Paul Goble
Vienna, January 26 – The ‘Sibiryak’ movement is seeking to unite all the peoples of the region independent of their origin or national self-definition to promote the social, economic and political interests of the region on the basis of what its organizers call a distinctive “Siberian self-consciousness and Siberian character.”
At the invitation of a group of Tomsk bloggers, more than two dozen Sibiryaks, including the head of the independent entrepreneurs’ union, a deputy of the Tomsk Public Chamber, and an organizer of increasingly popular “extreme tourism” in the region assembled in that Siberian city this week to define their next steps and broader goals (globalsib.com/9433/).
The participants expressed their respect for representatives of all nationalities, “be they Russians, Tatars, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Selkups or any other,” and said that the name of their movement, “Sibiryaks,” “makes it possible to unite all of them for the solution of common tasks” and the pursuit of future goals.
An overarching immediate goal, the Tomsk meeting said, is “the development of civil society in order to secure a worthy life and the harmonious development of each individual,” not only in the area around Tomsk which is a center of Sibiryak consciousness but for the entire region east of the Urals.
Some speakers, such as Konstantin Mukhametkaliyev, argued that “one should not develop civil society exclusively in Tomsk or even in Siberia alone.” And he suggested that “the ‘Sibiryaki’ eventually intends to work” throughout the Russian Federation. But despite that, the meeting underscored the tensions between “Sibiryaki” and Muscovites.
Practically all those taking part in the Tomsk sessions drew a sharp line between these two categories. Aleksandr Ostroushko argued that “the difference is one of mentality. Of course, even in Moscow there live many good people, and in Siberia, bad people are encountered.” But there is an underlying division.
Muscovites, he argued, divide “the country into the metropolitan center and the colonies. That is, they consider it a completely normal thing when the colonies work for the capital.” But Siberians have a very different view. While they consider “the entire country as their native territory,” they believe that everyone there must work to develop and not simply exploit its parts.
That difference, he said, explains why Muscovites so often “produce a negative reaction with Siberians.” And another difference is that Siberians assume that “the development of the country must not begin with Moscow” but rather with Siberia and other regions that “are really concerned not only about their own oblast, republic or kray but about others as well.”
The founders of the movement stressed that they are “against separatism despite the fact that the name ‘Sibiryaki’ often raises the question as to whether the participants [in the movement] are for the separation of Siberia from Russia or not.” They said “no revolution is planned,” but if one occurs, “the territory of Siberia will be divided between China and the US.”
But the movement is based on the proposition that the resources of Siberia should be used in the first instance for Siberians rather than as now serving as a source of new wealth for Moscow and leaving the region from which the raw materials are mined impoverished and looking for help.
Ludmila Strokova outlined five specific activities that the movement intends to pursue immediately in support of its broader goals: monitoring of the activities of government bodies and agencies, organization of local holidays, promotion of the study of local languages, volunteer work in orphanages, and free legal assistance to those who need it.
The various activities of the Sibiryaki are tracked on the GlobalSib.com website, and the leaders of the movement have published their email addresses in order to promote contacts. Among them are Lyudmila Strokova whose email is milkayo@sibmail.com and Konstantin Mukhametkalilyev whose online address is rus24@swibmail.com.
Up to now, Siberian regionalism has not attracted as much attention as ethnic nationalism, both because it lacks the structural features of the latter and because many assume that the Russian nation is a more integral entity than is in fact the case. And that makes the emergence of the Sibiryaki worth watching.
In comments to “NG-Regiony” this week, Aleksey Malashenko of the Carnegie Moscow Center, underscores that point with his argument that “inter-ethnic problems are not the main cause for the appearance of new border points” across Eurasia (www.ng.ru/regions/2011-01-24/6_we.html).
The collapse of the Russian state, the longtime specialist on ethnicity and religion says, “unfortunately is possible, although in interesting and unexpected forms, but it is certainly not a fact that its main cause will be inter-ethnic relations.” Rather, this disintegration may follow regional rather than ethnic lines.
