Paul Goble
Vienna, January 4 – Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal for the creation of a non-ethnic Russian nation reflects a far deeper national problem: the inability of Russians to face up to their national history and thus their tendency to keep resuscitating ideas from the past under new names while ignoring the context in which they existed, a Moscow argues.
As a result, the introduction of some such revived ideas, which many find attractive, opens the door to the revival of still others which they would not choose at all, or creates a situation in which the revenants from the past either fail to work as intended or even create new disasters.
In an article yesterday on the portal of the Information-Analytic Center of Social-Political Processes in the Post-Soviet States at Moscow State University, Natalya Belova says talk about ideas like the an updated Soviet people “would be funny if they were not so sad” (http://www.ia-centr.ru/expert/9650/).
Of course, she continues, it is the case that “everything new is the well forgotten old” but because of “historical amnesia,” Russians and their leaders seem to believe that they can pluck one part of the past out of context and revive it successfully without the risk that other parts of that past will return or that the restoration of the part will fail.
Consequently, she suggests, Russians are now being “welcome[d] to the second edition of the Soviet empire,” with “an all-Russian patriotism” supported not by “an atheist ideology” but by the views of the Russian Orthodox Church, an arrangement that by its very nature given the diversity of society in Russia will create a new set of problems.
The nineteenth century Russian imperial slogan, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationhood,” was, Belova writes, “a brilliant formual which under the conditions of the development of the Russian state does not even require a re-naming of the components,” however much things have changed.
At least in part that is because, “after the departure of Boris Yeltsin,the residents of our boundless motherland literally became gifted with an extra-sensory perception – already befeo elections are held it was always understood who will win.” But that is not the only problem Russia faces.
After the Manezh violence, it is far from clear that its participants will agree to live peacefully with everyone else because “we after all are one nation” or that assertions of that kind “will solve existing problems. And this means, that beyond the sacramental phrase ‘[non-ethnic] Russian nation” stands Stalin and the authoritarianism of Soviet times.
“Of course,” Belova adds, “one should not fall into paranoia and prepare for a rebirth of the 1930s,” but it is also a mistake to accept the misconception that “this process will be easy and without problems.”
Ancient wisdom holds that “if you want peace, prepare for war,” the Moscow analyst says. “Evidently, Russia must be prepared for uprisings and disorders.” “The optimists say that changes require victims,” but Belova notes, “the pessimists express the view that nothing good can be expected” and that disaster at home and abroad awaits.
“The main problem of Russia,” Belova continues, “is that [Russians] are not able to deal with [their] past.” Far too easily, they “forget and do not notice that what is being offered as ‘new’ in fact is old and far from the best of that” and worse that a non-ethnic Russian nation will depend on “the cult of a particular person.”
For those who want an example, she says, consider today’s Kazakhstan “where Nursultan Nazarbayev has been able to strengthen inter-national and inter-ethnic accord,” an arrangement that works while he is in office but “with his departure the entire idea may fall into pieces” with all the ensuring consequences.
“In Russia, however, there is no one leader.” There is the tandem, whose members Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev appear to have decided that “our future” will be ‘an upgrade of the Soviet epoch,” something that should worry all who know even a little about that past.
“Nevertheless,” Belova says, “one has to hope for the best. As one popular film observed sometime ago, ‘life will find a way out,’ sooner or later.” But in the near term, there are few grounds for hope given the gap between the leaders who think that a single “non-ethnic Russian nation” can be created and a population which is increasingly diverse.
And it is right here, Belova concludes, where there is “in truth an explosive mixture: a country where between the powers and the population is an enormous gap filled with distrust, a lack of understanding, conflicts of ‘fathers and sons,’” and an increasing influx of migrants alongside a growing number of residents who don’t want them around.
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Window on Eurasia: ‘Wikileak-ization’ of Media Transforming Russian Politics, Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 4 – The ‘Wikileak-ization’ of Russian media, one of three major trends in the increasingly important electronic media there over the last year, is transforming Russian society and Russian politics more rapidly and fundamentally than are the actions of any leader or bureaucracy, according to a Moscow analyst.
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Kirill Martynov, the political editor of that publication, argues that in 2010, “television finally died,” having been “changed into a cheap product for citizens who are too lazy to click a mouse” and that consequently trends in the Internet define the media scene (russ.ru/pole/Esche-pyat-desyat-let-v-tom-zhe-duhe).
He suggests that the three most important of these over the last twelve months have been what he calls “the Wikileak-ization” of the media that the Internet has made possible, the rise of public spaces like Facebook as a political tool and resource, and the changed relationship between Russians an events, a relationship no longer mediated in the same way by officials.
According to Martynov, the “Wikileak-ization” of the media represents “a more positive symptom than some others because it means that increasingly traditional media are “feeding off information from blogs and social networks” rather than generating it on their own, something that has changed the nature of public journalism.
