Paul Goble
Staunton, December 30 – President Dmitry Medvedev’s suggestion this week that “the idea of a ‘rossiiskaya natsiya’ of “Russian nation” is absolutely productive, and one need not be ashamed of using the term” has sparked dissent from those who insist that “rossiiskaya” is a non-ethnic political term while “natsiya” is an ethnic one by definition.
While some Russian commentators are expressing support for Medvedev’s idea because they see it as opening the way for the assimilation of non-Russians inside the country, most are objecting to this formulation as a contradiction in terms or one that threatens the Russian “natsiya” itself.
Those opposed note that the very idea of a “rossisskaya natsiya” appears to be Medvedev’s update of the “sovetsky narod” or “Soviet people” in the USSR, but they note that in Soviet times, not only academic specialists but party ideologists were careful to make the distinction between the non-ethnic “narod” and the inherently ethnic “natsiya.”
And they point out that under current conditions, Medvedev’s favored term neither has the ideological foundation that the idea of the Soviet people did or any place for the Russian nation, even though it appears to allow for the existence of all other ethnic communities in the country.
One of the sharpest criticisms reflecting this point of view has been offered by A.V. Borozdin in a comment to the Newsland.ru portal. The writer asks “just what is the ‘Rossiiskaya natsiya?” given that the first word always has been a political rather than an ethnic term and the latter has been an ethnic rather than a political one (newsland.ru/news/detail/id/607842/cat/94/).
“In the USSR, there was the Soviet people, there were [ethnic] Russians who united around themselves other peoples like the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Armenians and so on. This is the kind of matrix that our nano-kids are “attempting’ to copy” by “reinventing the bicycle” rather than going back and comparing the two terms.
Had Medvedev and his team done so, Borozdin continues, they would have seen that these two concepts, which to them seem so similar, are in fact very different. On the one hand, the “’Rossiiskaya natsia’ lacks the main element” that the Soviet people had, the ideology which held everything together and justified the actions of the state.
And on the other, the new term “lacks the core” of the Soviet people, the ethnic Russian nation. Within it, “there are Kyrgyz, Abkhaz, Tatars, Chechens, Daghestanis and even Chukchis, any nationality at all but NO [ethnic] Russians.” Consequently, there is neither an idea nor a human group to unite the population.
Instead, “there is only a common pot with the title ‘Rossiiskaya natsiya,’ in which we all are being cooked … [by] ‘events’ on Manezh Square, ‘developments’ in the Don camp, the Primorsky partisans” and all the rest, with nothing holding the various parts together except inertia and force.
Butakov says that “ever more often [he] hears from the first persons of the state that in Russia, there are no [ethnic] Russians; there are only [non-ethnic] ones.” Could it be that this is already the case, he asks bitterly, or are there still ethnic Russians who know they are a nation and not part of some artificial construct?
“It now seems to me,” Borozdin concludes, “judging b y the dynamic and acitons of our government that two nationalities are now pretending to be the root [of this new category]; the Chechens [and] the Daghestanis.” But such “a root,” regardless of what the current leaders think, will make it impossible for the tree of Russia to survive, let alone flourish.
Thursday, December 30, 2010
Window on Eurasia: For the 21st Century, Russia Needs a ‘Window on Asia,’ Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 30 – Peter the Great moved the Russian capital to Saint Petersburg to have “a window on Europe” which was then the most advanced place on earth, but now Moscow should consider moving the country’s capital in the Russian Far East to have “a window on Asia,” which is emerging as the most advanced continent in the 21st century.
That is the conclusion Russian nationalist commentator Yaroslave Butakov reaches on the basis of a survey of past Russian practice and the current state of discussions about the possibility that the Russian state will decide to move the country’s political capital away from Moscow (www.stoletie.ru/russkiiy_proekt/okno_v_aziju_2010-12-28.htm).