Malashenko argues that the Kazan Tatars “do not intend to separate themselves” from Russia, and the Caucasus, “despite the existing problems also does not want to acquire more serious difficulties.” Indeed, he said, he believes that if the collapse began “hypothetically with the Far East or with Kaliningrad, the North Caucasus would be held to the last.”
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Russian Nationalist Backs Independence for Non-Russians Who Want It
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 26 – Russian nationalists who support an expansive imperial agenda have always attracted more attention, but there is within the Russian nationalist camp a group that favors the creation of a smaller but more homogeneously ethnic Russian state by allowing non-Russian areas now within the Russian Federation to go their own way.
Perhaps the leading spokesman for that position now is Konstantin Krylov, the leader of the Russian Social Movement, who has told the Daghestani newspaper “Novoye delo” that he sees “nothing horrible” or “dangerous” in an outcome where a “’Russia for the Russians’ would be reduced to the area of several oblasts of Central Russia” (ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4057).
“For me,” Krylov says, “Russia is the country where Russians live. A Russia without Russians and not for Russians is simply not needed by us Russians. … The space where Russians can live freely and not be concerned about their future is constantly becoming smaller. In the Caucasus, for example, there are republics where the Russian population is practically gone.”
The “de-russification of the entire Caucasus” lies ahead, Krupnov says, “and the very same thing is taking place if perhaps not so markedly in other ethnocratic republics in which the rights of ‘the titular nations’ are guaranteed by the local and federal powers.”
At the same time, he argues, many “Russian lands from time immemorial” are being filled up with non-Russians from the Caucasus and Central Asia and “enjoying the protection of the Russian powers, are establishing their control over the Russian land. If things go any further, then the Russians will not have even those few oblasts about which we are talking.”
“And when this becomes a reality – and under the current tempo of the development of events, this can happen faster than we now imagine – the deparation of all non-Russian territories may turn out to be the last chance for the survival of the Russian people,” he continues, adding “amputation is better than gangrene.”
In Krupnov’s view, “if Tatarstan, Sakha or Daghestan will agree to remain inside Russia only under the condition of the putting down of the national aspirations of the Russian people, if they do not want to live in an ethnic Russian state … then their presence in Russia harms both Russia and themselves because it blocks their chances for development.”
Most of the non-Russian republics are living as parasites on the state budget, and that means that power in them if this continues “will belong not to the best people but to those who are able to extract more concessions and aid from the federal center. The energetic and ambitious will leave Russia … in order to study or to work … in Europe or America.”
Indeed, Krupnov argues, “in these very republics will be realized the worst of all possible scenarios: the dissolution of traditional society without the construction of a contemporary one Under the pressure of Russian habits and mass culture, the remains of traditional norms and values will be lost, and those from contemporary society will lead to nowhere.”
At the same time, however, Krupnov says that “the goal of the Russian nationalists” is not the creation of an ethnically homogenous state, something that would in any case require “ethnic purges,” but rather one in which the Russian people can enjoy is “lawful rights” and form “a Russian national state.”
Such a national state, he argues, “will not be afraid for its territorial integrity: a big territory is not for it a goal in and of itself and a source of pride.” Consequently, a Russian national state will be ready to allow those who want to leave to “do so peacefully, without blood, without serious conflict and even to preserve good relations for the future.”
Those non-Russians who choose to remain can rest assured that the Russian national state will treat them with care and “with an understanding of their problems beginning with economic and demographic ones and ending with cultural, linguistic, religious and so on.” This future Russia is likely to follow the example of the European Union in that regard.
“But these rights and guarantees are far from the main thing which the peoples of Russia will obtain,” Krupnov says. “The main thing they will achieve is freedom,” because “an anti-national state where the national majority is deprived of rights and is kept down is an unfree state,” something that concerns both the majority and the minorities as well.
“A national state is a free state,” Krupnov says. “In it exists real and not ‘sovereign’ democracy, an honest legal system and the rule of law because the elites do not need to suppress the majority of the people and fear it.” Instead, they can create the conditions for “freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, assembly and unions, and also the basic rights of the individual.”
