Paul Goble
Vienna, February 3 - Moscow’s approach to the nationality question is based on “a set of prejudices inherited from Soviet times,” prejudices that by themselves have been exploited by some of the powers that be to build a power vertical and that thus have the effect of precluding the development of democracy in the Russian Federation, according to a Moscow analyst.
In an essay on the APN.ru site yesterday, Mikhail Remizov says that the Russian ruling elite does not have a serious conception of nationality policy but rather operates according to prejudices inherited from Soviet times which are inconsistent with other aspects of post-Soviet realities (www.apn.ru/publications/article23602.htm).
Remizov names what he calls “the two basic contradictions of Soviet and Russian nationality policy. On the one hand, there is “the contradiction between a single political nation and the principle of multi-nationality of the state.” And on the other, there is “the contradiction between the state status of minorities and the lack of such status for the majority.”
With regard to the former, he notes, “representatives of ethnic minorities live in all states, but this by itself does not in any case make these states ‘multi-national.’” Rather, “the multi-nationality of the state is not a fact but a principle” based on the politicization of ethnicity which achieves it logical end in the ethno-territorial division” of the country.
“In other words, [Russians] are a ‘multi-national’ [country] not because [they] have ethnic minorities but because [they] have raised them to the rank of nations and given them state status,” something that from the outset contradictions “the logic of a civic nation which presupposes that ethnic membership of minorities remains their private affair.”
With regard to the second contradiction, the absence of “an analogous status” for the national minority either for the country as the whole or within non-Russian republics also gives rise to “the sharpness of the nationality question in the Soviet Union and in Russia.” Indeed, the situation in Russia in this regard is worse than it was in the USSR.
That is because “the Soviet Union as a state had a certain super-national source of legitimacy. It was an ideocracy,” in which “the bearer of sovereignty was the party which spoke in the name of a global ideology,” much as in pre-1917 Russia, “the bearer of sovereignty was not the people but the dynasty.”
“When power has a transcendental source of legitimacy, it can allow itself to play in mutli-nationality” because its basis of support in general “is outside the nation.” Now, however, Remizov says, Russia has “lost this support but it has preserved multi-nationality as a principle” of state organization. And that in turn is “blocking the democratic evolution of Russian power.”
Indeed, “this is the main reason why we unendingly reproduce the traditional construction of ‘supreme power’ raised above society – but already without any traditional or ideocratic basis for such a construction,” he adds, adding that “the Russian ruling class today is the nomenklatura without community and the feudal elite without the idea of divine law.”
According to Remizov, the problematic attitude of the powers that be to the nationality question “is connected precisely with the baselessness of its own position in the national system of coordinates,” a reality the analyst argues, “the powers that be sense – above all the President – given “the danger of Soviet inertia” leading to state collapse again.
It was a good sign, Remizov says, that Medvedev rejected the idea of re-establishing a nationalities ministry because “if [Russians] do not come out of this Soviet inertia, then [they] have every chance to become a failed state.” But moving beyond it to a civic nation in which nationality is a private matter won’t be easy.
Among Russians, the Moscow analyst argues, “the idea of a civic nation is conceived in mythological terms, as a certain guarantee of universal harmony as opposed to the danger and conflict-ridden idea of the ethnic nation” and “as a formula for the problem-free integration of the Caucasus.”
But this is “a very naïve” idea, Remizov says. The reality i8s that “a civic nation requires no less intensive community and even homogeneity than the ethnic,” a homogeneity “of political culture and civic consciousness,” something that “unfortunately” is not in evidence in relatins between Russians and the Caucasus.
That must be overcome through “national” rather than “ethnographic” assimilation into “a single civic culture.” If that project succeeds, ethnic differences will “lose their political significance.” But if it doesn’t, then the state must either operate as an authoritarian entity or find a new super-national ideological justification.
“A civic nation is called that,” Remizov says, precisely because “it consists of citizens and not of clans, feudal families and privileged strata” and “essentially this is precisely the situation to which the Russian majority is striving,” an effort that threatens both the authoritarians and the non-Russians clans.
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Efforts to Close Xenophobic Websites Not Effective, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 2 – Moscow officials are increasingly interested in blocking websites they deem extremist, but in most cases they lack the capacity to do so. And even when they succeed in closing one site, experts say, the nature of the Internet means that two or more similar sites take its place, much like the multiplication of heads of “a mythical dragon.”
As part of the Secure Runet Week, government and academic specialists organized a roundtable on “Forbidden Content in the Runet: Facts, Statistics, and Examples.” And this year they have devoted particular attention to “the role of the Internet in the solution of the nationality question” (rian.ru/press_video/20110201/329040320.html).
