exactly the opposite set of consequences he intends given that Kholmogorov’s argument is going to be heard not only by other ethnic Russians and the Russian regime but also by the non-Russians currently within the borders of that country.
Window on Eurasia: Terrorist Threat Dictates Moving Some Functions Away from Moscow, Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna , February 17 – Many Russians have argued that Russia and Russians would be better off if the country’s key institutions were not so hyper-centralized in Moscow. Now, they may have acquired a powerful new argument: Such concentration makes the Russian capital a tempting target for terrorists, especially if the latter gain access to weapons of mass destruction.
In an essay posted on the Liberty.ru portal, analyst Aleksandr Baurov says that the risk of such attacks at some point in the future is so great that the Russian authorities need to think seriously about moving many political and economic institutions out of Moscow lest Russia suffer irreparable harm from such an attack.
Baurov argues that since the September 11 attacks on the United States, “the world community has been living in permanent fear of a completely different level of [threat] than it did 10 or even 20 years ago – a greater fear than even during the period of the Cold War (www.liberty.ru/Themes/Moskva-obrechennyj-gorod.-Zachem-nuzhna-decentralizaciya-Rossii).
Indeed, he suggests, “the population of developed countries has turned out to have been driven into a real ‘ghetto of fear,’ and the most widespread of [its] fears is the danger of the use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and in the first instance nuclear weapons in a major city of Western civilization.”
Experts in the special services and political commentators have “more than once” considered the chance of such a terrorist attack and “on the whole agree with the view that the danger of its being carried out is constantly growing,” a view that is reflected in the scripts of many movies and television programs.
“Politics, as Bismarck said, is the art of the possible,” Baurov observes, adding that “it is impossible with certainty to assert that under the conditions of the intensifying competition and growth of protectionism, terror of this kind will not be used by radical elements in a number of governments and the leadership of major financial-industrial groups to achieve their goals.”
As a result, the Russian commentator says, “now the danger of a terrorist act with the application of a nuclear weapon or ‘a dirty bomb’ is higher than ever before – many times higher than the danger of the unsanctioned launch of nuclear rockets during the Codl War, when the problems of faceless terror did not exist.”
There are only two means of defense, Baurov says, the tactical, which involves “supporting the efforts of the special services to prevent the possibilities of terrorists from acquiring the material or models for nuclear weapons” and the strategic, which entails “radically reducing the potential consequences of a likely terrorist attack.”
Among the “most frequently” mentioned targets of terrorists are “strategic objects like hydro-electric dams, other dams, and atomic energy stations and major cities.” If the terrorists seek “economic or political” gain, “then the probability of a terrorist action against a major city turns out to be much higher.
And that probability, Baurov says, increases still further in those cases “when the economic and political center in one country coincide” and where the functions of both are hyper-centralized. “In that regard, Moscow is practically an idea target” whose attack would entail “catastrophic consequences.”
“The economic growth and political decisions in Russia in recent years have led to a significant centralization of power and the concentration of capital in the capital of the country.” Consequently, by attacking it with even “a dirty bomb,” terrorists could inflict “serious damage” on the entire Russian state.
According to Baurov, “the sudden destruction and radioactive contamination of the central part of the city would lead to the cessation of the functioning of the majority of federal government institutions and the loss of centralized archives and data bases. It would disorder the country’s transportation system and spread “chaos” throughout the country.
In particular, such an attack would result in “the disappearance of a significant share of the leading federal institutions” which because of the “vertical” integration of power would leave much of the country’s bureaucracy without guidance. Thus, in addition to the human losses and chaos, such an attack would entail “a chaotic growth of separatist tendencies.”
Consequently, Baurov warns, such an attack could lead “not only to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people but represent a danger to the further existence of Russia as a sovereign state.” Because that is an outcome various groups are interested in, “the danger of such a ‘risky’ decision is impermissibly high.”
Obviously, the Russian authorities must not reduce in any way their vigilance in controlling access to the raw materials needed for the construction of weapons of mass destruction or to existing weapons systems. “This is the task of the special services, and one has to hope that their direct interest in the survival of Russian statehood” will guide them.
But “even the very best means of observation and control may not save the situation if the strategic problem is not resolved,” Baurov argues. “Moscow must cease to be a place of super-concentrated opportunities, means and resources.” Instead, some of those must be shifted elsewhere to make the city “’a less attractive target’” for terrorists.
Indeed, the commentator says, “we must be glad that up to now no one has hurled a stone at this ‘glass house.’”
Given existing communication and transportation networks, he argues, there should be a carefully planned “transfer of a number of federal structures of executive power to other cities of Russia. And if that happens, then some of the business community will be inclined to move as well, a combination that as a collateral benefit will bring benefits to Muscovites.
With fewer people, he points out, the streets and public facilities of the capital will be less crowded and housing will be less expensive, developments that will also have the effect of making “the city more attractive for tourists.”
Moreover, Baurov argues, by taking this step, “we will not only seriously reduce the danger of the out of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, but we will secure a leading position among the developed countries as far as a plan for supporting the balance of global security.”
