Paul Goble
Staunton, January 17 – Russia’s system of federal districts, which stand between Moscow and the subjects of the federation, needs to be fundamentally revised if it is to be effective and more than home for politicians who have failed elsewhere or the locus for the further growth of the bureaucracy, according to a Daghestani commentator.
In an article on the first anniversary of the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District, Albert Esedov says that many Daghestanis had great expectations for the new entity all the more so because President Dmitry Medvedev unlike his predecessor Vladimir Putin stressed the economic role of this institution (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5269/109/).
And in the past year, there have been “several positive moves forward” – of “at the very least, a number of investment programs and plans have been adopted.” But there have been far more “shortcomings,” and these in turn raise some larger questions about the federal districts and how and even if they should develop in the future.
Among the problem with the North Caucasus Federal District, Esedov says, are the fact that “up until now the permanent address of the residence of the presidential plenipotentiary is not known, [its] organs and structures have not been formed, [its] website has not been launched, and there are no offices” to which the population can come with its problems.
Moreover, and in contrast to the situation in all other federal districts, no one has been talking about “the need to establish a federal university,” even though “by an irony of fate, all the major higher educational institutions of the region have already been united in a Southern Federal University,” except for Daghestani institutions which aren’t included.
But these are technical issues compared to some of the larger problems the existing federal districts present, Esedov says. Some of them don’t correspond to geography. The Southern Federal District, “which initially by the irony of fate was called the North Caucasus” one, for example, includes both subjects adjoining the Caucasus and some adjoining them.
And the North Caucasus Federal District doesn’t include Adygeya but does include Stavropol kray, the latter, Esedov suggests included by Moscow in order to “’correct’ the ‘less than good’ statistics” of the year-old federal district but an arrasngement with which Stavropol officials and residents are not pleased.
This “problem of the lack of correspondence of the borders with federal districts and the structures of regional identity at times,” the Daghestani analyst continues, “makes more difficult the work of the center with regions, by creating the phenomenon of ‘dissatisfied’ regions which resist integration in the framework of the existing federal districts.”
Putin set up the system in order to strengthen “the single system of executive power” by “distributing functions and authority of the organs of state power on three levels: the federal center, the federal districts and the subjects of the Federation.” But, Esedov points out, “this is [only] in theory.”
Moscow has never explained in detail why three-level federalism is necessary or defined in law the status of the federal districts. A major reason for this is that “all this would require constitutional amendments,” a step that the Moscow leadership has so far been quite reluctant to take.
Nor have their been “the necessary amendments” to the constitutions of the federal subjects, and consequently, one still has no reason, the Daghestani expert continues, “to consider the federal district as a link of the new territorial arrangement of the state.”
And Esedov continues, this federal innovation has taken place at a time when Moscow has been talking about amalgamating federal units, many of which have longstanding historical traditions and the destruction of which “in the name of the formal expansion of territory could be a political mistake not subject to correction.”
Because the federal districts have not been codified in law, their operations have depended in every case on “the personal factor,” on the individual in the top position, a pattern that further retards the institutionalization of the Russian political system even while allowing a place for more bureaucracy and for politicians who have failed elsewhere.
Finally, he points out, “there are no analogues in world practice to the three-level system of federalism” that Putin and Medvedev appear to be trying to put in place. Moreover, “the tendencies of development of federalism abroad are directed at the democratization of national political systems under conditions of decentralization and self-development of social systems.”
Such goals, Esedov argues, canb e achieved “only under conditions of systemic de-bureaucratization of the state and the construction of an open civil society,” exactly the opposite direction in which the Russian Federation with its federal districts is currently moving.
One possibility for Russian state development might be the elimination of first the presidents and heads of regions, then the elimination of regional parliaments, and finally the formation of real governments in the federal districts. That would be “logical,” he concludes, but it would certainly spark serious resistance.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Moves to Close Ukrainian Institutions in Russia
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 17 – Apparently confident that now it can do so without objections from the Yanukovich government in Kyiv, Moscow has disbanded the Federation of National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians of Russia and is setting the stage for closing the Ukrainian library in the Russian capital by continuing its seizures of “extremist” literature there.
The Russian government, like its Soviet predecessor, has never been supportive of the more than five million ethnic Ukrainians living there, refusing to open any Ukrainian-language state schools even as it has complained about closure of some of the many Russian-language schools operating in Ukraine.