As Butakov points out, “conversations about shifting the capital” have been going on for some time but are now intensifying. Given Russia’s “enormous size,” he says, it might seem that there are a large number of possibilities, but in fact, “a careful consideration” of this issue shows that the number of good prospects “is not so large.”
One of the reasons this remains unclear to most people discussing this issue, Butakov says, is that they are talking about it not in terms of the needs of the country as a whole and over the long term but rather to solve particular regional problems. But “shifting the capital only for that end” is neither necessary nor sufficient.
At the same time, the opponents of shifting the Russian capital typically forget that regardless of what happens to the political center of the country, Moscow “all the same will play the role of New York. Only on an even greater scale,” especially given existing economic arrangements and inertia.
Despite the likelihood that current elites would pocket much of the money intended for the construction of a new capital and that the rest of the population would thus gain less than it should, Butakov continues, there is all the same good reason “to talk about shifting the capital of Russia if one adopts the perspective of the development of the country.”
Under the best circumstances, “shifting the capital ought to ‘kill several birds with one stone,’ that it,it should make possible the most successful and effective solution of many problems of the country among which helping Moscow solve its ‘overload’ is far from being the first.”
Among these problems could be the recovery of depressed regions, the re-industrialization of company towns, and the development of high technology industry, as well as the “more profitable and effective” participation in the international “division of labor” that is emerging.
Unlike many countries, Butakov points out, Russia has frequently changed the location of its capital over the last millennium. And as his survey of this history shows, it has done so for a variety of reasons, including political control, military security, and linking the country to more rapidly developing outside countries.
Today, most discussions about shifting the capital focus on the possibility of moving it to some existing city in Siberia, but if the capital were simply moved to Yekaterinburg or Krasnoyarsk, the country would gain “simply yet another megalopolis with all the problems common to that status.”
To avoid that outcome, Butakov argues, it is useful to remember why Petere the Great moved the Russian capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg at the start of the 18th century. He did it to open “a window on Europe,” to allow the ideas and developments in the most advanced continent of that time to flow into Russia.
While not everyone approved, Peter’s decision provides a model – but with this difference. Today, the most advanced region of the planet at least in prospect is not Western Europe but rather the Asian-Pacific region, as various experts including Henry Kissinger have pointed out over recent decades..
“For many,” Butakov acknowledges, “the idea of shifting the Russian capital to the Far East will seem absurd, exactly as the idea of buildings a new capital in the swampy mouth of the Neva seemed three hundred years ago.” But a careful consideration of taking this step shows that is just as correct as Peter’s was.
One of the chief objections to moving the capital, Butakov points out, is from this perspective one of the chief reasons for doing so. Just as Peter moved his capital to project power and to defend his conquests, so too moving the capital to the Far East would be a way of projecting power and defending Russian interests against a rising China.
And there is even a place, in the triangle of the cities of Svobodny, Shimanovsk and Uglegorsk in the Amur oblast which would help promote exactly that stance. There is already a military facility there, and plans are underway to move the Russian space port to the outskirts of Uglegorsk by 2018.
As Butakov relates, Yuri Krupnov, a longtime advocate of moving the capital eastward, pointed out at a press conference on December 23 (globalsib.com/9184/) putting the capital in that triangle would not only ensure that Russia would retain Siberia and the Far East but that this region would be linked to and thus become part of “ the center of world development.”
Staunton, December 30 – Peter the Great moved the Russian capital to Saint Petersburg to have “a window on Europe” which was then the most advanced place on earth, but now Moscow should consider moving the country’s capital in the Russian Far East to have “a window on Asia,” which is emerging as the most advanced continent in the 21st century.
That is the conclusion Russian nationalist commentator Yaroslave Butakov reaches on the basis of a survey of past Russian practice and the current state of discussions about the possibility that the Russian state will decide to move the country’s political capital away from Moscow (www.stoletie.ru/russkiiy_proekt/okno_v_aziju_2010-12-28.htm).
