Paul Goble
Vienna, January 11 – A sense that Russia is once again on the verge of radical but unpredictable change is “hanging in the air” in Moscow, according to a leading Russian commentator, something that is generating apocalyptic predictions but not yet the political forces that could actually bring them about.
In an essay in yesterday’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Antoly Bernshtein says that this sense is infecting almost everyone. Ever more people in the population are becoming concerned, and ever more members of the powers that be, “occupied with their vertical, are not able to control the state” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10710).
And the sense that Russia has just heard the “overture” and will soon here the entire piece has only intensified over the last week weeks, with the clashes in the Manezh Square and the new sentences for Khodorkovsky and Lebedev leading to ever more speculation about what will happen next.
That is because these events have intensified the feelings that ever more Russians have come to share over the last year, namely, that “the case is not about ‘particular shortcomings’ … but rather than ‘something is rotten in the Kingdom of Denmark’” and that consequently something has to happen.
During 2010, Bernshtein says, various “initiatives in the localities” and “from below” have “clearly intensified,” including such people as the Primorsky partisans, the football radicals, the Khimki defenders, the automobile owners “who spoke out against” special privileges for the elite and the architects who did the same against the tearing down of historical monuments.
And that enumeration of growing popular unhappiness, the “Yezhednevny Zhurnal” writer continues, does not even include the political activities and protests of “the systemic opposition” which despite everything tried to secure its position and expand its reach into the population.
The foreign policy achievements the regime talked so much about in 2010, including the reset with the US and talks about possible visa free travel with the European Union, he points out, “have had practically no impact on the social-political situation within the country,” something that throws into sharp relief Russia’s mounting domestic problems.
In this environment, Bernshtein says that there is a sense that there might even be an attempt to restore order “by extraordinary measures,” adding that he personally “does not exclude” an August 1991-style coup – although it remains unclear just who would lead it or what “they would be saving.”
But at the same time, he notes, “so many similar apocalyptic predictions have not proved to be true,” that perhaps nothing dramatic will happen at all, that Russians will be prepared to wait for the 2012 elections and the powers that be will display “the instinct of self-preservation” by promoting “stability or stagnation … which many value.”
That is what many of his friends tell him, Bernshtein says, when he shares his “neurotic expectations of cataclysms ahead.” But despite their reassurance, it strikes him and many that “there is too much dissatisfaction of various kinds and too much aggression build up in people” for things to continue as they have.
“The polarization in society is too great,” he adds, suggesting that while “at one time, people spokes about the existence of “two nations in Russia, the intelligentsia and the people,” today, it seems there are still more” and that the differences among people are not simply socio-cultural but mental.”
In today’s Russia, “many people live as if they were foreigners.” And the only reality is that “each is for himself.” There is no clear way forward in any direction, Bernshtein suggests, but “one must not forget that there are limits to fear and to the much ballyhooed indifference” of the Russian population.
As for himself, Bernshtein concludes, he has “a strange sense of a shift toward other times.” The last decade has passed “not only on the calendar but symbolically as a certain era of stable stagnation” compared to “the wild 1990s.” And as a result, “the sense of change is hanging in the air” but in just what direction the wind is blowing is still impossible to say.
It remains, as the weather forecasters routinely point out, “changeable.”
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Window on Eurasia: Internet Can Help Consolidate Dispersed Nations like the Tatars, Expert Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 11 – The Tatar segment of the Internet can play a key role in the consolidation of that widely dispersed nation, providing a virtual meeting place in which Tatars regardless of where they live can come together, share ideas, and recognize their commonalities, according to a leading specialist on the web in the Russian Federation.
But unfortunately, Aynur Sibgatullin says, despite the explosive growth in the number and quality of Tatar sites, which may be collectively designated as “Tatnet,” “the obverwhelming majority of Tatars do not even suspect the possibilities which they could make use of thanks to [that segment of the Internet]” (tatar-tribun.ru/news/tatarskij-internet.html#more-1213).
To give some indication of the density and richness of this segment of the web, Sibgatullin lists some of the most important sites. In his article, each of these is available via hypertext links, making his survey especially useful not only for Tatars but also for other national groups considering developing this virtual space and for students of both.
