Paul Goble
Vienna, January 12 – “Eighty-five percent [of Russians polled by the Levada Center at the end of 2010] say that they do not have any idea about where their country is headed or whether it has a future,” attitudes that have reduced their time horizons to only a few weeks that led to apocalyptic speculations as well, according to the leader of that survey firm.
In a commentary in today’s “Vedomosti” and in an interview to the “Osobaya bukhva” portal, Lev Gudkov says that the expression of such attitudes is “especially interesting” given all the discussion by President Dmitry Medvedev about modernization and innovation in recent times (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/252911/bez_buduschego).
And he notes that 2010 ended “on a note of growing uncertainty: the usual hopes in the population that ‘everything will be fine’ in the new year … were combined with a high level of concern, collective tension and suppressed aggression with which people were dealing with some difficulty.”
When Russians are asked to identify the causes of their uncertainty, Gudkov continues, they first of all point to matters of immediate concern such as fear of inflation, infrastructure catastrophes and “a feeling of general defenselessness” and “constant conern abou the future of their children or the health of those close to them.”
But when they are queried about whether they believe the assurances of the government that “it is in a position to deal in the near future with economic problems,” Gudkov notes, “about half of the population is extremely skeptical,” with the more urban and better off being more so than their rural or poorer counterparts.
Economic instability, the sociologist points out, “is combined with a sharp feeling of social constraint and the absence of defense. Fifty-eight percent of all Russians and 73 percent of Muscovites with higher education say they do not feel that they can count on the laws to defend them.
Moreover, Gudkov says, their concerns about their incomes are being “intensified by a growing understand that the present political system has turned out to be not simply a break on the development of the country but [in and of itself] represents an ever more seiroius threat for society and its future.”
Russians and especially the most educated “ever more strongly are worried by the trajectory of the possible evolution of the regime, Gudkov says. And the more harshly the powers deal with their opponents and critics and the more closed off they are relative to society, the more often and the more insistently these qusitons are being raised.”
Over the course of the last decade, economic growth and earnings from the sale of oil “allowed the existing powers to buy the support not only of influential groups closely connected with the media, the bureaucracy [and other parts of the elite] but also broader strata of the population.” And “censorship neutralized any expression of social dissatisfaction and protest.”
But the economic crisis and evidence of official incompetence and unconcern has thrown into high relief the rickety quality of the bureaucracy and the uncertainty of daily life for everyone in Russia, and that conjunction, Gudkov argues, “is disturbing people today much more than in the past.”
Moreover, there is a breakdown in relations between the powers that be and the population. This is manifested in various ways, Gudkov notes. “Three quarters of the population of Russia related to the higher leadership with great doubts, customarily keeping its own opinion for ‘internal use,’” just like in Soviet times.
In addition, he says, “it has become obvious that the system of unlimited power is reducing the effectiveness of administration, subordinating tasks of the strategic development of the country to issues of retaining power and the personal enrichment of the circle of peple near the highest leadership.”
Because the powers that be select people for positions not on the basis of qualifications but “on personal loyalty and opportunism,” the sociologist says, “it is inevitable” that the quality of governance will decline and public participation and trust in the institutions of government will fall as well.
Politics under “the authoritasrian regime” is no longer a sphere of “common interests.” Instead, “social life has become poor in events, and among them an ever larger place is occupied by catastrophes, scandals and crimes,” a pattern that further reduces public confidence in those in charge, in society as a whole, and in the future.
Another divide is between the center and the periphery, a development that “is dangerous in its own right but is still more so because the provinces which form the social base of Russian authoritarianism draw after themselves the more developed minority of the center,” to the detriment of all.
Given what the regime has done, it is important to focus on “the absence of resistance from the side of society,” a shortcoming that reflects the breakdown in social ties and the willingness of the powers that be to use both carrots and sticks to ensure quiescence if not active support.
When mass disorders do occur as in the case of the Manezh Square violence, Gudkov insists, they are the product of that trend rather than of “cynicism” and reflect the growing sense in the population that the use of force by the powers that be is either “complete illegality” or “the manifestation of unrestrained greed and a lack of consciousness” by those in power.
