Paul Goble
Staunton, December 31 – Filaret, the patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, said yesterday that Moscow has put in place a plan to split and destroy his patriarchate and that it has assigned “the main role in this plan to the organs of state power in Ukraine” rather than in the past to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Expressing his regret for talking about unpleasant realities on the eve of holidays, Filaret said in his declaration that “the rapid development of events and the increase in pressure on the Kyivan Patriarchate had forced him to take this step in order to mobilize Ukrainians against its realization (www.cerkva.info/ru/news/patriarkh/1143-zajava-patr.html).
Filaret said that the plan to destroy the Ukrainian Patriarchate had been “created in Moscow and proposed by Moscow Patriarch Kirill and his subordinates.” But according to the Ukrainian churchman, “the main role” in its implementation has been assigned to the Ukrainian government of President Viktor Yanukovich rather than to hierarchs subordinate to Moscow.
Last spring, Filaret noted, the Moscow Patriarchate as part of its preparation for Kirill’s visit to Ukraine dispatched agents to various oblasts of Ukraine to seek allies within the hierarchy of Filaret’s church. “But this plan failed,” the Kyiv patriarch said, and consequently, Moscow decided to try another approach.
Then, beginning this summer, he continued, reports came in to Kyiv that priests loyal to him had been summoned by government bureaucrats who questioned them as to why they were loyal to Filaret rather than to Kirill. And as of now, Filaret said, “in some bishoprics, up to 70 percent of the priests” had been subjected to such “pressure.”
In a number of these cases – and he provides details on several across Ukraine -- Filaret said, the local officials were supported “from offices in the capital,” a reference to Yanukovich’s regime. And “in all of these cases … the representatives of the Ukrainian authorities … acted in the interests of the Moscow Patriarchate” rather than in defense of religious freedom.
That will lead to trouble, Filaret said, although “at present” no one can say exactly where the next clashes between Ukrainian Orthodox and those who want to be subordinate to Moscow will break out. “But if the realization of the Moscow plan doesn’t stop, conflicts will arise in the future.”
To date, the combined Moscow church and Ukrainian government effort has “been able to find in the Kyiv Patriarchate only a few traitors” because most of its parishioners and priesthood remain loyal to the idea of an autocephalous Ukrainian church and do not want to be subordinate to a church in another country.
Filaret added that he was sure that this effort by Moscow in alliance with Ukrainian officials will generate “strong anger” among Ukrainians, a development that the Kyiv Patriarchate hopes can be avoided. But “in response to all our appeals to the authorities, we do not hear anything” except empty declarations about equal protection of all churches.
What is happening, the Kyiv patriarch warned, could reignite the church conflicts that marked the first decade of Ukraine’s post-Soviet existence, including the kind of violence that took place on July 18, 1995, when the Ukrainian militia beat those who were taking part in the funeral of the late Patriarch Volodymyr, an event known as “bloody Tuesday” in Ukraine.
“We are not afraid of new persecutions,” Filaret said. Nonetheless, he called on “all parishioners” to show “vigilance” and not allow the Moscow Patriarchate working together with Ukrainian officials to shift their congregations to the Russian church without the explicit consent of the members of these churches.
Filaret also called on “society and the international community [as well as journalists in Ukraine and abroad] to focus attention on [this latest] violation of the rights of the believers of the Kyiv Patriarchate and to the increase of pressure on our Church. Your voice must be raised in defense of the truth!’
The Moscow Patriarchate has three reasons for seeking to gain control of parishes and even entire bishoprics of the Kyiv Patriarchate. First of all, Kirill and the hierarchy oppose any autocephaly for the Ukrainian church. Second, nearly half of all the bishoprics of the Moscow Patriarchate are in Ukraine. And third, the Russian church has ties with business groups there.
Consequently, it is no surprise that the Moscow Patriarchate is continuing to put pressure on Filaret’s organization. But what is disturbing is that the Yanukovich government, apparently in its effort to curry favor with Moscow, appears to be working hand in glove with the Russian church against Ukrainian believers.
Such a combination is certain to disturb not only Filaret and his church but all Ukrainians who value the independence of their state and all people of good will who support the principles of freedom of religion. Clearly, President Yanukovich needs to consider whether he wants to continue to offend both groups.