But in recent weeks, Moscow has moved against even the few Ukrainian institutions that do exist inside the Russian Federation. On the basis of a March 2010 appeal by the Russian justice ministry, the Russian Supreme Court on November 24 “liquidated” the Federal National-Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians of Russia” as a legal person.
According to Vladimir Semenenko, the former head of that former institution, the Justice Minsitry made three specific complaints about the group’s “diversions.” First, Semenko gave an interview to Radio Liberty. Second, the group organized a public conference on Ukrainian studies in Russia. And third, its leaders took part in commemorations of the Great Famine.
On January 13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that the closure was based on the autonomy’s political action. He said that that the autonomy had been shuttered because its leaders “were engaged in political activity directed at undermining Russian-Ukrainian relations” (globalist.org.ua/shorts/61127.html).
Meanwhile, Russian interior ministry officials have been conducting searches for “extremist” literature in the Ukrainian Library in Moscow. The latest of these occurred last Friday. Both Ukrainian embassy officials and Russian ones insist the library has not been closed, but the librarians there say that a court case is hanging over them and it.
Natalya Sharina, the library’s director, said the MVD officers had come from the anti-extremist section and had behaved in such a threatening way that members of her staff had called for emergency medical help. She acknowledged that the library was still open, but said the “criminal case” was going on “in parallel” (www.unian.net/rus/print/416293).
Foreign Minister Lavrov, also on January 13th, insisted that “no on has closed the library of Ukrainian literature.” But he added that “there really were seized several books which are now being studied on the basis of our legislation which prohibits the distribution of nationalistic ideas.”
In discussing both these cases, Grani.ru commentator Vitaly Portnikov says that “in contemporary Russia one must not be surprised by anything.” But in order to make sense of what Russian officials are now doing against Ukrainians, he recalls an event in which he was a participant at the end of the 1980s (grani.ru/opinion/portnikov/m.185343.html).
At that time, the Moscow city Komsomol organization summoned representatives of the recently founded Jewish, Ukrainian and Belarusian youth groups in the Russian capital to a meeting. The Komsomol city organization secretary wanted to know why Portnikov, who is Jewish, was involved with a Ukrainian club.
“I somewhat angrily noted,” Portnikov recalls, “that until recently for the study of Hebrew, Jews had been sent to the camps, and now Jews are being blamed for a knowledge of Ukrainian. ‘ Ukrainians are worse than the Jews,’ the secretary responded. ‘Jews will at least leave, but Ukrainians want to destroy our great land.’”
At the time, Portnikov says, he “did not devote important to this insane dialogue because I could not imagine that Ukrainians in Russia could find themselves in the position of Jews of the 19440s and 1950s, that [Moscow officials] would stomp on their books with dirty boots” or close Ukrainian institutions as they had done earlier with Jewish ones.
But as the latest events show, he concludes with obvious sadness, “it turns out that even this is possible.”
Staunton, January 17 – Apparently confident that now it can do so without objections from the Yanukovich government in Kyiv, Moscow has disbanded the Federation of National Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians of Russia and is setting the stage for closing the Ukrainian library in the Russian capital by continuing its seizures of “extremist” literature there.
The Russian government, like its Soviet predecessor, has never been supportive of the more than five million ethnic Ukrainians living there, refusing to open any Ukrainian-language state schools even as it has complained about closure of some of the many Russian-language schools operating in Ukraine.
But in recent weeks, Moscow has moved against even the few Ukrainian institutions that do exist inside the Russian Federation. On the basis of a March 2010 appeal by the Russian justice ministry, the Russian Supreme Court on November 24 “liquidated” the Federal National-Cultural Autonomy of Ukrainians of Russia” as a legal person.
According to Vladimir Semenenko, the former head of that former institution, the Justice Minsitry made three specific complaints about the group’s “diversions.” First, Semenko gave an interview to Radio Liberty. Second, the group organized a public conference on Ukrainian studies in Russia. And third, its leaders took part in commemorations of the Great Famine.
On January 13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov confirmed that the closure was based on the autonomy’s political action. He said that that the autonomy had been shuttered because its leaders “were engaged in political activity directed at undermining Russian-Ukrainian relations” (globalist.org.ua/shorts/61127.html).