As Butakov points out, “conversations about shifting the capital” have been going on for some time but are now intensifying. Given Russia’s “enormous size,” he says, it might seem that there are a large number of possibilities, but in fact, “a careful consideration” of this issue shows that the number of good prospects “is not so large.”
One of the reasons this remains unclear to most people discussing this issue, Butakov says, is that they are talking about it not in terms of the needs of the country as a whole and over the long term but rather to solve particular regional problems. But “shifting the capital only for that end” is neither necessary nor sufficient.
At the same time, the opponents of shifting the Russian capital typically forget that regardless of what happens to the political center of the country, Moscow “all the same will play the role of New York. Only on an even greater scale,” especially given existing economic arrangements and inertia.
Despite the likelihood that current elites would pocket much of the money intended for the construction of a new capital and that the rest of the population would thus gain less than it should, Butakov continues, there is all the same good reason “to talk about shifting the capital of Russia if one adopts the perspective of the development of the country.”
Under the best circumstances, “shifting the capital ought to ‘kill several birds with one stone,’ that it,it should make possible the most successful and effective solution of many problems of the country among which helping Moscow solve its ‘overload’ is far from being the first.”
Among these problems could be the recovery of depressed regions, the re-industrialization of company towns, and the development of high technology industry, as well as the “more profitable and effective” participation in the international “division of labor” that is emerging.
Unlike many countries, Butakov points out, Russia has frequently changed the location of its capital over the last millennium. And as his survey of this history shows, it has done so for a variety of reasons, including political control, military security, and linking the country to more rapidly developing outside countries.
Today, most discussions about shifting the capital focus on the possibility of moving it to some existing city in Siberia, but if the capital were simply moved to Yekaterinburg or Krasnoyarsk, the country would gain “simply yet another megalopolis with all the problems common to that status.”
To avoid that outcome, Butakov argues, it is useful to remember why Petere the Great moved the Russian capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg at the start of the 18th century. He did it to open “a window on Europe,” to allow the ideas and developments in the most advanced continent of that time to flow into Russia.
While not everyone approved, Peter’s decision provides a model – but with this difference. Today, the most advanced region of the planet at least in prospect is not Western Europe but rather the Asian-Pacific region, as various experts including Henry Kissinger have pointed out over recent decades..
“For many,” Butakov acknowledges, “the idea of shifting the Russian capital to the Far East will seem absurd, exactly as the idea of buildings a new capital in the swampy mouth of the Neva seemed three hundred years ago.” But a careful consideration of taking this step shows that is just as correct as Peter’s was.
One of the chief objections to moving the capital, Butakov points out, is from this perspective one of the chief reasons for doing so. Just as Peter moved his capital to project power and to defend his conquests, so too moving the capital to the Far East would be a way of projecting power and defending Russian interests against a rising China.
And there is even a place, in the triangle of the cities of Svobodny, Shimanovsk and Uglegorsk in the Amur oblast which would help promote exactly that stance. There is already a military facility there, and plans are underway to move the Russian space port to the outskirts of Uglegorsk by 2018.
As Butakov relates, Yuri Krupnov, a longtime advocate of moving the capital eastward, pointed out at a press conference on December 23 (globalsib.com/9184/) putting the capital in that triangle would not only ensure that Russia would retain Siberia and the Far East but that this region would be linked to and thus become part of “ the center of world development.”
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Gets a Mufti
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 30 – Talgat Tajuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) based in Ufa, today appointed his first deputy, Albir Krganov, 34, who currently serves as mufti of the Chuvash Republic, to be the leader of a new MSD for Moscow and Central Russia subordinate to Tajuddin’s organization.
On the one hand, this represents the latest move in a broader campaign by Tajuddin and his backers against his rival, Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), and could set the stage for the longtime Ufa-based mufti to achieve his goal of becoming “the Muslim patriarch” of the Russian Federation.