Obviously, a Russian national state will be respect other nations that want to have states similarly founded, Krupnov says, but he notes that this does not mean that the Russian national state he hopes to see emerge will ignore any mistreatment of ethnic Russians abroad, although he suggests such mistreatment will be minimized by the existence of a truly Russian state.
That is because the leaders of some neighboring countries have often acted toward ethnic Russians in the way that they have because “Russia [has been and is today] an anti-national state. [These countries] see how Russians are treated in Russia,” Krupnov suggests, “and they act in the same way.”
In other remarks, Krupnov said that he considers the Great Russians, the Little Russians and the Belarusians to be “three branches (or subethnoses) of a single Russian people,” but he adds that “it does not follow from this that they must be immediately combined. More than that, Krupnov says, there is no sense” of putting that goal before them “even as a project.”
And Krupnov observes by concluding that while there may be “forces” in the world interested in promoting inter-ethnic hostility in Russia, one should not lay “all problems” at the doorstep of “their wrecking activity.” The “Uzbek who raped and killed Anya Beshnova a Russian girl, was hardly inspired to do so by agents of foreign intelligence services.”
Vienna, January 26 – Russian nationalists who support an expansive imperial agenda have always attracted more attention, but there is within the Russian nationalist camp a group that favors the creation of a smaller but more homogeneously ethnic Russian state by allowing non-Russian areas now within the Russian Federation to go their own way.
Perhaps the leading spokesman for that position now is Konstantin Krylov, the leader of the Russian Social Movement, who has told the Daghestani newspaper “Novoye delo” that he sees “nothing horrible” or “dangerous” in an outcome where a “’Russia for the Russians’ would be reduced to the area of several oblasts of Central Russia” (ndelo.ru/one_stat.php?id=4057).
“For me,” Krylov says, “Russia is the country where Russians live. A Russia without Russians and not for Russians is simply not needed by us Russians. … The space where Russians can live freely and not be concerned about their future is constantly becoming smaller. In the Caucasus, for example, there are republics where the Russian population is practically gone.”
The “de-russification of the entire Caucasus” lies ahead, Krupnov says, “and the very same thing is taking place if perhaps not so markedly in other ethnocratic republics in which the rights of ‘the titular nations’ are guaranteed by the local and federal powers.”
At the same time, he argues, many “Russian lands from time immemorial” are being filled up with non-Russians from the Caucasus and Central Asia and “enjoying the protection of the Russian powers, are establishing their control over the Russian land. If things go any further, then the Russians will not have even those few oblasts about which we are talking.”
“And when this becomes a reality – and under the current tempo of the development of events, this can happen faster than we now imagine – the deparation of all non-Russian territories may turn out to be the last chance for the survival of the Russian people,” he continues, adding “amputation is better than gangrene.”
In Krupnov’s view, “if Tatarstan, Sakha or Daghestan will agree to remain inside Russia only under the condition of the putting down of the national aspirations of the Russian people, if they do not want to live in an ethnic Russian state … then their presence in Russia harms both Russia and themselves because it blocks their chances for development.”
Most of the non-Russian republics are living as parasites on the state budget, and that means that power in them if this continues “will belong not to the best people but to those who are able to extract more concessions and aid from the federal center. The energetic and ambitious will leave Russia … in order to study or to work … in Europe or America.”
Indeed, Krupnov argues, “in these very republics will be realized the worst of all possible scenarios: the dissolution of traditional society without the construction of a contemporary one Under the pressure of Russian habits and mass culture, the remains of traditional norms and values will be lost, and those from contemporary society will lead to nowhere.”
At the same time, however, Krupnov says that “the goal of the Russian nationalists” is not the creation of an ethnically homogenous state, something that would in any case require “ethnic purges,” but rather one in which the Russian people can enjoy is “lawful rights” and form “a Russian national state.”
Such a national state, he argues, “will not be afraid for its territorial integrity: a big territory is not for it a goal in and of itself and a source of pride.” Consequently, a Russian national state will be ready to allow those who want to leave to “do so peacefully, without blood, without serious conflict and even to preserve good relations for the future.”