While participants offered some “examples of successful cooperation between the Internet community and the powers,” most pointed to the problems that the authorities have in doing anything, problems that reflect both limitations in the law and the international and flexible nature of the Internet itself.
In reporting on this roundtable, Novosti commentator Sergey Varshavchik underscored that “no one can give a 100 percent guarantee that extremist materials [blocked in one place] won’t appear in another place in the World Wide Web,” like “the mythical dragon in the place of one lopped off head grew two new ones” (www.rian.ru/analytics/20110202/329543038.html).
Other participants in the roundtable pointed to even greater difficulties. Sergey Gulyaev, the representative of the social ties administration of the Moscow office of the interior ministry, said that officials often get information too late in order to be able to document its appearance and track down where it came from.
Vladimir Fornal, the deputy chief of the K Department of the Interior Administration in Moscow Oblast agreed, and he complained to journalists that “at times when a complain reaches us, many references already do not exist and it is impossible to follow them” back to where they came from.
On a more positive note, Gulyaev added, some progress is being made because Runet operators are policing themselves, something that gives ho0pe for the future. Indeed, he continued, “one can conclude that the epoch of the wild Internet has passed” and that the Runet will take steps to remove “prohibited materials.”
Vladislav Tsyplukhin, a representative of the social network “V Kontakte,” told the group that his organization now has approximately “600 moderators” whose job it is to make sure that extremist and other banned materials do not appear on its sites. But the task they and others like them face is enormous.
There was “an especially powerful outburst of complaints” at the Manezh Square events in December, officials said, complaints about radical nationalism that overwhelmed the usual complaints about child pornography. But in many cases, perhaps 90 percent, what people were upset about did not fall within the limits of the law as it now exists.
But that is only one part of the problem, the roundtable suggested. Russian officials can bring charges against the RU and SU domains, but they can do little against those registered abroad, like Kavkaz-Tsentr, a radical North Caucasus site that Moscow has pursued without success as the site has shifted its hosting from one country to another.
Given this situation, Anton Nosik a journalist who participated in the formation of Runet said that “the struggle with extremism on the Internet is senseless and ineffective because such sites, in his view, number in the hundreds of thousands” and can always outpace the efforts of the authorities to close them down.
But political and social pressure to do just that continues, and consequently, Russian officials will use all the weapons at their command from denial of service attacks to hacking to pursuit of IP providers in order to do so, even though as Nosik suggests, they may be fighting a losing battle. (For an example, see www.vestitambov.ru/?new_id=3516).
Vienna, February 2 – Moscow officials are increasingly interested in blocking websites they deem extremist, but in most cases they lack the capacity to do so. And even when they succeed in closing one site, experts say, the nature of the Internet means that two or more similar sites take its place, much like the multiplication of heads of “a mythical dragon.”
As part of the Secure Runet Week, government and academic specialists organized a roundtable on “Forbidden Content in the Runet: Facts, Statistics, and Examples.” And this year they have devoted particular attention to “the role of the Internet in the solution of the nationality question” (rian.ru/press_video/20110201/329040320.html).
While participants offered some “examples of successful cooperation between the Internet community and the powers,” most pointed to the problems that the authorities have in doing anything, problems that reflect both limitations in the law and the international and flexible nature of the Internet itself.
In reporting on this roundtable, Novosti commentator Sergey Varshavchik underscored that “no one can give a 100 percent guarantee that extremist materials [blocked in one place] won’t appear in another place in the World Wide Web,” like “the mythical dragon in the place of one lopped off head grew two new ones” (www.rian.ru/analytics/20110202/329543038.html).
Other participants in the roundtable pointed to even greater difficulties. Sergey Gulyaev, the representative of the social ties administration of the Moscow office of the interior ministry, said that officials often get information too late in order to be able to document its appearance and track down where it came from.
Vladimir Fornal, the deputy chief of the K Department of the Interior Administration in Moscow Oblast agreed, and he complained to journalists that “at times when a complain reaches us, many references already do not exist and it is impossible to follow them” back to where they came from.
On a more positive note, Gulyaev added, some progress is being made because Runet operators are policing themselves, something that gives ho0pe for the future. Indeed, he continued, “one can conclude that the epoch of the wild Internet has passed” and that the Runet will take steps to remove “prohibited materials.”
Vladislav Tsyplukhin, a representative of the social network “V Kontakte,” told the group that his organization now has approximately “600 moderators” whose job it is to make sure that extremist and other banned materials do not appear on its sites. But the task they and others like them face is enormous.
There was “an especially powerful outburst of complaints” at the Manezh Square events in December, officials said, complaints about radical nationalism that overwhelmed the usual complaints about child pornography. But in many cases, perhaps 90 percent, what people were upset about did not fall within the limits of the law as it now exists.
