Paul Goble
Vienna, February 10 – Even as Moscow attempts to come up with a nationality policy for the Russian Federation, each of the country’s federal subjects has pursued its own specific policy in this area, something that means regardless of what the center does, Russia already is a country with a multitude of official nationality “policies,” according to a leading Moscow expert.
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Rostislav Turovsky, a political scientist at Moscow State University who specializes in regional issues, notes that “in the majority of Russian regions, a carefully thought out and well-based nationality policy simply does not exist” (www.russ.ru/pole/Tehnologiya-nacional-noj-politiki).
But in those places where it does exist -- predominantly ethnic Russian or not -- the actual policy varies widely depending “on the personality of the governor” and on whether he considers it necessary to implement any policy in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations” and whether he is a “Russian patriot” or a “pragmatist” for whom “national questions are secondary.
In recent years, “an ever greater number of regional leaders have become pragmatists,” Turovsky says, a sharp contrast from the 1990s where most leaders felt obliged to have a position and carry out a policy on the Russian nation, friendship of the peoples, and the handling of immigrants.
During the first decade of this century, the Moscow political scientist says, “ideological interest [among the governors] in these questions fell sharply.” Indeed, and despite the expectations of some, it also fell “even in republics” because many of the new leaders appointed by Moscow were also “pragmatists.”
For them, “the nationality question in comparison with issues of economic development has receded to a secondary position.” And as a result, the order of the day which now is formulated in the highest organs of power is a challenge for the basic part of the regional elites which does not know what to do with such challenges both ideologically and technologically.”
In the non-Russian republics, he continues, “elites are much more sensitive to questions of nationality policy but at the same time, they understand them very subjectively.” In republics with one titular nationality, “nationality policy is about the securing of the dominating positions of this ethnos in power.”
In republics with a large number of ethnic Russians, “the ethnic elites intentionally work in order to strengthen the position of the titular ethnos in power and to support this ideologically through corresponding propaganda of ethnic history.” And in republics more multi-ethnic, “nationality policy is understood as the distribution of posts among the main ethnic groups.”
But even in these latter cases, Turovsky argues, this is “a political-technology approach to nationality policy to the extent that one is speaking in this case about the handing out of posts and about how ethnic membership is for this a weighty criteria” rather than a deeper reflection on the management of ethnic issues.
Migration has created new problems in many regions, ones that are far more challenging than in earlier times. But even here, the Moscow expert says, policy is “pragmatic” in many cases, reflecting “the symbiotic relations with the powers which form ties with Caucasus business” and work to ensure first and foremost that there are migrants available for work.
This can and does lead to situations in many places “when in public regionalleaders will speak out on behalf of the priority positions of the [ethnic] Russian community but in practice and to a remarkable degree begin to base themselves on the resources of business of ‘Caucasus origin.’”
Indeed, electoral considerations often force leaders to take such public stands, again for pragmatic reasons. The political parties are the same: they “do not so much struggle with the phenomenon [of the problems migration causes] as attempt to win the votes of those who will go out on the Manezh Square.”
Every Russian party does this, Turovsky says, with the KPRF seeking “unity of the ideas of the left and the ideas of nationalism,” United Russia approaching “nationalism through the theme of conservatism, and other parties reaching out in order to pragmatically use rather than really address the issue.
Turovsky says that this pattern holds for the liberal parties as well and has done so at least since the liberal nationalism of Boris Fedorov in “Forward Russia” in 1995, a trend that is explained by the fact that “not all liberals are supporters of globalization; there is another trend: liberalism in a separate state defended by protectionism.”
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Deputies, Religious Say Struggle against Terrorism Must Not Violate Rights of Ordinary Citizens
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 9 – Balancing the requirements of the counter-terrorist struggle and the rights of citizens has not been easy for any country, but in Russia under Vladimir Putin, most people have been prepared to accept restrictions on their rights if that is the price of guaranteeing security.
And while human rights activists have regularly complained about the ways in which the security forces have engaged in actions that violate the Russian Constitution and Russian law, few mainstream political figures have taken up that cause. But now, perhaps because of official over-reaching, that may be changing.
