Paul Goble
Vienna, January 27 – Unlike other countries which have suffered a major terrorist attack and then blocked further ones, Russia continues to suffer ever more of them, an indication that regardless of whether such violence is criminal or ideology, Moscow is “losing the war,” according to an increasing number of Russian analysts.
What makes this especially troubling, Roman Popkov writes in “Osobaya bukhva” today is that the Russian people should that “in exchange for freedom [they would get] security, but instead, [they] have received terrorism” (www.specletter.com/svoboda-slova/2011-01-27/v-obmen-na-svobodu-my-hoteli-bezopasnost-a-poluchili-terrorizm.html).
While the population at large is not yet posing questions to the powers that be about this, many in the blogosphere are already raising them and suggesting some disturbing answers, Popkov says. “The majority of bloggers,” he says, are already talking about “the crying inadequacy of the special services which have not been able to prevent terrorist acts.”
Moreover, he continues, the criticism in the blogosphere increasingly concerns “not only the Interior Ministry but the FSB, the institution which recently has been able to avoid major scandals” but which one blogger says is staffed by people more interested in having a dacha than in protecting the people.
As one blogger put it, “the terrorists have come out of the outhouses [Putin promised to drown them in] and feel themselves quite comfortable in the heart of the country. It is understandable that terrorism is a serious question, and it is obvious that in any country, it is difficult to struggle with it.”
“But the question is simple,” he continues, “is what is going on [in Russia] a struggle against it? Show the entire country your dachas, apartments, cars and bank accounts. And we will be convinced who is working for the country and who is serving the Motherland, and who has rank only for the solution of his own needs. No one should be beyond question.”
“Unfortunately,” another blogger said, “nothing particularly unusual [or unexpected] took place in Domodedovo.” People need to recognize that “we are at war” and that since 1985, a civil war has been taking place. And still no end to that is visible.” Instead, one must say, that any end appears to be receding.
If Russian bloggers have been critical of the security services, Popkov continues, they are also very critical of the Russian media, noting that almost the only valuable information comes from social media like Twitter and the Internet rather than the conventional electronic or print outlets.
An even more sweeping denunciation of the security services and hence of the powers that be behind them was offered by the editors of the Kasparov.ru site, the portal of opposition leader Gary Kasparov, who suggested that Domodedovo showed Moscow is engaged in “an imitation of a struggle with terrorism” (www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=4D3FE1A422CD6).
The powers that be, the editors of the portal say, have engaged in “absurd forms of the total imitation” of normal practices and “the distortion of the meanings” that these things have for all people. That began with the imitation of political competition and civil society, but now it has extended to an imitation of a struggle against terrorism.
Because everything is an imitation, they suggest, no one is ever held responsible for the failures of the security agencies to protect Russians and Russian cities. Instead, those at the top of “the power vertical” choose whom to blame in an effort to distract attention from their own failures to fight terrorism in an effective way.
“It is possible to accuse the airport management of a section of the militia for failing to maintain the demands of security,” they say. “But airports do not struggle with terrorist. The local department of the militia fulfills an assisting role, [while] the main work must be conducted at the level of the Interior Ministry, the FSB, and the National Anti-Terrorist Committee.
Indeed, they conclude, “the power vertical is wisely constructed. Having been established for the defense of citizens from terrorist acts, it covers those who are above from the threat of responsibility for any shortcomings,” just one of the ways in which the current Moscow struggle against terrorism has become an imitation of what a real struggle should be.
Thursday, January 27, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Only Repression or a Massive Infusion the of Money Can Save Russian Army, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 27 – Some 200,000 young Russians avoided military service this fall, an indication that the draft in the Russian Federation has become so unpopular that Moscow can save the situation only by employing ever more repressive measures or providing a massive infusion of new funds for the armed services, according to a Russian analyst.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” yesterday, Sergey Ishchenko points out that the number of young men who avoided the draft this past fall could have formed 40 motorized rifle brigades -- not to mention the number of units that could be in existence if those avoiding service in earlier rounds of the draft had gone into the military (svpressa.ru/society/article/37644/).
It is clear to all, Ishchenko says, that something must be done “immediately,” but there is no agreement on just what. Propaganda efforts like posters saying “The Motherland Calls!” no longer attract young men to service but indicate to them that they need to find ways of avoiding going into the military.
“Whether anyone likes it or not,” he continues, “there are ever fewer moral stimulus for service in Russia.” And despite what it claims to be doing the defense ministry and the high command are in fact contributing to this, eliminating important symbols in the name of economy or efficiency.
Given this “current Russian army reality,” Ishchenko argues, there can be only “one way out” of the current impasse: “If the system takes away moral stimulus for military service, it is simply obligated to replace them with material ones.” In short, “the market” should determine what happens.
Given that the soldier’s work is “one of the most difficult and dangerous,” that means that he or she must be paid “not three kopecks a day as now” but rather more. That does not mean that the military needs to go over to a professional body but rather that “it is necessary to pay draftees not a little money.”