Those non-Russians who choose to remain can rest assured that the Russian national state will treat them with care and “with an understanding of their problems beginning with economic and demographic ones and ending with cultural, linguistic, religious and so on.” This future Russia is likely to follow the example of the European Union in that regard.
“But these rights and guarantees are far from the main thing which the peoples of Russia will obtain,” Krupnov says. “The main thing they will achieve is freedom,” because “an anti-national state where the national majority is deprived of rights and is kept down is an unfree state,” something that concerns both the majority and the minorities as well.
“A national state is a free state,” Krupnov says. “In it exists real and not ‘sovereign’ democracy, an honest legal system and the rule of law because the elites do not need to suppress the majority of the people and fear it.” Instead, they can create the conditions for “freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, assembly and unions, and also the basic rights of the individual.”
Obviously, a Russian national state will be respect other nations that want to have states similarly founded, Krupnov says, but he notes that this does not mean that the Russian national state he hopes to see emerge will ignore any mistreatment of ethnic Russians abroad, although he suggests such mistreatment will be minimized by the existence of a truly Russian state.
That is because the leaders of some neighboring countries have often acted toward ethnic Russians in the way that they have because “Russia [has been and is today] an anti-national state. [These countries] see how Russians are treated in Russia,” Krupnov suggests, “and they act in the same way.”
In other remarks, Krupnov said that he considers the Great Russians, the Little Russians and the Belarusians to be “three branches (or subethnoses) of a single Russian people,” but he adds that “it does not follow from this that they must be immediately combined. More than that, Krupnov says, there is no sense” of putting that goal before them “even as a project.”
And Krupnov observes by concluding that while there may be “forces” in the world interested in promoting inter-ethnic hostility in Russia, one should not lay “all problems” at the doorstep of “their wrecking activity.” The “Uzbek who raped and killed Anya Beshnova a Russian girl, was hardly inspired to do so by agents of foreign intelligence services.”
Window on Eurasia: Ethnic Russian Nationalism Could Be ‘State Destroying,’ Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 26 – There is no “Russian question,” a Moscow commentator says, “but it is easy to create it” with a slogan like “Russia for the Russians,” which Russians define as a demand for special privileges and non-Russians as meaning “Russia AGAINST the Non-Russians” or even “’Russia without the non-Russians,’ including the non-Russian republics.”
And as recent events at the start of the 2011 and 2012 electoral cycles show, Leonid Radzikhovsky argues, the raising of “the Russian question” not only threatens to re-open and exacerbate “the nationality question at the expense of other issues but make ethnic Russian nationalism into a “state-destroying” force (www.rg.ru/2011/01/25/radzihovskij.html).
Despite polls showing that Russian voters are far more concerned about inflation and economic issues, recent events almost certainly mean that “the nationality question” will play an important role in upcoming campaigns with various parties seeking to present themselves as defenders of this or that group especially given recent ethnic clashes in Russian cities.
But the most prominent aspect of this issue, Radzikhovsky argues, is “the Russian question” both because the ethnic Russians are the largest nationality in the Russian Federation and because members of this community have been advancing slogans of the “Russia for the Russians” kind.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), and a number of others in recent months have insisted that “it is above all necessary to solve the Russian question,” an assertion that invites a discussion about just what that “question” consists of.
“Perhaps,” Radzikhovsky says, “Russian people are deprived of some rights?!” That would be laughable if people weren’t saying it so seriously and “not simply ‘seriously’ but with anger and pathos.” Many will be angry with him for saying this, the commentator says, because Russians appear to like to feel themselves insulted and injured.
But such feelings make it especially important to consider the facts. “The state language always was Russian,” he notes, although it is true that the state never limited itself to ethnic Russians alone. Moreover, “almost the entire government, the Presidential Adminstraiton, all governors, and deputies are ethnic Russians.”
And while in the first post-Soviet years, the representation of ethnic Russians in the country’s business elites was “disproportionately small,” now “the proportion has corrected itself and more than 70 percent” have Russian names, whatever their ethnic background may be, exactly what one would expect given the percentage of Russians in the population.
