Paul Goble
Staunton, February 12 – Neither more force nor more money will improve the situation of the North Caucasus, according to one Moscow commentator. Only the return of ethnic Russians and other “non-titular nationalities” to that region will have that effect and also reverse today’s pattern when the North Caucasus is coming to major Russian cities.
In an essay posted on the Stoletie.ru portal, Yaroslav Butakov argues that Moscow can improve the situation in the North Caucasus as a whole only by taking the North Caucasus under control and sending more ethnic Russians there rather than trying to erect a Chinese-style “Great Wall” to separate themselves from that unsettled region.
Not only would allowing that region to go its own way create a base for forces hostile to Russia, but as recent experience has shown, “a state border is not an obstacle for mass migration if the latter is generated by objective social and economic causes.” Consequently, Butakov says, “the future of the Caucasus and of all Russia is in the return of Russians to the Caucasus.”
Neither force nor money will be enough, he argues. Russian forces have been fighting for the last two decades, and Moscow is currently spending “six times more money from the federal budget” per resident of the North Caucasus than it is for residents of other regions (www.stoletie.ru/tekuschiiy_moment/russkije_vozvrashhajtes_na_kavkaz_2011-02-10.htm).
And as Russians already know, Butakov says, “if Moscow leaves the Caucasus, the Caucasus will come to Moscow. [Indeed,] it has already arrived” -- in the form of often unwelcome gastarbeiters.
Given all this, he continues, it is far from surprising that many in Russia are concluding that it is long past time to end subsidies to people who are only threatening Russia with more explosions – and especially to stop sending people in that region more money than other law-abiding citizens of the Russian Federation are receiving.
But the solution is the creation of conditions for the return of ethnic Russians to that region, a group whose flight has been driven both by the nationalist and religious movements there and also by the impoverishment of the region, the latter phenomenon, Butakov argues, is “a direct result” of the ethno-nationalism of the titular peoples that has been cultivated for decades.”
Since the 1970s, in fact, the number of ethnic Russians in that region has declined both absolutely and relatively and their flight has been paralleled, as few notice, by the flight of “other ‘non-titular’ peoples” from the region, many of whom are just as autochthonian as the titular nations.
During almost the entire Soviet period, Butakov points out, “the sadly well-known ‘rooting’ of the state apparatus” continued, a policy which “ignored not only the principle of national equality but also the scientific truth that indigenous peoples do not exist anywhere on earth.”
After the Russian Federation emerged from the ruins of the USSR, this process of elevating the “titular” nationalities and the driving out of the “non-titular ones intensified,” Butakov observes, as a result of which the number of ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus fell by 86 percent after 1991.
The exodus of ethnic Russians has even disturbed some republic leaders, because among those leaving were “not a few of the scientific-technic intelligentsia and specialists with higher education in various spheres of activity.” But if the local leaders were concerned, they generally failed to take the necessary steps to reverse this trend.
Consequently, Moscow must take the lead and finance primarily those programs in the region which will result in the return of ethnic Russians to the North Caucasus, the only basis for improving the situation, Butakov observes, because in his words, “the future of the Caucasus and of all Russia [depends] on the return of Russians to the Caucasus.”
The Moscow commentator says that he is not talking about the return of exactly the same Russians who have left over the last 30 years. “The majority of them do not want to return.” Instead, what is needed is a restoration of the Soviet-era program “when thousands of Russian speciualists went ‘to raise the cultural level of the national borderlands.’”
To underscore how important such a program would be, Butakov argues that the current situation in the North Caucasus “very much recalls the time just before the disintegration of the USSR [because] no republic of the former Union, nor even all of them taken together could have buried a great union power if the Russian Federation did not want this.”