As it often does with emerging issues, the Regions.ru news agency asked eight members of the Duma and the Federation Council and eight religious leaders about their views concerning the balance between counter-terrorism and the rights of Russian citizens. Compared with similar surveys in the past, their views are somewhat surprising (www.regions.ru/news/2337977/).
The occasion for this survey was a report, subsequently confirmed by interior ministry officials, that militiamen in Moscow as “an experiment” had been told to collect detailed dossiers on the lives and activities of ordinary citizens in their districts as a “prophylactic” measure against the possibility that they might engage in terrorist activities.
The eight parliamentarians were unanimous in their assessment that the proposed collection of data on ordinary Muscovites in the name of the counter-terrorist strategy is wrong and against the law, a view that the eight religious leaders echoed with varying degrees of intensity.
Viktor Orlov, a senator from Kamchatka, said he was “seriously concerned” by the Moscow interior ministry plan even as an experiment, arguing that such a step crossed the line governing what militiamen should do. And he promised that he and other deputies would “carefully follow” what is going on in the interior ministry as a result.
“Spying on citizens does not fall within the competence” of local militiamen, he suggested, adding that he “doubts that this [program] is legal even within the framework of the program on the struggle with terrorism,” an indication that in his mind at least Moscow has gone too far and needs to be reined in.
Senator Vladimir Gusev from Saratov who serves on the Federation Council’s economic policy committee, said that such an experiment was “very dangerous … [because] the decision to collect about a citizen a full packet of information including even his sexual orientation will allow people to speak about the beginning of total watching of the population.”
While one can understand the desire of the interior ministry to do everything to counter terrorism, Gusev said, “this does not mean that it is necessary to launch an experiment that involves looking into the personal lives of people.” That some officials think otherwise is thus very disturbing.
And along with the others, Aleksandr Pochinok, a senator from Krasnodar kray, took a similar position, explicitly stating that “even on behalf of the struggle with terrorism one must not sacrifice freedom.” And he pointed out that the US reaction to September 11 had been based on that principle, something Russia would do well to follow as well.
Among the religious leaders, the reaction to the latest MVD “experiment” was similar with some religious leaders denouncing it as “anti-constitutional” and others suggesting that Russians should appeal against it first in the Constitutional Court and then, if necessary, to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (www.regions.ru/news/2338137/).
Some of them pleaded a lack of expertise to judge what was going on, but others were very clear. Among the latter was Elena Leontyeva, the head of the Moscow Buddhist Center, who said that society must precisely define what it will tolerate in the struggle with crimes of all kinds.
“It is necessary to draw legal limits,” she said. “Soviety must decide to what limit it will go an dhow often each of us is prepared to share with the powers personal information and whether this should become a continuing or periodic practice.” Unfortunately, she continued, “it is difficult to imagine that we will be able to do without this in the immediate future.”
Vienna, February 9 – Balancing the requirements of the counter-terrorist struggle and the rights of citizens has not been easy for any country, but in Russia under Vladimir Putin, most people have been prepared to accept restrictions on their rights if that is the price of guaranteeing security.
And while human rights activists have regularly complained about the ways in which the security forces have engaged in actions that violate the Russian Constitution and Russian law, few mainstream political figures have taken up that cause. But now, perhaps because of official over-reaching, that may be changing.
As it often does with emerging issues, the Regions.ru news agency asked eight members of the Duma and the Federation Council and eight religious leaders about their views concerning the balance between counter-terrorism and the rights of Russian citizens. Compared with similar surveys in the past, their views are somewhat surprising (www.regions.ru/news/2337977/).
The occasion for this survey was a report, subsequently confirmed by interior ministry officials, that militiamen in Moscow as “an experiment” had been told to collect detailed dossiers on the lives and activities of ordinary citizens in their districts as a “prophylactic” measure against the possibility that they might engage in terrorist activities.
The eight parliamentarians were unanimous in their assessment that the proposed collection of data on ordinary Muscovites in the name of the counter-terrorist strategy is wrong and against the law, a view that the eight religious leaders echoed with varying degrees of intensity.
Viktor Orlov, a senator from Kamchatka, said he was “seriously concerned” by the Moscow interior ministry plan even as an experiment, arguing that such a step crossed the line governing what militiamen should do. And he promised that he and other deputies would “carefully follow” what is going on in the interior ministry as a result.
