Paul Goble
Staunton, December 27 – As ethnic tensions in the Russian Federation have intensified, many non-Russian officials in the Middle Volga and North Caucasus have called for the re-establishment of the Ministry for Nationality Affairs that then-President Vladimir Putin disbanded in 2001.
But today, incumbent President Dmitry Medvedev said he would not take that step because such institutions, which people always call for when there is a problem, had not been effective in the past and would only create more bureaucracy rather than lead to better policies and inter-ethnic relations(www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/obshestvo/meznaz/30900.html).
He thus rebuffed calls this past week for the restoration of such an institution from the State Council of Tatarstan (karim-yaushev.ru/2010/12/24/1052/), the World Congress of Tatars (islamportal.ru/novosti/104/1354/), and a leader of the Moscow Daghestani community (www.sknews.ru/main/45052-rossiyu-spasti-ili-raschlenit.html), among others.
These and other advocates of the restoration of such a ministry argue that in a country as ethnically diverse as Russia, there needs to be a government institution with the responsibility and authority needed to develop a coordinated set of policies lest there be even more ethnic conflicts in the future.
And they look back to the existence of the People’s Commissariat of Nationality Affairs at the dawn of Soviet power (1917-1923) and at the Russian Federation Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy (1994-2001) as being such institutions and providing the non-Russians with a forum to present their grievances and ideas.
The advocates of a new nationalities ministry focus on the latter. It was created in January 1994 in place of the State Committee on the Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities and the State Committee for Social-Economic Development of the North. Initially called the Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Regional Policy, it was renamed the Minstry for Naitonality Affairs and Federal Relations in 1996.
In May 2000, this ministry was given additional responsibilities for regulating migration and renamed again, this time as the Ministry for Federation Affairs and National and Migraiton Policy. But on October 16, 2001, then-President Putin disbanded it, dividing its responsibilities among the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry for Economic Development.
Putin explained his action at the same as one intended to “optimize the structures of the federal organs of power.” But many people, especially among the non-Russians though then and now that he had disbanded the Nationalities Ministry as part of his broader drive to recentralize power in the Russian Federation and build his power vertical.”
As both Soviet and Russian experience showed, there is a fundamental problem with a ministry of this type. If it is given enough power to develop nationality policy across the board, it would become a super-ministry, one that would be giving orders to almost every other agency of the Russian state.
But if it does not have that kind of power, then it is difficult to see exactly what it will do that is not also being done by others, raising the question of whether it is an unnecessary redundancy and little more than a talk shop for non-Russian nationalities interested in having a venue to present their views.
Many in the Moscow expert community share those concerns, and in an article entitled, “The Spectre of a Nationalities Ministry is Wandering Through Russia,” journalist Yegor Maymushin concludes that academic specialists “do not see any sense in re-establishing” such a structure (www.dailyj.ru/articles/2010/12/24/79713.html).
Aleksandr Duka, head of the sociology of power and civil society sector of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said that the whole idea of creating such a structure “from the outset is not very clear” and that he thus opposes taking this step. Institutions already exist to do everything its backers say it would do.
The sociologist added that from his perspective, it is “doubly suspicious” that the chief advocates of a new nationalities ministry are from Tatarstan. “In this republic,” he noted, “there always were quite strong attitudes about a special relationship with Russia to the point of separation.”
Vladimir Gelman, a professor of political science at St. Petersburg’s European University, agreed. Moreover, he said, the previous incarnations of a nationalities ministry provided no basis for seeking a new one. These institutions “arose and then disappeared” without any real results being visible to anyone.
Medvedev’s decision today means that there won’t be a nationalities ministry any time soon, but those in the North Caucasus and the Middle Volga who believe it would help them are unlikely to stop pushing for one, especially because they have some allies in Moscow and because new ethnic clashes are likely to make their arguments more persuasive.
Monday, December 27, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow Promotes Nationalism to Direct Popular Anger Away from Itself, Mlechin Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 27 – In the tradition of its Soviet predecessors, the current Russian powers that be are promoting radical Russian nationalism not only because it reflects their own private views but because such feelings direct popular anger away from itself and toward labor migrants from the North Caucasus and Central Asia, a prominent Moscow publicist argues.