The creation of a Central MSD is something that Tajuddin has long sought in order to bolster his claim to be the supreme mufti of the Russian Federation, and the establishment of this position, even if he does not personally occupy it, will boost his standing not only among the civil powers that be but also among many Muslim communities in that country.
And on the other, Krganov’s appointment is part of a generational change at the top of Russia’s Muslim leadership. The new Moscow mufti was not yet five years old when Tajuddin became head of the Central MSD, and unlike nearly all of the current leaders, he was trained exclusively at institutions within the Russian Federation.
A generation ago, Tajuddin was part of the youngest and last generation of Soviet Muslim leaders, and like most of its other members, he saw his position and influence dependent far less on the support of the Muslim faithful than on the backing of the state, a view that many believe continues to inform his practice and explains some of the political support he still has.
According to the Russian media, even after Krganov takes office as mufti of Moscow, he will remain head of the MSD of Chuvashia and first deputy head of the Central MSD in Ufa. But clearly most of his time, at least in the immediate future, will be devoted to convening a mejlis in the Russian capital to set up the MSD (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38942).
Krganov told Interfax that “the establishment of a muftiate of Moscow within the Central MSD of Russia is not an innovation: historically, Muslim structures [in the Russian capital] have always functioned under the jurisdiction of the Central MSD in UFA,” with the latter appointing the imams of Moscow’s mosques.
Since early 2000, the new mufti said, the Central MSD had made several attempts to create an MSD for Moscow and Moscow oblast, but it was “blocked” in its attempts by Gainutdin and his SMR, both of which enjoyed closer relations with former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
Krganov says that at the start, the new MSD will unite “the basic part of the Islamic communities of the region,” including two mosques in the city and the Islamic Center on Kasatkin Street – although he said the Central MSD “intends to return” the building of the latter because it had been a kindergarten and Moscow needs more of them.
The new mufti said that his basic responsibilities will be “to develop a constructive dialogue with the organs of power and with the traditional religions, to build a mosque and residence of the Central MSD of Russia in the capital, to strengthen work with Muslim youth, and ‘to direct all its influence and efforts to the preservation of peace and stability” there.
An ethnic Tatar who comes from a family of imams, Krganov was born in October 1976 in the village of Chkalovskoye in the Chuvash Republic. After graduating from local schools, he attended a medrassah in Kazan, two Islamic higher schools in Ufa, the Chuvash State University and the Russian Academy of State Service in Moscow (mishar.ucoz.ru/index/0-8).
At the age of 15, he became the muezzin and second imam of the Central Cathedral Mosque in Shygyrdan. The following year he was named deputy imam of the Kazan Muslim organization and curator for the republics of Chuvashia, Mordvinia, and Mari El. And then in 1993 – still only 17 – he became president of the Islamic Center of the Chuvash Republic.
In May 1994, Krganov’s rapid rise continued when he was chosen mufti and head of the MSD of the Chuvash Republic. Four years later, he was named head of the department of internal affairs and external relations of Tajuddin’s Central MSD, a post that brought him into contact with Muslim leaders across the Russian Federaiton.
In November 2005, Tajuddin named him first deputy chairman of the Central MSD and plenipotentiary representative of that organization to the Russian Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Central Federal District. During his time in Chuvashia, Krganov oversaw the construction of more than 40 mosques and a medrassah and was credited with maintaining Muslim unity there.
But perhaps the most important event in his career was Krganov’s development of close ties with Vladimir Putin. On December 31, 1999, the new mufti accompanied Putin on the latter’s visit to Chechnya. Later when Putin came to Chuvashia, the Russian leader praised Krganov for maintaining good relations among that republic’s ethnic and religious groups.
Staunton, December 30 – Talgat Tajuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) based in Ufa, today appointed his first deputy, Albir Krganov, 34, who currently serves as mufti of the Chuvash Republic, to be the leader of a new MSD for Moscow and Central Russia subordinate to Tajuddin’s organization.