While a number of nations suffered from official discrimination in the past, including in the eyes of many ethnic Russians their own ancestors, there is no legal discrimination against any ethnic group at the present time. There are, of course, day to day clashes on an ethnic basis, something that will be true in any multi-ethnic society.
Indeed, the Moscow commentator continues, while it is “a lie” to say that “criminals have no nationality,” it is also untrue to suggest that members of one or another ethnic community are committing a disproportionate share of crimes. Yes, some North Caucasians have killed Russians, but probability suggests far more Russians have died at the hands of other Russians.
Under these conditions, what does it mean “to solve the Russian question?” Russians have all the rights they should have, “but ‘the question’ is not solved.” From that flows “logically” one conclusion, Radzikhovsky says. ‘The solution of the question’ must be the offering of privileges to Russians – in comparison with other nations.”
And what would that mean in practice? It would mean that Russians would be competing with Russians rather than Caucasians for university places and jobs, something that would exacerbate social and class tensions even if it lessened Russian national concerns.
But members of “the other nations” would react as well. And therein lies a serious threat. The slogan “Russian for the Russians” when translated into “non-Russian” languages will mean “Russia AGAINST the non-Russians;” that is, “Russia without the non-Russians” and ultimately without the non-Russian republics as well.
Radzikhovsky concludes by suggesting that there is no such thing as the Russian question, but he adds that “CREATING it is easy.” And if it arises, Russians who view themselves as “a state forming nation” could be transformed into “a state destructing one,” even as this distracts attention from the “REAL vital problems in Russia” today.
Vienna, January 26 – There is no “Russian question,” a Moscow commentator says, “but it is easy to create it” with a slogan like “Russia for the Russians,” which Russians define as a demand for special privileges and non-Russians as meaning “Russia AGAINST the Non-Russians” or even “’Russia without the non-Russians,’ including the non-Russian republics.”
And as recent events at the start of the 2011 and 2012 electoral cycles show, Leonid Radzikhovsky argues, the raising of “the Russian question” not only threatens to re-open and exacerbate “the nationality question at the expense of other issues but make ethnic Russian nationalism into a “state-destroying” force (www.rg.ru/2011/01/25/radzihovskij.html).
Despite polls showing that Russian voters are far more concerned about inflation and economic issues, recent events almost certainly mean that “the nationality question” will play an important role in upcoming campaigns with various parties seeking to present themselves as defenders of this or that group especially given recent ethnic clashes in Russian cities.
But the most prominent aspect of this issue, Radzikhovsky argues, is “the Russian question” both because the ethnic Russians are the largest nationality in the Russian Federation and because members of this community have been advancing slogans of the “Russia for the Russians” kind.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), and a number of others in recent months have insisted that “it is above all necessary to solve the Russian question,” an assertion that invites a discussion about just what that “question” consists of.
“Perhaps,” Radzikhovsky says, “Russian people are deprived of some rights?!” That would be laughable if people weren’t saying it so seriously and “not simply ‘seriously’ but with anger and pathos.” Many will be angry with him for saying this, the commentator says, because Russians appear to like to feel themselves insulted and injured.
But such feelings make it especially important to consider the facts. “The state language always was Russian,” he notes, although it is true that the state never limited itself to ethnic Russians alone. Moreover, “almost the entire government, the Presidential Adminstraiton, all governors, and deputies are ethnic Russians.”
And while in the first post-Soviet years, the representation of ethnic Russians in the country’s business elites was “disproportionately small,” now “the proportion has corrected itself and more than 70 percent” have Russian names, whatever their ethnic background may be, exactly what one would expect given the percentage of Russians in the population.
While a number of nations suffered from official discrimination in the past, including in the eyes of many ethnic Russians their own ancestors, there is no legal discrimination against any ethnic group at the present time. There are, of course, day to day clashes on an ethnic basis, something that will be true in any multi-ethnic society.