In an article in yesterday’s “Moskovsky Komsomolets,” Leonid Mlechin says that “nationalism in Russia has flourished because this is useful to the powers that be” because it redirects popular anger away from them and because nationalism “doesn’t require any rational arguments” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2010/12/26/555142-mastera-delit-i-vyichitat-.html).
Poll show that “the majority of the population willingly supports the slogan, ‘Russia for the Russians’ although the very same people will never permit the Caucasus to leave Russia” after two wars. Instead, Mlechin says, the slogan means for them that “non-Russian smust know their place, live where they were born, not come to [them], and not settle alongside [them].”
Despite its lack of rationality, Mlechin suggests that there are three ideas behind this slogan in the minds of most Russians. First, “all countries encounter problems with migration,” but Russians ignore the fact that for most countries, migrants are foreigners, while in Russia, they are Russian citizens.
Second, he continues, Russians believe that those who come act badly and that they must live “according to our rules.” But again many of the rules that the Russians say they want migrants to obey, such as avoiding the law and not bribing militiamen, are rules that the Russians themselves do not follow.
And third, Russians view them as “the other,” as people with “different mentality and different traditions,” who “do not want to follow generally acceptable norms.” But Russians get angry when Baltic officials make the same point about ethnic Russians living and working in those countries.
The migrants in Russian cities, even though those from the North Caucasus are Russian citizens, are considered to be “second class people” who must “follow [Russians] in order to learn good manners.” But “what example do we Muscovites show the guests of the capital?” Mlechin asks.
“Drunken cursing, crudeness, impoliteness, caddishness, and a lack of respect to the elderly and women – here, unfortunately, are what our street existence looks like,” the publicist says. And he argues that “only the ability to see one’s own shortcomings gives one the moral right to reproach others. But we forgive ourselves for what we won’t forgive others.”
In large measure, he continues, Russians do not like those who “look different,” something that means people do not ask themselves whether they are objecting to an action that anyone, including another Russian commit, or simply to someone who is different anthropologically.
Now some officials are talking about “creating ‘ethnic’ units within the militia.” Other countries have these, but they generally deal with foreigners “who poorly speak the state language.” But people from the Caucasus “are not foreigners. And the word ‘diaspora’ is not very appropriate” either.
That is because “the Chechens or the Daghestanis do not emigrate to Moscow but go to the capital of their own state. And they must be subordinate to a common law, and one must relate to them as to all other citizens of Russia,” something the Russian nationalists clearly have no desire to do.
Many in the Russian Federation today think that these divisions are all the product of post-Soviet developments. But in fact, they have their roots in Soviet reality, something that was carefully concealed by the Soviets until they burst on the scene during perestroika and contributed to the destruction of the USSR.
That country, Mlechin stresses, “was destroyed not by the efforts of liberally inclined dissidents. [It] was killed off by open nationalism.”
He gives several examples of this, including the insistence of Stalin’s officials that “Jews have not only a ‘passport’ difference from Russians,” Nursultan Nazarbayev’s statement in Soviet times that he and his Kazakhs were “second class” people, and the regret a Chuvash cosmonaut had that he could not go into space before the Russian Yuri Gagarin did.
As then, nowadays, “politicians unceasingly divide the people of Russia into their own and aliens, into ours and not ours, into indigenous and non-indigenous, into titular and non-titular, into true believers and those who believe otherwise.” Not surprisingly, young people absorb all this and act upon it.
What should be happening, Mlechin argues, is inculcating in the population “a sense of unity, community, and the solidarity of the people of Russia.” But for that to happen, “at a minimum there would have to be a review of the principles of domestic policy, the values of official propaganda and the vocabulary of the politicians.”
And unfortunately, he adds, that is not going to happen. “The outburst of nationalist feelings is yet another testimony of the internal tension in society, of general disappoint and dissatisfaction, of despair and anger,” all of which have been intensified by the current economic crisis.
