Paul Goble
Staunton, January 28 – One sign that a political leader or movement may be in deep trouble is when its leaders decide to take on an issue that most people in the country they are operating in feel should be beyond politics either because it is something they view as natural or as part of an untouchable national tradition.
Vladimir Putin’s United Russia appears to have crossed that line with the announcement today of plans to “modernize” the Russian language, the holy of holies not only for many Russian nationalists but also for ordinary Russians who view their language as part of themselves and their culture and thus something that should be beyond the power even of the Kremlin.
In an article on United Russia’s portal (er.ru/er/text.shtml?18/2403,100022) and in “Nezavisimaya gazeta” (www.ng.ru/politics/2011-01-27/3_kartblansh.html), Aleksey Chadayev, head of the party’s political department, says that all Russians have noticed that their language is inadequate to discuss many issues, forcing Russians to borrow from English and other tongues.
“Consequently, he says, “task number one in the context of the modernization of the country and at the same time in the context of an effective cultural policy about which President [Dmitry Medvedev] spoke is the modernization of the Russian language,” especially in the economic, administrative and political” realms.
According to Chadayev, “effective policy means the selection of instruments” allowing the state to produce in a particular direction “with clear and unambiguous criteria for the assessment of the results.” Among these instruments, “the main and most valuable is the Russian language which everywhere and always is the height of culture.”
Unfortunately, he continues, if Russians are honest with themselves, the lexical wealth of the Russian language is “today insufficient” for the discussion of many issues, and even junior specialists “are forced to shift to other world languages as the basic ‘working’ language” of their fields. Worse still, the number of such sectors is growing, Chadayev says.
Moreover, he continues, “even in the basic spheres of our social life, Russia ‘does not succeed’ in coping with today’s tempo and rhythm of changes, with difficulty ‘masters’ new standars, and far from always correctly adapts to the changing picture of the world” especially in fields like economics and politics.
As a result, a large number of far from the best foreign words have entered the Russian language, he says, something that threatens its future. Consequently, the modernization of Russian is a first order task, one equivalent to what the Chinese refer to as starting all projects by correcting names.
Although Chadayev did not specify exactly what he would like to see happen or how this modernization of Russian would take place, his remarks immediately drew criticism because there are few things Russians are prouder of than their language and because past efforts to “modernize” Russian have not been popular.
Indeed, for many, discussions of modernization canraise the spectre of changing the alphabet as happened in 1917. But the possibility of even smaller changes has already sparked a sharp rebuke from the Union of Writers of Russia which has always seen itself as a defender of the national tongue.
In a comment posted today on the “Russkaya narodnaya liniya” portal, Nikolay Konyayev, the secretary of the administration of that organization, pointedly suggests that “language cannot be subordinate to the decisions of the party” but must grow organically (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/01/28/nikolaj_konyaev_yazyk_ne_mozhet_podchinyatsya_resheniyam_partii/).
“Calls for the modernization of the Russian language by themselves elicit only surprise,” he writes. “How can an individual even discuss something he does not understand?” As writers know, “language arises by itself and lives according to its own laws. It is not subordinate to the demands of the moment from an individual or a specific party.”
That there are too many borrowings from other languages, especially in perestroika times and more recently Konyayev says is absolutely true and especially disturbing because there were Russian words for them beforehand. But handing over the task to expel them to one or another party is not so much a solution but rather another form of the problem.
Friday, January 28, 2011
Window on Eurasia: ‘Three Nations’ Competing for Dominance within Ukraine, Lviv Activist Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 28 – Most analysts view relations between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as the basic source of conflict in Ukraine today. Some have argued that this conflict is among three groups: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians.
But Yuri Mikhalchishin, deputy head of the Ukrainian nationalist Freedom Party in the Lviv city council, told “Glavkom” yesterday that the real conflict in Ukraine at the present time is about “the right to exist” for one or another of “three different national projects” (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1368975.html).
“Today we can quite confidently speak about the formation” of three distinctive groupings: the Freedom Party leader argues, “[first,] a contemporary Ukrainian nation, [second,] a Little Russia nation, and [third,] a neo-Soviet nation, the representatives of which are commonly called “sovki.”
The contemporary Ukrainian nation, he suggests, “is that part of the old Ukrainian ethnic base” who members “consider themselves Ukrainians” and see “continuity and an uninterrupted pattern of Ukrainiaan statehood from Kyivan Rus to Ukraine of 1991 and who desire the development of the Ukrainian state in its ethnic boundaries.”
The “Little Russia” group is “the politically amorphous part of ethnic Ukrainians who have been subjected to strong de-nationalization: in particular, as a result of mass repressions, collectivization and the consequences of the Second World War for central and northern Ukraine.”