Gudkov’s portrait of Russian society is not a pretty one. On the one hand, it suggests that the current regime may be able to continue for some time given the sense of defenselessness among the population. But on the other, the obvious lack of legitimacy of those in power and their reliance on force alone suggest that the entire edifice could change quickly and radically.
Russians clearly sense that if outside observers do not, and that explains why more than eight out of ten of them now say that they do not know what their future or that of their country will be and even more why they have reduced to time horizon to only a few weeks, an almost unprecedented event for that society.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Few Daghestanis Would Turn in Extremists They Know to the Authorities, Survey Finds
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 12 – Only one young Daghestani in four would turn in to the authorities someone he suspected of being an extremist, according to a recent sociological survey conducted in that troubled North Caucasus republic and one that underscores just how difficult a task Moscow faces in rooting out militants and bringing peace to that republic.
Indeed, according to Salikh Mulimov, a sociologist at Daghestan State University, many of those questions said it would be useful to “organize public discussions with representatives of extremist and terrorist views,” hardly an indication that those making this proposal view the latter at beyond the pale (www.riadagestan.ru/news/2011/01/10/108056/).
Last spring, Mulimov and his team surveyed 1600 students and university-age Daghestanis and interviewed an additional 500 people over the age of 30 in order to determine their attitudes toward “religious-political extremism and terrorism.” The results have now been published in the journal “Narody Daghestana” and reported by RIADaghestan.ru.
Both groups were asked two sets of questions, the first of which consisted of queries designed to measure the level of the knowledge of respondents about religious-political extremism, the reasons it has appeared in the North Caucasus and the goals and intentions of those who practice it.
The second block, Mulimov continues, featured “specific questions” that required the respondents to express their own attitude toward extremism, terrorism, and the struggle against it. The study was conducted, he suggests because “despite the enormous number of human victims, Daghestani society unfortunately has not really condemned terrorism and extremism.”
Among the findings are the following: “An absolute majority of the young people questioned – 74.5 percent – consider the religious situation in the republic to be tense and conflict-ridden.” And they say that this reflects the introduction of new religious movements and “the struggle of various religious organizations to increase the number of their followers.”
Asked whether it is permissible to force people to accept a particular religious dogma, 68 percent of young Daghestanis said that it was not, but 23 percent said it was, and seven percent said they found it difficult to answer the question.
When the survey asked “If you knew that there were extremists or terrorists among your acquaintances, neighbors or relatives, would you report this to the law enforcement organs,” “only 418 or the 1600” said that they would, while 35 percent said they wouldn’t and the remainder, just under 40 percent said they were uncertain.
When members of the older age groups were asked by the sociologists the same question, 32 percent said that they would, an equal number 32.1 percent said they would not, and another third – 35.5 percent – told the interviewers that they found it difficult to answer this particular question.
Among the reasons the older Daghestanis who said they would not turn in someone to the authorities gave were the following: “This isn’t my responsibility,” “this contradicts my understanding,” and “I am afraid that the law enforcement organs would not defend me or leave me in peace.”
The groups were then asked whether religious organizations in Daghestan should “act according to federal and republic laws.” Just over half – 840 of the 1600 – of the young people said that they should, but “about 40 percent,” Muslim underlined, “consider that [they] “need not act in the legal field of federal and republic laws or find it difficult to answer this question.”
And when asked whether they supported the implementation of the principle of separation of church and state, only just offer a quarter – 442 – said they did, while nearly half – 748 – said they were opposed to something that is enshrined in both the Russian Federation and Daghestani constitutions.
The sociologists then asked whether the university-age Daghestanis thought going over to shariat law would reduce the level of extremism and terrorism in the North Caucasus, a third – 534 – said that it would, 40 percent said it would not, and a quarter said that they found it difficult to say.
