Paul Goble
Staunton, December 23 – The North Caucasus at the present time is “our Palestine,” Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov says, the result of the deal between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov in which the former has purchased the loyalty of the latter for cash and at the price of allowing the Chechen leader and his minions to do what they like throughout Russia.
If Russia is to escape from this dilemma, Nemtsov said in the course of an online press conference today, several steps are necessary because as the Manezh violence shows the problems of that region are no longer confined to it but rather spreading throughout Russian society (www.gazeta.ru/interview/nm/s3471769.shtml).
First of all, the opposition leader says, the deal between Putin and Kadyrov must be annulled and all Kadyrov militants “disarmed and sent back to Chechnya.” Second, Russians must recognize that nothing will change until the current regime is changed because “Putin personally” protects “the banditry” of the militia and by implication that of the Chechens.
And third, Nemtsov said, it is imperative that Moscow address recent failures in youth policy by assigning “as the minister for youth policy an individual who enjoys the respect of the fans” who formed a major portion of the participants in the wave of protests that have swept through the Russian capital and other cities.
A second opposition figure who took part in the “Gazeta” conference, Garri Kasparov, expanded on these points. He said that the situation in the North Caucasus and the consequences of developments there for the entire country were now so serious that an increasing number of Russians were thinking what had been unthinkable until recently.
“For very many citizens of Russia, including those far from politicz, a civilized divorce with the North Caucasus” is no longer viewed as “a tragedy” for the entire country. But despite those feelings, Kasparov argued, “after so many years of living together,” separating the North Caucasus out from Russia would not be easy or painless.
“But it is also obvious,” he continued, it is precisely the Putin policy of pacification of the Caucasus which has created a constant source for the reproudciton of the criminal milieu which now is not limited to the geography of the North Caucasus but has spread literally throughout all of Russia.”
These and other questions addressed to the opposition figures arose from growing concerns about what will happen next after the Manezh Square violence. Kasparov said that there will be more such violence, something he called “the natural result of the policy which has been conducted in Russia during the administration of Vladimir Putin.”
Indeed, he said, the Manezh events and those that have followed them reflect the combination of “all the problems of contemporary Russian society, [including] in the first instance the absence of prospects for the overwhelming part of Russian young people,” the failure of social escalators to work, and the increasing economic divides especially in the cities.
But in addition, Kasparov pointed out, “the constant playing of the powers that be with the nationalistic theme” has had its effect. “Sooner or later” that had to produce the kind of explosion which appears to be occurring now and which the current powers that be seem powerless to deal with.
The comments of Nemtsov and Kasparov are important for three ways. First, by drawing the parallel between the North Caucasus and Palestine, the two are highlighting both the need to do something and the difficulty of doing anything, a bind that those more engaged in sloganeering often forget.
Second, their linkage of Putin and Kadyrov, while not new, is certain to gain them and the opposition more support because, as they point out, the deal the two authoritarian leaders have concluded not only has not worked – the North Caucasus isn’t really more peaceful – but has made the situation worse by spreading the plague of violence into central Russia.
And third, although this was certianly not their intention, their discussion of the inability of the current powers that be to address this situation will simultaneously add to the frustrations many Russians feel about the current situation and inspire those who believe that the only way to change things under the circumstances is to go into the streets.
Thursday, December 23, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Thanks to Iranian Missionaries, Tajikistan Now One-Third Shiite
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 23 – Shiite missionaries from Iran have increased the share of the followers of that trend in Islam within Tajikistan from 11 percent a year or so ago to 33 percent now, according to Dushanbe officials, a development that has already sparked intra-Islamic conflicts in that country and threatens to deepen its problems in the future.
While the expert community in the former Soviet space and the West has paid some attention to Dushanbe’s recent efforts to recall Tajiks studying in Islamic schools abroad in order to block Sunni radicalism in that Central Asian republic, few writers have paid much attention to a development that may prove even more serious.