(This process, which means that the traditional media are increasingly aggregators of materials gathered by others, has gone so far in Russia that another Moscow commentator suggested last week that for the first time “the anonymous source” should be Russia’s person of the year (www.polit.ru/event/2010/12/30/4elovek.html).)
“An immediate effect” of this, Martynov continues, is that “censorship in the traditional sense is losing any meaning” and that suggestions about “the absence in Russia of freedom of expression are little by little being reduced in meaning” because almost everything that reaches the Internet passes beyond the ability of officials to control.
The WikiLeaks case shows that “even the most powerful national state on the planet, that of the United States, is not in a position in the instance of an eye to deal with Australian freek Julian Assange. And as a result of this change, “new types of censorship have arisen” which seek not to prevent but to provide a context to or a commentary on that which can’t be stopped.
Ths trend in the Russian media means that “there will gradually be ever more real politics in our society,” because the opposition now has “truly unlimited possibilities for struggle with the regime” allowing it to call into the streets “hundreds of thousands of people,” a resource that the opposition itself is only beginning to understand and exploit.
Another Internet change in Russia with political implications is the use of social sites like Youtube. Many who have been persecuted by the powers that be have turned to it, making Youtube itself “into a refuge for the condemned and despairing” lonely opponents of the regime” which could not play by the rules of society because that would condemn them to defeat.”
The Youtube “syndrome,” Martynov argues, is a less hopeful development because it “testifies to the extraordinarily deep illness of Russian society,” many of whose members recognize that using “the legal means of resolving conflicts, namely through the courts,” will not work for them.
The third trend in the Internet, however, is “connected with the rise of a civil society in Russia,” Martynov says, because it has changed the relationship between those who are directly involved in something be it an accident, a natural disaster or a political event and those who are learning about it from afar.
The Internet audience “finds out about a misfortune not from an abstract news reader with a professionally-concerned voice but from ‘friends’ even if they are ‘virtual.’ And we are ready to help them without an order from the bosses and without hoping that the bosses in general will act effectively in this situation.”
Sometimes this assistance is “completely symbolic” as when we share information with others. But even that “makes us “active participants,” and from that can come “more real help.” According to Martynovv, “such mutual help without an order [from above] is civil society.” And he proposes identifying January 1, 2011, as its “official birthday.”
But there are two other aspects worth noting, Martynov says. On the one hand, Russians are “so accustomed to our warm homes, lighted spaces, working televisions, a flood of information, an excess of entertainment, and ability to travel that “we sincerely believe that any spontaneous misfortune arises only because of a government failure.”
We are, he suggests, “children of stability and mortgages, when in reality we live on a planet forgotten by God in a second class solar system in a not particularly important galaxy.” That is something 2010 “taught us” or should have taught us” with its various natural disasters like the eruption of a volcano in Iceland that no government could do anything about.
And on the other, he concludes, while “political Russia” is focusing on 2011-2012 and the changes that will bring, “social Russia is trying to survive and economically to become better off. There is nothing new in this.” But more than that, it shows that Russia has become part of the “globalized world” and that its problems are Russia’s problems and vice versa.
Vienna, January 4 – The ‘Wikileak-ization’ of Russian media, one of three major trends in the increasingly important electronic media there over the last year, is transforming Russian society and Russian politics more rapidly and fundamentally than are the actions of any leader or bureaucracy, according to a Moscow analyst.
In an essay on the “Russky zhurnal” portal, Kirill Martynov, the political editor of that publication, argues that in 2010, “television finally died,” having been “changed into a cheap product for citizens who are too lazy to click a mouse” and that consequently trends in the Internet define the media scene (russ.ru/pole/Esche-pyat-desyat-let-v-tom-zhe-duhe).
He suggests that the three most important of these over the last twelve months have been what he calls “the Wikileak-ization” of the media that the Internet has made possible, the rise of public spaces like Facebook as a political tool and resource, and the changed relationship between Russians an events, a relationship no longer mediated in the same way by officials.
According to Martynov, the “Wikileak-ization” of the media represents “a more positive symptom than some others because it means that increasingly traditional media are “feeding off information from blogs and social networks” rather than generating it on their own, something that has changed the nature of public journalism.
(This process, which means that the traditional media are increasingly aggregators of materials gathered by others, has gone so far in Russia that another Moscow commentator suggested last week that for the first time “the anonymous source” should be Russia’s person of the year (www.polit.ru/event/2010/12/30/4elovek.html).)
“An immediate effect” of this, Martynov continues, is that “censorship in the traditional sense is losing any meaning” and that suggestions about “the absence in Russia of freedom of expression are little by little being reduced in meaning” because almost everything that reaches the Internet passes beyond the ability of officials to control.