Friday, December 31, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Putin’s Return to Presidency Wouldn’t ‘Automatically Solve Anything,’ Dugin Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 31 – “Russia is living through the end of the Putin cycle,” Aleksandr Dugin says, and consequently, “even if Putin will come back, his return will not automatically decide anything.” Instead, the Eurasianist commentator says, that step “will be not an answer but a new question.”
In an essay on the Evrazia site today, Dugin says that he along with many others feel that “together with the end of 2010 is ending a definite cycle in Russian politics” and that while those in power seek to “give the impression that all is as before,” this “does not convince anyone” that things are not shifting in a fundamental way (http://evrazia.org/article/1545).
Dugin begins with the assertion that “the power of Yeltsin in the 1990s was illegitimate” and that Vladimir Putin ultimately legitimized his position by taking steps like preventing the disintegration of Russia, building the vertical of power, driving the oligarchs out of politics, and strengthening the siloviki.
These steps “satisfied the majority” and made Putin “legitimate” both in comparison with Yeltsin and on his own. At the same time, however, Dugin argues that in comparison with Yeltsin, Putin turned only “90 degrees and not 180.” He stopped a process but he did not “turn onto a new direction.”
That was enough for the early 1990s and it is enough for those in Putin’s entourage who even now talk about preserving the status quo. But in fact, Dugin suggests, the last time Putin could have continued on that basis was in 2008 when he could have become “a ‘Russian Lukashenka, whom the masses would have loved, the elites feared, and the West hated.”
Instead, Putin “preferred to act differently” and to hand over the presidency to Dmitry Medvedev. “That meant the end” or at least the beginning of the end of the Putin cycle because it was “intended as a step toward liberalism, the West and the oligarchy” rather than a true continuation of what Putin had been doing up to then.
In the Russian system today, Dugin says, there are three “politological zones,” which he designates as “Russia-1,” “Russia-2,” and “Russia-3.” The first of these supports a continuation of the Putin compromise, something that is clearly impossible and would not be sustained even by Putin’s repudiation of Medvedev’s current approach.
The second, the Eurasian leader says, involves “pure Westernism, liberalism and reformism in the Yeltsin spirit” and seeks “modernization, democratization, rapprochement with the West, globalization and the destruction of the Putin vertical.” In short, Russia-2 is “the orange field.”
The third, Dugin says, is “the much less well-formed ideologically and organizationally position of the popular masses of Russia who are drawn to order, a strong power, social defense, nationalism and patriotism” and who don’t like “the Westernization of Russian society.” It is “an enormous social base but does not have in practice any political representation.”
Under Putin, the Russian political system was “dominated by Russia-1,” which situated itself between the “orange” Russia-2 and the “black” Russia-3. That ended with the emergence of the tandem in 2008, Dugin says, when a “gray” Russia emerged, given that Medvedev adopted a position between the “gray” compromise of the Putin system and the “orange” one of Russia-2.
Medvedev’s trajectory, the Eurasianist continues, is “from the gray toward the orange, and ir remains only to guess to what point it will go on this path.” One can “easily foresee” that it will lead to “the territorial disintegration of Russia, the sharpening of civil conflict, a revenge of the liberals, and a sharp decline in the importance of Russia in the international sphere.”
As for Putin, Dugin says, the former president should “logically” move in the direction of Russia-3 or “the black segment.” But “Putin is not moving in this direction and occupies precisely that place which he occupied earlier – in the middle of the gray zone.” And that points to a serious problem.
Putin, Dugin says, faces “a serious problem – the context [within which he must act ] has changed, but the forms of his political thought have remained the same.” In short, he has not adapted, and that in turn means that Putin is simply marking time, something that does not work to his benefit as Russia continues to evolve.
“Before our eyes,” the Eurasian leader argues, “the process of the disaggregation of the existing political system of Russia will begin in 2011: the zone of the gray segment will continually be reduced in size, while the ‘orange’ and the ‘gray’ (Russia-2 and Russia-3) will gather force.”