“Now,” he says, “a similar collapse threatens to be repeated already within the Russian Federation.” And he asks whether Russians will learn from “the sad experience of 1989-1991” or repeat it with even more tragic consequences for the future of the country and all its residents – Russians and non-Russians alike.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Growing Nationalism Reflects Russians’ Sense Their Country is Going in the Wrong Direction, Gudkov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, February 12 – Nationalist sentiments among Russians as measured by expression of support for the slogan “Russia for the [ethnic] Russians” have reached 58 percent, tying the previous high of a decade ago, a trend that reflects their sense that Russia is headed in the wrong direction.
According to Lev Gudkov, the director of the independent Levada Center polling agency, “this idea has passed from the arsenal of the more radically inclined and intolerant groups into the more moderate and careful strata – and consequently” support for this term may not mean exactly what it did before (www.nr2.ru/moskow/319969.html).
Instead, the sociologist suggested in an interview given to “Svobodnaya pressa” and described by the New Region agency, what most Russians mean by giving their support to this term now means what earlier surveys captured as “’Russia for the [ethnic] Russians in moderation.’”
Thus, the polls capture a situation which is quite different from the one in 2001 when a similar percentage of Russians expressed support for this idea. Then, he said, “the causes were the post-crisis time, Putin’s propaganda of the need for ‘a strong hand,’ and the war in Chechnya.”
“Now,” Gudkov suggested, “there are no such bases [for that declaration and its sources lie “in the new increase of the sense of the population that Russia has enemies – on this question the peak was reached in2003-2004, when it rose to 77 percent in the relatively well-off 2006-2007.” At present, that sense has gone backup to 72 percent, “a very high level.”
Such feelings of isolationism and of a hostile environment are “generally speaking,” Gudkov continued, with a sense that things are moving in the wrong direction. And he noted that “periodically when Russians lose an idea about the future, then in balancing compensation rows hostility to the external world and the sense that their country has internal enemies.”
Only about 12 to 15 percent of the Russian population is more or less constantly xenophobic, Gudkov argued. Moreover, “by themselves, nationalistic, racist and chauvinist attitudes [of other Russians who may say they back “Russia for the Russians”] are relatively passive if one does not include this most radical nucleus.”
The problem intensifies and protests begin, he said, “when nationalism combines with social protest and dissatisfaction.” Under those conditions, it “acquires an explosive character – anti-government, anti-regime, and becomes a very significant force” often quite unexpectedly given the general passivity of people with these views most of the time.
“Russian nationalism by its character, unlike the nationalisms of the Baltic, Georgia and so on is very conservative and directed at the defense of the existing situation or compensatory in its character,” manifesting itself in “antipathy or hatred” of others only when they are assumed to be a threat,” Gudkov said.
Another “special feature of Russian nationalism,” again in sharp contrast to the other nationalisms he mentioned, is that “it cannot be combined with the ideas of freedom and democracy as they exist in Western countries and thus be converted into ‘national democracy,’” as happens elsewhere.
Russians “have not had a basis for national self-assertion during the last 20 years,” Gudkov said, and as a result, Russian nationalism constantly returns “in its rhetoric to earlier periods, to the war, to Stalinism and to the Soviet Union.” Such a nationalism is not suitable for setting goals for the future.
But that does not mean that it is not a powerful and potentially dangerous force if it combines with “social protest, dissatisfaction and anti-regime attitudes.” Such a coming together is not yet “very clearly expressed,” Gudkov argued, except in Moscow and a few other Russian cities.
The authorities, however, are already sufficiently worried about the situation, he continued, that they are pushing forward government-controlled opposition parties, such as the LDPR and Rodina in order to try to control and direct these sentiments in ways that will be less threatening to themselves.
Given the attitudes the Levada Center has found, Gudkov said, it is completely likely that the regime will create additional “such pseudo-parties” even though with all such groups “the Kremlin is afraid of losing control.” In the past, the powers could count on the patriotism and nationalism of the population to be supportive of the regime.
Now, however, Russia’s leading pollster concluded, these ideas are in the process of transmuting themselves and thus are becoming a potential threat, with there being a very real chance that “protest actions will become uncontrolled” and thus beyond the capacity of the regime to rein in.