But that is only one part of the problem, the roundtable suggested. Russian officials can bring charges against the RU and SU domains, but they can do little against those registered abroad, like Kavkaz-Tsentr, a radical North Caucasus site that Moscow has pursued without success as the site has shifted its hosting from one country to another.
Given this situation, Anton Nosik a journalist who participated in the formation of Runet said that “the struggle with extremism on the Internet is senseless and ineffective because such sites, in his view, number in the hundreds of thousands” and can always outpace the efforts of the authorities to close them down.
But political and social pressure to do just that continues, and consequently, Russian officials will use all the weapons at their command from denial of service attacks to hacking to pursuit of IP providers in order to do so, even though as Nosik suggests, they may be fighting a losing battle. (For an example, see www.vestitambov.ru/?new_id=3516).
Window on Eurasia: Dugin Describes ‘Egyptian Scenario’ for Russia
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 3 – Aleksandr Dugin, the influential Eurasian activist, says that no one should think that the events in Egypt are “isolated” or even restricted to the Arab world. Instead, he said, they are part of a broad American effort to weaken others by promoting democracy in place of authoritarianism.
But he suggests that in Egypt and quite possibly in the Russian Federation as well, this effort may backfire, bringing to power not democratic regimes deferential to Washington but rather “fundamentalist” groups hostile to the West, Islamic in the Egyptian case and “Orthodox-monarchist nationalist” ones in Russia (www.nr2.ru/moskow/318861.html).
Dugin’s argument, which appears to be more a warning to the Moscow elite than a prediction, may in fact be used by the powers that be in the Russian capital to adopt an even more authoritarian approach or to launch witch hunts against any Russians thinking of “an Egyptian scenario.” Indeed, there is some evidence that this may already be happening.
The Eurasianist commentator says that what is going on in Egypt and elsewhere reflects the ideas laid out by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice several years ago in Ankara when she called for the replacement of “pro-American dictators and the coming to power of just as pro-American democratic forces.”
She made this proposal, Dugin says, because “the nationally sovereign subordinate to America dictators were not sufficient for the achievement of American interests and it was time to produce to the next stage of cosmopolitanism, global society, and the development of human rights ideology which would prepare for the unification of the entire planet.”
Given this agenda, he continues, “the marionette [dictators] who had served the West in the past were slated for elimination. And now this has begun,” by means of American-style “color revolutions in the arab world, with the hope and goal of bringing to power democratic regimes like those of Yushchenko [of Ukraine] or Saakashavili [of Georgia].”
“Pro-American dictators, based on corruption [and] indifference to human rights and the population’s social welfare,” Dugin says, are “incapable of carrying out the real reforms these countries and societies need.” Consequently they must be replaced by forces that can do precisely that.
“The Americans hope that in Egypt and Tunisia and in other countries will come to power democratic structures oriented toward a democraqtic society, human rights, civil freedoms, modernization and the like.” But they may be proved wrong in the Arab world, where “the real opposition” is “Islamic fundamentalism.” And it is that which may come to power.
Thus, Dugin argues, this American tactic may backfire on its authors and lead to the formation of anti-American regimes.
As far as Russia is concerned, Dugin says, “the parallels are absolutely obvious. In Russia, there exists a pro-Western, pro-American, liberal democratic corrupt regime,” which is becoming “ever more anti-people and corrupt” under Dmitry Medvedev whose approach has undercut the hopes for a better course of development that Vladimir Putin had promised.
What is happening in Moscow now, Dugin says, is “the conversion of Russia into a colonial supplier of the West” which is prepared to sign the strategic arms treaty, refuse to help Iran, and erect a monument to Yeltsin “whom almost unanimously all strata of the [Russian] population hate.”
If an Egyptian scenario is realized in Russia, then “the inglorious end of Ben Ali and Mubarak is what awaits Medvedev,” the only outcome the West permits for those who slavishly follow its will, the Russian Eurasianist says. And it will sacrifice the ruler of “a pro-Western, pro-American, liberal democratic as well as corrupt and anti-social leader” without a thought.
But there is another way in which the analogy holds: The US may not get the outcome it wants in Russia because of the growing influence of “conservative, Orthodox-monarchist nationalist circles.” And just as the Islamist fundamentalists may come to power in the Arab world, Dugin says, so these people may come to power in Russia if the US presses ahead.
According to the Eurasianist, “Russia very much recalls a post-colonial state, partially independence but partially looking over its shoulder at its master.” Dugin suggests that no one had to conquer Russia event at the end of the Cold War because there was “more betrayal and apathy” among the Russian leadership who “delegitimize” themselves just as the Arabs have.
