Paul Goble
Vienna, February 8 – In a comparison certain to attract attention among many Russian leaders, a United Russia ideologist says that the recent “’Kronstadt revolt,” a reference to street where ethnic clashes took place in Moscow recently, raises the issue of “a NEP,” the acronym in the current context for a New Ethno-Political Policy.”
In an interview posted on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, United Russia’s coordinator for nationality policy and relations with religious organizations, makes this historically charged comparison to the events of 1921 to underscore the urgency of change in this sector (www.russ.ru/pole/Kronshtadtskij-myatezh-zhestko-postavil-vopros-o-NEPe).
In the 1990s, Sultygov says, “there could not be any talk about a [non-ethnic Russian political nation and state community.” That became possible, he suggests, “only after the restoration of the political-legal space and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation in 2003 with the constitutional referendum in Chechnya.
Immediately after that, then President Vladimir Putin “first used the words ‘all of us are one, united, powerful [non-ethnic] Russian people,” an idea he developed in a speech in Cheboksary the following year by saying that “we have every basis to speak about [the non-ethnic] Russian people as about a single nation.”
Such usage, Sultygov argues, “only returns us to pre-Soviet history” when those terms were widely used, and “in this sense, the Russian power is articulating the idea of ‘[the non-ethnic] Russia exclusively in the format of the construction ofa super-nbational civil society, of a [non-ethic] Russian political nation.”
Such an entity, he continues, in no way represents an attack on non-Russian nations, and Sultygov cites with approval ethnographer Valery Tishkov’s proposal to the effect that “Russia is a nation of nations.”
While a great deal has been accomplished since 2003, Sultygov says, “a mature civil nation is the obverse of a mature civil society,” and consequently, there is a great deal more to be done, not only on migration issues which have attracted the most attention because of the clashes they have provoked but elsewhere.
There is “a serious contradiction between the policy for the formation of all-civic identity which is primarily only declared and the policy of ethnic nation building which is really being carried out … [And] in these conditions, citizens who are not member of the so-called ‘titular nations feel themselves de facto victims of discrimination.”
That is why, Sultygov says, President Dmitry Medvedev recently said that “all state employees in whatever post and in whatever region they serve must act in the interests of the people as a whole and not of its individual groups,” something that would suggest that he expects them to behave as [non-ethnic] Russians rather than as members of one or another ethnic nation.
The recent “’Kronstadt revolt’” – as he describes the events on Moscow’s Kronstadt boulevard – raises the question about the need for “a NEP – a new ethno-national policy directed at the formation of a post-Soviet [non-ethnic] Russian identity” because “obviously, the situation when things are ‘already not Soviet but still not completely [non-ethnic] Russian is mortally dangerous for the country.”
Like Medvedev, Sultygov dismisses the need for a new nationalities ministry by pointing out that nationality issues in late Soviet times were decided “not by the Ministry of Nationalities but by the CPSU which organized systematic work of all organs of power, institutions, organizations, enterprises, and public groups in this sphere.”
What is needed now, he continues, is the development of “a renewed Conception of state nationality policy,” as has been proposed by Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin and which is likely to be adopted at an upcoming session of the presidium of the Russian State Council.
And in his view, Sultygov says, it would also be useful to create a permanent commission of the presidium of the State Council on Questions of the formation of a new [non-ethnic] Russian identity, the [non-ethnic] Russian nation, and the realization of state policy in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations.”
This body would be headed on a rotational basis by the leaders of the subjects of the Federation who would thus have a greater opportunity to advance their views on a federal level. And at the same time, he added, there should be an inter-agency government commission on national construction and “the coordination of the NEP.”
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Number of States May Double in 21st Century and Russia May Contribute to that Trend, Moscow Expert Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 8 – The number of states in the world may double over the course of the next century, and the Russian Federation may contribute to their number unless its government and people recognize that genuine federalism is the best defense of the territorial integrity of multi-national states, according to a leading Moscow specialist.
In an interview taken by Yevgeny Shestakov published in “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Vladimir Ryzhkov, a professor of the Higher School of Economics, argues that former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s suggestion that the regions and republics “take as much sovereignty as they can swallow” saved the country rather than threatened it as many think.
At that time, he points out, the center was failing to organize things, and it was critically important for the regions to take responsible on themselves for the development of the country. But despite all the changes in Russia since Yeltsin made his remarks, his words remain “important even today” (www.rg.ru/2011/02/03/ryjkov-site.html).
That is because the “extraordinary centralization” Vladimir Putin carried out, has left “the regions tied hands and feet.” The regional heads “cannot decide even elementary things” because “in each there are some 50 federal structures which are not subordinate to governors or egional deputies” and which are “too far from Moscow” to be controlled from there.
The threat of the disintegration of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was “very strongly exaggerated,” Ryzhkov says, and was more or less ended by the 1993 Constitution and by the actions of Putin after 1999. But some of the solutions have created new dangers, the Moscow scholar suggests.
As Russians are inclined to forget, “there are a great numer of examples when harsh centralization has led to the disintegration of the state,” he observes, and “on the contrary, decentralization, federalization and the taking into account of national diversity has more often serves to preserve the unity of the state.”
Despite the expectations of many, the number of national movements seeking their own country is increasing, in part at least because there is no “international standard for the creation” of new states.” Instead, sometimes the international community supports them and sometimes it doesn’t.
