Paul Goble
Staunton, January 18 – Vladimir Putin has “chosen the Belarusian path of dictatorship and repression,” opposition figures, who were released this weekend after being detained in a sanctioned protest action on December 3, told the media yesterday, and the Russian leader has opened the way to future clashes and violence of the kind many call “big blood.”
Three leading opposition figures, Eduard Limonov, the head of the banned National Bolshevik Party, Boris Nemtsov, a leader of Solidarity, and Ilya Yashin, a leader of Solidarity’s youth wing, whom Amnesty International had identified as “prisoners of conscience” spoke at a Moscow press conference (www.nr2.ru/moskow/316481.html).
In the past, Limonov said, the powers had come after him for organizing “unsanctioned meetings,” something he never denied. But now officials appear to have decided on the use of “demonstrative force” and to go after even those who have permission to take part in officially sanctioned meetings.
“This is yet another decisive step toward a fascist regime,” he continued. Russian society has always “expected to see fascism in the form of skinheads but now state fascism has arrived.” People must struggle against it “to the end,” and he pledged to do so even though he indicated that he “could not exclude” that he would be killed in the process.
Nemtsov for his part said that the recent actions by the Russian authorities show that there is no longer any real court system left in the country but rather only a set of institutions that the powers that be are prepared to use against any and all opponents in order to hold on to the powers which they “are afraid to lose.”
“For the first time in 50 years,” Nemtsov pointed out, those in power have arrested a former vice prime minister. “This means,” he suggested, “that in principle the prime minister too can be arrested,” and that everyone is now at risk, however secure and comfortable he may feel at present.
What is going on in Russia today, he continued, is “a Moscow to Minsk train. Then to Ashgabat, and then I don’t know. [Perhaps] Pyongyang. [The powers that be in Russia] hate Lukashenka like all dictators hate one another. But they copy [the Belarusian leader’s] methods.” Consequently, what is going on in Russia, Nemtsov said, is “the Lukashenka-ization of Russia.”
Yashin put it bluntly: “Putin is leading the country toward big blood,” the Russian expression for a massive crackdown rather than the selective targeting of opponents that has occurred up to now. “Judging from everything,” he said, “Putin is prepared to hold onto power [even] at the price” of such actions.
Such moves will “provoke a civil war” by creating “an atmosphere of hatred in our country,” Yashin said, adding that “we are not revolutionaries. We are supporters of the exiting Constitution. Putin and his entourage are conducting a war with our Constitution. If we don’t defend it, the country will collapse. Putin is leading the country toward collapse.”
Many commentators with links to the regime have accused these three and other members of the opposition of being closely linked with the West. They took this occasion to show that such charges are not true, arguing that the West should end all sanctions against Russia but impose them on the current ruling elite.
Nemtsov was explicit: “It is necessary,” he said, “to life all sanctions against Russia … and to introduce sanctions against those scoundrels who are guilty of the destruction of elections and freedom, the introduction of censorship and so on.” The list of those should begin with Putin but include others like Vladislav Surkov as well.
“If the world community really wants there to be democracy in Russia,” he continued, “the ideal variant would be to have this list confirmed by the European Parliament.” That is because those on such a list “make their money in Russia but keep in Europe” where they take vacations and educate their children.
But Limonov was skeptical that anything could come of Nemtsov’s proposal. “The dependence of the Europeans on Russia gas” means, he said that “they will not start an argument with Putin and his friends.” That, he continued, is “our misfortune and no one besides the Russian people will be able to do anything about it.”
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Real Clash of Civilizations is Between Orthodoxy and Entire Christian West, Russian Churchman Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 18 – Islam is closer to Russian Orthodoxy than are either Catholicism or Protestantism, an expansion of Vladimir Putin’s observation about Orthodoxy and Catholicism last year and an indication that for many in Moscow, the real clash of civilizations is not between Christianity and Islam but rather between Orthodoxy and Western Christendom.
In a comment to “Russkaya narodnaya liniya” yesterday, Archpriest Igor Dronov, the secretary of the Bishkek eparchate administration of the Russian Orthodox Church, says that those who made fun of Putin’s observation are wrong, that the prime minister’s words correspond to reality, and that they can be extended to include Protestantism as well
(www.ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/01/17/protoierej_igor_dronov_nam_blizhe_musulmane_chem_protestanty/).
Dronov’s observation comes in the course of his survey of Orthodox developments in Kyrgyzstan during 2010. He notes that in that country, “there still live not a few Russian people, although gradually we are being called a diaspora,” despite our “memory that Russia and Kyrgyzia were a single country, a single empire.”
Obviously, the archpriest continues, the worst development of the past year were the communal clashes in the southern Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Jalalabad, clashes that Dronov says “produced the same shocking impression on [him] that the bombing of Yugoslavia did at one time” in the past.
But the most positive development of the past year was that a conference on “Different Religious – Common Values – Joint Actions” organized by the country’s State Commission on Religious Affairs and the European Council of Religious leaders allowed Kyrgyzstan to avoid creating an inter-religious council.