The Republic of Tatarstan maintains an official server, “a unique kind of visiting card” for Kazan which contains both information about and links to the basic structures of the state, the media, educational institutions, a “Who’s Who” of Tatars, and the personal sites of both the former and current presidents of the republic.
Another site that is especially useful is the collective web server of the Civil Society network of Tatarstan that is operated by Kazan State University. Here there are links to individual educational institutions and scholars, to academic journals and publications, and to sources on the history, culture, and religion of the republic and nation.
The Tatnet also features numerous media outlets, including Tatasr-Inform, TatNews.ru, Intertat, and various newspapers including electronic versions of “Tatarstan Republic,” “Tatar Kray,” “Moskovsky komsomolets v Tatarstane,” “Vechernyaya Kazan,” and journals like “Tatarstan.” And there are Tatasr outlets like “Tatar donyasi” and “Azatlyk.”
In addition, the Tatnet features several Tatar radio stations whose programming is streamed including Dulkyn and Radio Liberty in Tatar and Bashkir. And it has analytic reports from among others, Panorama-Forum, EAWARN for the Volga Federal District, and the ethnological monitoring conducted by R. Abdurakhmanov and E. Mavrina.
Many Tatar cities have their own sites, with Kazan having a disproportionate number. Increasingly, Sibgastullin continues, companies and even individuals in the republic are creating and maintaining frequently updated sites as well. And he calls attention to sites operated by libraries and specialized research centers.
“With the appearance of the Internet, ethnic Tatars living beyond the borders of the Republic Tatarstan acquired a unique opportunity to order an acquire through the net Tastsar books, audio and video materials, and perhaps most importantly textbooks on Tatar language through a range of online stores.
Because most Tatars live beyond the borders of Tatarstan, the Tatnet is thus serving as a virtual space in which all of them can come together, something Tatars in Kazan have long dreamed of but up until now they have not the possibility of arranging. That is likely to have profound effects for the maintenance of Tatar identity across the Russian Federation.
But equally important, the Tatnet represents the latest way in which the Kazan Tatars have served as the model for other dispersed nationalities in the Russian Federation and as an indication to all that far more can now be learned about themselves and these others by those far away thanks to the world wide web than many people currently assume.
Vienna, January 11 – The Tatar segment of the Internet can play a key role in the consolidation of that widely dispersed nation, providing a virtual meeting place in which Tatars regardless of where they live can come together, share ideas, and recognize their commonalities, according to a leading specialist on the web in the Russian Federation.
But unfortunately, Aynur Sibgatullin says, despite the explosive growth in the number and quality of Tatar sites, which may be collectively designated as “Tatnet,” “the obverwhelming majority of Tatars do not even suspect the possibilities which they could make use of thanks to [that segment of the Internet]” (tatar-tribun.ru/news/tatarskij-internet.html#more-1213).
To give some indication of the density and richness of this segment of the web, Sibgatullin lists some of the most important sites. In his article, each of these is available via hypertext links, making his survey especially useful not only for Tatars but also for other national groups considering developing this virtual space and for students of both.
The Republic of Tatarstan maintains an official server, “a unique kind of visiting card” for Kazan which contains both information about and links to the basic structures of the state, the media, educational institutions, a “Who’s Who” of Tatars, and the personal sites of both the former and current presidents of the republic.
Another site that is especially useful is the collective web server of the Civil Society network of Tatarstan that is operated by Kazan State University. Here there are links to individual educational institutions and scholars, to academic journals and publications, and to sources on the history, culture, and religion of the republic and nation.
The Tatnet also features numerous media outlets, including Tatasr-Inform, TatNews.ru, Intertat, and various newspapers including electronic versions of “Tatarstan Republic,” “Tatar Kray,” “Moskovsky komsomolets v Tatarstane,” “Vechernyaya Kazan,” and journals like “Tatarstan.” And there are Tatasr outlets like “Tatar donyasi” and “Azatlyk.”
In addition, the Tatnet features several Tatar radio stations whose programming is streamed including Dulkyn and Radio Liberty in Tatar and Bashkir. And it has analytic reports from among others, Panorama-Forum, EAWARN for the Volga Federal District, and the ethnological monitoring conducted by R. Abdurakhmanov and E. Mavrina.
