Paul Goble
Vienna, January 25 – The intellectual capacity of Vladimir Putin and his top aides has “continually fallen” over the last decade because of the lack of political competition and the theft of resources, Boris Nemtsov says, and consequently those in power often do not recognize what they are doing.
“If everything were right with them in the head,” the Russian opposition leader told the Ukrainian UNIAN news agency, “they would never in their lives take such decisions” as trying to intimidate the opposition by arresting the leadership. “But the problem is that [in their heads] everything is not in order” (www.unian.net/rus/print/417559).
Nemtsov told UNIAN’s Roman Tsimbalyuk that “the powers that be thought that [by arresting the opposition leadership at the end of December] they could demoralize and fright us. But we were not demoralized and not frightened. On the contrary, we became more certain in the correctness of our approach.”
Nemtsov said he “cannot retreat” because behind him are “millions of people” and “to defend the Constitution is a task not simply important and noble but one that is absolutely necessary for the country.” At present, people in Russia in general have no rights and o possibilities to defend themselves.”
Putin has “destroyed the court. There is no such institution in Russia already. And in this situation,” Nemtsov said, it would be wrong to sit at home and drink beer.” Consequently, he and other members of the opposition will press ahead whatever Putin and his team try to do in response. “There is a threat [against the opposition], but it will not stop me,” he added.
Despite everything that Putin and his regime have done, Nemtsov continued, nearly one in every five Russian adults support the opposition, according to Levada Center polls, and he implied that were there a freer media and a freer political climate, that share would be significantly higher.
Asked about relations within the Russian tandem, Nemtsov said that “Medvedev for almost three years has worked as president and has not become one. No one takes him seriously.” He says one thing, but if Putin says something else, that is what happens, a pattern that “for him is a personal tragedy.”
“Medvedev could become president if he pardoned Khodorkovsky, eliminated the censorship, and fired Putin. He doesn’t even need a parliament for this. But so far, he gives the impression of a very weak man.” Putin is thus very likely to return to the presidency. Indeed, Nemtsov assessed his chances as “90 percent.”
The reasons for that are clear, Nemtsov said. “Putin controls the special services, businesses, the major media outlets and the governors. That is, Putin takes all the serious decisions including the incarceration of Khodorkovsky and our arrests,” he added. “Medvedev at that time was skiing or twittering or conducting his blog.”
To his great regret, Nemtsov said, “Ukraine is moving in this [same] direction, and much more quickly than {he} had expected. God forbid that you reach the Putin-Lukashenka level of the state. This would be a catastrophe for my beloved Ukraine.”
At present, Ukraine is “moving toward the side of Russia,” something Nemtsov said is “mortally dangerous for Ukraine,” and he said that “the patriots of Ukraine and people of good sense must oppose this Putinization of Ukraine” before an even greater tragedy occurs there than has so far.
“I understand Yanukovich,” Nemtsov continued. “His main goal was to seize power at any price and to hold it as long as possible. He is not doing this with great intelligence and will end badly.” The Russian opposition figure urged the Ukrainian president to reflect on what has happened in Tunisia and the attitude of the world toward Lukashenka.
Nemtsov pointed out that “it is more difficult to run a democratic country” than a non-democratic one. “One has to consider the opinions of those around, to make compromises, to listen to extremely unpleasant people and to follow the rules.” That is hard for Yanukovich because of his own biography.
But Ukraine needs democracy in order to become a flourishing country, and Nemtsov added that “Ukrainians will live better than Russia if we retain a dictatorship. For some reason we do not learn from the mistakes of others and repeat them. [But] it isn’t necessary to do this” and Ukrainians must not.
And for those Ukrainians who think that the current Russian leadership is made up of their friends, Nemtsov urged that they remember that Putin for example “considers all Ukrainians to be Banderites,” hardly the attitude of someone who wishes Ukraine and its people well.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
Moscow Treating Domodedovo ‘Not as a Terrorist Act But as a Natural Disaster,’ Soldatov and Borogan Say
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 25 – The officials Dmitry Medvedev assembled in the wake of the explosion at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport and the behavior of other officials suggests, two of Russia’s leading specialists on the intelligence services suggest, that the Russian president is treating this outrage not so much as a terrorist act but rather as a natural disaster.