The survey also asked people ab out the goals of religious extremists, about the factors behind its spread in Daghestan and the North Caucasus, and about their own knowledge of and practice of Islam. (While more than 80 percent of those surveyed said they were Muslims, only much smaller fractions practice the faith.)
The answers of the older age group to other questions are especially intriguing. Asked what the difference was between Sufism and the Wahhabis, 53 percent said that “they know nothing” about either, but they immediately added that “the Wahhabis reject a mediating role in religion” and “do not read the Koran at the graves of the dead.”
And asked in what kind of state – secular or religious – they would like to live, two-thirds of the sample said they would like to live in a secular state, while only 16.4 percent said they would like to life in a shariat one. At the same time, six percent said they would like to life “in a good, stable, rich and ideal state.”
Vienna, January 12 – Only one young Daghestani in four would turn in to the authorities someone he suspected of being an extremist, according to a recent sociological survey conducted in that troubled North Caucasus republic and one that underscores just how difficult a task Moscow faces in rooting out militants and bringing peace to that republic.
Indeed, according to Salikh Mulimov, a sociologist at Daghestan State University, many of those questions said it would be useful to “organize public discussions with representatives of extremist and terrorist views,” hardly an indication that those making this proposal view the latter at beyond the pale (www.riadagestan.ru/news/2011/01/10/108056/).
Last spring, Mulimov and his team surveyed 1600 students and university-age Daghestanis and interviewed an additional 500 people over the age of 30 in order to determine their attitudes toward “religious-political extremism and terrorism.” The results have now been published in the journal “Narody Daghestana” and reported by RIADaghestan.ru.
Both groups were asked two sets of questions, the first of which consisted of queries designed to measure the level of the knowledge of respondents about religious-political extremism, the reasons it has appeared in the North Caucasus and the goals and intentions of those who practice it.
The second block, Mulimov continues, featured “specific questions” that required the respondents to express their own attitude toward extremism, terrorism, and the struggle against it. The study was conducted, he suggests because “despite the enormous number of human victims, Daghestani society unfortunately has not really condemned terrorism and extremism.”
Among the findings are the following: “An absolute majority of the young people questioned – 74.5 percent – consider the religious situation in the republic to be tense and conflict-ridden.” And they say that this reflects the introduction of new religious movements and “the struggle of various religious organizations to increase the number of their followers.”
Asked whether it is permissible to force people to accept a particular religious dogma, 68 percent of young Daghestanis said that it was not, but 23 percent said it was, and seven percent said they found it difficult to answer the question.
When the survey asked “If you knew that there were extremists or terrorists among your acquaintances, neighbors or relatives, would you report this to the law enforcement organs,” “only 418 or the 1600” said that they would, while 35 percent said they wouldn’t and the remainder, just under 40 percent said they were uncertain.
When members of the older age groups were asked by the sociologists the same question, 32 percent said that they would, an equal number 32.1 percent said they would not, and another third – 35.5 percent – told the interviewers that they found it difficult to answer this particular question.
Among the reasons the older Daghestanis who said they would not turn in someone to the authorities gave were the following: “This isn’t my responsibility,” “this contradicts my understanding,” and “I am afraid that the law enforcement organs would not defend me or leave me in peace.”
The groups were then asked whether religious organizations in Daghestan should “act according to federal and republic laws.” Just over half – 840 of the 1600 – of the young people said that they should, but “about 40 percent,” Muslim underlined, “consider that [they] “need not act in the legal field of federal and republic laws or find it difficult to answer this question.”
And when asked whether they supported the implementation of the principle of separation of church and state, only just offer a quarter – 442 – said they did, while nearly half – 748 – said they were opposed to something that is enshrined in both the Russian Federation and Daghestani constitutions.
The sociologists then asked whether the university-age Daghestanis thought going over to shariat law would reduce the level of extremism and terrorism in the North Caucasus, a third – 534 – said that it would, 40 percent said it would not, and a quarter said that they found it difficult to say.
The survey also asked people ab out the goals of religious extremists, about the factors behind its spread in Daghestan and the North Caucasus, and about their own knowledge of and practice of Islam. (While more than 80 percent of those surveyed said they were Muslims, only much smaller fractions practice the faith.)