By promoting nationalist ideas, the powers that be both show who and what they themselves are, regardless of what they say in public, and achieve one of their own ends: they re-direct social anger at the way things are away from themselves and toward the migrant workers.” Thus, at least for a time, they protect themselves against united protests against their power.
Staunton, December 27 – In the tradition of its Soviet predecessors, the current Russian powers that be are promoting radical Russian nationalism not only because it reflects their own private views but because such feelings direct popular anger away from itself and toward labor migrants from the North Caucasus and Central Asia, a prominent Moscow publicist argues.
In an article in yesterday’s “Moskovsky Komsomolets,” Leonid Mlechin says that “nationalism in Russia has flourished because this is useful to the powers that be” because it redirects popular anger away from them and because nationalism “doesn’t require any rational arguments” (www.mk.ru/politics/article/2010/12/26/555142-mastera-delit-i-vyichitat-.html).
Poll show that “the majority of the population willingly supports the slogan, ‘Russia for the Russians’ although the very same people will never permit the Caucasus to leave Russia” after two wars. Instead, Mlechin says, the slogan means for them that “non-Russian smust know their place, live where they were born, not come to [them], and not settle alongside [them].”
Despite its lack of rationality, Mlechin suggests that there are three ideas behind this slogan in the minds of most Russians. First, “all countries encounter problems with migration,” but Russians ignore the fact that for most countries, migrants are foreigners, while in Russia, they are Russian citizens.
Second, he continues, Russians believe that those who come act badly and that they must live “according to our rules.” But again many of the rules that the Russians say they want migrants to obey, such as avoiding the law and not bribing militiamen, are rules that the Russians themselves do not follow.
And third, Russians view them as “the other,” as people with “different mentality and different traditions,” who “do not want to follow generally acceptable norms.” But Russians get angry when Baltic officials make the same point about ethnic Russians living and working in those countries.
The migrants in Russian cities, even though those from the North Caucasus are Russian citizens, are considered to be “second class people” who must “follow [Russians] in order to learn good manners.” But “what example do we Muscovites show the guests of the capital?” Mlechin asks.
“Drunken cursing, crudeness, impoliteness, caddishness, and a lack of respect to the elderly and women – here, unfortunately, are what our street existence looks like,” the publicist says. And he argues that “only the ability to see one’s own shortcomings gives one the moral right to reproach others. But we forgive ourselves for what we won’t forgive others.”
In large measure, he continues, Russians do not like those who “look different,” something that means people do not ask themselves whether they are objecting to an action that anyone, including another Russian commit, or simply to someone who is different anthropologically.
Now some officials are talking about “creating ‘ethnic’ units within the militia.” Other countries have these, but they generally deal with foreigners “who poorly speak the state language.” But people from the Caucasus “are not foreigners. And the word ‘diaspora’ is not very appropriate” either.
That is because “the Chechens or the Daghestanis do not emigrate to Moscow but go to the capital of their own state. And they must be subordinate to a common law, and one must relate to them as to all other citizens of Russia,” something the Russian nationalists clearly have no desire to do.
Many in the Russian Federation today think that these divisions are all the product of post-Soviet developments. But in fact, they have their roots in Soviet reality, something that was carefully concealed by the Soviets until they burst on the scene during perestroika and contributed to the destruction of the USSR.
That country, Mlechin stresses, “was destroyed not by the efforts of liberally inclined dissidents. [It] was killed off by open nationalism.”
He gives several examples of this, including the insistence of Stalin’s officials that “Jews have not only a ‘passport’ difference from Russians,” Nursultan Nazarbayev’s statement in Soviet times that he and his Kazakhs were “second class” people, and the regret a Chuvash cosmonaut had that he could not go into space before the Russian Yuri Gagarin did.
As then, nowadays, “politicians unceasingly divide the people of Russia into their own and aliens, into ours and not ours, into indigenous and non-indigenous, into titular and non-titular, into true believers and those who believe otherwise.” Not surprisingly, young people absorb all this and act upon it.
