Paul Goble
Vienna, February 16 – The problems of the economic decline in single-industry cities, the so-called “monogorods,” have reemerged with new force as officials face up to the reality that the attention Vladimir Putin gave to Pikalevo and Moscow’s program to deal with the problem have done very little to solve the problems.
Indeed, Pikalevo residents are warning that a new period of economic decline, despite all of the center’s promises, will force them to demonstrate once again, and Sergey Darkin, governor of Primorsky kray, is warning that further layoffs at one “city-forming plant” as the company town’s economic centers are called could lead to an explosion.
What makes the situation more problematic is that earlier many Russian workers were prepared to believe that Moscow or at least the country’s most senior leaders could and would solve their problems, but now, in the wake of a meeting President Dmitry Medvedev held earlier this week, they can see that the center has in effect left them to their unhappy fate.
As in the past, officials in the central Russian government blame local officials for what is taking place, saying that the worsening situation in at least 70 of these cities – the total number of which are estimated to be nearly 500 – is not because Moscow has failed to act but because local officials have failed to show initiative.
In a Politcom.ru commentary, Anatoly Medvedev notes that after Putin’s visit to Pikalevo in 2009, the central government adopted a two-pronged program to address the company town problem, calling for both shifts in populations to places with more jobs and diversification of the economies of these cities (www.politcom.ru/11448.html).
Vice Prime Minister Shuvalov told President Medvedev that the basic problem in this sector is that “positive government initiatives” from Moscow after 2009 have failed because “the municipal authorities cannot even adequately prepare an investment program for a small administrative division” of the country.
From the very beginning, the Politcom.ru commentator says, there were doubts that Moscow’s proposals would work if for no other reason than “the obligation laid on the municipal authorities for the formation of basic proposals for restructuring that would make their cities attractive for investment could not be fulfilled a priori.”
Municipal officials in Russia “are not accustomed to showing initiative” regarding such questions and “do not have the necessary level of expert support for the formulation of ideas interesting to investors,” he continues. And he notes that already in March of last year, Moscow experts had concluded that only the most enterprising regional heads would be helped.
The others, scholars at the Moscow Institute for the Analysis of Enterprises and Markets at the Higher School of Economics argued, would be left to their own devices. In short, “those who did not show initiative … would not receive the necessary help.” Given the pattern of leadership in these company towns, many resemble the latter rather than the former.
According to Anatoly Medvedev, “the problem of the realization of the programs for company towns is very instructive and a clear example of the fact that municipal and local powers cannot be allies of the federal authorities in positive undertakings,” adding that “to a certain extent, this is the fault of federal officials” who won’t delegate or support.
At the meeting with Shuvalov, President Medvedev displayed his anger about the situation, but despite that and despite his calls for expanded efforts to help the millions of people who live but in many cases no longer work in company towns, the situation in at least some of them appears to be headed toward an explosion.
The Novy region agency reports today that Pikalevo, whose demonstrations first attracted broad attention to the company town issue and even caused Putin to visit their depressed area, is headed into another period of protests given that “2000 workers of the city forming enterprise may [soon] be without work” (www.nr2.ru/moskow/320678.html).
And yesterday, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported that Primorsky Kray Governor Darkin has been told that the managers of one company town industry are going to be laying off 1300 more workers, possibly prompting some of them to strike and others fearful about the future to join them in sympathy (www.nr2.ru/fareast/320453.html).
Moscow’s strategy is clear: it will seek to blame local officials for all the problems and pose as a defender of the workers. But the center’s failure to live up to its promises over the last year means that ever fewer workers are going to believe it and ever more may decide that protest strikes and other actions are the only weapons they have to advance their cause.
And that is even more likely given that this long-simmering problem is once again heating up as Russia heads into another electoral cycle, during which it is likely any number of candidates from various parties will attempt to win support by taking the side of the displaced workers and putting the blame on Moscow for not living up to its promises.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Patriarch Official Warns Against Giving Up Ethnic Identities
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 16 – In open opposition to the Kremlin and in a clear tilt toward Russian nationalists, a senior official of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has called for the retention of ethnic self-identification among citizens of the Russian Federation.