Consequently, Dugin says, “already now the split of the tandem cannot become aa real political event and enliven political processes.” And that in turn reflects the new reality that Putin’s “dominant” gray zone “has exhausted its resources. One must look beyond its borders.” Putin hasn’t done so, and unless he changes, his return by itself would not solve anything.
Staunton, December 31 – “Russia is living through the end of the Putin cycle,” Aleksandr Dugin says, and consequently, “even if Putin will come back, his return will not automatically decide anything.” Instead, the Eurasianist commentator says, that step “will be not an answer but a new question.”
In an essay on the Evrazia site today, Dugin says that he along with many others feel that “together with the end of 2010 is ending a definite cycle in Russian politics” and that while those in power seek to “give the impression that all is as before,” this “does not convince anyone” that things are not shifting in a fundamental way (http://evrazia.org/article/1545).
Dugin begins with the assertion that “the power of Yeltsin in the 1990s was illegitimate” and that Vladimir Putin ultimately legitimized his position by taking steps like preventing the disintegration of Russia, building the vertical of power, driving the oligarchs out of politics, and strengthening the siloviki.
These steps “satisfied the majority” and made Putin “legitimate” both in comparison with Yeltsin and on his own. At the same time, however, Dugin argues that in comparison with Yeltsin, Putin turned only “90 degrees and not 180.” He stopped a process but he did not “turn onto a new direction.”
That was enough for the early 1990s and it is enough for those in Putin’s entourage who even now talk about preserving the status quo. But in fact, Dugin suggests, the last time Putin could have continued on that basis was in 2008 when he could have become “a ‘Russian Lukashenka, whom the masses would have loved, the elites feared, and the West hated.”
Instead, Putin “preferred to act differently” and to hand over the presidency to Dmitry Medvedev. “That meant the end” or at least the beginning of the end of the Putin cycle because it was “intended as a step toward liberalism, the West and the oligarchy” rather than a true continuation of what Putin had been doing up to then.
In the Russian system today, Dugin says, there are three “politological zones,” which he designates as “Russia-1,” “Russia-2,” and “Russia-3.” The first of these supports a continuation of the Putin compromise, something that is clearly impossible and would not be sustained even by Putin’s repudiation of Medvedev’s current approach.
The second, the Eurasian leader says, involves “pure Westernism, liberalism and reformism in the Yeltsin spirit” and seeks “modernization, democratization, rapprochement with the West, globalization and the destruction of the Putin vertical.” In short, Russia-2 is “the orange field.”
The third, Dugin says, is “the much less well-formed ideologically and organizationally position of the popular masses of Russia who are drawn to order, a strong power, social defense, nationalism and patriotism” and who don’t like “the Westernization of Russian society.” It is “an enormous social base but does not have in practice any political representation.”
Under Putin, the Russian political system was “dominated by Russia-1,” which situated itself between the “orange” Russia-2 and the “black” Russia-3. That ended with the emergence of the tandem in 2008, Dugin says, when a “gray” Russia emerged, given that Medvedev adopted a position between the “gray” compromise of the Putin system and the “orange” one of Russia-2.
Medvedev’s trajectory, the Eurasianist continues, is “from the gray toward the orange, and ir remains only to guess to what point it will go on this path.” One can “easily foresee” that it will lead to “the territorial disintegration of Russia, the sharpening of civil conflict, a revenge of the liberals, and a sharp decline in the importance of Russia in the international sphere.”
As for Putin, Dugin says, the former president should “logically” move in the direction of Russia-3 or “the black segment.” But “Putin is not moving in this direction and occupies precisely that place which he occupied earlier – in the middle of the gray zone.” And that points to a serious problem.
Putin, Dugin says, faces “a serious problem – the context [within which he must act ] has changed, but the forms of his political thought have remained the same.” In short, he has not adapted, and that in turn means that Putin is simply marking time, something that does not work to his benefit as Russia continues to evolve.
“Before our eyes,” the Eurasian leader argues, “the process of the disaggregation of the existing political system of Russia will begin in 2011: the zone of the gray segment will continually be reduced in size, while the ‘orange’ and the ‘gray’ (Russia-2 and Russia-3) will gather force.”
