Paul Goble
Vienna, February 2 – Because of the continuing impact of Soviet anti-religious policies, many of those converting to Islam or returning to the faith of their fathers are joining radical sects which use religion as a cover for political goals or terrorism rather than becoming followers of “traditional Islam,” according to an advisor to the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR).
In a comment broadcast on the Russian News Service, Vyacheslav Polosin says that most of those converting to Islam or returning to it lack “elementary knowledge about their religion,” as a result of “70 years of state atheism) and thus have their heads turned by those who deal in superficial slogans (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=39337).
These people are thus ready to be “lead by the hand into dark basements” where their new instructors tell them that “the most radical things” are the essence of Islam, the kind of assertion that their own ignorance prevents them from being in a position to reject or at least challenge.
What Orthodox Christians call “the churchification” of believers, the process of bringing believers into a particular parish, is something for which “unfortunately,” Polosin says, there is no analogy in Islam in the Russian Federation. Such arrangements did exist before 1917, but they were destroyed by the Soviets and “have not been restored.”
As a result, the SMR advisor says, “part of the young people [who turn to Islam in Russia] fall under the influence not of normal Muslim teachers and not of traditional Islam but rather of sects or bands which are prepared to make use of religion and to carry out terrorist tasks.”
Appearing on the same broadcast was Roman Silantyev, a prominent Russian specialist on Islam with close ties to the Moscow Patriarchate who has often offended Muslim leaders by his criticism of them and their activities. He said that he completely agreed with Polosin on this point.
“People who accept Islam for ideological reasons in the overwhelming majority of cases go into sectors which in most cases are terrorist or extremist,” Silantyev said. He said that his data show that there are no more than 6,000 ethnic Russian Muslims in the Russian Federation, and that 70 percent of these were women who had married Muslim men.
The 1800 other ethnic Russian converts have turned to Islam for ideological reasons, and many of them have taken part in terrorist and criminal actions. That pattern is not the case for ethnic Muslims who return to Islam, he said, noting that “the Tatars who number four million have given the terrorists and extremist much less than have ethnic Russian Muslims.”
“If we ask ethnic Russian Muslims about the organizations of which they are a part and the direction these organizations are directed,” Silantyev said, “then we find that in practice there are almost no bearers of traditional Islam among them: These are some kind of extremist, terrorist sects, sects of Shiite origin,” and others like the Ahmadi and Bahais.
A third participant in the broadcast, Vasily Derevyankin, the president of the Muslim religious organization ‘The Direct Path,” noted that “the majority of new ethnic Russian Muslims come to Islam not from Christianity – “such people one can count on the fingers of one hand” – but rather from atheism, paganism, secular humanism, or “their own view of monotheism.”
Without getting into the question as to whether Silantyev’s figures are accurate – many Muslims and non-Muslim scholars would say they are far too low – this discussion is notable for three reasons. First, it suggests that Moscow does not believe there are that many ethnic Russian Muslims but very much fears even the few that exist.
Second, it highlights the ways in which Soviet atheism has had the effect of opening the way to radicalism among Muslims not only by destroying the basic infrastructure of the mosque but also by making it impossible for three or more generations of people to learn even the basics of the faith.
And third, Polosin’s implicit suggestion that Muslims would benefit from the kind of “churchification” that the Russian Orthodox have could mean that Moscow may seek to promote such a process among Muslims, an effort likely to be counterproductive not only by further delegitimating the official hierarchy but by leading more Muslims to escape its net altogether.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Experts Discuss Why Russians aren’t in Revolt
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 2 – The spread of political protests in the Middle East and increasing problems inside Russia including corruption, income differentiation and official arbitrariness have prompted ever more Russian analysts to ask why is it that Russians are not going into the streets more often and revolting against the powers that be.
Such queries were given a new focus recently when Lev Gudkov, the head of the Levada Analytic Center, told the Moscow media that “85 percent of the population of Russia considers that they are not in a position to influence anything in the country” and thus do not try to change things by engaging in public protests (forum-msk.org/material/politic/5409735.html).
But Gudkov insisted, Russians should not be blamed for this apparent social apathy. The figure he cited, the Levada head said, “means not that people do not sympathize with the victims [of this or that disaster or policy] but rather that they are not prepared to do something because of this.” In short, “cases of force generate [both] horror and indifference.”
“Hatred to the force structures, the growth of corruption, and [so on] taken together weaken the generally accepted rules of behavior,” Gudkov says. “the normative system of society is breaking down like a rotten fabric,” something he suggested is linked to “disappointment in reformism.”