That does not mean that he and those reporting to him do not believe that what happened in Domodedovo was a terrorist act, Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan suggest in an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” but rather that the leadership is not acting in the ways one would expect it to if that is the case (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10770).
And that in turn raises questions both about the nature of Moscow’s counter-terorrist strategy and perhaps even more fundamentally about the way in which Medvedev (and Putin) are making use of the intelligence services and even the way in which the powers that be are interacting with the population at times of tragedy.
As soon as Medvedev learned about the terrorist act at Domodedovo, the two Agentura.ru specialists say, the Russian president called three officials to meet with him: Aleksandr Bastrykin, the head of the Investigation Committee, Yury Chaika, the prosecutor general, and Igor Levitin, the transportation minister.
Thus, the two analysts say, the president assembled “only those who are responsible for reacting to a terrorist action rather than those, like Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev and FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov who are charged with preventing terrorist actions. Nor were these two called to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Apparently both the president and the prime minister “considered it inappropriate to ask questions” about why Domodedovo had occurred. But Nurgaliyev and Bortnikov not only failed to appear before Medvedev and Putin but they also did not show up “in front of the television cameras, thereby avoiding the necessity of answering questions from journalists.”
According to Soldatov and Borogan, “the tactic chosen by the authorities can have only one explanation.” For the president and prime minister, the terrorist action is being “equated to a natural disaster where by definition there are not guilty parties but there is only a spontaneously arising tragic situation to which it is necessary to react appropriately.”
“In such circumstances,” they add, “what is needed are not questions but orders.”
This approach, Soldatov and Borogan note, “appeared long before the terrorist act at Domodedova” this week, adding that “at the very least, during the last two years, the special services have been equating terrorism to a phenomenon of nature,” given that Bortnikov has not reported to the media in 2009 or 2010 about the results of his agencies work in this area.
The two analysts recall that a year ago they wrote of their impression that “the refusal of Bortnikov from the longstanding practice of annual reports to the press meant the FSB no longer intends to hide that the special services report only to the Kremlin.” Now, they say it appears “the FSB and MVD do not consider themselves subordinate even to the Kremlin” and that Medvedev and Putin accept that.
But the reaction of other officials highlights an even bigger disconnect. In the past, for example, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov always visited the site of a terrorist act both to demonstrate that he was in charge and gave interviews to the media in order to underscore his ties to the population that was suffering.
“This old tradition of the 1990s died immediately after Medvedev replaced the mayor of the city,” Soldatov and Borogan say. “Sobyanin came to the site of the tragedy, that is, he fulfilled the functions of administration but he did not consider it necessary to meet with the press there.” He limited himself to “declarations before ‘his own’ television cameras.”
According to the two analysts, “it is characteristic that Bornikov and Sobyanin are both appointees of Medvedev and both with ease have rejected the practice of their predecessors, Patrushev and Luzhkov by refusing to appear before the press.” This new approach, Soldatov and Borogan say, suggests that they don’t feel “any degree of responsibility before the people.”
But that raises some serious issues, they point out. “Countering terrorists is not simply an area of administrative decisions of various degrees of effectiveness, the shortcomings of which can be covered in secrecy.” More to the point, no amount of secrecy can hide that Moscow now isn’t demanding that the force structures react to the threat in a timely fashion.
Since the announcement of a national counter-terrorism strategy in 2004 and 2006, “the chief priority is not to permit an attack of large groups of militants which would lead ot the loss of administrative control (that is, of political stability) in the region or country as a whole” rather than protecting the population.
The terrorists have changed tactics as a result, Soldatov and Borogan say, shifting to small groups, the use of suicide bombers, and attacking officials. That shift has allowed Medvedev to solemnly declare about “the completion of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya,” but it has left Russia and Russians less well-protected against terror than they were.