Meanwhile, Russian interior ministry officials have been conducting searches for “extremist” literature in the Ukrainian Library in Moscow. The latest of these occurred last Friday. Both Ukrainian embassy officials and Russian ones insist the library has not been closed, but the librarians there say that a court case is hanging over them and it.
Natalya Sharina, the library’s director, said the MVD officers had come from the anti-extremist section and had behaved in such a threatening way that members of her staff had called for emergency medical help. She acknowledged that the library was still open, but said the “criminal case” was going on “in parallel” (www.unian.net/rus/print/416293).
Foreign Minister Lavrov, also on January 13th, insisted that “no on has closed the library of Ukrainian literature.” But he added that “there really were seized several books which are now being studied on the basis of our legislation which prohibits the distribution of nationalistic ideas.”
In discussing both these cases, Grani.ru commentator Vitaly Portnikov says that “in contemporary Russia one must not be surprised by anything.” But in order to make sense of what Russian officials are now doing against Ukrainians, he recalls an event in which he was a participant at the end of the 1980s (grani.ru/opinion/portnikov/m.185343.html).
At that time, the Moscow city Komsomol organization summoned representatives of the recently founded Jewish, Ukrainian and Belarusian youth groups in the Russian capital to a meeting. The Komsomol city organization secretary wanted to know why Portnikov, who is Jewish, was involved with a Ukrainian club.
“I somewhat angrily noted,” Portnikov recalls, “that until recently for the study of Hebrew, Jews had been sent to the camps, and now Jews are being blamed for a knowledge of Ukrainian. ‘ Ukrainians are worse than the Jews,’ the secretary responded. ‘Jews will at least leave, but Ukrainians want to destroy our great land.’”
At the time, Portnikov says, he “did not devote important to this insane dialogue because I could not imagine that Ukrainians in Russia could find themselves in the position of Jews of the 19440s and 1950s, that [Moscow officials] would stomp on their books with dirty boots” or close Ukrainian institutions as they had done earlier with Jewish ones.
But as the latest events show, he concludes with obvious sadness, “it turns out that even this is possible.”
Window on Eurasia: New Siberian Movement Combines Regional, Economic and Political Goals
Paul Goble
Staunton, January 17 – Among the most interesting responses to the Manezh Square violence last month has been the formation of a new social movement of Siberians (“Sibiryaki”), a group committed to overcoming divisions within the ethnic Russian community there and across the country as well as splits between ethnic Russians and other peoples in that region.
After the Manezh clashes on December 11, a meeting of diasporas in Moscow called for the creation of strong new intermediary organizations between individuals and the state in order to ensure that the rights of all groups, including ethnic Russians, are protected (www.peoples-rights.info/2011/01/v-tomske-sozdaetsya-obshhestvennoe-dvizhenie-sibiryaki/).
Not surprisingly, however, Russian nationalist movements with often openly xenophobic goals and non-Russian groups which sought to defend themselves against the increasingly assertive Russian nationalists, but such “bridging” groups have emerged as well, examples of the growth of civil society in Russia beyond the usual frameworks.
One, the Sibiryak Movement, was created on December 24th and will hold a constituent session on January 24th in Tomsk. It consists of those who identify as “descendents of those exiled to Siberia, including for political reasons, of those who fled from serfdom and simply wanted to be free, and of indigenous peoples who want to see the flowering of their own lands.”
And on the basis of this composition, the new group is committed to the idea that “Siberia now must become the cradle of freedom and the expression of the will of the people,” not as formed in political parties or the state but as a social movement, the Sibiryaki are appealing to their fellow Siberians and fellow believers across Russia.
Collective decision making of the kind exemplified by the Cossack “krug” is “in the traditions of Russian society,” organizers say, “and our Social Movement is called upon to defend the interests of members of the group (medical and legal assistance),” to organize volunteers, to ensure that laws on housing are observed and that federalism grows.
The meeting on the 24th is to discuss the goals and tasks of the movement. Among the goals the organizers suggest should be at the center of attention are “the restoration of historical memory and of the traditional cultural and linguistic milieu of peoples living on the territory of Siberia.”
Moreover, they say, the group should provide “support for socially defenseless strata of the population, defense of the rights and legal interests of participants of the Movement, and the development of civil society for guaranteeing a worthy life and the harmonious development of each individual.”