Speaking on NTV, Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Synod’s Department for Church-Society Relations, said that “if ethnic self-identification is given up, then very quickly the [non-ethnic] Russian self-identification will be given up as well” and Russians might cease to consider themselves “citizens of the country” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=39528).
The archpriest’s comments came in response to the Kremlin’s proposal to have all citizens of the Russian Federation identify as [non-ethnic] Russians in order to form a common civic nation, a step advocates say will help overcome ethnic divisions but one that opponents argue will undermine Russian culture and identity.
Arguments for such a civic self-identification, the often outspoken Orthodox leader argued, do not convince him. If ethnic identification is given up as the supporters of a Russian civic nation appear to want, he said, then the question inevitably arises, “Why then should someone not immediately become a citizen of the world?”
(In fact, it should be pointed out, that Chaplin is erecting a straw man. None of the advocates of a civic nation have suggested that Russians or non-Russians should give up their ethnic self-identifications, only that these identities should be de-politicized and subordinated to a broader non-ethnic civic identification.)
This will please Russian nationalists, but they will be even happier with what Chaplin said next: “Everyone knows perfectly well that Jews play chess better and Africans play basketball better … This does not mean that one is better and the other worse, they are simply difference, and this ethnic variety must be taken into account.”
Chaplin also had words of support for non-ethnic Russians who do not like the idea of a civic nation either. “All cultures which are present in Russia,” he said, “are worthy of development but while expressing their cultural identification one way or another, they must take into consideration the views of others and live together with others.”
The archpriest, who is a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, has long been one of the most voluble of the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church. Occasionally, he appears to be speaking only for himself, and sometimes his words represent a trial balloon in which the hierarchy is testing for the reaction of the population and the powers that be.
But in this case, Chaplin appears to be speaking for the Moscow Patriarchate – or at least expressing the feelings of most of the hierarchs, given that others among them have expressed similar feelings in recent weeks albeit in a more guarded way than the archpriest has chosen to do in this case.
If that is the case, it has enormous political consequences. On the one hand, the negative attitude of the Church will make it far more difficult for Medvedev to push through any program in support of a non-ethnic civic nation. And on the other, this division between the Kremlin and the Patriarchate may set the stage for more independent church action than in the past.
That could cost the regime what has been an unquestioned source of support, and it could boost the chances of Russian nationalist groups and politicians in the upcoming electoral cycles, something that could make Chaplin’s comments this week a bellwether of a fundamental change in direction in Russian politics.
Vienna, February 16 – In open opposition to the Kremlin and in a clear tilt toward Russian nationalists, a senior official of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church has called for the retention of ethnic self-identification among citizens of the Russian Federation.
Speaking on NTV, Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Synod’s Department for Church-Society Relations, said that “if ethnic self-identification is given up, then very quickly the [non-ethnic] Russian self-identification will be given up as well” and Russians might cease to consider themselves “citizens of the country” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=39528).
The archpriest’s comments came in response to the Kremlin’s proposal to have all citizens of the Russian Federation identify as [non-ethnic] Russians in order to form a common civic nation, a step advocates say will help overcome ethnic divisions but one that opponents argue will undermine Russian culture and identity.
Arguments for such a civic self-identification, the often outspoken Orthodox leader argued, do not convince him. If ethnic identification is given up as the supporters of a Russian civic nation appear to want, he said, then the question inevitably arises, “Why then should someone not immediately become a citizen of the world?”
(In fact, it should be pointed out, that Chaplin is erecting a straw man. None of the advocates of a civic nation have suggested that Russians or non-Russians should give up their ethnic self-identifications, only that these identities should be de-politicized and subordinated to a broader non-ethnic civic identification.)
This will please Russian nationalists, but they will be even happier with what Chaplin said next: “Everyone knows perfectly well that Jews play chess better and Africans play basketball better … This does not mean that one is better and the other worse, they are simply difference, and this ethnic variety must be taken into account.”