Consequently, Dugin says, “already now the split of the tandem cannot become aa real political event and enliven political processes.” And that in turn reflects the new reality that Putin’s “dominant” gray zone “has exhausted its resources. One must look beyond its borders.” Putin hasn’t done so, and unless he changes, his return by itself would not solve anything.
Window on Eurasia: West Failing to Defend Its Values in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 31 – Even as some in Europe and the United States are taking pride in their criticism of Moscow’s persecution of Khodorkovsky, a Moscow commentator is warning that the West is failing to defend its values in the face of the rise of neo-totalitarian regimes in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus.
In an essay on Grani.ru, Dmitry Shusharin says that at present “as in earlier years,” Western elites are viewing “the social-political processes which are leading to the formation of regimes hostile to Europe’s Judeo-Christian civilization” as manifestations of “temporary difficulties” rather than of “an all-European crisis … of identity and values.”
What is going on, he suggests, is “the collusion of elites” and the willingness of “those who hold power in the free world” of hostile and for civilization fatal values and strivings as equal alternatives” rather than as a challenge that they must take up and win for themselves as well as for those suffering under these regimes (grani.ru/opinion/shusharin/m.184918.html).
“Soviet totalitarianism,” Shusharin continues, “was destroyed because Western elites from the outset did not accept the principles, habits and morals of the totalitarian elite” and because these elites both were “firm” in maintaining this position even as they showed “sympathy to the population of the totalitarian states.”
These values were manifested most clearly in Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech in which he talked about “the iron curtain” and Ronald Reagan’s Guildhall speech in which he identified the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” And they were largely maintained by Western leaders until the end of the USSR.
But, Shusharin argues, “over the last 20 years, precisely what Ronald Reagan warned about has taken place: Western elites have accepted the elites of the post-Soviet states just as they are.” And this is especially evident in the reaction of these elites to the rise of the “neo-totalitarianism” in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Lukashenka’s moves against his opponents in Belarus, the persecution of Khodorkovsky “and much else” in Russia, and Yanukovich’s efforts to put Yulia Timoshenka behind bars are things that “you cannot call anything but the liquidation of political competition.” And the fact that the three don’t get alone is “completely unimportant.”
“The elites of the three Eastern Slavic states, despite the political declarations and economic integration,” the Grani commentator continues, “are distancing themselves from Europe, by stopping the process of national genesis on their territories and throwing challenges to European identity and the European system of values.”
“That is the result of the two post-Soviet decades,” Shusharin says, “and it is one of the main problems of Europe and of Judeo-Christian civilization.” But tragically, he notes, “European elites do not recognize it,” in large part because “they are occupied with something else.”
The Moscow commentator cites the recent declaration of the Synod of the Greek Church in which the authors call for choosing happiness over freedom, just as Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor warned that people would do. That is how things stand “in one of the countries of the European Union” and why its elites are the way they are.
In this environment, Shusharin says, “there is nothing suprising” in the fact that “Putin’s spies” are able to buy off or corrupt “American parliamentarians and bureaucrats,” just as there is “nothing especially surprising in the career of former German Chancellor Schroeder” and others less well known.
“The corrupt integration of elites of the democratic and neo-totalitarian countries is what we have been observing in the last decade,” the Grani writer argues. And consequently it is time to say: “’Farewell, Fukuyama [who failed to recognize what totalitarianism had done, and] hello, Arendt [who did].’”
“Francis Fukuyama,” Shusharin notes, “was pleased like a child by the collapse of communist ideology because ‘the elite … which arose in the epoch of Brezhnev and Mao turned out to be more like the elite of Western countries with the same le vel of economic development than anyone could have predicted.’”
Such views, Shusharin continues, are an example of how far the current political elites of the West “are from Reagan’s clarity and firmness. But in a consumerist culture,” he says, “the pupil clearly went further than the teacher.”
In her classic “Origins of Totalitarianism,” Hannah Arendt made several observations that are even more relevant. She argued that in assessing totalitarian societies, it is a mistake to separate “domestic” and “foreign” as Western governments are inclined to do because such a system is “a disease of both the nation and the civilization as a whole.”
“Now,” Shusharin says, “to speak about this division is still more difficult and therefore neo-totalitarianism is more dangerous than its predecessor: it strives not toward isolation but toward integration” in order to gain “for its own needs the achievements of that civilization whose fundamental values and principles it both denies and destroys.”