On the one hand, this represents the latest move in a broader campaign by Tajuddin and his backers against his rival, Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR), and could set the stage for the longtime Ufa-based mufti to achieve his goal of becoming “the Muslim patriarch” of the Russian Federation.
The creation of a Central MSD is something that Tajuddin has long sought in order to bolster his claim to be the supreme mufti of the Russian Federation, and the establishment of this position, even if he does not personally occupy it, will boost his standing not only among the civil powers that be but also among many Muslim communities in that country.
And on the other, Krganov’s appointment is part of a generational change at the top of Russia’s Muslim leadership. The new Moscow mufti was not yet five years old when Tajuddin became head of the Central MSD, and unlike nearly all of the current leaders, he was trained exclusively at institutions within the Russian Federation.
A generation ago, Tajuddin was part of the youngest and last generation of Soviet Muslim leaders, and like most of its other members, he saw his position and influence dependent far less on the support of the Muslim faithful than on the backing of the state, a view that many believe continues to inform his practice and explains some of the political support he still has.
According to the Russian media, even after Krganov takes office as mufti of Moscow, he will remain head of the MSD of Chuvashia and first deputy head of the Central MSD in Ufa. But clearly most of his time, at least in the immediate future, will be devoted to convening a mejlis in the Russian capital to set up the MSD (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38942).
Krganov told Interfax that “the establishment of a muftiate of Moscow within the Central MSD of Russia is not an innovation: historically, Muslim structures [in the Russian capital] have always functioned under the jurisdiction of the Central MSD in UFA,” with the latter appointing the imams of Moscow’s mosques.
Since early 2000, the new mufti said, the Central MSD had made several attempts to create an MSD for Moscow and Moscow oblast, but it was “blocked” in its attempts by Gainutdin and his SMR, both of which enjoyed closer relations with former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
Krganov says that at the start, the new MSD will unite “the basic part of the Islamic communities of the region,” including two mosques in the city and the Islamic Center on Kasatkin Street – although he said the Central MSD “intends to return” the building of the latter because it had been a kindergarten and Moscow needs more of them.
The new mufti said that his basic responsibilities will be “to develop a constructive dialogue with the organs of power and with the traditional religions, to build a mosque and residence of the Central MSD of Russia in the capital, to strengthen work with Muslim youth, and ‘to direct all its influence and efforts to the preservation of peace and stability” there.
An ethnic Tatar who comes from a family of imams, Krganov was born in October 1976 in the village of Chkalovskoye in the Chuvash Republic. After graduating from local schools, he attended a medrassah in Kazan, two Islamic higher schools in Ufa, the Chuvash State University and the Russian Academy of State Service in Moscow (mishar.ucoz.ru/index/0-8).
At the age of 15, he became the muezzin and second imam of the Central Cathedral Mosque in Shygyrdan. The following year he was named deputy imam of the Kazan Muslim organization and curator for the republics of Chuvashia, Mordvinia, and Mari El. And then in 1993 – still only 17 – he became president of the Islamic Center of the Chuvash Republic.
In May 1994, Krganov’s rapid rise continued when he was chosen mufti and head of the MSD of the Chuvash Republic. Four years later, he was named head of the department of internal affairs and external relations of Tajuddin’s Central MSD, a post that brought him into contact with Muslim leaders across the Russian Federaiton.
In November 2005, Tajuddin named him first deputy chairman of the Central MSD and plenipotentiary representative of that organization to the Russian Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Central Federal District. During his time in Chuvashia, Krganov oversaw the construction of more than 40 mosques and a medrassah and was credited with maintaining Muslim unity there.
But perhaps the most important event in his career was Krganov’s development of close ties with Vladimir Putin. On December 31, 1999, the new mufti accompanied Putin on the latter’s visit to Chechnya. Later when Putin came to Chuvashia, the Russian leader praised Krganov for maintaining good relations among that republic’s ethnic and religious groups.
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