And he suggests that there is yet another benefit. “Besides everything else, such structural changes will lead to a qualitative change of the bureaucratic structures and methods of administration toward more flexible and liberal ones.” And such a change in turn could help promote “a more democratic” Russia as well.
Vienna , February 17 – Many Russians have argued that Russia and Russians would be better off if the country’s key institutions were not so hyper-centralized in Moscow. Now, they may have acquired a powerful new argument: Such concentration makes the Russian capital a tempting target for terrorists, especially if the latter gain access to weapons of mass destruction.
In an essay posted on the Liberty.ru portal, analyst Aleksandr Baurov says that the risk of such attacks at some point in the future is so great that the Russian authorities need to think seriously about moving many political and economic institutions out of Moscow lest Russia suffer irreparable harm from such an attack.
Baurov argues that since the September 11 attacks on the United States, “the world community has been living in permanent fear of a completely different level of [threat] than it did 10 or even 20 years ago – a greater fear than even during the period of the Cold War (www.liberty.ru/Themes/Moskva-obrechennyj-gorod.-Zachem-nuzhna-decentralizaciya-Rossii).
Indeed, he suggests, “the population of developed countries has turned out to have been driven into a real ‘ghetto of fear,’ and the most widespread of [its] fears is the danger of the use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and in the first instance nuclear weapons in a major city of Western civilization.”
Experts in the special services and political commentators have “more than once” considered the chance of such a terrorist attack and “on the whole agree with the view that the danger of its being carried out is constantly growing,” a view that is reflected in the scripts of many movies and television programs.
“Politics, as Bismarck said, is the art of the possible,” Baurov observes, adding that “it is impossible with certainty to assert that under the conditions of the intensifying competition and growth of protectionism, terror of this kind will not be used by radical elements in a number of governments and the leadership of major financial-industrial groups to achieve their goals.”
As a result, the Russian commentator says, “now the danger of a terrorist act with the application of a nuclear weapon or ‘a dirty bomb’ is higher than ever before – many times higher than the danger of the unsanctioned launch of nuclear rockets during the Codl War, when the problems of faceless terror did not exist.”
There are only two means of defense, Baurov says, the tactical, which involves “supporting the efforts of the special services to prevent the possibilities of terrorists from acquiring the material or models for nuclear weapons” and the strategic, which entails “radically reducing the potential consequences of a likely terrorist attack.”
Among the “most frequently” mentioned targets of terrorists are “strategic objects like hydro-electric dams, other dams, and atomic energy stations and major cities.” If the terrorists seek “economic or political” gain, “then the probability of a terrorist action against a major city turns out to be much higher.
And that probability, Baurov says, increases still further in those cases “when the economic and political center in one country coincide” and where the functions of both are hyper-centralized. “In that regard, Moscow is practically an idea target” whose attack would entail “catastrophic consequences.”
“The economic growth and political decisions in Russia in recent years have led to a significant centralization of power and the concentration of capital in the capital of the country.” Consequently, by attacking it with even “a dirty bomb,” terrorists could inflict “serious damage” on the entire Russian state.
According to Baurov, “the sudden destruction and radioactive contamination of the central part of the city would lead to the cessation of the functioning of the majority of federal government institutions and the loss of centralized archives and data bases. It would disorder the country’s transportation system and spread “chaos” throughout the country.
In particular, such an attack would result in “the disappearance of a significant share of the leading federal institutions” which because of the “vertical” integration of power would leave much of the country’s bureaucracy without guidance. Thus, in addition to the human losses and chaos, such an attack would entail “a chaotic growth of separatist tendencies.”
Consequently, Baurov warns, such an attack could lead “not only to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people but represent a danger to the further existence of Russia as a sovereign state.” Because that is an outcome various groups are interested in, “the danger of such a ‘risky’ decision is impermissibly high.”
Obviously, the Russian authorities must not reduce in any way their vigilance in controlling access to the raw materials needed for the construction of weapons of mass destruction or to existing weapons systems. “This is the task of the special services, and one has to hope that their direct interest in the survival of Russian statehood” will guide them.
But “even the very best means of observation and control may not save the situation if the strategic problem is not resolved,” Baurov argues. “Moscow must cease to be a place of super-concentrated opportunities, means and resources.” Instead, some of those must be shifted elsewhere to make the city “’a less attractive target’” for terrorists.
Indeed, the commentator says, “we must be glad that up to now no one has hurled a stone at this ‘glass house.’”
Given existing communication and transportation networks, he argues, there should be a carefully planned “transfer of a number of federal structures of executive power to other cities of Russia. And if that happens, then some of the business community will be inclined to move as well, a combination that as a collateral benefit will bring benefits to Muscovites.
With fewer people, he points out, the streets and public facilities of the capital will be less crowded and housing will be less expensive, developments that will also have the effect of making “the city more attractive for tourists.”
Moreover, Baurov argues, by taking this step, “we will not only seriously reduce the danger of the out of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction, but we will secure a leading position among the developed countries as far as a plan for supporting the balance of global security.”
And he suggests that there is yet another benefit. “Besides everything else, such structural changes will lead to a qualitative change of the bureaucratic structures and methods of administration toward more flexible and liberal ones.” And such a change in turn could help promote “a more democratic” Russia as well.
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