Vienna, January 25 – The officials Dmitry Medvedev assembled in the wake of the explosion at Moscow’s Domodedovo airport and the behavior of other officials suggests, two of Russia’s leading specialists on the intelligence services suggest, that the Russian president is treating this outrage not so much as a terrorist act but rather as a natural disaster.
That does not mean that he and those reporting to him do not believe that what happened in Domodedovo was a terrorist act, Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan suggest in an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” but rather that the leadership is not acting in the ways one would expect it to if that is the case (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10770).
And that in turn raises questions both about the nature of Moscow’s counter-terorrist strategy and perhaps even more fundamentally about the way in which Medvedev (and Putin) are making use of the intelligence services and even the way in which the powers that be are interacting with the population at times of tragedy.
As soon as Medvedev learned about the terrorist act at Domodedovo, the two Agentura.ru specialists say, the Russian president called three officials to meet with him: Aleksandr Bastrykin, the head of the Investigation Committee, Yury Chaika, the prosecutor general, and Igor Levitin, the transportation minister.
Thus, the two analysts say, the president assembled “only those who are responsible for reacting to a terrorist action rather than those, like Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev and FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov who are charged with preventing terrorist actions. Nor were these two called to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Apparently both the president and the prime minister “considered it inappropriate to ask questions” about why Domodedovo had occurred. But Nurgaliyev and Bortnikov not only failed to appear before Medvedev and Putin but they also did not show up “in front of the television cameras, thereby avoiding the necessity of answering questions from journalists.”
According to Soldatov and Borogan, “the tactic chosen by the authorities can have only one explanation.” For the president and prime minister, the terrorist action is being “equated to a natural disaster where by definition there are not guilty parties but there is only a spontaneously arising tragic situation to which it is necessary to react appropriately.”
“In such circumstances,” they add, “what is needed are not questions but orders.”
This approach, Soldatov and Borogan note, “appeared long before the terrorist act at Domodedova” this week, adding that “at the very least, during the last two years, the special services have been equating terrorism to a phenomenon of nature,” given that Bortnikov has not reported to the media in 2009 or 2010 about the results of his agencies work in this area.
The two analysts recall that a year ago they wrote of their impression that “the refusal of Bortnikov from the longstanding practice of annual reports to the press meant the FSB no longer intends to hide that the special services report only to the Kremlin.” Now, they say it appears “the FSB and MVD do not consider themselves subordinate even to the Kremlin” and that Medvedev and Putin accept that.
But the reaction of other officials highlights an even bigger disconnect. In the past, for example, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov always visited the site of a terrorist act both to demonstrate that he was in charge and gave interviews to the media in order to underscore his ties to the population that was suffering.
“This old tradition of the 1990s died immediately after Medvedev replaced the mayor of the city,” Soldatov and Borogan say. “Sobyanin came to the site of the tragedy, that is, he fulfilled the functions of administration but he did not consider it necessary to meet with the press there.” He limited himself to “declarations before ‘his own’ television cameras.”
According to the two analysts, “it is characteristic that Bornikov and Sobyanin are both appointees of Medvedev and both with ease have rejected the practice of their predecessors, Patrushev and Luzhkov by refusing to appear before the press.” This new approach, Soldatov and Borogan say, suggests that they don’t feel “any degree of responsibility before the people.”
But that raises some serious issues, they point out. “Countering terrorists is not simply an area of administrative decisions of various degrees of effectiveness, the shortcomings of which can be covered in secrecy.” More to the point, no amount of secrecy can hide that Moscow now isn’t demanding that the force structures react to the threat in a timely fashion.
Since the announcement of a national counter-terrorism strategy in 2004 and 2006, “the chief priority is not to permit an attack of large groups of militants which would lead ot the loss of administrative control (that is, of political stability) in the region or country as a whole” rather than protecting the population.