What should be happening, Mlechin argues, is inculcating in the population “a sense of unity, community, and the solidarity of the people of Russia.” But for that to happen, “at a minimum there would have to be a review of the principles of domestic policy, the values of official propaganda and the vocabulary of the politicians.”
And unfortunately, he adds, that is not going to happen. “The outburst of nationalist feelings is yet another testimony of the internal tension in society, of general disappoint and dissatisfaction, of despair and anger,” all of which have been intensified by the current economic crisis.
By promoting nationalist ideas, the powers that be both show who and what they themselves are, regardless of what they say in public, and achieve one of their own ends: they re-direct social anger at the way things are away from themselves and toward the migrant workers.” Thus, at least for a time, they protect themselves against united protests against their power.
Window on Eurasia: Nationalism Greater Threat to Russia than is Islamic Extremism, Daghestan Historian Argues
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 27 – Russians currently devote so much attention to radical Islamism in the North Caucasus and elsewhere that they all too often fail to see that ethnic nationalism is a far greater threat to their interests both within the Russian Federation and abroad, according to a Daghestani historian.
In an online essay today, Sergey Israpilov gives as an example of this the fact that the Russian defense doctrine identifies “Caucasian Islamists [as] one of the three most probable threats” to the country, as if “an enormous power with a nuclear shield” is going to be attacked and destroyed by “a few dozen extremists” (www.apn.ru/publications/article23500.htm).
“Such great attention to the small number of terrorists and the level of the danger they represent does not in any way correspond to existing reality,” Israpilov says, and he argues that this “heightened attention to the danger of terrorists is a phenomenon not of reality but rather one of social consciousness.”
Of course, Israpilov says, attacks by Islamists do present a real threat to militia workers and to specific individuals, and they are thus unwelcome. “But in ‘the struggle with terror’ today have been drawn in not just particular individual militiamen but all of Russia, all of its budget, all of its political and financial resources, the special services and the army.”
In many ways, he continues, this reaction, which itself is having a negative impact on the economy and society, is like the one some people experience because of allergies to insect bites. The bites themselves “do not threat the life of the individual,” but “the severe allergic reaction can be extraordinarily dangerous.”
“The true danger for Russia” thus does not come from “Islam in its radical form,” either in the North Caucasus or abroad. There are relatively few Wahhabis in the former, and the greatest threats to Russia in the Muslim world come not from countries with “Islamist regimes” but rather from “secular” and “democratic” ones.
According to Israpilov, “the greatest real harm to Russia comes from contemporary ‘democratic’ Afghanistan … which sends to Russia drugs which every year kill 40,000 to 50,000 young Russians.” When the radical Islamist Taliban was in power, the Daghestani historian says, this danger was much less.
And “the greatest potential threat to Russia from the side of the Islamic world,” he continues, “also is represented by secular national regimes in countries like Pakistan and Iran which have or are building their own nuclear arms,” the kind of threat that no country can afford to ignore.
“When extreme and more radical Islamists come to power,” Israpilov points out, “they as their first act destroy the social structure of society which makes impossible the existence of a contemporary economy and even more the creation of its own military industry and contemporary forms of armament.”
Moreover, Israpilov says, “even millions of ultra-radical mujahids in a poor and starving country do not threaten their neighbors in any way. The mujahids in the entire world fight only with arms which they are able to steal or buy from ‘unbelievers.’ And therefore,” he argues, “in essence, they are not that dangerous for Russia.”
“If the citizens of some southern country or other consider it worthwhile to destroy their own national state as a non-Islamic error,” he argues, “this is their affair and their problem. But if their national state builds ballistic missiles and trades in drugs, then this is already a problem for Russia.”
The same logic holds inside of Russia. Nationalism, Israpilov suggests, “both among the ethnic Russians themselves and among the peoples of the Caucasus, represents the main potential danger.” The radical Islamists can carry out “an armed struggle in the forests” but they do not represent the truth threat for the integrity of Russia or the majority of Russian citizens.”
But “ethno-nationalism is an enemy which is really capable of destroying Russia,” Israpilov says. That is because “Russia today is in a difficult situation: [It] is the only country in Europe and one of the few in the world in which several autochthonian peoples are building a common statehood.”