That is the conclusion of Mikhail Kozminykh, the human rights ombudsman for Leningrad oblast, who recent proposed talking about “soldiers’ capital” on the basis of an analogy with the much discussed “mothers’ capital” that the Russian government has begun to pay in an effort to boost the country’s birthrate.
Kozminykh told “Svobodnaya pressa” that he came up with the idea on the basis of his own past experience in the military and of conversations with draftees and the families they left behind, many of whom could not find jobs or feared that they would not be able to re-enter the workforce after discharge.
It came to me, the ombudsman said, that “the state which has called up a young person from his customary milieu is obligated to take upon itself part of the problems which arise with him as a result. How to do this in the best way? There is the experience with ‘mothers’ capital.” And that provided a model, Kozminykh said.
The Leningrad official said that he has proposed paying soldiers an amount equal to half of the amount given to mothers. That would be “somewhere near 170,000 rubles [6,000 US dollars] for a year of service. If the draftee has a family, the money should be transferred at the time of his drafting. If not, it should go to him afterwards, Kozminykh added.
In addition, the ombudsman said that the draft age should be increased from 18 to 21. At 18, many are “still children.” Three years later, “they become real men,” and that means that they will deal with their responsibilities “in a different way,” one that would benefit both the military and society far more.
Multiplying the amount Kozminykh proposes by the number of draftees in the Russian military would yield a large budgetary line, but the ombudsman said that he was prepared to support increasing the budget to handle it. If such a step is not taken, Moscow will either have to use force to push people into the military or face more problems with filling the ranks.
Vienna, January 27 – Some 200,000 young Russians avoided military service this fall, an indication that the draft in the Russian Federation has become so unpopular that Moscow can save the situation only by employing ever more repressive measures or providing a massive infusion of new funds for the armed services, according to a Russian analyst.
In an article in “Svobodnaya pressa” yesterday, Sergey Ishchenko points out that the number of young men who avoided the draft this past fall could have formed 40 motorized rifle brigades -- not to mention the number of units that could be in existence if those avoiding service in earlier rounds of the draft had gone into the military (svpressa.ru/society/article/37644/).
It is clear to all, Ishchenko says, that something must be done “immediately,” but there is no agreement on just what. Propaganda efforts like posters saying “The Motherland Calls!” no longer attract young men to service but indicate to them that they need to find ways of avoiding going into the military.
“Whether anyone likes it or not,” he continues, “there are ever fewer moral stimulus for service in Russia.” And despite what it claims to be doing the defense ministry and the high command are in fact contributing to this, eliminating important symbols in the name of economy or efficiency.
Given this “current Russian army reality,” Ishchenko argues, there can be only “one way out” of the current impasse: “If the system takes away moral stimulus for military service, it is simply obligated to replace them with material ones.” In short, “the market” should determine what happens.
Given that the soldier’s work is “one of the most difficult and dangerous,” that means that he or she must be paid “not three kopecks a day as now” but rather more. That does not mean that the military needs to go over to a professional body but rather that “it is necessary to pay draftees not a little money.”
That is the conclusion of Mikhail Kozminykh, the human rights ombudsman for Leningrad oblast, who recent proposed talking about “soldiers’ capital” on the basis of an analogy with the much discussed “mothers’ capital” that the Russian government has begun to pay in an effort to boost the country’s birthrate.
Kozminykh told “Svobodnaya pressa” that he came up with the idea on the basis of his own past experience in the military and of conversations with draftees and the families they left behind, many of whom could not find jobs or feared that they would not be able to re-enter the workforce after discharge.
It came to me, the ombudsman said, that “the state which has called up a young person from his customary milieu is obligated to take upon itself part of the problems which arise with him as a result. How to do this in the best way? There is the experience with ‘mothers’ capital.” And that provided a model, Kozminykh said.
The Leningrad official said that he has proposed paying soldiers an amount equal to half of the amount given to mothers. That would be “somewhere near 170,000 rubles [6,000 US dollars] for a year of service. If the draftee has a family, the money should be transferred at the time of his drafting. If not, it should go to him afterwards, Kozminykh added.
In addition, the ombudsman said that the draft age should be increased from 18 to 21. At 18, many are “still children.” Three years later, “they become real men,” and that means that they will deal with their responsibilities “in a different way,” one that would benefit both the military and society far more.
Multiplying the amount Kozminykh proposes by the number of draftees in the Russian military would yield a large budgetary line, but the ombudsman said that he was prepared to support increasing the budget to handle it. If such a step is not taken, Moscow will either have to use force to push people into the military or face more problems with filling the ranks.
Window on Eurasia: Belarusian Opposition Exploring the Creation of Government in Exile
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 27 – Outraged by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s actions since the elections and encouraged by the support they have received from the European Union, Belarusian opposition leaders are discussing with Lithuania the possibility of creating “an informal embassy of Belarus” there, a kind of government in exile with which other states could interact.