To that end, the Sibiryaki Movement organizers say, they want to initiate dialogue “among representatives of various nations, nationalities and peoples and among representatives of various religious confessions,” to promote Siberian traditions economic and linguistic, and to contribute to “the rebirth of traditional values, including moral and family ones.”
Although it is far from clear that this group will become a major force, its appearance now is nonetheless important for three reasons. First, it is a unusual example in Russia of an effort to combine social and political goals across ethnic and even regional lines, a combination that could make it an important model for others.
Second, it reflects the aspirations of at least some in Russia to promote at the same time traditional social values and a modernized state sector providing support for those who need it, a combination rarely found in the Russian Federation or, it should be said, in many other countries at the present time.
And third, the new group with its focus on Siberian identity is yet another indication that places in that country far from the capital can be, as the group itself puts it, “a cradle” for the rise of new social and political ideas that are not necessarily directed at the dismantling of the Russian state.
Some Siberians, of course, do favor independence for their land, but most support the idea of genuine federalism and democracy within Russia. This new group appears to reflect the views of that regional majority, something the rest of Russia should now attend to lest continuing neglect of their ideas lead these Siberians to change their views.
Staunton, January 17 – Among the most interesting responses to the Manezh Square violence last month has been the formation of a new social movement of Siberians (“Sibiryaki”), a group committed to overcoming divisions within the ethnic Russian community there and across the country as well as splits between ethnic Russians and other peoples in that region.
After the Manezh clashes on December 11, a meeting of diasporas in Moscow called for the creation of strong new intermediary organizations between individuals and the state in order to ensure that the rights of all groups, including ethnic Russians, are protected (www.peoples-rights.info/2011/01/v-tomske-sozdaetsya-obshhestvennoe-dvizhenie-sibiryaki/).
Not surprisingly, however, Russian nationalist movements with often openly xenophobic goals and non-Russian groups which sought to defend themselves against the increasingly assertive Russian nationalists, but such “bridging” groups have emerged as well, examples of the growth of civil society in Russia beyond the usual frameworks.
One, the Sibiryak Movement, was created on December 24th and will hold a constituent session on January 24th in Tomsk. It consists of those who identify as “descendents of those exiled to Siberia, including for political reasons, of those who fled from serfdom and simply wanted to be free, and of indigenous peoples who want to see the flowering of their own lands.”
And on the basis of this composition, the new group is committed to the idea that “Siberia now must become the cradle of freedom and the expression of the will of the people,” not as formed in political parties or the state but as a social movement, the Sibiryaki are appealing to their fellow Siberians and fellow believers across Russia.
Collective decision making of the kind exemplified by the Cossack “krug” is “in the traditions of Russian society,” organizers say, “and our Social Movement is called upon to defend the interests of members of the group (medical and legal assistance),” to organize volunteers, to ensure that laws on housing are observed and that federalism grows.
The meeting on the 24th is to discuss the goals and tasks of the movement. Among the goals the organizers suggest should be at the center of attention are “the restoration of historical memory and of the traditional cultural and linguistic milieu of peoples living on the territory of Siberia.”
Moreover, they say, the group should provide “support for socially defenseless strata of the population, defense of the rights and legal interests of participants of the Movement, and the development of civil society for guaranteeing a worthy life and the harmonious development of each individual.”
To that end, the Sibiryaki Movement organizers say, they want to initiate dialogue “among representatives of various nations, nationalities and peoples and among representatives of various religious confessions,” to promote Siberian traditions economic and linguistic, and to contribute to “the rebirth of traditional values, including moral and family ones.”
Although it is far from clear that this group will become a major force, its appearance now is nonetheless important for three reasons. First, it is a unusual example in Russia of an effort to combine social and political goals across ethnic and even regional lines, a combination that could make it an important model for others.
Second, it reflects the aspirations of at least some in Russia to promote at the same time traditional social values and a modernized state sector providing support for those who need it, a combination rarely found in the Russian Federation or, it should be said, in many other countries at the present time.
And third, the new group with its focus on Siberian identity is yet another indication that places in that country far from the capital can be, as the group itself puts it, “a cradle” for the rise of new social and political ideas that are not necessarily directed at the dismantling of the Russian state.
Some Siberians, of course, do favor independence for their land, but most support the idea of genuine federalism and democracy within Russia. This new group appears to reflect the views of that regional majority, something the rest of Russia should now attend to lest continuing neglect of their ideas lead these Siberians to change their views.
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