As a result, “people continue to show loyalty to the powers that be. But the trend of the day is indifference,” all the more so because the media insist and the Russian people believe that there is no alternative for them. That sense, of course, makes it easier for the authorities to rule them because it leads people to ask “for what should [we] protest?”
Mikhail Vinogradov, a professor of psychiatry, said that he considers Gudkov’s argument to be “a provocation” against both the people and the powers that be. And he suggested that “the level of civic activity [among Russians] is completely sufficient” given the challenges and possibilities in their country.
Russians today, he suggested, “do not have the occations [for protest] comparable to those in Algeria or France.” Instead, “we have our own process of socialization,” and “we have inherited from the former regime a very complicated government. Today reforms are taking place.” Consequently, there is nothing and no one to struggle against.
Sergey Udaltsov, the leader of the Left Front, in contrast had a somewhat different take on the situation. “Undoubtedly,” he said, “the distinctive characteristic of Russian society today is apathy, indifference, individualism and a lack of faith in the possibility of changing anything” at any level.
That represents a change from the late 1980s and 1990s, and Udaltsov said it reflected the institutionalization of “semi-totalitarian democracy” by Vladimir Putin beginning in 2000. Such public passivity, he said, “is characteristic for all totalitarian societies. If one recalls Soviet times, there weren’t any mass protests either.”
Then, Udaltsov continued, the reason was that “the idea that they cannot influence the actions of the powers that be was drilled into the consciousness of the people” by the system. Now, he said, “the powers that be actively through the mass media are pushing this [same] ideological doctrine.”
The current powers that be, he said, “do everything in order to show citizens that protests do not influence the decisions” of the powers.” If people protest something as they do, the authorities respond in almost all cases by doing nothing until there is a sufficient interval to cast doubt on the notion that the protests played any role in any change.
“How all this will end,” Udaltsov added, “we know. The period of apathy will not continue forever. The problems will not become fewer, people will express their dissatisfaction in the Internet (in Soviet times, they did so in their kitchens).” And if the state does not begin a dialogue with the society, such feelings will lead to “a social explosion.”
A third observer, Geydar Dzhemal, the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, offered yet another view. Today, he said, unlike “at the end of the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s,” the population lacks the leaders who might take them into the street, either genuine ones or false ones supplied by the security services.
Moreover, Dzhemal argued, “the picture of the world [that gave rise to protests 20 years ago] has been destroyed. Earlier the intelligentsia had the idea that in the West was a gleaming island of democracy and in the Soviet land, a dark kingdom.” This wasn’t entirely accurate, but it existed and played a major role.
At present, Russians lack “such a picture.” The West is “also a dark kingdom,” and things in Russia are complicated. “In brief, people no longer have in their consciousness this exact dichotomy” and the guidance it offers. And as that has happened, “they have been converted into a silent majority.”
Russians now, Dzhemal said, carry around anger with them “but they do not know what channels they should use to express it. Such a situation is especially dangerous because when at last the cock crows,” the anger of the silent majority will overwhelm the system. “People who do not understand the situation and cannot influence it will remain silent only until then.”
Vienna, February 2 – The spread of political protests in the Middle East and increasing problems inside Russia including corruption, income differentiation and official arbitrariness have prompted ever more Russian analysts to ask why is it that Russians are not going into the streets more often and revolting against the powers that be.
Such queries were given a new focus recently when Lev Gudkov, the head of the Levada Analytic Center, told the Moscow media that “85 percent of the population of Russia considers that they are not in a position to influence anything in the country” and thus do not try to change things by engaging in public protests (forum-msk.org/material/politic/5409735.html).
But Gudkov insisted, Russians should not be blamed for this apparent social apathy. The figure he cited, the Levada head said, “means not that people do not sympathize with the victims [of this or that disaster or policy] but rather that they are not prepared to do something because of this.” In short, “cases of force generate [both] horror and indifference.”
“Hatred to the force structures, the growth of corruption, and [so on] taken together weaken the generally accepted rules of behavior,” Gudkov says. “the normative system of society is breaking down like a rotten fabric,” something he suggested is linked to “disappointment in reformism.”
As a result, “people continue to show loyalty to the powers that be. But the trend of the day is indifference,” all the more so because the media insist and the Russian people believe that there is no alternative for them. That sense, of course, makes it easier for the authorities to rule them because it leads people to ask “for what should [we] protest?”
Mikhail Vinogradov, a professor of psychiatry, said that he considers Gudkov’s argument to be “a provocation” against both the people and the powers that be. And he suggested that “the level of civic activity [among Russians] is completely sufficient” given the challenges and possibilities in their country.