“A century ago, there were five strong states in Europe which controlled almost the entire world – Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia and Germany. But the successful development of capitalism destroyed these states. [And] today there are more than 70 mono-national states which have shed a great deal of bloof for freedom from ‘warmly beloved’ neighbors.”
Over the course of Russian history, there have been two periods when capitalism developed quickly – “the second half of the 19th century and the end of the20th century. Both these periods ended with the collapse of the country and the separating out from Russian of two dozen mono-national states.”
Given this trend, Russians need to reconsider the relative dangers of radical Islam and ethno-nationalism, Israpilov says. “As far as the Caucasus is concerned, the rapid Islamizaiton of the region does not harm the interests of Russia” because “Islam and ethno-nationalism and two irreconcilable enemies.”
“Where it can, Islam destroys nationalism, [and] where it can, nationalism struggles with Islam,” Israpilov points out. If Islamism is successful, nationalism ceases to function, but more than that, because Islamist norms drawn from the seventh century are successfully imposed, neither industry nor governing structures will be effective.
Indeed, “both in the international arena and within Russia, radical Islam is harmful above all not toward those of other faiths but in relation to their own nationalists.” That can easily be seen in the case of Daghestan and the members of its diasporas in Moscow and other Russian cities, the Makhachkala-based historian says.
Quite often, those who leave Daghestan are “well educated” and even have their own business. “They leave Daghestan abov e all because they feel themselves uncomfortable in the rapidly Islamicizing Daghestan.” In their “native” republic, they have come to feel themselves an “alien” element.
But often in Russia, these very same Daghestanis do not integrate into the larger society but instead stand apart from the Russians and some engage in criminality. They thus “create a source of threat for concrete Russians and for Russia as a whole” not directly but because “they provoke Russian nationalism.”
The sad fact, Israpilov continues, is that “precisely the most ‘Europeanized’ Daghestanis and Caucasians as a whole are infected by the bacillus of nationalism,” something that is “alien” both for the Caucasus and for Islam and that was “introduced into our life namely by European and Western education.”
“The nationalism of the small peoples of Russia is just as much an enemy for Islam and for Muslims remaining in Daghestan as it is for Russia and for Russia,” Israpilov argues, “and thus, Russia must not fight with radical Islam [at least in this context] but seek a dialogue with it and, if necessary, support it.”
Staunton, December 27 – Russians currently devote so much attention to radical Islamism in the North Caucasus and elsewhere that they all too often fail to see that ethnic nationalism is a far greater threat to their interests both within the Russian Federation and abroad, according to a Daghestani historian.
In an online essay today, Sergey Israpilov gives as an example of this the fact that the Russian defense doctrine identifies “Caucasian Islamists [as] one of the three most probable threats” to the country, as if “an enormous power with a nuclear shield” is going to be attacked and destroyed by “a few dozen extremists” (www.apn.ru/publications/article23500.htm).
“Such great attention to the small number of terrorists and the level of the danger they represent does not in any way correspond to existing reality,” Israpilov says, and he argues that this “heightened attention to the danger of terrorists is a phenomenon not of reality but rather one of social consciousness.”
Of course, Israpilov says, attacks by Islamists do present a real threat to militia workers and to specific individuals, and they are thus unwelcome. “But in ‘the struggle with terror’ today have been drawn in not just particular individual militiamen but all of Russia, all of its budget, all of its political and financial resources, the special services and the army.”
In many ways, he continues, this reaction, which itself is having a negative impact on the economy and society, is like the one some people experience because of allergies to insect bites. The bites themselves “do not threat the life of the individual,” but “the severe allergic reaction can be extraordinarily dangerous.”
“The true danger for Russia” thus does not come from “Islam in its radical form,” either in the North Caucasus or abroad. There are relatively few Wahhabis in the former, and the greatest threats to Russia in the Muslim world come not from countries with “Islamist regimes” but rather from “secular” and “democratic” ones.