“Spying on citizens does not fall within the competence” of local militiamen, he suggested, adding that he “doubts that this [program] is legal even within the framework of the program on the struggle with terrorism,” an indication that in his mind at least Moscow has gone too far and needs to be reined in.
Senator Vladimir Gusev from Saratov who serves on the Federation Council’s economic policy committee, said that such an experiment was “very dangerous … [because] the decision to collect about a citizen a full packet of information including even his sexual orientation will allow people to speak about the beginning of total watching of the population.”
While one can understand the desire of the interior ministry to do everything to counter terrorism, Gusev said, “this does not mean that it is necessary to launch an experiment that involves looking into the personal lives of people.” That some officials think otherwise is thus very disturbing.
And along with the others, Aleksandr Pochinok, a senator from Krasnodar kray, took a similar position, explicitly stating that “even on behalf of the struggle with terrorism one must not sacrifice freedom.” And he pointed out that the US reaction to September 11 had been based on that principle, something Russia would do well to follow as well.
Among the religious leaders, the reaction to the latest MVD “experiment” was similar with some religious leaders denouncing it as “anti-constitutional” and others suggesting that Russians should appeal against it first in the Constitutional Court and then, if necessary, to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (www.regions.ru/news/2338137/).
Some of them pleaded a lack of expertise to judge what was going on, but others were very clear. Among the latter was Elena Leontyeva, the head of the Moscow Buddhist Center, who said that society must precisely define what it will tolerate in the struggle with crimes of all kinds.
“It is necessary to draw legal limits,” she said. “Soviety must decide to what limit it will go an dhow often each of us is prepared to share with the powers personal information and whether this should become a continuing or periodic practice.” Unfortunately, she continued, “it is difficult to imagine that we will be able to do without this in the immediate future.”
Window on Eurasia: Non-Russians Unhappy about Proposed Use of Term ‘Rossiyane’
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 10 – The Kremlin’s plan to promote the term “Rossiyane” to define the national identity of the citizens of the Russian Federation is already drawing fire from Tatar analysts and activists, an indication that non-ethnic Russians are just as opposed to its introduction as are many ethnic Russian nationalists.
For both ethnic Russian nationalists and non-Russians, President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to push “Rossiyane” as a collective term for all citizens of the Russian Federation represents a threat to their position. For ethnic Russians, it calls into question the Russianness of the state; and for non-Russians, it suggest they may be submerged in a larger entity.
Over the past several weeks as details of Moscow’s program in this area have seeped out, Russian nationalists have attacked it repeatedly in both the mainstream media and the blogosphere. But non-Russian opposition, while in evidence at the regional level, has been less vocal.
Now, the Regnum news agency has surveyed the opinions of a group of analysts and activists in Tatarstan, the titular republic of the largest non-Russian nationality in the country and often a bellwether of the direction that other non-Russians will take on important on this as well as on other issues (regnum.ru/news/polit/1373145.html).
According to various Moscow newspapers, Medvedev decided on this step which may be taken even today in order to fill “the ideological vacuum” which was created after the end of the USSR and which has “begun to be filled by ethnic nationalism” among various ethnic groups, Russia and non-Russian alike.
In the future, if this plan is carried through as various commentators suggest it will be, “soon residents of Russia perhaps will be proposed to respond to the question of national membership with the word ‘Rossiyane,’” a term that refers not to the ethnic dimension of identity but to membership in a non-ethnic civic nation.
According to these reports, Regnum says, Russian citizens will be encouraged to “call themselves Rossiyane and if they desire to add, for example, a ‘Rossiyanin of Tatar origin,” a formulation that will strike many people as strange or even as a threat to their national self-identifications.
Vladimir Belyayev, a professor of politics, sociology and management at Kazan State Technical University told Regnum that “both in the Russian system of education and in the mass media is maintained the understanding of the nation as an ethnos,” thus making the proposed formulation a rather radical departure.
And because that is the case, “if a sharp change in the treatment of the definition of the nation will be adopted, many will thing that the powers are insisting on assimilation, the swallowing up of all peoples by one and nothing good will happen beyond the forming up of various Russian peoples around [ethnic Russian] ultra-nationalists.”