The WikiLeaks case shows that “even the most powerful national state on the planet, that of the United States, is not in a position in the instance of an eye to deal with Australian freek Julian Assange. And as a result of this change, “new types of censorship have arisen” which seek not to prevent but to provide a context to or a commentary on that which can’t be stopped.
Ths trend in the Russian media means that “there will gradually be ever more real politics in our society,” because the opposition now has “truly unlimited possibilities for struggle with the regime” allowing it to call into the streets “hundreds of thousands of people,” a resource that the opposition itself is only beginning to understand and exploit.
Another Internet change in Russia with political implications is the use of social sites like Youtube. Many who have been persecuted by the powers that be have turned to it, making Youtube itself “into a refuge for the condemned and despairing” lonely opponents of the regime” which could not play by the rules of society because that would condemn them to defeat.”
The Youtube “syndrome,” Martynov argues, is a less hopeful development because it “testifies to the extraordinarily deep illness of Russian society,” many of whose members recognize that using “the legal means of resolving conflicts, namely through the courts,” will not work for them.
The third trend in the Internet, however, is “connected with the rise of a civil society in Russia,” Martynov says, because it has changed the relationship between those who are directly involved in something be it an accident, a natural disaster or a political event and those who are learning about it from afar.
The Internet audience “finds out about a misfortune not from an abstract news reader with a professionally-concerned voice but from ‘friends’ even if they are ‘virtual.’ And we are ready to help them without an order from the bosses and without hoping that the bosses in general will act effectively in this situation.”
Sometimes this assistance is “completely symbolic” as when we share information with others. But even that “makes us “active participants,” and from that can come “more real help.” According to Martynovv, “such mutual help without an order [from above] is civil society.” And he proposes identifying January 1, 2011, as its “official birthday.”
But there are two other aspects worth noting, Martynov says. On the one hand, Russians are “so accustomed to our warm homes, lighted spaces, working televisions, a flood of information, an excess of entertainment, and ability to travel that “we sincerely believe that any spontaneous misfortune arises only because of a government failure.”
We are, he suggests, “children of stability and mortgages, when in reality we live on a planet forgotten by God in a second class solar system in a not particularly important galaxy.” That is something 2010 “taught us” or should have taught us” with its various natural disasters like the eruption of a volcano in Iceland that no government could do anything about.
And on the other, he concludes, while “political Russia” is focusing on 2011-2012 and the changes that will bring, “social Russia is trying to survive and economically to become better off. There is nothing new in this.” But more than that, it shows that Russia has become part of the “globalized world” and that its problems are Russia’s problems and vice versa.
Window on Eurasia: FSB Continues KGB Practice of Setting Patriots and Liberals against Each Other, Former MVD General Says
Paul Goble
Vienna, January 4 – The Russian FSB is continuing the Soviet-era KGB practice associated with General Filip Bobkov of pushing liberals and patriots into fighting one another through the use of agents in both, according to a former MVD general who worked alongside the infamous Bobkov 25 years ago.
In an interview with RFE/RL’s Russian Service, Vladimir Ovchinsky, an ex-MVD major general who later headed the Russian section of Interrpol, said that recent events strongly suggest that Russia has been marching “a closed circle for more than 20 years” as far the way in which security agencies deal with protests (www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2262376.html).
Ovchinsky said that the clash in Manezh Square caused him to recall his service in the MVD in the mid- to late- 1980s when he was responsible for countering crime among young people in Moscow, an experience that proved to him that some officials were provoking nationalists while others were horrified by that.
At that time, he told RFe/RL’s Mikhail Shevelev, “there were two wins in the KGB. One, counter-intelligence, assessed the situation quite accurately, [but] the other, the Fifth Chief Directorate, attempted to make use of the Lyubertsy, the fascists, and directed them against pro-Western youth groups.”
The former MVD officer said that the comment of Filipp Bobkov, the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR about this was “well known.” According to Bobkov, the story has it, “he had in his office two safes: in one were the dossiers of those who called themselves Russian patriots and in the other those who listed themselves among the democrats.”
“And among the first and also among the second are both sincere people and paid agents” of the authorities, Bobkov remarked.
Ovchinnikov said that in his view, this “two-handed game is continuing even now. Neither the system, nor the ideology nor the situation has changed.” And he noted that the fact that there is a minister in the Russian Federation government by the name of Yakemenko who a little more than two decades ago was a Lyubertsy is significant.
Moreover, the longtime MVD officer continued, the slogan “Moscow for All!” clearly appears to be “a logical response to the slogan ‘Moscow for the Muscovites!’” and thus highlights the way in which the powers that be at the present time may be trying to balance one group off against another.
“To go out and say that we are for internationalism and that we support the idea of Moscow being open to all is certainly not a bad thing,” Ovchinnikov continued. “But it is categorically insufficient for the resolution of the most serious problems” which face Russia now. Indeed, it may be a distraction and even an intended one.”