The answers of the older age group to other questions are especially intriguing. Asked what the difference was between Sufism and the Wahhabis, 53 percent said that “they know nothing” about either, but they immediately added that “the Wahhabis reject a mediating role in religion” and “do not read the Koran at the graves of the dead.”
And asked in what kind of state – secular or religious – they would like to live, two-thirds of the sample said they would like to live in a secular state, while only 16.4 percent said they would like to life in a shariat one. At the same time, six percent said they would like to life “in a good, stable, rich and ideal state.”
Window on Eurasia: ‘Five or Six Bureaucrats’ Make Moscow’s Nationality and Religious Policies, Muslim Scholar Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 12 – Moscow’s policies on nationality and religion are controlled by a group of “five or six bureaucrats” in the Presidential Administration and council of ministers staff, an arrangement that must be changed if the country is to overcome its increasingly serious ethnic and religious problems, according to a leading Muslim scholar.
While some of those involved are entirely competent, Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, the president of the Islamic Cultural Center, told Portal-Credo.ru, both their small number and the closed nature of decision making in these areas are major sources of the country’s difficulties (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=81750&type=view).
On the one hand, the current arrangement allows members of “the anti-Muslim lobby” to influence outcomes without being forced to defend themselves in the course of the free flow of debate. And on the other, he says, it means that Moscow’s decisions are both less well-formulated than they might be and inevitably less legitimate in the eyes of the population.
Recent events and commentaries show, Niyazov says clarly show that in Russia today, “there is a very strong anti-Islamic lobby. Islamophobes are represented in the power structures, in the law enforcement system, in the mass media, and unfortunately in the system of the fraternal for us Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
“And what is still more surprising,” he continues, is that there not a few supporters [of this lobby] in the Muslim structures as well.”
The lobby consists of two groups “the ultra-liberals” and “the chauvinists and ultra-nationalists,” who agree on little else except “their dislike and even hatred of our religion,” a reflection of their limited knowledge about Islam and either “nearsightedness or conscious lack of a desire to see Russia strong, united and whole.”
One of the most publically prominent Islamophobes, the Muslim educator continues, is Roman Silantyev, but he is “not an independent figure” but instead serves as the mouthpiece of “the extreme Islamophobic wing of the Russian political and information elite.” In sum, he is “the tip of the iceberg” consisting of those among the powers that be who are opposed to Islam.
A segment of this group has found its way into “key information resources such as Interfax-Religiya, Muslim.su, “and certain others.” And these people enjoy “a definite protection from the site of certain bureaucrats in the Presidential Administration and among the representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.”
Asked to name names, Niyazov demurs, preferring instead to talk about those within the upper reaches of the Russian power elite whom he considers to be sympathetic and supportive of Islam. Among those he singles out is Vladislav Surkov in the Presidential Administration who Niyazov says plays a central role in ethnic and religious policy making.
“Despite the lack of a systemic and strategically constructed nationality policy in [Russia], Niyazov says, the relative inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace that exists is largely due to “the social-political construction developed [over the last decade] with the immediate participation of Surkov.”
“I personally know Vladislav Yuryevich very well,” Niyazov continues, “and know him as a tolerant individual,” the product of “a multi-naitonal and multi-religious family” and thus someone who “understands all the importance” of approaching the sphere of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations with extreme care.
Some of those who work around Surkov have shown less sympathy and understanding, Niyazov suggests, and points to the creation of the new Muslim inter-religioual organization, RAIS, as an example of their work. And when asked why Surkov met with the leaders of that group, Niyazov suggested that the Presidential aide wanted to assess the situation personally.
In the course of the extensive interview, Niyazov comments on many things ranging from the state of Islamic practice in the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga – he sees positive trends in both – to the recent attacks on Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), who the Muslim educator says has been misunderstood.
But he concludes his comments by pointing to three major problems for Muslims in Russia today. First, there are the conflicts arising from efforts to build new mosques in major Russian cities. Second, the banning of Muslim books by local courts who often act without expertise is troubling.