Staunton, February 12 – Nationalist sentiments among Russians as measured by expression of support for the slogan “Russia for the [ethnic] Russians” have reached 58 percent, tying the previous high of a decade ago, a trend that reflects their sense that Russia is headed in the wrong direction.
According to Lev Gudkov, the director of the independent Levada Center polling agency, “this idea has passed from the arsenal of the more radically inclined and intolerant groups into the more moderate and careful strata – and consequently” support for this term may not mean exactly what it did before (www.nr2.ru/moskow/319969.html).
Instead, the sociologist suggested in an interview given to “Svobodnaya pressa” and described by the New Region agency, what most Russians mean by giving their support to this term now means what earlier surveys captured as “’Russia for the [ethnic] Russians in moderation.’”
Thus, the polls capture a situation which is quite different from the one in 2001 when a similar percentage of Russians expressed support for this idea. Then, he said, “the causes were the post-crisis time, Putin’s propaganda of the need for ‘a strong hand,’ and the war in Chechnya.”
“Now,” Gudkov suggested, “there are no such bases [for that declaration and its sources lie “in the new increase of the sense of the population that Russia has enemies – on this question the peak was reached in2003-2004, when it rose to 77 percent in the relatively well-off 2006-2007.” At present, that sense has gone backup to 72 percent, “a very high level.”
Such feelings of isolationism and of a hostile environment are “generally speaking,” Gudkov continued, with a sense that things are moving in the wrong direction. And he noted that “periodically when Russians lose an idea about the future, then in balancing compensation rows hostility to the external world and the sense that their country has internal enemies.”
Only about 12 to 15 percent of the Russian population is more or less constantly xenophobic, Gudkov argued. Moreover, “by themselves, nationalistic, racist and chauvinist attitudes [of other Russians who may say they back “Russia for the Russians”] are relatively passive if one does not include this most radical nucleus.”
The problem intensifies and protests begin, he said, “when nationalism combines with social protest and dissatisfaction.” Under those conditions, it “acquires an explosive character – anti-government, anti-regime, and becomes a very significant force” often quite unexpectedly given the general passivity of people with these views most of the time.
“Russian nationalism by its character, unlike the nationalisms of the Baltic, Georgia and so on is very conservative and directed at the defense of the existing situation or compensatory in its character,” manifesting itself in “antipathy or hatred” of others only when they are assumed to be a threat,” Gudkov said.
Another “special feature of Russian nationalism,” again in sharp contrast to the other nationalisms he mentioned, is that “it cannot be combined with the ideas of freedom and democracy as they exist in Western countries and thus be converted into ‘national democracy,’” as happens elsewhere.
Russians “have not had a basis for national self-assertion during the last 20 years,” Gudkov said, and as a result, Russian nationalism constantly returns “in its rhetoric to earlier periods, to the war, to Stalinism and to the Soviet Union.” Such a nationalism is not suitable for setting goals for the future.
But that does not mean that it is not a powerful and potentially dangerous force if it combines with “social protest, dissatisfaction and anti-regime attitudes.” Such a coming together is not yet “very clearly expressed,” Gudkov argued, except in Moscow and a few other Russian cities.
The authorities, however, are already sufficiently worried about the situation, he continued, that they are pushing forward government-controlled opposition parties, such as the LDPR and Rodina in order to try to control and direct these sentiments in ways that will be less threatening to themselves.
Given the attitudes the Levada Center has found, Gudkov said, it is completely likely that the regime will create additional “such pseudo-parties” even though with all such groups “the Kremlin is afraid of losing control.” In the past, the powers could count on the patriotism and nationalism of the population to be supportive of the regime.
Now, however, Russia’s leading pollster concluded, these ideas are in the process of transmuting themselves and thus are becoming a potential threat, with there being a very real chance that “protest actions will become uncontrolled” and thus beyond the capacity of the regime to rein in.
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