Unfortunately, he said, “everyone – the powers that be, the liberals and the patriots are ignoring these problems,” at the root of which the MVD officer said was the vacuum created by the absence of “a single state ideology,” a vacuum that he suggested will be filled “not by democratic ideals but by fascist ones.”
Ovchinnikov said that it is absolutely necessary to talk about what his interviewer called “the main problem, the absence of a state” rather than act as if everything is basically all right and that “the single unresolved problem” consists of those with nationalist views, The problem Russia faces is much bigger and deeper than that, the former MVD general said.
While there are many parallels with the 1980s, he argued, the situation is “much more terrible” today because there are deeper social divisions and more clearly separable groups, including ethnic ones. Both liberals and patriots need to acknowledge that if there is any hope of moving forward.
“It would be a good thing for a state to speak the truth. You are a national patriot?” Ovchinnikov said, then “say aloud that Kvachkov is a fascist and a provocateur. You liberals! Stand up and say that what we have now is to a large extent the result of those errors which were committed in the 1990s.”
Until that happens, he suggested, official provocations are going to continue because they will continue to be effective, because they will continue to distract attention from real problems and because they will continue to sow the kind of trust that precludes the formation of the networks of trust that are the foundation of any genuine and effective civil society.
Vienna, January 4 – The Russian FSB is continuing the Soviet-era KGB practice associated with General Filip Bobkov of pushing liberals and patriots into fighting one another through the use of agents in both, according to a former MVD general who worked alongside the infamous Bobkov 25 years ago.
In an interview with RFE/RL’s Russian Service, Vladimir Ovchinsky, an ex-MVD major general who later headed the Russian section of Interrpol, said that recent events strongly suggest that Russia has been marching “a closed circle for more than 20 years” as far the way in which security agencies deal with protests (www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/2262376.html).
Ovchinsky said that the clash in Manezh Square caused him to recall his service in the MVD in the mid- to late- 1980s when he was responsible for countering crime among young people in Moscow, an experience that proved to him that some officials were provoking nationalists while others were horrified by that.
At that time, he told RFe/RL’s Mikhail Shevelev, “there were two wins in the KGB. One, counter-intelligence, assessed the situation quite accurately, [but] the other, the Fifth Chief Directorate, attempted to make use of the Lyubertsy, the fascists, and directed them against pro-Western youth groups.”
The former MVD officer said that the comment of Filipp Bobkov, the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR about this was “well known.” According to Bobkov, the story has it, “he had in his office two safes: in one were the dossiers of those who called themselves Russian patriots and in the other those who listed themselves among the democrats.”
“And among the first and also among the second are both sincere people and paid agents” of the authorities, Bobkov remarked.
Ovchinnikov said that in his view, this “two-handed game is continuing even now. Neither the system, nor the ideology nor the situation has changed.” And he noted that the fact that there is a minister in the Russian Federation government by the name of Yakemenko who a little more than two decades ago was a Lyubertsy is significant.
Moreover, the longtime MVD officer continued, the slogan “Moscow for All!” clearly appears to be “a logical response to the slogan ‘Moscow for the Muscovites!’” and thus highlights the way in which the powers that be at the present time may be trying to balance one group off against another.
“To go out and say that we are for internationalism and that we support the idea of Moscow being open to all is certainly not a bad thing,” Ovchinnikov continued. “But it is categorically insufficient for the resolution of the most serious problems” which face Russia now. Indeed, it may be a distraction and even an intended one.”
Unfortunately, he said, “everyone – the powers that be, the liberals and the patriots are ignoring these problems,” at the root of which the MVD officer said was the vacuum created by the absence of “a single state ideology,” a vacuum that he suggested will be filled “not by democratic ideals but by fascist ones.”
Ovchinnikov said that it is absolutely necessary to talk about what his interviewer called “the main problem, the absence of a state” rather than act as if everything is basically all right and that “the single unresolved problem” consists of those with nationalist views, The problem Russia faces is much bigger and deeper than that, the former MVD general said.
While there are many parallels with the 1980s, he argued, the situation is “much more terrible” today because there are deeper social divisions and more clearly separable groups, including ethnic ones. Both liberals and patriots need to acknowledge that if there is any hope of moving forward.
“It would be a good thing for a state to speak the truth. You are a national patriot?” Ovchinnikov said, then “say aloud that Kvachkov is a fascist and a provocateur. You liberals! Stand up and say that what we have now is to a large extent the result of those errors which were committed in the 1990s.”
Until that happens, he suggested, official provocations are going to continue because they will continue to be effective, because they will continue to distract attention from real problems and because they will continue to sow the kind of trust that precludes the formation of the networks of trust that are the foundation of any genuine and effective civil society.
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