And third, there is the key problem of how policies in this sector are made. According to Niyazov, there needs to be “a systemic elaboration of [policies about] inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in [Russia],” something that will involve a large number of people and not just “five or six bureaucrats” in the top ranks of the Kremlin and the government.
Vienna, January 12 – Moscow’s policies on nationality and religion are controlled by a group of “five or six bureaucrats” in the Presidential Administration and council of ministers staff, an arrangement that must be changed if the country is to overcome its increasingly serious ethnic and religious problems, according to a leading Muslim scholar.
While some of those involved are entirely competent, Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, the president of the Islamic Cultural Center, told Portal-Credo.ru, both their small number and the closed nature of decision making in these areas are major sources of the country’s difficulties (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=81750&type=view).
On the one hand, the current arrangement allows members of “the anti-Muslim lobby” to influence outcomes without being forced to defend themselves in the course of the free flow of debate. And on the other, he says, it means that Moscow’s decisions are both less well-formulated than they might be and inevitably less legitimate in the eyes of the population.
Recent events and commentaries show, Niyazov says clarly show that in Russia today, “there is a very strong anti-Islamic lobby. Islamophobes are represented in the power structures, in the law enforcement system, in the mass media, and unfortunately in the system of the fraternal for us Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
“And what is still more surprising,” he continues, is that there not a few supporters [of this lobby] in the Muslim structures as well.”
The lobby consists of two groups “the ultra-liberals” and “the chauvinists and ultra-nationalists,” who agree on little else except “their dislike and even hatred of our religion,” a reflection of their limited knowledge about Islam and either “nearsightedness or conscious lack of a desire to see Russia strong, united and whole.”
One of the most publically prominent Islamophobes, the Muslim educator continues, is Roman Silantyev, but he is “not an independent figure” but instead serves as the mouthpiece of “the extreme Islamophobic wing of the Russian political and information elite.” In sum, he is “the tip of the iceberg” consisting of those among the powers that be who are opposed to Islam.
A segment of this group has found its way into “key information resources such as Interfax-Religiya, Muslim.su, “and certain others.” And these people enjoy “a definite protection from the site of certain bureaucrats in the Presidential Administration and among the representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church.”
Asked to name names, Niyazov demurs, preferring instead to talk about those within the upper reaches of the Russian power elite whom he considers to be sympathetic and supportive of Islam. Among those he singles out is Vladislav Surkov in the Presidential Administration who Niyazov says plays a central role in ethnic and religious policy making.
“Despite the lack of a systemic and strategically constructed nationality policy in [Russia], Niyazov says, the relative inter-ethnic and inter-religious peace that exists is largely due to “the social-political construction developed [over the last decade] with the immediate participation of Surkov.”
“I personally know Vladislav Yuryevich very well,” Niyazov continues, “and know him as a tolerant individual,” the product of “a multi-naitonal and multi-religious family” and thus someone who “understands all the importance” of approaching the sphere of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations with extreme care.
Some of those who work around Surkov have shown less sympathy and understanding, Niyazov suggests, and points to the creation of the new Muslim inter-religioual organization, RAIS, as an example of their work. And when asked why Surkov met with the leaders of that group, Niyazov suggested that the Presidential aide wanted to assess the situation personally.
In the course of the extensive interview, Niyazov comments on many things ranging from the state of Islamic practice in the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga – he sees positive trends in both – to the recent attacks on Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), who the Muslim educator says has been misunderstood.
But he concludes his comments by pointing to three major problems for Muslims in Russia today. First, there are the conflicts arising from efforts to build new mosques in major Russian cities. Second, the banning of Muslim books by local courts who often act without expertise is troubling.
And third, there is the key problem of how policies in this sector are made. According to Niyazov, there needs to be “a systemic elaboration of [policies about] inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in [Russia],” something that will involve a large number of people and not just “five or six bureaucrats” in the top ranks of the Kremlin and the government.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