The terrorists have changed tactics as a result, Soldatov and Borogan say, shifting to small groups, the use of suicide bombers, and attacking officials. That shift has allowed Medvedev to solemnly declare about “the completion of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya,” but it has left Russia and Russians less well-protected against terror than they were.
Window on Eurasia: A Democratic Russia in Its Current Borders is a Contradiction in Terms, Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 25 – The Russian Federation is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If it does not democratize, it will fall further and further behind the West in its economic, social and political development. But if Russia does move toward democracy, it will -- just like the Soviet Union before it -- almost certainly fall into pieces, according to one Russian commentator.
In a blog post picked up by the Rosbalt.ru news agency and entitled “The End of History,” a writer who uses the screen name Alexalexxx argues that in an effort to straddle the space between these two positions, Russia has been “condemned to built false ‘democratic’ structures,” again just like in Soviet times (www.rosbalt.ru/2011/01/18/809796.html).
An example of this effort, he says, is President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for “the reform of the Federation Council,” an appeal that has no real meaning because there is no division of power and hence the parliament, including its upper chamber, has no real powers to act as a legislature.
“Up to now,” the blogger says, “Russia is an imperial structure at the stage of historical collapse and is capable of existing not with a democratic regime of administration but exclusively in a ‘frozen’ state.” That is because “any democratic Russia will inevitably collapse given the incompatibility of the civilizational foundations of its territories.”
The USSR of course “encountered the very same problem” when it tried to hold together places as diverse as the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova. “Nothing connected them except the powerfully passionate character of the imperial idea.” When that weakened and the “totalitarian” controls disappeared, the entire edifice collapsed.
Russia’s time “has still not ended,” the blogger writes, and “it continues to exist in the former imperial regime.” But “its territory is seeking its natural borders within which the centrifugal forces will be balanced by the centripedal ones. But this balance has not yet been achieved.”
As compared to the past, however, there are additional problems. In pre-modern Russia, the center could hold the periphery by “naked force,” but now “in modern times, the historical alternative of democracy has appeared, a regime of maximum effectiveness for economics and social organization.”
Indeed, the blogger argues, “the standards of life in the 20th century are such that without democracy it is impossible to guarantee the development of the personality as well as the level o fhis security, rights and social comfort. “ In short, he says, “only an individual whose rights are guaranteed can make the new economy.”
Put in another way, “a Silicon Valley can be developed only because the creative of the personality is not vitiated by the struggle with arbitrariness or wasted in dealing with an authoritarian bureaucracy.” But “if you do not have independent media and deputies, and if you live under the power of corruption, your possibilities … are approaching zero.”
And because that is so, the blogger says, “the historical imperative of the democratic model of development in the 20th century came into what was for Russia a tragic contradiction given that country’s imperial form.” Competition requires democracy, but democracy is fatal for an empire.
Expressed in the most lapidary way, the blogger says, the choice confronting Russia is this “either the Caucasus or Russian notebook computers and smart phones” – or, put in another way, either a frozen authoritarian system “with imitation democratic institutions” or “democracy with advanced technology but without holding on to the Caucasus.”
Alexalexxx then addresses the issue of the Caucasus in another way. “Thousands of people from Central Russia,” he notes, “have been forced to pass through the school of force in the Caucasus and to traumatize their own psyches, after which on their return they reproduce the feudal level of legal consciousness.”
But whatever some in Moscow may think, it is impossible to “freeze” law “in one part of the country and to allow democracy to develop in the rest of its territory.” If the central government continues to try to do that, it will only exacerbate the civilizational dilemma it now faces.
Clearly, a democratic Russia cannot include the North Caucasus, the blogger says, but just what its actual borders should be is “a separate subject which can become part of the agenda only with a rejection of ‘the imperial’ in the name of development,” something that has not yet happened in Russia.
As a result, for the time being, Alexalexxx says, Russians “are condemned to imitate democratic institutions … following an imperial matrix and forcibly running after ‘the vertical’ of territory in the framework of ‘Great Russia.’” But there is a price for this, and that price is the loss of compatibility with other countries and hence of a comparable standard of living.