Indeed, the Moscow commentator continues, while it is “a lie” to say that “criminals have no nationality,” it is also untrue to suggest that members of one or another ethnic community are committing a disproportionate share of crimes. Yes, some North Caucasians have killed Russians, but probability suggests far more Russians have died at the hands of other Russians.
Under these conditions, what does it mean “to solve the Russian question?” Russians have all the rights they should have, “but ‘the question’ is not solved.” From that flows “logically” one conclusion, Radzikhovsky says. ‘The solution of the question’ must be the offering of privileges to Russians – in comparison with other nations.”
And what would that mean in practice? It would mean that Russians would be competing with Russians rather than Caucasians for university places and jobs, something that would exacerbate social and class tensions even if it lessened Russian national concerns.
But members of “the other nations” would react as well. And therein lies a serious threat. The slogan “Russian for the Russians” when translated into “non-Russian” languages will mean “Russia AGAINST the non-Russians;” that is, “Russia without the non-Russians” and ultimately without the non-Russian republics as well.
Radzikhovsky concludes by suggesting that there is no such thing as the Russian question, but he adds that “CREATING it is easy.” And if it arises, Russians who view themselves as “a state forming nation” could be transformed into “a state destructing one,” even as this distracts attention from the “REAL vital problems in Russia” today.
Window on Eurasia: Dido Case Highlights Problems of Very Small Nations in Russia Now
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 26 – The very smallest nationalities in the Russian Federation face enormous difficulties in defending their constitutional and human rights, a fact of life that has been highlighted by the tragic situation of the Dido people of Daghestan and the difficulties its members have had in seeking just treatment.
In the current issue of the Daghestani newspaper “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” Amil Sarkarov provides the most detailed discussion yet of two recent developments that attracted broader attention to one of the smallest nations of multi-national Daghestan and the travails of that people (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5314/109/).
The first involves the fallout from a November 30 fire which “almost completely destroyed the village of Tsebari where many of the Dido people live. Although fortunately no lives were lost, the Dido were left homeless and without basic facilities, and most of them are now living either outside their traditional homeland or in tents in that mountainous region.
The fire itself attracted the attention of the all-Russian and Daghestani media as well as promises by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov that the Russian Federation as a whole and Daghestan in particular would rebuild the Dido village.
But, Sarkarov reports, “the residents of Tsebari on the whole remain dissatisfied with the extent and timeliness of the promised help.” In many cases, the Dido say, “not all the humanitarian help supposedly received by those who had suffered reached the intended addressees in reality.”
Some of it may never have been sent, some of it may have been skimmed off by officials, and some may yet arrive because of the difficulties of getting assistance in to an isolated and extremely mountainous part of Daghestan. As a result, the Dido say, they are suffering through the winter without adequate protections.
And they are also worried that the Moscow and Makhachkala authorities may take the easy way out and build housing in such a way or in such a location that it will destroy the “cultural face” of their nation or at the very least make it impossible for the Dido people to live together and thus maintain their national traditions.
That tragedy led to the second event which attracted even more attention to the plight of the Dido. In December Magomed Gamzatov, a Dido from Shamkhal, travelled to Georgia to ask Tbilisi to provide assistance “in the resolution of the problems of the Didos [by helping the members of that nation] with the development of language, culture and recognition.”
Despite Georgian claims, Gamzatov did not ask for asylum in Georgia for his people or ask that Tbilisi annex Dido lands. Instead, he was driven to make the trip by a sense of hopelessness that has arisen, Sarkarov says, by “the complete disappointment in the republic and federal powers that be” and the hope that “another state” might help them.
Gamazatov, the Daghestani journalist continues, was animated by a desire to secure “the recognition [of the Dido] as a separate and self-standing people,” one that was deported and “suffered as a result of the forced resettlement in 1944 onto Chechen lands left vacant” after Stalin deported that nation to Central Asia.
According to the Dido themselves, their nation numbers approximately 30,000 people, twice the official reports in censuses. In most cases, Sarkarov says, census takers have counted many of them as Avars, one of the major ethnic groups of Daghestan among whom the Dido live.