Members of this group “recognize their blood relationship to those Ukrainians who position themselves as a clearly conscious Ukrainian nation but are more indifferent relative to [its] future.” And they form that part of contemporary Ukrainian society which by its passivity and absence of vision … equates two polar tendencies,” those of Lviv and those of Donetsk.
“The third part,” Mikhalchishin says, “is the neo-Soviet nation, that part of the population of Ukraine which possibly is the result of mixed marriages of Ukrainians, Russians and representatives of other peoples of the former Soviet Union.” It is a product of Soviet nationality policy and of efforts to produce a single “Soviet people.”
Such people view “the liquidation of the USSR … as a catastrophe in their lives” and continue to “identify with a single all-union center of influence in Moscow.” Culturally, spiritually and economically, they identify themselves [not with Russians necessarily] but with the Soviet period of history,” seeing it as a model for the future.”
Such people are “extraordinarily hostile to the very idea of the existence of Ukraine as “a separate state unit on the geopolitical map of the world.”
According to Mikhalchishin, “today’s Ukraine is divided not along an ‘east-west- line,’” that is geographically “but more alone one of “a spiritual-biological character.” Each of the three groups, he says, has about 30 percent of the population and thus no one of them is in a predominant position now.
Despite its “biological component,” something that will cause many to dismiss it, Mikhalchishin’s proposed model really focuses on psychology, and it provides a more adequate explanation for why Ukrainian politics is so unstable and why individuals and groups ally with or oppose one another than do most ethnic models.
Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that Moscow and Kyiv under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich are working to promote the third group at the expense of the other two. One clear example of that involves the fate of Ukrainian organizations in the Russian Federation, organizations that Russian officials have moved to close.
Even as Moscow courts move to close Ukrainian autonomy organizations in Russia, people close to the process told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” that the Russian powers that be are working with Kyiv to set up “new [Ukrainian] structures with a new [and presumably less nationalist] leadership” (www.ng.ru/politics/2011-01-28/100_ukraina.html).
Staunton, January 28 – Most analysts view relations between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as the basic source of conflict in Ukraine today. Some have argued that this conflict is among three groups: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians.
But Yuri Mikhalchishin, deputy head of the Ukrainian nationalist Freedom Party in the Lviv city council, told “Glavkom” yesterday that the real conflict in Ukraine at the present time is about “the right to exist” for one or another of “three different national projects” (www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1368975.html).
“Today we can quite confidently speak about the formation” of three distinctive groupings: the Freedom Party leader argues, “[first,] a contemporary Ukrainian nation, [second,] a Little Russia nation, and [third,] a neo-Soviet nation, the representatives of which are commonly called “sovki.”
The contemporary Ukrainian nation, he suggests, “is that part of the old Ukrainian ethnic base” who members “consider themselves Ukrainians” and see “continuity and an uninterrupted pattern of Ukrainiaan statehood from Kyivan Rus to Ukraine of 1991 and who desire the development of the Ukrainian state in its ethnic boundaries.”
The “Little Russia” group is “the politically amorphous part of ethnic Ukrainians who have been subjected to strong de-nationalization: in particular, as a result of mass repressions, collectivization and the consequences of the Second World War for central and northern Ukraine.”
Members of this group “recognize their blood relationship to those Ukrainians who position themselves as a clearly conscious Ukrainian nation but are more indifferent relative to [its] future.” And they form that part of contemporary Ukrainian society which by its passivity and absence of vision … equates two polar tendencies,” those of Lviv and those of Donetsk.
“The third part,” Mikhalchishin says, “is the neo-Soviet nation, that part of the population of Ukraine which possibly is the result of mixed marriages of Ukrainians, Russians and representatives of other peoples of the former Soviet Union.” It is a product of Soviet nationality policy and of efforts to produce a single “Soviet people.”
Such people view “the liquidation of the USSR … as a catastrophe in their lives” and continue to “identify with a single all-union center of influence in Moscow.” Culturally, spiritually and economically, they identify themselves [not with Russians necessarily] but with the Soviet period of history,” seeing it as a model for the future.”
Such people are “extraordinarily hostile to the very idea of the existence of Ukraine as “a separate state unit on the geopolitical map of the world.”
According to Mikhalchishin, “today’s Ukraine is divided not along an ‘east-west- line,’” that is geographically “but more alone one of “a spiritual-biological character.” Each of the three groups, he says, has about 30 percent of the population and thus no one of them is in a predominant position now.
Despite its “biological component,” something that will cause many to dismiss it, Mikhalchishin’s proposed model really focuses on psychology, and it provides a more adequate explanation for why Ukrainian politics is so unstable and why individuals and groups ally with or oppose one another than do most ethnic models.
Meanwhile, it is increasingly clear that Moscow and Kyiv under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich are working to promote the third group at the expense of the other two. One clear example of that involves the fate of Ukrainian organizations in the Russian Federation, organizations that Russian officials have moved to close.