Chaplin also had words of support for non-ethnic Russians who do not like the idea of a civic nation either. “All cultures which are present in Russia,” he said, “are worthy of development but while expressing their cultural identification one way or another, they must take into consideration the views of others and live together with others.”
The archpriest, who is a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, has long been one of the most voluble of the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church. Occasionally, he appears to be speaking only for himself, and sometimes his words represent a trial balloon in which the hierarchy is testing for the reaction of the population and the powers that be.
But in this case, Chaplin appears to be speaking for the Moscow Patriarchate – or at least expressing the feelings of most of the hierarchs, given that others among them have expressed similar feelings in recent weeks albeit in a more guarded way than the archpriest has chosen to do in this case.
If that is the case, it has enormous political consequences. On the one hand, the negative attitude of the Church will make it far more difficult for Medvedev to push through any program in support of a non-ethnic civic nation. And on the other, this division between the Kremlin and the Patriarchate may set the stage for more independent church action than in the past.
That could cost the regime what has been an unquestioned source of support, and it could boost the chances of Russian nationalist groups and politicians in the upcoming electoral cycles, something that could make Chaplin’s comments this week a bellwether of a fundamental change in direction in Russian politics.
Window on Eurasia: Foreign Reporters Leaving Uzbekistan as Tashkent Imposes Tighter Controls on Uzbek Journalists
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 16 – Uzbekistan is at risk of becoming a black hole as far as news is concerned given that the number of foreign journalists accredited there has fallen by more than half since the Andijon crackdown of May 2005, and Tashkent has stepped up its repression of domestic journalists as well.
In an article posted on the Fergananews.com site this week, Aleksey Volosevich, who is based in Tashkent, says there were approximately 80 foreign journalists accredited in Uzbekistan at the time of Andijon. A year ago, there were 38, and now that figure has declined to 33 in the most populous country in Central Asia (www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=6899).
Fro many reasons, including the financial difficulties of many news agencies, the number of foreign correspondents around the world has declined, forcing those who want to keep track of developments in any country to rely more heavily than they did in the past on journalists of the country involved.
In many places, these journalists are more than able to fill the gap, but in Uzbekistan, where the government continues to pursue a repressive policy against journalists and the media, the departure of the foreign journalists who have often provided both a model and a defense for responsible journalism is especially serious.
Volosevich says there are five representatives of the Russian media, two correspondents of Reuters who are accredited but not resident in Uzbekistan, two BBC journalists, one from Agence France Presse, one from the Belgian paper “Le Soir,” seven from China, five from Turkey, three each from Kazakh, Iranian, and Azerbaijani outlets and one from Kyrgyzstan.
Many of those who do have accreditation are nonetheless only rarely coming to Tashkent. And this decline and their absence means that the press service of the Uzbekistan foreign ministry sometimes must work hard “to assemble eight to ten correspondents” at what are the increasingly infrequent press conferences of that institution.
The Uzbekistan authorities have accelerated this decline by stripping some of the foreign journalists of their accreditation. Rakhim Sultanov, a correspondent of Golos Rossii who had been working in Tashkent since 1994, for example, not long ago lost his accreditation, but despite repeated inquiries, Uzbek officials refused to tell him why.
In Uzbekistan, the loss of accreditation is a serious matter not only for foreign journalists but also for Uzbek ones, Voposevich notes, but it is not only Uzbekistan that is involved. According to an agreement between Tashkent and Moscow in 1998, “if a correspondent is not accredited,” he cannot be referred to as an accredited correspondent in either country’s media.
Under one interpretation, of course, this is simple accuracy, but under another – and that is how the Uzbek authorities choose to define the terms of this accord -- this provision can be used to block a journalist from getting paid for his work or even being able to publish his materials at all.
After the “color” or “velvet” revolutions, Uzbek officials adopted a policy which can only be described as “paranoid,” Volosevich says. Local journalists risk losing their accreditation or even their jobs if they go to a Western embassy without the prior approval of Tashkent.
In what he says is “not an exaggeration,” “if foreign correspondents are ‘neutralized’ by means of depriving them of their accreditation, then their local colleagues are not infrequently removed from their jobs for a single unsanctioned trip to Western or neighboring countries” whether or not they report about this or not.