Because of that probability, Belyayev added, he is certain that this is “an ill-timed initiative of the state which will only further divide our peoples.”
Larisa Usmanova, a sociologist at the Kazan Federal University agreed, arguing that “one must not insist on an identity crudely and artificially.” Instead, the entire process must be gradual. “In the USSR, the formation among children of the idea about their being part of the civic nation ‘the Soviet people’ began with kindergarten” and was developed thereafter.
At the same time, she said, that “to return, as certain nationally concerned politicians have proposed to the listing of ethno-national identity in documents is impermissible,” as that too would exacerbate inter-ethnic feelings.
Guzel Makarova, a scholar at the Kazan Center of Ethno-sociological Research of the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History, added, that “undoubtedly, ‘civic identity among residents of Russia ought to be in the first place’ but that ‘for many, the word ‘Rossiyanin’ is conflated with the word ‘[ethnic] Russian.’” And that creates problems.
It is radically “incorrect” to assert that “Russia is ‘an Orthodox [ethnic] Russian country,’ and that Tatarstan is ‘a Tatar Muslim republic.’ When the large and small motherlands are identified with religious or national factors, this leads to a loss of civic identity.” And that in turn threatens further divisions and conflicts.
Rafael Khakimov, the director of the Tatarstan Institute of History, noted that “the [ethnic] Russians were the first to speak out against the domination of the rossiyane identity.” As for himself, Khakimov said, he was “not against the idea that residents of Russia should have a civic identity.”
“But,” he continued, it is necessary to understand that this is [part of] the European tradition of nation building” which has not been part of the Russian experience.
Aleksandr Salagayev, the president of the Society of Russian Culture Society of the Republic of Tatarstan, agreed with Khakimov, noting that he is “against ‘rossiyantsvo’ under the condition of the absence of the Russians of their own ethno-cultural structures and centers of responsibility for Russian language and culture.”
DamirIskhakov, the director of the Center of Ethnopolitical Monitoring of the World Congress of Tatars, said that “it is possible to be a good Rossiyanin and a bad Tatar at one and the same time.” He suggested that the new idea could share “the fate of ‘the Soviet people,” thus promoting divisions and tensions rather than overcoming them.
Others in Tatarstan agreed, including Yevgeny Ivanov, the leader of the independent Kryashen youth movement, Ruslan Aysin, the chairman of the World Forum of Tatar Youth Movement, Bulat Shageyev, a member of the socialist wing of the Tatar youth movement, and Nail Nabiullin, the leader of Azatlyk.
But perhaps the most damning comment came from Rafik Karimullin, a Tatar activist, who suggested that “the new initiative of the Kremlin ideologues will become ‘an extension of the policy of the USSR’” in putting pressure on all peoples of the country in violation of the Constitution and international norms.
Such an approach, he said, “will lead to the moral degradation not only of the non-Russian peoples but also of the [ethnic] Russian. And the very combination of words, ‘a Rossiyanin of Tatar origin,’ [that Medvedev and Moscow now want to use] will sound stupid and funny.”
Vienna, February 10 – The Kremlin’s plan to promote the term “Rossiyane” to define the national identity of the citizens of the Russian Federation is already drawing fire from Tatar analysts and activists, an indication that non-ethnic Russians are just as opposed to its introduction as are many ethnic Russian nationalists.
For both ethnic Russian nationalists and non-Russians, President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to push “Rossiyane” as a collective term for all citizens of the Russian Federation represents a threat to their position. For ethnic Russians, it calls into question the Russianness of the state; and for non-Russians, it suggest they may be submerged in a larger entity.
Over the past several weeks as details of Moscow’s program in this area have seeped out, Russian nationalists have attacked it repeatedly in both the mainstream media and the blogosphere. But non-Russian opposition, while in evidence at the regional level, has been less vocal.
Now, the Regnum news agency has surveyed the opinions of a group of analysts and activists in Tatarstan, the titular republic of the largest non-Russian nationality in the country and often a bellwether of the direction that other non-Russians will take on important on this as well as on other issues (regnum.ru/news/polit/1373145.html).