“If Europe does not recognize the elections [in Belarus], Oleg Metelitsa, a close advisor for former presidential candidate Vladmir Neklyayev who is now in a Minsk prison, said yesterday, “it is important to have a political represtantion so that Europe will be able to speak with someone from Belarus” (www.ng.ru/cis/2011-01-26/1_lukashenko.html).
Another reason for the establishment of such an institution is have a focal point for providing assistance of one kind or another to the hundreds of young people who have fled Belarus in the wake of the latest Lukashenka crackdown in order to seek refuge in neighboring states like Poland and Lithuania.
Up to now, “Nezavisimaya” reports, only one Belarusian – Viktor Kontsevenko, an aide to Nikoaly Statkevich – has formally asked for political asylum. The others hope to return, but if Lukashenka continues on his current course, more of the nearly one in five Belarusians now working or living abroad may also request asylum.
If the current Belarusian opposition does form a kind of government in exile, that will be the second such institution from that country. At the present time, there is still a self-proclaimed Belarusian government in exile from the times of the 1920 republic. Based in Canada and headed by Ivonka Survilla, it is not recognized by any other state.
But the new institution, if it takes shape, might attract greater support. Given that Lukashenka’s actions have destroyed any claim he may have to be the legitimate leader of a legitimate government and given the failure up to now of foreign powers to force him to change, the existence of a government in exile could provide additional leverage.
Were some foreign states to recognize that government as legitimate and hence the powers that be in Minsk as illegitimate, that would certainly increase pressure on Minsk to change, with even more Belarusians coming to recognize that they will be left isolated if they do not move toward changing the government there.
But if that positive result could be one of the outcomes, there are at least two other negative ones. On the one hand, Lukashenka might decide that he has no reason to engage the international community and dig in in much the same way that the generals in Myanmar have over the last two decades.
And on the other, given the very unpredictable nature of the Minsk leader, it is possible that he would launch some kind of campaign against any government that either hosted or recognized a Belarusian government in exile. In the first case, that could even lead to violence, and in the second, to economic actions, including blocking the flow of Russian oil and gas.
Because of all these dangers, efforts to create a Belarusian government in exile are likely to proceed cautiously, but given the thuggishness that Lukashenka has shown in recent weeks, the possibility that Belarusians and others will conclude that they have no other choice is more real than ever before.
Vienna, January 27 – Outraged by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s actions since the elections and encouraged by the support they have received from the European Union, Belarusian opposition leaders are discussing with Lithuania the possibility of creating “an informal embassy of Belarus” there, a kind of government in exile with which other states could interact.
“If Europe does not recognize the elections [in Belarus], Oleg Metelitsa, a close advisor for former presidential candidate Vladmir Neklyayev who is now in a Minsk prison, said yesterday, “it is important to have a political represtantion so that Europe will be able to speak with someone from Belarus” (www.ng.ru/cis/2011-01-26/1_lukashenko.html).
Another reason for the establishment of such an institution is have a focal point for providing assistance of one kind or another to the hundreds of young people who have fled Belarus in the wake of the latest Lukashenka crackdown in order to seek refuge in neighboring states like Poland and Lithuania.
Up to now, “Nezavisimaya” reports, only one Belarusian – Viktor Kontsevenko, an aide to Nikoaly Statkevich – has formally asked for political asylum. The others hope to return, but if Lukashenka continues on his current course, more of the nearly one in five Belarusians now working or living abroad may also request asylum.
If the current Belarusian opposition does form a kind of government in exile, that will be the second such institution from that country. At the present time, there is still a self-proclaimed Belarusian government in exile from the times of the 1920 republic. Based in Canada and headed by Ivonka Survilla, it is not recognized by any other state.
But the new institution, if it takes shape, might attract greater support. Given that Lukashenka’s actions have destroyed any claim he may have to be the legitimate leader of a legitimate government and given the failure up to now of foreign powers to force him to change, the existence of a government in exile could provide additional leverage.
Were some foreign states to recognize that government as legitimate and hence the powers that be in Minsk as illegitimate, that would certainly increase pressure on Minsk to change, with even more Belarusians coming to recognize that they will be left isolated if they do not move toward changing the government there.
But if that positive result could be one of the outcomes, there are at least two other negative ones. On the one hand, Lukashenka might decide that he has no reason to engage the international community and dig in in much the same way that the generals in Myanmar have over the last two decades.
And on the other, given the very unpredictable nature of the Minsk leader, it is possible that he would launch some kind of campaign against any government that either hosted or recognized a Belarusian government in exile. In the first case, that could even lead to violence, and in the second, to economic actions, including blocking the flow of Russian oil and gas.
Because of all these dangers, efforts to create a Belarusian government in exile are likely to proceed cautiously, but given the thuggishness that Lukashenka has shown in recent weeks, the possibility that Belarusians and others will conclude that they have no other choice is more real than ever before.
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