Many Tatar cities have their own sites, with Kazan having a disproportionate number. Increasingly, Sibgastullin continues, companies and even individuals in the republic are creating and maintaining frequently updated sites as well. And he calls attention to sites operated by libraries and specialized research centers.
“With the appearance of the Internet, ethnic Tatars living beyond the borders of the Republic Tatarstan acquired a unique opportunity to order an acquire through the net Tastsar books, audio and video materials, and perhaps most importantly textbooks on Tatar language through a range of online stores.
Because most Tatars live beyond the borders of Tatarstan, the Tatnet is thus serving as a virtual space in which all of them can come together, something Tatars in Kazan have long dreamed of but up until now they have not the possibility of arranging. That is likely to have profound effects for the maintenance of Tatar identity across the Russian Federation.
But equally important, the Tatnet represents the latest way in which the Kazan Tatars have served as the model for other dispersed nationalities in the Russian Federation and as an indication to all that far more can now be learned about themselves and these others by those far away thanks to the world wide web than many people currently assume.
Window on Eurasia: Iran Setting the Stage for a Hezbollah-Type Threat in Tajikistan, Dushanbe Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 11 – Iran’s increasingly active effort to spread Shiite Islam in Tajikistan, a project that over the past year has boosted the share of the followers of that trend from nine to 30 percent of all Tajiks, is laying the groundwork for a Tehran-controlled Hezbollah-type challenge to Dushanbe, according to an analyst based in that Central Asian republic.
In an article on the Centrasia.ru portal yesterday, Mikhal Kalantarov says that behind the positive public face of relations between Tajikistan and Iran over the past decade, relations that reflect their common language, “something terrible” has been going on that Dushanbe officials have been reluctant to pay attention to (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1294665480).
That consists of the effort of “certain interested circles in Iran [to] actively disseminate the ideas of Shiism on the territory of our country,” a republic whose people have traditionally followed Sunni Islam and who have viewed their attachment to this dominant trend within the faith as the major distinguishing factor between themselves and the Iranians.
Particularly active in this regard, Kalantarov says, has been the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe in the months since May 2010. Its officers have organized meetings in various Tajik cities in which they have sought to promote Shiism, despite the fact that Dushanbe has been trying to “normalize the religious situation in the country.”
Indeed, the commentator says, it turns out that “our ‘fraternal Iran’” is in this way undercutting the efforts of the Tajik government with regard to Islam and thus further exacerbating still further the international political situation in Tajikistan which “even without this” is growing more troubling.
.Iranian diplomats have also been organizing courses in which Tajiks learn foreign languages and how to use the Internet, but these supposedly religiously neutral activities in fact are being used by the Iranians as a way of attracting young Tajiks to Iranian Shiite literature and even to study in Iranian educational institutions.
“However,” Kalantarov continues, Iran’s efforts “are not limited to only this.” Its diplomats are actively recruiting Tajiks for Tehran’s “selfish goals.” In the 2010-2011 academic year, for example, some 70 Tajiks aged 14 to 16 are studying in an Iranian religious college that has been set up in Dushanbe, and many of its graduates are set to continue studying in Iran.
There is also an Iranian-supported medrassah that has been attached to the Tajik Muslim Spiritual Administration (MSD). “More than 10 percent of the instructors” of this institution are Iranian citizens, they train some 200 Tajik middle school graduates each year, and four to five of the graduates are sent on to theological centers in Iran.
What happens to these Tajik students there is especially worrisome. In the Iranian city of Zakheday, there are dozens of medrassahs in which Tajik students are enrolled. “Many of them,” Kalantarov says, “are subsequently sent to the camps of Al-Qaeda militants located on the territory of neighboring Pakistan.”
When these Tajik graduates of Iranian institutions return to their homeland, they threaten to become “suitable instruments in the distribution of the ideas of Shiism in Tajikistan,” often serving in mosques and working to redirect Tajik Muslims into the Iranian fold to the detriment of national identity.
Moreover, he continues, “the employees of the Iranian diplomatic mission without particular difficulties are able to buy off our corrupt religious leaders.” Not long ago, Kalantarov reports, the Tajik authorities arrested one such Shiite leader “for disseminating among his parishioners religiously extremist ideas.”