Russians today, he suggested, “do not have the occations [for protest] comparable to those in Algeria or France.” Instead, “we have our own process of socialization,” and “we have inherited from the former regime a very complicated government. Today reforms are taking place.” Consequently, there is nothing and no one to struggle against.
Sergey Udaltsov, the leader of the Left Front, in contrast had a somewhat different take on the situation. “Undoubtedly,” he said, “the distinctive characteristic of Russian society today is apathy, indifference, individualism and a lack of faith in the possibility of changing anything” at any level.
That represents a change from the late 1980s and 1990s, and Udaltsov said it reflected the institutionalization of “semi-totalitarian democracy” by Vladimir Putin beginning in 2000. Such public passivity, he said, “is characteristic for all totalitarian societies. If one recalls Soviet times, there weren’t any mass protests either.”
Then, Udaltsov continued, the reason was that “the idea that they cannot influence the actions of the powers that be was drilled into the consciousness of the people” by the system. Now, he said, “the powers that be actively through the mass media are pushing this [same] ideological doctrine.”
The current powers that be, he said, “do everything in order to show citizens that protests do not influence the decisions” of the powers.” If people protest something as they do, the authorities respond in almost all cases by doing nothing until there is a sufficient interval to cast doubt on the notion that the protests played any role in any change.
“How all this will end,” Udaltsov added, “we know. The period of apathy will not continue forever. The problems will not become fewer, people will express their dissatisfaction in the Internet (in Soviet times, they did so in their kitchens).” And if the state does not begin a dialogue with the society, such feelings will lead to “a social explosion.”
A third observer, Geydar Dzhemal, the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, offered yet another view. Today, he said, unlike “at the end of the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s,” the population lacks the leaders who might take them into the street, either genuine ones or false ones supplied by the security services.
Moreover, Dzhemal argued, “the picture of the world [that gave rise to protests 20 years ago] has been destroyed. Earlier the intelligentsia had the idea that in the West was a gleaming island of democracy and in the Soviet land, a dark kingdom.” This wasn’t entirely accurate, but it existed and played a major role.
At present, Russians lack “such a picture.” The West is “also a dark kingdom,” and things in Russia are complicated. “In brief, people no longer have in their consciousness this exact dichotomy” and the guidance it offers. And as that has happened, “they have been converted into a silent majority.”
Russians now, Dzhemal said, carry around anger with them “but they do not know what channels they should use to express it. Such a situation is especially dangerous because when at last the cock crows,” the anger of the silent majority will overwhelm the system. “People who do not understand the situation and cannot influence it will remain silent only until then.”
Window on Eurasia: Russian Fascists, North Caucasus Separatists Feed Off One Another, Arutyunov Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, February 2 – .Russia’s senior academic specialist on the North Caucasus says that the interests of “the pseudo-Islamic separatists” and of “the Russian fascists” intersect: “If one of them did not exist,” Sergey Arutyunov argues, “the other would lose the ground under its feet.”
Among other things, the corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences who heads the Caucasus department of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Antrhopology, says, that means that each has a tendency to exaggerate about the other, a tendency that should induce skepticism all around (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/180465/).
Arutyunov’s comment was one of a series of expert reactions surveyed by Kavkaz-Uzel concerning claims by some Russian officials and Moscow media outlets that a shadowy but supposedly militant and powerful separatist “Nogay battalion” had played a role in the Domodedovo airport attack.
Arutyunov said that in his view, “the Nogays have the fewest of all possibilities for a separatist movement and a partisan struggle” because for that a people needs “numbers, territory, and a compact and uniform ethnic composition,” something that the Nogays don’t have. And “even if some kind of battalion does exist, there would hardly be more than 20 people in it.”
The academician added that any organization which might be called a Nogay battalion in any6 case would be “part of a network established in the North Caucasus” and would “not be pursuing ethnic goals or self-determination.” Instead, it would be “purely fanatically religious,” and like other such groups would call itself by an ethnic name only to identify its location.
According to Arutyunov, the siloviki do not have any “concrete” information about such a battalion, despite the willingness of some of them to talk about it. In his view, the problem is that “there is Russian fascism and they are playing with [that movement].” Thus the siloviki are prepared to play up something the fascists care about.
Indeed, Arutyunov continues, “the interests of the pseudo-separatists and the Russian fascists intersect,” with each side interested in presenting its opponent as larger than it is. “In the interests of the pseudo-Islamic separatists, in order that there be more Russian fascism and in the interests of the Russian fascists that there be more separatism.”
Other experts with whom Kavkaz-Uzel spoke were equally skeptical about reports on a role for “the Nogay battalion.” Orkhan Dzhemal, a political scientist who specializes on the Caucasus, said that such a group “ceased its activities already in 2002.” Since that time, he said, he and others who track such groups had simply “forgotten about it.”