The interconnectedness between Tashkent’s efforts to force out foreign journalists and to restrict the work of domestic ones was highlighted last year by a case brought against Vladimir Berezovsky of Vesti.uz, Malik Boboyev of VOA, and documentary photographer Umida Akhmedova, a case that drew international attention and combination.
But despite this condemnation, Tashkent had all three convicted, something that had the effect of harming “the authority and image of Uzbekistan,” precisely the offenses for which the three were charged. Unfortunately, Tashkent clearly cares more about defending itself by restricting the free flow of information than it does about its image and that basic human right.
Vienna, February 16 – Uzbekistan is at risk of becoming a black hole as far as news is concerned given that the number of foreign journalists accredited there has fallen by more than half since the Andijon crackdown of May 2005, and Tashkent has stepped up its repression of domestic journalists as well.
In an article posted on the Fergananews.com site this week, Aleksey Volosevich, who is based in Tashkent, says there were approximately 80 foreign journalists accredited in Uzbekistan at the time of Andijon. A year ago, there were 38, and now that figure has declined to 33 in the most populous country in Central Asia (www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=6899).
Fro many reasons, including the financial difficulties of many news agencies, the number of foreign correspondents around the world has declined, forcing those who want to keep track of developments in any country to rely more heavily than they did in the past on journalists of the country involved.
In many places, these journalists are more than able to fill the gap, but in Uzbekistan, where the government continues to pursue a repressive policy against journalists and the media, the departure of the foreign journalists who have often provided both a model and a defense for responsible journalism is especially serious.
Volosevich says there are five representatives of the Russian media, two correspondents of Reuters who are accredited but not resident in Uzbekistan, two BBC journalists, one from Agence France Presse, one from the Belgian paper “Le Soir,” seven from China, five from Turkey, three each from Kazakh, Iranian, and Azerbaijani outlets and one from Kyrgyzstan.
Many of those who do have accreditation are nonetheless only rarely coming to Tashkent. And this decline and their absence means that the press service of the Uzbekistan foreign ministry sometimes must work hard “to assemble eight to ten correspondents” at what are the increasingly infrequent press conferences of that institution.
The Uzbekistan authorities have accelerated this decline by stripping some of the foreign journalists of their accreditation. Rakhim Sultanov, a correspondent of Golos Rossii who had been working in Tashkent since 1994, for example, not long ago lost his accreditation, but despite repeated inquiries, Uzbek officials refused to tell him why.
In Uzbekistan, the loss of accreditation is a serious matter not only for foreign journalists but also for Uzbek ones, Voposevich notes, but it is not only Uzbekistan that is involved. According to an agreement between Tashkent and Moscow in 1998, “if a correspondent is not accredited,” he cannot be referred to as an accredited correspondent in either country’s media.
Under one interpretation, of course, this is simple accuracy, but under another – and that is how the Uzbek authorities choose to define the terms of this accord -- this provision can be used to block a journalist from getting paid for his work or even being able to publish his materials at all.
After the “color” or “velvet” revolutions, Uzbek officials adopted a policy which can only be described as “paranoid,” Volosevich says. Local journalists risk losing their accreditation or even their jobs if they go to a Western embassy without the prior approval of Tashkent.
In what he says is “not an exaggeration,” “if foreign correspondents are ‘neutralized’ by means of depriving them of their accreditation, then their local colleagues are not infrequently removed from their jobs for a single unsanctioned trip to Western or neighboring countries” whether or not they report about this or not.
The interconnectedness between Tashkent’s efforts to force out foreign journalists and to restrict the work of domestic ones was highlighted last year by a case brought against Vladimir Berezovsky of Vesti.uz, Malik Boboyev of VOA, and documentary photographer Umida Akhmedova, a case that drew international attention and combination.
But despite this condemnation, Tashkent had all three convicted, something that had the effect of harming “the authority and image of Uzbekistan,” precisely the offenses for which the three were charged. Unfortunately, Tashkent clearly cares more about defending itself by restricting the free flow of information than it does about its image and that basic human right.
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