Staunton, December 31 – Even as some in Europe and the United States are taking pride in their criticism of Moscow’s persecution of Khodorkovsky, a Moscow commentator is warning that the West is failing to defend its values in the face of the rise of neo-totalitarian regimes in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus.
In an essay on Grani.ru, Dmitry Shusharin says that at present “as in earlier years,” Western elites are viewing “the social-political processes which are leading to the formation of regimes hostile to Europe’s Judeo-Christian civilization” as manifestations of “temporary difficulties” rather than of “an all-European crisis … of identity and values.”
What is going on, he suggests, is “the collusion of elites” and the willingness of “those who hold power in the free world” of hostile and for civilization fatal values and strivings as equal alternatives” rather than as a challenge that they must take up and win for themselves as well as for those suffering under these regimes (grani.ru/opinion/shusharin/m.184918.html).
“Soviet totalitarianism,” Shusharin continues, “was destroyed because Western elites from the outset did not accept the principles, habits and morals of the totalitarian elite” and because these elites both were “firm” in maintaining this position even as they showed “sympathy to the population of the totalitarian states.”
These values were manifested most clearly in Winston Churchill’s Fulton speech in which he talked about “the iron curtain” and Ronald Reagan’s Guildhall speech in which he identified the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” And they were largely maintained by Western leaders until the end of the USSR.
But, Shusharin argues, “over the last 20 years, precisely what Ronald Reagan warned about has taken place: Western elites have accepted the elites of the post-Soviet states just as they are.” And this is especially evident in the reaction of these elites to the rise of the “neo-totalitarianism” in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Lukashenka’s moves against his opponents in Belarus, the persecution of Khodorkovsky “and much else” in Russia, and Yanukovich’s efforts to put Yulia Timoshenka behind bars are things that “you cannot call anything but the liquidation of political competition.” And the fact that the three don’t get alone is “completely unimportant.”
“The elites of the three Eastern Slavic states, despite the political declarations and economic integration,” the Grani commentator continues, “are distancing themselves from Europe, by stopping the process of national genesis on their territories and throwing challenges to European identity and the European system of values.”
“That is the result of the two post-Soviet decades,” Shusharin says, “and it is one of the main problems of Europe and of Judeo-Christian civilization.” But tragically, he notes, “European elites do not recognize it,” in large part because “they are occupied with something else.”
The Moscow commentator cites the recent declaration of the Synod of the Greek Church in which the authors call for choosing happiness over freedom, just as Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor warned that people would do. That is how things stand “in one of the countries of the European Union” and why its elites are the way they are.
In this environment, Shusharin says, “there is nothing suprising” in the fact that “Putin’s spies” are able to buy off or corrupt “American parliamentarians and bureaucrats,” just as there is “nothing especially surprising in the career of former German Chancellor Schroeder” and others less well known.
“The corrupt integration of elites of the democratic and neo-totalitarian countries is what we have been observing in the last decade,” the Grani writer argues. And consequently it is time to say: “’Farewell, Fukuyama [who failed to recognize what totalitarianism had done, and] hello, Arendt [who did].’”
“Francis Fukuyama,” Shusharin notes, “was pleased like a child by the collapse of communist ideology because ‘the elite … which arose in the epoch of Brezhnev and Mao turned out to be more like the elite of Western countries with the same le vel of economic development than anyone could have predicted.’”
Such views, Shusharin continues, are an example of how far the current political elites of the West “are from Reagan’s clarity and firmness. But in a consumerist culture,” he says, “the pupil clearly went further than the teacher.”
In her classic “Origins of Totalitarianism,” Hannah Arendt made several observations that are even more relevant. She argued that in assessing totalitarian societies, it is a mistake to separate “domestic” and “foreign” as Western governments are inclined to do because such a system is “a disease of both the nation and the civilization as a whole.”
“Now,” Shusharin says, “to speak about this division is still more difficult and therefore neo-totalitarianism is more dangerous than its predecessor: it strives not toward isolation but toward integration” in order to gain “for its own needs the achievements of that civilization whose fundamental values and principles it both denies and destroys.”
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