This history, Sarkarov concludes, “raises a reasonable question: what else must be done [if you are a member of a small nationality like the Dido] in order that [the powers that be in both Makhachkala and Moscow] will stop violating your constitutional rights” and allow your
The Dido people, a predominantly Muslim group of mountaineers seldom attract attention, and even basic facts are in dispute. The Dido, for example, call themselves “Tsez,” but most specialists and now the media refer to them as Dido, a designation that in fact comes not from the Dido themselves but from the Georgian (www.eki.ee/books/redbook/didos.shtml).
But as many often forget, there are more than 150 other small nationalities in the Russian Federation, and they face problems in many cases even more severe than do the Dido. That is why the leaders of some of them have pressed so hard for the re-establishment of a special government ministry to deal with their problems.
President Dmitry Medvedev, possibly fearful of the reaction of some ethnic Russians to anything that smacks of deference to minorities, has announced that he opposes the idea and that no new Ministry for Nationality Affairs will be established. But as several writers have pointed out, that decision does not end or solve the problem.
In a commentary this week on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Akhmed Azimov, the head of the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus and an advisor to the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), argues that it is imperative that Moscow create “an alternative” to such a ministry if it rejects re-establishing it (www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Nuzhna-al-ternativa-Minnacu).
Azimov says that Medvedev’s pledge to address nationality problems combined with his refusal to restore a nationalities ministry generates bitter “associations with the struggle against corruption when there is tough rhetoric [about the need to do something] and then an absence of doing anything.”
“Such a situation,” he writes, “is dangerous for any power, especially when there is a high risk of inter-ethnic clashes. If there is no conviction and readiness to do something, then it is better not to make bold declarations; if there is a readiness, then one must immediately seek ideas … and if there is an understanding of what is necessary, there must be a search for partners.”
Consequently, he continues, “it seems to many that one of these obvious steps of the powers that be which would demonstrate its political will should be the restoration of the ministry of nationalities. This trivial idea is only a reflection of the striving of part of society to see the return of the authorities to this sector.”
But even if a decision has been made not to restore such a ministry, that decision alone, Azimov says, “does not free the President from the need to establish some other organ” responsible for “an adequate realization of his positions on this question.” There must be some institutional focus.
And he argues that one possibility could be the creation of a Council for Nationality Policy attached to the Office of the President, an institution that should have a permanent secretariat or working group and one that perhaps could be headed by a vice prime minister” to ensure its prominence.
Thus, Medvedev’s rejection of a nationalities ministry is not the end of the story. Rather, it is yet another turn, and more than that, as the Dido case shows, the failure of Moscow to have an institution of that kind will only increase cynicism among the non-Russians, something that as Azimov says is dangerous for the state itself.
Vienna, January 26 – The very smallest nationalities in the Russian Federation face enormous difficulties in defending their constitutional and human rights, a fact of life that has been highlighted by the tragic situation of the Dido people of Daghestan and the difficulties its members have had in seeking just treatment.
In the current issue of the Daghestani newspaper “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” Amil Sarkarov provides the most detailed discussion yet of two recent developments that attracted broader attention to one of the smallest nations of multi-national Daghestan and the travails of that people (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5314/109/).
The first involves the fallout from a November 30 fire which “almost completely destroyed the village of Tsebari where many of the Dido people live. Although fortunately no lives were lost, the Dido were left homeless and without basic facilities, and most of them are now living either outside their traditional homeland or in tents in that mountainous region.
The fire itself attracted the attention of the all-Russian and Daghestani media as well as promises by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov that the Russian Federation as a whole and Daghestan in particular would rebuild the Dido village.
But, Sarkarov reports, “the residents of Tsebari on the whole remain dissatisfied with the extent and timeliness of the promised help.” In many cases, the Dido say, “not all the humanitarian help supposedly received by those who had suffered reached the intended addressees in reality.”
Some of it may never have been sent, some of it may have been skimmed off by officials, and some may yet arrive because of the difficulties of getting assistance in to an isolated and extremely mountainous part of Daghestan. As a result, the Dido say, they are suffering through the winter without adequate protections.