According to Israpilov, “the greatest real harm to Russia comes from contemporary ‘democratic’ Afghanistan … which sends to Russia drugs which every year kill 40,000 to 50,000 young Russians.” When the radical Islamist Taliban was in power, the Daghestani historian says, this danger was much less.
And “the greatest potential threat to Russia from the side of the Islamic world,” he continues, “also is represented by secular national regimes in countries like Pakistan and Iran which have or are building their own nuclear arms,” the kind of threat that no country can afford to ignore.
“When extreme and more radical Islamists come to power,” Israpilov points out, “they as their first act destroy the social structure of society which makes impossible the existence of a contemporary economy and even more the creation of its own military industry and contemporary forms of armament.”
Moreover, Israpilov says, “even millions of ultra-radical mujahids in a poor and starving country do not threaten their neighbors in any way. The mujahids in the entire world fight only with arms which they are able to steal or buy from ‘unbelievers.’ And therefore,” he argues, “in essence, they are not that dangerous for Russia.”
“If the citizens of some southern country or other consider it worthwhile to destroy their own national state as a non-Islamic error,” he argues, “this is their affair and their problem. But if their national state builds ballistic missiles and trades in drugs, then this is already a problem for Russia.”
The same logic holds inside of Russia. Nationalism, Israpilov suggests, “both among the ethnic Russians themselves and among the peoples of the Caucasus, represents the main potential danger.” The radical Islamists can carry out “an armed struggle in the forests” but they do not represent the truth threat for the integrity of Russia or the majority of Russian citizens.”
But “ethno-nationalism is an enemy which is really capable of destroying Russia,” Israpilov says. That is because “Russia today is in a difficult situation: [It] is the only country in Europe and one of the few in the world in which several autochthonian peoples are building a common statehood.”
“A century ago, there were five strong states in Europe which controlled almost the entire world – Britain, France, Austro-Hungary, Russia and Germany. But the successful development of capitalism destroyed these states. [And] today there are more than 70 mono-national states which have shed a great deal of bloof for freedom from ‘warmly beloved’ neighbors.”
Over the course of Russian history, there have been two periods when capitalism developed quickly – “the second half of the 19th century and the end of the20th century. Both these periods ended with the collapse of the country and the separating out from Russian of two dozen mono-national states.”
Given this trend, Russians need to reconsider the relative dangers of radical Islam and ethno-nationalism, Israpilov says. “As far as the Caucasus is concerned, the rapid Islamizaiton of the region does not harm the interests of Russia” because “Islam and ethno-nationalism and two irreconcilable enemies.”
“Where it can, Islam destroys nationalism, [and] where it can, nationalism struggles with Islam,” Israpilov points out. If Islamism is successful, nationalism ceases to function, but more than that, because Islamist norms drawn from the seventh century are successfully imposed, neither industry nor governing structures will be effective.
Indeed, “both in the international arena and within Russia, radical Islam is harmful above all not toward those of other faiths but in relation to their own nationalists.” That can easily be seen in the case of Daghestan and the members of its diasporas in Moscow and other Russian cities, the Makhachkala-based historian says.
Quite often, those who leave Daghestan are “well educated” and even have their own business. “They leave Daghestan abov e all because they feel themselves uncomfortable in the rapidly Islamicizing Daghestan.” In their “native” republic, they have come to feel themselves an “alien” element.
But often in Russia, these very same Daghestanis do not integrate into the larger society but instead stand apart from the Russians and some engage in criminality. They thus “create a source of threat for concrete Russians and for Russia as a whole” not directly but because “they provoke Russian nationalism.”
The sad fact, Israpilov continues, is that “precisely the most ‘Europeanized’ Daghestanis and Caucasians as a whole are infected by the bacillus of nationalism,” something that is “alien” both for the Caucasus and for Islam and that was “introduced into our life namely by European and Western education.”
“The nationalism of the small peoples of Russia is just as much an enemy for Islam and for Muslims remaining in Daghestan as it is for Russia and for Russia,” Israpilov argues, “and thus, Russia must not fight with radical Islam [at least in this context] but seek a dialogue with it and, if necessary, support it.”
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