According to various Moscow newspapers, Medvedev decided on this step which may be taken even today in order to fill “the ideological vacuum” which was created after the end of the USSR and which has “begun to be filled by ethnic nationalism” among various ethnic groups, Russia and non-Russian alike.
In the future, if this plan is carried through as various commentators suggest it will be, “soon residents of Russia perhaps will be proposed to respond to the question of national membership with the word ‘Rossiyane,’” a term that refers not to the ethnic dimension of identity but to membership in a non-ethnic civic nation.
According to these reports, Regnum says, Russian citizens will be encouraged to “call themselves Rossiyane and if they desire to add, for example, a ‘Rossiyanin of Tatar origin,” a formulation that will strike many people as strange or even as a threat to their national self-identifications.
Vladimir Belyayev, a professor of politics, sociology and management at Kazan State Technical University told Regnum that “both in the Russian system of education and in the mass media is maintained the understanding of the nation as an ethnos,” thus making the proposed formulation a rather radical departure.
And because that is the case, “if a sharp change in the treatment of the definition of the nation will be adopted, many will thing that the powers are insisting on assimilation, the swallowing up of all peoples by one and nothing good will happen beyond the forming up of various Russian peoples around [ethnic Russian] ultra-nationalists.”
Because of that probability, Belyayev added, he is certain that this is “an ill-timed initiative of the state which will only further divide our peoples.”
Larisa Usmanova, a sociologist at the Kazan Federal University agreed, arguing that “one must not insist on an identity crudely and artificially.” Instead, the entire process must be gradual. “In the USSR, the formation among children of the idea about their being part of the civic nation ‘the Soviet people’ began with kindergarten” and was developed thereafter.
At the same time, she said, that “to return, as certain nationally concerned politicians have proposed to the listing of ethno-national identity in documents is impermissible,” as that too would exacerbate inter-ethnic feelings.
Guzel Makarova, a scholar at the Kazan Center of Ethno-sociological Research of the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History, added, that “undoubtedly, ‘civic identity among residents of Russia ought to be in the first place’ but that ‘for many, the word ‘Rossiyanin’ is conflated with the word ‘[ethnic] Russian.’” And that creates problems.
It is radically “incorrect” to assert that “Russia is ‘an Orthodox [ethnic] Russian country,’ and that Tatarstan is ‘a Tatar Muslim republic.’ When the large and small motherlands are identified with religious or national factors, this leads to a loss of civic identity.” And that in turn threatens further divisions and conflicts.
Rafael Khakimov, the director of the Tatarstan Institute of History, noted that “the [ethnic] Russians were the first to speak out against the domination of the rossiyane identity.” As for himself, Khakimov said, he was “not against the idea that residents of Russia should have a civic identity.”
“But,” he continued, it is necessary to understand that this is [part of] the European tradition of nation building” which has not been part of the Russian experience.
Aleksandr Salagayev, the president of the Society of Russian Culture Society of the Republic of Tatarstan, agreed with Khakimov, noting that he is “against ‘rossiyantsvo’ under the condition of the absence of the Russians of their own ethno-cultural structures and centers of responsibility for Russian language and culture.”
DamirIskhakov, the director of the Center of Ethnopolitical Monitoring of the World Congress of Tatars, said that “it is possible to be a good Rossiyanin and a bad Tatar at one and the same time.” He suggested that the new idea could share “the fate of ‘the Soviet people,” thus promoting divisions and tensions rather than overcoming them.
Others in Tatarstan agreed, including Yevgeny Ivanov, the leader of the independent Kryashen youth movement, Ruslan Aysin, the chairman of the World Forum of Tatar Youth Movement, Bulat Shageyev, a member of the socialist wing of the Tatar youth movement, and Nail Nabiullin, the leader of Azatlyk.
But perhaps the most damning comment came from Rafik Karimullin, a Tatar activist, who suggested that “the new initiative of the Kremlin ideologues will become ‘an extension of the policy of the USSR’” in putting pressure on all peoples of the country in violation of the Constitution and international norms.
Such an approach, he said, “will lead to the moral degradation not only of the non-Russian peoples but also of the [ethnic] Russian. And the very combination of words, ‘a Rossiyanin of Tatar origin,’ [that Medvedev and Moscow now want to use] will sound stupid and funny.”
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