But this Iranian effort is not just about Islam. “Today,” Kalantarov notes, “Iran is the initiator and sponsor of extremist organizations of the Shiite trend in Middle Eastern countries,” organizations like Hezbollah. And it is “perfectly clear that Iran could use a similar scenario in Tajikistan as well.”
Consequently, he says, Tajik officials should be more attentive to what the Iranians are doing in this regard lest, in the wake of some explosion, they find themselves facing a well-organized and funded opponent within the borders of their country that is controlled and directed by a foreign power.
Vienna, January 11 – Iran’s increasingly active effort to spread Shiite Islam in Tajikistan, a project that over the past year has boosted the share of the followers of that trend from nine to 30 percent of all Tajiks, is laying the groundwork for a Tehran-controlled Hezbollah-type challenge to Dushanbe, according to an analyst based in that Central Asian republic.
In an article on the Centrasia.ru portal yesterday, Mikhal Kalantarov says that behind the positive public face of relations between Tajikistan and Iran over the past decade, relations that reflect their common language, “something terrible” has been going on that Dushanbe officials have been reluctant to pay attention to (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1294665480).
That consists of the effort of “certain interested circles in Iran [to] actively disseminate the ideas of Shiism on the territory of our country,” a republic whose people have traditionally followed Sunni Islam and who have viewed their attachment to this dominant trend within the faith as the major distinguishing factor between themselves and the Iranians.
Particularly active in this regard, Kalantarov says, has been the Iranian embassy in Dushanbe in the months since May 2010. Its officers have organized meetings in various Tajik cities in which they have sought to promote Shiism, despite the fact that Dushanbe has been trying to “normalize the religious situation in the country.”
Indeed, the commentator says, it turns out that “our ‘fraternal Iran’” is in this way undercutting the efforts of the Tajik government with regard to Islam and thus further exacerbating still further the international political situation in Tajikistan which “even without this” is growing more troubling.
.Iranian diplomats have also been organizing courses in which Tajiks learn foreign languages and how to use the Internet, but these supposedly religiously neutral activities in fact are being used by the Iranians as a way of attracting young Tajiks to Iranian Shiite literature and even to study in Iranian educational institutions.
“However,” Kalantarov continues, Iran’s efforts “are not limited to only this.” Its diplomats are actively recruiting Tajiks for Tehran’s “selfish goals.” In the 2010-2011 academic year, for example, some 70 Tajiks aged 14 to 16 are studying in an Iranian religious college that has been set up in Dushanbe, and many of its graduates are set to continue studying in Iran.
There is also an Iranian-supported medrassah that has been attached to the Tajik Muslim Spiritual Administration (MSD). “More than 10 percent of the instructors” of this institution are Iranian citizens, they train some 200 Tajik middle school graduates each year, and four to five of the graduates are sent on to theological centers in Iran.
What happens to these Tajik students there is especially worrisome. In the Iranian city of Zakheday, there are dozens of medrassahs in which Tajik students are enrolled. “Many of them,” Kalantarov says, “are subsequently sent to the camps of Al-Qaeda militants located on the territory of neighboring Pakistan.”
When these Tajik graduates of Iranian institutions return to their homeland, they threaten to become “suitable instruments in the distribution of the ideas of Shiism in Tajikistan,” often serving in mosques and working to redirect Tajik Muslims into the Iranian fold to the detriment of national identity.
Moreover, he continues, “the employees of the Iranian diplomatic mission without particular difficulties are able to buy off our corrupt religious leaders.” Not long ago, Kalantarov reports, the Tajik authorities arrested one such Shiite leader “for disseminating among his parishioners religiously extremist ideas.”
But this Iranian effort is not just about Islam. “Today,” Kalantarov notes, “Iran is the initiator and sponsor of extremist organizations of the Shiite trend in Middle Eastern countries,” organizations like Hezbollah. And it is “perfectly clear that Iran could use a similar scenario in Tajikistan as well.”
Consequently, he says, Tajik officials should be more attentive to what the Iranians are doing in this regard lest, in the wake of some explosion, they find themselves facing a well-organized and funded opponent within the borders of their country that is controlled and directed by a foreign power.
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