Whether Dugin’s analogy is appropriate is certain to be a matter of debate, but there is clearly one way in which Moscow might use even the possibility of this outcome to its own advantage, invoking it to justify a crackdown generally or a witch hunt against specific opponents.
The latter possibility is suggested by Moscow coverage of a Tatar nationalist leader’s call for Tatars to “follow the example of Egypt,” something that the Kremlin could not possibly tolerate and that many in Russia might see as a reason for coming down very hard on those who propose it (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1370965.html).
Vienna, February 3 – Aleksandr Dugin, the influential Eurasian activist, says that no one should think that the events in Egypt are “isolated” or even restricted to the Arab world. Instead, he said, they are part of a broad American effort to weaken others by promoting democracy in place of authoritarianism.
But he suggests that in Egypt and quite possibly in the Russian Federation as well, this effort may backfire, bringing to power not democratic regimes deferential to Washington but rather “fundamentalist” groups hostile to the West, Islamic in the Egyptian case and “Orthodox-monarchist nationalist” ones in Russia (www.nr2.ru/moskow/318861.html).
Dugin’s argument, which appears to be more a warning to the Moscow elite than a prediction, may in fact be used by the powers that be in the Russian capital to adopt an even more authoritarian approach or to launch witch hunts against any Russians thinking of “an Egyptian scenario.” Indeed, there is some evidence that this may already be happening.
The Eurasianist commentator says that what is going on in Egypt and elsewhere reflects the ideas laid out by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice several years ago in Ankara when she called for the replacement of “pro-American dictators and the coming to power of just as pro-American democratic forces.”
She made this proposal, Dugin says, because “the nationally sovereign subordinate to America dictators were not sufficient for the achievement of American interests and it was time to produce to the next stage of cosmopolitanism, global society, and the development of human rights ideology which would prepare for the unification of the entire planet.”
Given this agenda, he continues, “the marionette [dictators] who had served the West in the past were slated for elimination. And now this has begun,” by means of American-style “color revolutions in the arab world, with the hope and goal of bringing to power democratic regimes like those of Yushchenko [of Ukraine] or Saakashavili [of Georgia].”
“Pro-American dictators, based on corruption [and] indifference to human rights and the population’s social welfare,” Dugin says, are “incapable of carrying out the real reforms these countries and societies need.” Consequently they must be replaced by forces that can do precisely that.
“The Americans hope that in Egypt and Tunisia and in other countries will come to power democratic structures oriented toward a democraqtic society, human rights, civil freedoms, modernization and the like.” But they may be proved wrong in the Arab world, where “the real opposition” is “Islamic fundamentalism.” And it is that which may come to power.
Thus, Dugin argues, this American tactic may backfire on its authors and lead to the formation of anti-American regimes.
As far as Russia is concerned, Dugin says, “the parallels are absolutely obvious. In Russia, there exists a pro-Western, pro-American, liberal democratic corrupt regime,” which is becoming “ever more anti-people and corrupt” under Dmitry Medvedev whose approach has undercut the hopes for a better course of development that Vladimir Putin had promised.
What is happening in Moscow now, Dugin says, is “the conversion of Russia into a colonial supplier of the West” which is prepared to sign the strategic arms treaty, refuse to help Iran, and erect a monument to Yeltsin “whom almost unanimously all strata of the [Russian] population hate.”
If an Egyptian scenario is realized in Russia, then “the inglorious end of Ben Ali and Mubarak is what awaits Medvedev,” the only outcome the West permits for those who slavishly follow its will, the Russian Eurasianist says. And it will sacrifice the ruler of “a pro-Western, pro-American, liberal democratic as well as corrupt and anti-social leader” without a thought.
But there is another way in which the analogy holds: The US may not get the outcome it wants in Russia because of the growing influence of “conservative, Orthodox-monarchist nationalist circles.” And just as the Islamist fundamentalists may come to power in the Arab world, Dugin says, so these people may come to power in Russia if the US presses ahead.
According to the Eurasianist, “Russia very much recalls a post-colonial state, partially independence but partially looking over its shoulder at its master.” Dugin suggests that no one had to conquer Russia event at the end of the Cold War because there was “more betrayal and apathy” among the Russian leadership who “delegitimize” themselves just as the Arabs have.
Whether Dugin’s analogy is appropriate is certain to be a matter of debate, but there is clearly one way in which Moscow might use even the possibility of this outcome to its own advantage, invoking it to justify a crackdown generally or a witch hunt against specific opponents.
The latter possibility is suggested by Moscow coverage of a Tatar nationalist leader’s call for Tatars to “follow the example of Egypt,” something that the Kremlin could not possibly tolerate and that many in Russia might see as a reason for coming down very hard on those who propose it (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1370965.html).
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