Even as Moscow courts move to close Ukrainian autonomy organizations in Russia, people close to the process told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” that the Russian powers that be are working with Kyiv to set up “new [Ukrainian] structures with a new [and presumably less nationalist] leadership” (www.ng.ru/politics/2011-01-28/100_ukraina.html).
Window on Eurasia: Reading Habits Highlight ‘Leftward Drift’ in Russian Society, Moscow Paper Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 28 – Booksellers in the Russian capital, the editors of “Nezavisimaya gazeta” note today, report that demand is growing among their young educated customers for Marxist and neo-Marxist literature, something for which there was almost no demand in the first post-communist decade.
Some people will see this as something completely unexpected, the editors say, but others will view it as completely logical, a “leftward drift” in reading habits that has been “taking place in the entire world” as economic conditions have worsened but that is occurring in Russia “with a certain delay” (www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-01-28/2_red.html).
In the West, where the opposition of “leftist intellectuals” and “a rightist establishment” is something “traditional,” so too has been the demand for Marxist literature especially when economic times are tough. But in Russia, direct experience with communism and with the post-Soviet Communist Party of the Russian Federation had immunized most against this.
Now, however, “with the onset of the world financial crisis, the situation has changed.” If the 1990s, young people could count on “a social elevator” to boost their careers, now, “the elevator has stalled,” and over the last decade, “social status began to depend not on individual initiative and effort but on [connections like in earlier times].”
Not surprisingly, the editors continue, many young people turned to Marx’s Das Kapital and other Marxist works for explanations of their situation, especially one in which the rich seemed to get richer, the poor poorer and the gap between the two ever wider in post-Soviet Russia.
“The euphoria of the 1990s” with its “doubtful injection of optimism” about the end of history has passed, the editors say, and the educated young are trying to find explanations for the world as they find it. While some are looking to neo-capitalist writings, an increasing share are disappointed in the market and are turning to Marxist ones.
This interest in leftist ideology, the editors suggest, has little or nothing to do with the Communist Party which has served as “a factor of stability” in the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. Instead, it reflects a deeper search for justice in a world that appears unjust and a desire for explanations that people can use to cope.
Consequently, this new interest in Marxist and neo-Marxist texts does not necessarily portend any increase in support for the KPRF. Instead, it points to the rise of a new element among the educated one, an element less enamored of market ideology and more willing to consider non-market-based ideas and solutions.
At the very least, the rise of this group will provoke a renewed debate over what role the state should play in Russian life and the economy. And more speculatively, this renewed interest in ideologues of the left may help prepare the ground for the rise of a new leftist party, one that could appeal to those who have been left behind far more effectively than the communists can.
Staunton, January 28 – Booksellers in the Russian capital, the editors of “Nezavisimaya gazeta” note today, report that demand is growing among their young educated customers for Marxist and neo-Marxist literature, something for which there was almost no demand in the first post-communist decade.
Some people will see this as something completely unexpected, the editors say, but others will view it as completely logical, a “leftward drift” in reading habits that has been “taking place in the entire world” as economic conditions have worsened but that is occurring in Russia “with a certain delay” (www.ng.ru/editorial/2011-01-28/2_red.html).
In the West, where the opposition of “leftist intellectuals” and “a rightist establishment” is something “traditional,” so too has been the demand for Marxist literature especially when economic times are tough. But in Russia, direct experience with communism and with the post-Soviet Communist Party of the Russian Federation had immunized most against this.
Now, however, “with the onset of the world financial crisis, the situation has changed.” If the 1990s, young people could count on “a social elevator” to boost their careers, now, “the elevator has stalled,” and over the last decade, “social status began to depend not on individual initiative and effort but on [connections like in earlier times].”
Not surprisingly, the editors continue, many young people turned to Marx’s Das Kapital and other Marxist works for explanations of their situation, especially one in which the rich seemed to get richer, the poor poorer and the gap between the two ever wider in post-Soviet Russia.
“The euphoria of the 1990s” with its “doubtful injection of optimism” about the end of history has passed, the editors say, and the educated young are trying to find explanations for the world as they find it. While some are looking to neo-capitalist writings, an increasing share are disappointed in the market and are turning to Marxist ones.
This interest in leftist ideology, the editors suggest, has little or nothing to do with the Communist Party which has served as “a factor of stability” in the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. Instead, it reflects a deeper search for justice in a world that appears unjust and a desire for explanations that people can use to cope.
Consequently, this new interest in Marxist and neo-Marxist texts does not necessarily portend any increase in support for the KPRF. Instead, it points to the rise of a new element among the educated one, an element less enamored of market ideology and more willing to consider non-market-based ideas and solutions.
At the very least, the rise of this group will provoke a renewed debate over what role the state should play in Russian life and the economy. And more speculatively, this renewed interest in ideologues of the left may help prepare the ground for the rise of a new leftist party, one that could appeal to those who have been left behind far more effectively than the communists can.
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