And they are also worried that the Moscow and Makhachkala authorities may take the easy way out and build housing in such a way or in such a location that it will destroy the “cultural face” of their nation or at the very least make it impossible for the Dido people to live together and thus maintain their national traditions.
That tragedy led to the second event which attracted even more attention to the plight of the Dido. In December Magomed Gamzatov, a Dido from Shamkhal, travelled to Georgia to ask Tbilisi to provide assistance “in the resolution of the problems of the Didos [by helping the members of that nation] with the development of language, culture and recognition.”
Despite Georgian claims, Gamzatov did not ask for asylum in Georgia for his people or ask that Tbilisi annex Dido lands. Instead, he was driven to make the trip by a sense of hopelessness that has arisen, Sarkarov says, by “the complete disappointment in the republic and federal powers that be” and the hope that “another state” might help them.
Gamazatov, the Daghestani journalist continues, was animated by a desire to secure “the recognition [of the Dido] as a separate and self-standing people,” one that was deported and “suffered as a result of the forced resettlement in 1944 onto Chechen lands left vacant” after Stalin deported that nation to Central Asia.
According to the Dido themselves, their nation numbers approximately 30,000 people, twice the official reports in censuses. In most cases, Sarkarov says, census takers have counted many of them as Avars, one of the major ethnic groups of Daghestan among whom the Dido live.
This history, Sarkarov concludes, “raises a reasonable question: what else must be done [if you are a member of a small nationality like the Dido] in order that [the powers that be in both Makhachkala and Moscow] will stop violating your constitutional rights” and allow your
The Dido people, a predominantly Muslim group of mountaineers seldom attract attention, and even basic facts are in dispute. The Dido, for example, call themselves “Tsez,” but most specialists and now the media refer to them as Dido, a designation that in fact comes not from the Dido themselves but from the Georgian (www.eki.ee/books/redbook/didos.shtml).
But as many often forget, there are more than 150 other small nationalities in the Russian Federation, and they face problems in many cases even more severe than do the Dido. That is why the leaders of some of them have pressed so hard for the re-establishment of a special government ministry to deal with their problems.
President Dmitry Medvedev, possibly fearful of the reaction of some ethnic Russians to anything that smacks of deference to minorities, has announced that he opposes the idea and that no new Ministry for Nationality Affairs will be established. But as several writers have pointed out, that decision does not end or solve the problem.
In a commentary this week on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Akhmed Azimov, the head of the Russian Congress of Peoples of the Caucasus and an advisor to the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), argues that it is imperative that Moscow create “an alternative” to such a ministry if it rejects re-establishing it (www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-povestka/Nuzhna-al-ternativa-Minnacu).
Azimov says that Medvedev’s pledge to address nationality problems combined with his refusal to restore a nationalities ministry generates bitter “associations with the struggle against corruption when there is tough rhetoric [about the need to do something] and then an absence of doing anything.”
“Such a situation,” he writes, “is dangerous for any power, especially when there is a high risk of inter-ethnic clashes. If there is no conviction and readiness to do something, then it is better not to make bold declarations; if there is a readiness, then one must immediately seek ideas … and if there is an understanding of what is necessary, there must be a search for partners.”
Consequently, he continues, “it seems to many that one of these obvious steps of the powers that be which would demonstrate its political will should be the restoration of the ministry of nationalities. This trivial idea is only a reflection of the striving of part of society to see the return of the authorities to this sector.”
But even if a decision has been made not to restore such a ministry, that decision alone, Azimov says, “does not free the President from the need to establish some other organ” responsible for “an adequate realization of his positions on this question.” There must be some institutional focus.
And he argues that one possibility could be the creation of a Council for Nationality Policy attached to the Office of the President, an institution that should have a permanent secretariat or working group and one that perhaps could be headed by a vice prime minister” to ensure its prominence.
Thus, Medvedev’s rejection of a nationalities ministry is not the end of the story. Rather, it is yet another turn, and more than that, as the Dido case shows, the failure of Moscow to have an institution of that kind will only increase cynicism among the non-Russians, something that as Azimov says is dangerous for the state itself.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