Vienna, January 25 – The Russian Federation is caught on the horns of a dilemma. If it does not democratize, it will fall further and further behind the West in its economic, social and political development. But if Russia does move toward democracy, it will -- just like the Soviet Union before it -- almost certainly fall into pieces, according to one Russian commentator.
In a blog post picked up by the Rosbalt.ru news agency and entitled “The End of History,” a writer who uses the screen name Alexalexxx argues that in an effort to straddle the space between these two positions, Russia has been “condemned to built false ‘democratic’ structures,” again just like in Soviet times (www.rosbalt.ru/2011/01/18/809796.html).
An example of this effort, he says, is President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent call for “the reform of the Federation Council,” an appeal that has no real meaning because there is no division of power and hence the parliament, including its upper chamber, has no real powers to act as a legislature.
“Up to now,” the blogger says, “Russia is an imperial structure at the stage of historical collapse and is capable of existing not with a democratic regime of administration but exclusively in a ‘frozen’ state.” That is because “any democratic Russia will inevitably collapse given the incompatibility of the civilizational foundations of its territories.”
The USSR of course “encountered the very same problem” when it tried to hold together places as diverse as the Baltic states, Georgia, and Moldova. “Nothing connected them except the powerfully passionate character of the imperial idea.” When that weakened and the “totalitarian” controls disappeared, the entire edifice collapsed.
Russia’s time “has still not ended,” the blogger writes, and “it continues to exist in the former imperial regime.” But “its territory is seeking its natural borders within which the centrifugal forces will be balanced by the centripedal ones. But this balance has not yet been achieved.”
As compared to the past, however, there are additional problems. In pre-modern Russia, the center could hold the periphery by “naked force,” but now “in modern times, the historical alternative of democracy has appeared, a regime of maximum effectiveness for economics and social organization.”
Indeed, the blogger argues, “the standards of life in the 20th century are such that without democracy it is impossible to guarantee the development of the personality as well as the level o fhis security, rights and social comfort. “ In short, he says, “only an individual whose rights are guaranteed can make the new economy.”
Put in another way, “a Silicon Valley can be developed only because the creative of the personality is not vitiated by the struggle with arbitrariness or wasted in dealing with an authoritarian bureaucracy.” But “if you do not have independent media and deputies, and if you live under the power of corruption, your possibilities … are approaching zero.”
And because that is so, the blogger says, “the historical imperative of the democratic model of development in the 20th century came into what was for Russia a tragic contradiction given that country’s imperial form.” Competition requires democracy, but democracy is fatal for an empire.
Expressed in the most lapidary way, the blogger says, the choice confronting Russia is this “either the Caucasus or Russian notebook computers and smart phones” – or, put in another way, either a frozen authoritarian system “with imitation democratic institutions” or “democracy with advanced technology but without holding on to the Caucasus.”
Alexalexxx then addresses the issue of the Caucasus in another way. “Thousands of people from Central Russia,” he notes, “have been forced to pass through the school of force in the Caucasus and to traumatize their own psyches, after which on their return they reproduce the feudal level of legal consciousness.”
But whatever some in Moscow may think, it is impossible to “freeze” law “in one part of the country and to allow democracy to develop in the rest of its territory.” If the central government continues to try to do that, it will only exacerbate the civilizational dilemma it now faces.
Clearly, a democratic Russia cannot include the North Caucasus, the blogger says, but just what its actual borders should be is “a separate subject which can become part of the agenda only with a rejection of ‘the imperial’ in the name of development,” something that has not yet happened in Russia.
As a result, for the time being, Alexalexxx says, Russians “are condemned to imitate democratic institutions … following an imperial matrix and forcibly running after ‘the vertical’ of territory in the framework of ‘Great Russia.’” But there is a price for this, and that price is the loss of compatibility with other countries and hence of a comparable standard of living.
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