“But the general trend, if one looks at statistics,” Ryzhkov continues, “is the following: when the United Nations was established in 1945, it had 51 members. Now there are almost 200. That is, we see that the general trend in the world is all the same acquisition of statehood by ever newere and newer national groups and peoples.”
“If this trend continues,” he remarks, then in the 21st century the number of states may double again in the course of the 21st century.” Moreover, if Moscow handles the situation poorly, the Russian Federation itself could contribute to their number, something that would leave the country centered on Moscow much reduced.
Ryzhkov cites the observation of the great British ethnographic theorist Ernest Gellner that “Russia has few chances [to retain its current borders] because it is a large multinational state whose people ever more frequently recognize their national identities,” something Gellner regretted but concluded as true.
Russia has three “models of development,” Ryzhkov suggests, two of which will prove fatal. The first is a Reich, or “the construction of an ethnic Russian multi-national state, a ‘Russia for the Russians.’ This would mean collapse in the course of the country in the course of the [next] five or six years.”
The second scenario is the Byzantine one, and this, Ryzhkov says, is what is “takin place in Russia now,” something he describes as “the latest attempt to build an imperial state with a strong center in Moscow which will govern the borderlands including the national ones with the help either of local cadres or appointed governors.”
This path too is “dangerous: the extraordinary bureaucratization and centralization of administration will step by step create the basis for separatism because the powers assigne dyb Moscow will ever less be positively viewed by the local population” and “dissatisfaction [with them] will automatically mean dissatisfaction with Moscow.”
“This crude bureaucratic imperial path has already led to the country to collapse twice, in 1917 and 1991,” Ryzhkov argues. And it can do so again.
Only federalism and genuine federalism at that can save Russia, Ryzhkov argues, and consequently, Moscow must “return now to the very fruitful model of a federation which is written in our Constitution but not [yet] realized. In that way we will be able to avoid the danger of the collapse of the country.” But that is not just the best way but the only one.
Vienna, February 8 – The number of states in the world may double over the course of the next century, and the Russian Federation may contribute to their number unless its government and people recognize that genuine federalism is the best defense of the territorial integrity of multi-national states, according to a leading Moscow specialist.
In an interview taken by Yevgeny Shestakov published in “Rossiiskaya gazeta,” Vladimir Ryzhkov, a professor of the Higher School of Economics, argues that former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s suggestion that the regions and republics “take as much sovereignty as they can swallow” saved the country rather than threatened it as many think.
At that time, he points out, the center was failing to organize things, and it was critically important for the regions to take responsible on themselves for the development of the country. But despite all the changes in Russia since Yeltsin made his remarks, his words remain “important even today” (www.rg.ru/2011/02/03/ryjkov-site.html).
That is because the “extraordinary centralization” Vladimir Putin carried out, has left “the regions tied hands and feet.” The regional heads “cannot decide even elementary things” because “in each there are some 50 federal structures which are not subordinate to governors or egional deputies” and which are “too far from Moscow” to be controlled from there.
The threat of the disintegration of the Russian Federation in the 1990s was “very strongly exaggerated,” Ryzhkov says, and was more or less ended by the 1993 Constitution and by the actions of Putin after 1999. But some of the solutions have created new dangers, the Moscow scholar suggests.
As Russians are inclined to forget, “there are a great numer of examples when harsh centralization has led to the disintegration of the state,” he observes, and “on the contrary, decentralization, federalization and the taking into account of national diversity has more often serves to preserve the unity of the state.”
Despite the expectations of many, the number of national movements seeking their own country is increasing, in part at least because there is no “international standard for the creation” of new states.” Instead, sometimes the international community supports them and sometimes it doesn’t.
“But the general trend, if one looks at statistics,” Ryzhkov continues, “is the following: when the United Nations was established in 1945, it had 51 members. Now there are almost 200. That is, we see that the general trend in the world is all the same acquisition of statehood by ever newere and newer national groups and peoples.”
“If this trend continues,” he remarks, then in the 21st century the number of states may double again in the course of the 21st century.” Moreover, if Moscow handles the situation poorly, the Russian Federation itself could contribute to their number, something that would leave the country centered on Moscow much reduced.
Ryzhkov cites the observation of the great British ethnographic theorist Ernest Gellner that “Russia has few chances [to retain its current borders] because it is a large multinational state whose people ever more frequently recognize their national identities,” something Gellner regretted but concluded as true.
Russia has three “models of development,” Ryzhkov suggests, two of which will prove fatal. The first is a Reich, or “the construction of an ethnic Russian multi-national state, a ‘Russia for the Russians.’ This would mean collapse in the course of the country in the course of the [next] five or six years.”
The second scenario is the Byzantine one, and this, Ryzhkov says, is what is “takin place in Russia now,” something he describes as “the latest attempt to build an imperial state with a strong center in Moscow which will govern the borderlands including the national ones with the help either of local cadres or appointed governors.”
This path too is “dangerous: the extraordinary bureaucratization and centralization of administration will step by step create the basis for separatism because the powers assigne dyb Moscow will ever less be positively viewed by the local population” and “dissatisfaction [with them] will automatically mean dissatisfaction with Moscow.”
“This crude bureaucratic imperial path has already led to the country to collapse twice, in 1917 and 1991,” Ryzhkov argues. And it can do so again.
Only federalism and genuine federalism at that can save Russia, Ryzhkov argues, and consequently, Moscow must “return now to the very fruitful model of a federation which is written in our Constitution but not [yet] realized. In that way we will be able to avoid the danger of the collapse of the country.” But that is not just the best way but the only one.
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