It had been proposed that such a council include Orthodox, Muslims and Protestants, but Dronov insists that “the presence of the Protestants in this council would have been inappropriate bcause they advance their own goals, covering them with the authority of the religious majority of Kyrgyzstan.”
Such a conclusion may strike some in Russia as strange, Dronov says, but Orthodox Russians in Kyrgyzstan are situated in “somewhat different circumstances than Orthodox in Russia” and thus must act differently because Kyrgyzstan is 80 percent Muslim while Russia is 80 percent Orthodox.
“However strange it may seem,” Dronov continues, “Muslims are closer to the Orthodox living in Kyrgyzstan than are Christian-Protestants -- closer, of course, not in the area of faith and dogma … but in the area of practice” on such questions as HIV/AIDS and juvenile justice where Protestants promote “’Western values’” while Orthodox and Muslims share other values.
Among the Western values Protestants seek to advance is “liberalism which destroys everything, including both the family and the state.” Moreover, Dronov says, “Protestants, especially the newly formed sects is distinguished by aggressive proselytism,” something that he says creates “serious tension and dissatisfaction with Christianity in general.”
“Simple people did not very clearly distinguish the differences between denominations and dissatisfaction [with representatives of one denomination within a particular faith] sooner or later can lead to extreme and aggressive actions,” such as Muslims attacking Orthodox because they are angry at Protestants.
About two years ago, Dronov says, Muslims in one Kyrgyz town decided to attack an Orthodox church there, but “it turned out that they had come by mistake.” They were angry because one of their relatives had been recruited by the neo-Pentecostals. “This case,” Dronov argues, “is very indicative” of the problem.
And he writes: “If we were to give complete freedom to our Western ‘brothers in Christ,’ then such situations would be much more frequent. More than that, it is possible that inter-religious clashes would appear in comparison with which the inter-ethnic clashes which took place in the south of Kyrgyzstan would be child’s play.”
Staunton, January 18 – Islam is closer to Russian Orthodoxy than are either Catholicism or Protestantism, an expansion of Vladimir Putin’s observation about Orthodoxy and Catholicism last year and an indication that for many in Moscow, the real clash of civilizations is not between Christianity and Islam but rather between Orthodoxy and Western Christendom.
In a comment to “Russkaya narodnaya liniya” yesterday, Archpriest Igor Dronov, the secretary of the Bishkek eparchate administration of the Russian Orthodox Church, says that those who made fun of Putin’s observation are wrong, that the prime minister’s words correspond to reality, and that they can be extended to include Protestantism as well
(www.ruskline.ru/news_rl/2011/01/17/protoierej_igor_dronov_nam_blizhe_musulmane_chem_protestanty/).
Dronov’s observation comes in the course of his survey of Orthodox developments in Kyrgyzstan during 2010. He notes that in that country, “there still live not a few Russian people, although gradually we are being called a diaspora,” despite our “memory that Russia and Kyrgyzia were a single country, a single empire.”
Obviously, the archpriest continues, the worst development of the past year were the communal clashes in the southern Kyrgyz cities of Osh and Jalalabad, clashes that Dronov says “produced the same shocking impression on [him] that the bombing of Yugoslavia did at one time” in the past.
But the most positive development of the past year was that a conference on “Different Religious – Common Values – Joint Actions” organized by the country’s State Commission on Religious Affairs and the European Council of Religious leaders allowed Kyrgyzstan to avoid creating an inter-religious council.
It had been proposed that such a council include Orthodox, Muslims and Protestants, but Dronov insists that “the presence of the Protestants in this council would have been inappropriate bcause they advance their own goals, covering them with the authority of the religious majority of Kyrgyzstan.”
Such a conclusion may strike some in Russia as strange, Dronov says, but Orthodox Russians in Kyrgyzstan are situated in “somewhat different circumstances than Orthodox in Russia” and thus must act differently because Kyrgyzstan is 80 percent Muslim while Russia is 80 percent Orthodox.
“However strange it may seem,” Dronov continues, “Muslims are closer to the Orthodox living in Kyrgyzstan than are Christian-Protestants -- closer, of course, not in the area of faith and dogma … but in the area of practice” on such questions as HIV/AIDS and juvenile justice where Protestants promote “’Western values’” while Orthodox and Muslims share other values.
Among the Western values Protestants seek to advance is “liberalism which destroys everything, including both the family and the state.” Moreover, Dronov says, “Protestants, especially the newly formed sects is distinguished by aggressive proselytism,” something that he says creates “serious tension and dissatisfaction with Christianity in general.”
“Simple people did not very clearly distinguish the differences between denominations and dissatisfaction [with representatives of one denomination within a particular faith] sooner or later can lead to extreme and aggressive actions,” such as Muslims attacking Orthodox because they are angry at Protestants.
About two years ago, Dronov says, Muslims in one Kyrgyz town decided to attack an Orthodox church there, but “it turned out that they had come by mistake.” They were angry because one of their relatives had been recruited by the neo-Pentecostals. “This case,” Dronov argues, “is very indicative” of the problem.