This reflects a more general trend among the militants, Dzhemal said. “During the first Chechen war, it was important [to make such ethnic declarations but] now it is considered to be bad tone: In these circles, it is not considered polite to ask about nationality. They [insist that they] are internationalists.”
Konstantin Kazenin, the chief editor of the Regnum news agency, agreed, telling Kavkaz-Uzel that the Nogay battalion is a question for historians rather than for security officials. But he suggested that the use of this term now reflected less an evil intent than simple “ignorance” of the multi-national nature of the militants in the North Caucasus now.
Akhmed Yarlykanov, a senior specialist at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, provided another perspective. He suggested that the term “Nogay battalion” was “for external use.” Inside the organization, “there is a complete international, albeit a green one. They consider that all of them are [first and foremost] Muslims.”
The reason some of these groups give themselves an ethnic name, he continued, is that they are interested in underscoring their presence in various parts of the North Caucasus and in showing that the Islamist cause is attracting support from the various ethnic groups of that region.
Consequently, Yarlykanov said, talk by others about these groups does not necessarily reflect reality but rather “creates tension and plays into the hands of the separatists,” something that clearly appears to be the case in recent discussions of the Nogay battalion and the Domodedovo action.
Vienna, February 2 – .Russia’s senior academic specialist on the North Caucasus says that the interests of “the pseudo-Islamic separatists” and of “the Russian fascists” intersect: “If one of them did not exist,” Sergey Arutyunov argues, “the other would lose the ground under its feet.”
Among other things, the corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences who heads the Caucasus department of the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Antrhopology, says, that means that each has a tendency to exaggerate about the other, a tendency that should induce skepticism all around (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/180465/).
Arutyunov’s comment was one of a series of expert reactions surveyed by Kavkaz-Uzel concerning claims by some Russian officials and Moscow media outlets that a shadowy but supposedly militant and powerful separatist “Nogay battalion” had played a role in the Domodedovo airport attack.
Arutyunov said that in his view, “the Nogays have the fewest of all possibilities for a separatist movement and a partisan struggle” because for that a people needs “numbers, territory, and a compact and uniform ethnic composition,” something that the Nogays don’t have. And “even if some kind of battalion does exist, there would hardly be more than 20 people in it.”
The academician added that any organization which might be called a Nogay battalion in any6 case would be “part of a network established in the North Caucasus” and would “not be pursuing ethnic goals or self-determination.” Instead, it would be “purely fanatically religious,” and like other such groups would call itself by an ethnic name only to identify its location.
According to Arutyunov, the siloviki do not have any “concrete” information about such a battalion, despite the willingness of some of them to talk about it. In his view, the problem is that “there is Russian fascism and they are playing with [that movement].” Thus the siloviki are prepared to play up something the fascists care about.
Indeed, Arutyunov continues, “the interests of the pseudo-separatists and the Russian fascists intersect,” with each side interested in presenting its opponent as larger than it is. “In the interests of the pseudo-Islamic separatists, in order that there be more Russian fascism and in the interests of the Russian fascists that there be more separatism.”
Other experts with whom Kavkaz-Uzel spoke were equally skeptical about reports on a role for “the Nogay battalion.” Orkhan Dzhemal, a political scientist who specializes on the Caucasus, said that such a group “ceased its activities already in 2002.” Since that time, he said, he and others who track such groups had simply “forgotten about it.”
This reflects a more general trend among the militants, Dzhemal said. “During the first Chechen war, it was important [to make such ethnic declarations but] now it is considered to be bad tone: In these circles, it is not considered polite to ask about nationality. They [insist that they] are internationalists.”
Konstantin Kazenin, the chief editor of the Regnum news agency, agreed, telling Kavkaz-Uzel that the Nogay battalion is a question for historians rather than for security officials. But he suggested that the use of this term now reflected less an evil intent than simple “ignorance” of the multi-national nature of the militants in the North Caucasus now.
Akhmed Yarlykanov, a senior specialist at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, provided another perspective. He suggested that the term “Nogay battalion” was “for external use.” Inside the organization, “there is a complete international, albeit a green one. They consider that all of them are [first and foremost] Muslims.”
The reason some of these groups give themselves an ethnic name, he continued, is that they are interested in underscoring their presence in various parts of the North Caucasus and in showing that the Islamist cause is attracting support from the various ethnic groups of that region.
Consequently, Yarlykanov said, talk by others about these groups does not necessarily reflect reality but rather “creates tension and plays into the hands of the separatists,” something that clearly appears to be the case in recent discussions of the Nogay battalion and the Domodedovo action.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