And he writes: “If we were to give complete freedom to our Western ‘brothers in Christ,’ then such situations would be much more frequent. More than that, it is possible that inter-religious clashes would appear in comparison with which the inter-ethnic clashes which took place in the south of Kyrgyzstan would be child’s play.”
Window on Eurasia: Ukrainian Mufti Calls for ‘Canonical’ Translation of Koran
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 18 – In the last week alone, new translations of the meaning of the Koran have appeared in both Hungarian and Ukrainian, and in many countries, including Turkey and the Russian Federation, there are now multiple translations, often fundamentally different one from another.
But because Islamic doctrine holds that the Koran itself exists only in Arabic and that all translations are at best an approximation, few Muslim leaders have addressed the issue of how to deal with the fact that almost four out of every five Muslims in the world do not know Arabic and thus must rely either on translations or the commentary of others.
Even discussing this issue is difficult for Muslims both because translations entail the risk of change in the Koran’s meaning, something anathema to most Muslims and because Muslim leaders are aware that putting their basic text in the vernacular could affect Islam in the same way that German and English translations of the Vulgate Bible affected Western Christianity.
But now Mufti Said Ismagilov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Ukraine, has suggested that the faithful in his country need “a canonical translation of the meanings of the Holy Koran,” an obvious step toward acceptance of a translation of the Koran in each language as authoritative (islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/8641/visibletype/1/index.html).
Ismagilov’s comments are a reaction to a Ukrainian translation of a Russian version of the Koran, a translation the mufti says forces him to note that “both the scholarly community and the Muslims of our country need a canonical translation of the meanings of the Koran, made from the language of the original and corresponding to the demands of the Islamic tradition.”
As Ismagilov points out, “it is not enough simply to know the Arabic language well and to know the specific language that its ayats must be rendered into. Koranica Arabic is itself a unique phenomenon in Arabic philology itself to the point that it is a separate trend within Arabic.”
“In view of the extraordinary complexity and sacral nature,” the mufti continues, “the Koran for a long time was forbidden to be translated into other languages. Later, in order to allow an acquaintance with the meanings of the Holy Writing of Islam by those peoples who do not know Arabic, Islamic theology began to allow the possibility of translations.”
But in order to make such a translation, the Ukrainian MSD head says, “it is considered insufficient to be a linguist and translator.” Instead one must be a specialist in a whole group of Shariat fields.” Because of that requirement, most translations have been the work not of individual scholars but of editorial groups.
A decade ago, the MSD of Ukraine together with the All-Ukraine Al-Raid Association of Public Organizations began the process of translating the Koran into Ukrainian. The first four suras were translated and published in 2002. That translation, which is still not done, will be “canonical” and authoritative. Unfortunately, the latest one from Russian is not.
Staunton, January 18 – In the last week alone, new translations of the meaning of the Koran have appeared in both Hungarian and Ukrainian, and in many countries, including Turkey and the Russian Federation, there are now multiple translations, often fundamentally different one from another.
But because Islamic doctrine holds that the Koran itself exists only in Arabic and that all translations are at best an approximation, few Muslim leaders have addressed the issue of how to deal with the fact that almost four out of every five Muslims in the world do not know Arabic and thus must rely either on translations or the commentary of others.
Even discussing this issue is difficult for Muslims both because translations entail the risk of change in the Koran’s meaning, something anathema to most Muslims and because Muslim leaders are aware that putting their basic text in the vernacular could affect Islam in the same way that German and English translations of the Vulgate Bible affected Western Christianity.
But now Mufti Said Ismagilov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Ukraine, has suggested that the faithful in his country need “a canonical translation of the meanings of the Holy Koran,” an obvious step toward acceptance of a translation of the Koran in each language as authoritative (islam.in.ua/3/ukr/full_news/8641/visibletype/1/index.html).
Ismagilov’s comments are a reaction to a Ukrainian translation of a Russian version of the Koran, a translation the mufti says forces him to note that “both the scholarly community and the Muslims of our country need a canonical translation of the meanings of the Koran, made from the language of the original and corresponding to the demands of the Islamic tradition.”
As Ismagilov points out, “it is not enough simply to know the Arabic language well and to know the specific language that its ayats must be rendered into. Koranica Arabic is itself a unique phenomenon in Arabic philology itself to the point that it is a separate trend within Arabic.”
“In view of the extraordinary complexity and sacral nature,” the mufti continues, “the Koran for a long time was forbidden to be translated into other languages. Later, in order to allow an acquaintance with the meanings of the Holy Writing of Islam by those peoples who do not know Arabic, Islamic theology began to allow the possibility of translations.”
But in order to make such a translation, the Ukrainian MSD head says, “it is considered insufficient to be a linguist and translator.” Instead one must be a specialist in a whole group of Shariat fields.” Because of that requirement, most translations have been the work not of individual scholars but of editorial groups.
A decade ago, the MSD of Ukraine together with the All-Ukraine Al-Raid Association of Public Organizations began the process of translating the Koran into Ukrainian. The first four suras were translated and published in 2002. That translation, which is still not done, will be “canonical” and authoritative. Unfortunately, the latest one from Russian is not.
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