Historically, Tajiks, although they speak a Persian language, overwhelmingly have been followers of the Sunni tradition in Islam, something that both distinguishes them from the Iranians and has limited Tehran’s influence there. But the small indigenous Shiite community has grown dramatically in recent months, thanks largely to Iranian missionaries.
In an analysis posted on the Centrasia.ru portal yesterday, Fariddun Kabirov argues that this development has been assisted both by Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmon’s policy of rapprochement with Iran and by Dushanbe’s assumption that it has sufficient resources to counter any Shiite-Sunni clashes (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1293039240).
But that assumption may no longer be justified, Kabirov says. There have already been clashes in various regions of that Central Asian countries between Sunni and Shiia Muslims, clashes that have increased in number and intensity as Shiite missionaries, exploiting Dushanbe’s approach, have “flooded into Tajikistan” and pushed a pro-Iranian line.
According to Kabirov, the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous oblast, Khatlon and Sogdian oblasts and “even Dushanbe” are now centers of Iranian Shiites there. “It is sufficient to note,” Kabirov continues, “that a year or two ago, Shiites were on the order of 11 percent of all Muslims of Tajikistan. Today this number has more than tripled to 33.4 percent.”
The Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Tajikistan, “just like the official powers that be,” has proved itself incapable of blocking the spread of Iranian-backed Shiism there. And as a result, the intensification of clashes between Sunnis and Shiias is now “practically out of control.”
Given this, Kabirov argues, “the Iranians or their local followers” are increasingly the dominant players in Tajik religious life among young people, and they routinely “send the young for instruction in the religious schools of Iran,” something Rakhmon opposes but has not succeeded in ending.
Kabirov adds ominously: Cultural exchanges between Iran and Tajikistan are no longer really that. Instead, Iran sends Shiite missionaries to Tajikistan, and they send Tajiks to Iran to study in order to be their future “colleagues.” Thus, “in our state is slowly but truly being formed a certain invisible army which can become a decisive weapon in future great games.”
And he asks whether this is what Rakhmon intended or now intends.
The rapid shift from Sunni to Shiia among Tajikistan’s Muslims reflects a particular feature of post-Soviet Muslim communities. Because the communist regime prevented Muslims from knowing much about their faith, few Muslims even after 1991 could define with any degree of precision differences between Shiia and Sunni.
Indeed, in many post-Soviet republics, including Tajikistan, Shiia mosques often are referred to by the population as “Iranian mosques,” and Sunni mosques are identified as “national” or “Turkish” or “Saudi” depending on who paid for them and who is the head of the local Muslim community.
In addition to making the shift from one of the trends of Islam to another easier, however, that pattern has another consequence, one which may play an especially large role in a place like Tajikistan. To the extent that those who now choose to identify as Shiia view themselves as going to “Iranian” mosques, at least some of them will tend to identify with Tehran.
That will have the effect of further weakening national identities and the state structures on which they rely and make it far easier for Iran to gain influence in a region where most observers had assumed over the last two decades that it had been largely shut out, a potentially serious development given the problems in neighboring Afghanistan.
Staunton, December 23 – Shiite missionaries from Iran have increased the share of the followers of that trend in Islam within Tajikistan from 11 percent a year or so ago to 33 percent now, according to Dushanbe officials, a development that has already sparked intra-Islamic conflicts in that country and threatens to deepen its problems in the future.
While the expert community in the former Soviet space and the West has paid some attention to Dushanbe’s recent efforts to recall Tajiks studying in Islamic schools abroad in order to block Sunni radicalism in that Central Asian republic, few writers have paid much attention to a development that may prove even more serious.
Historically, Tajiks, although they speak a Persian language, overwhelmingly have been followers of the Sunni tradition in Islam, something that both distinguishes them from the Iranians and has limited Tehran’s influence there. But the small indigenous Shiite community has grown dramatically in recent months, thanks largely to Iranian missionaries.
In an analysis posted on the Centrasia.ru portal yesterday, Fariddun Kabirov argues that this development has been assisted both by Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmon’s policy of rapprochement with Iran and by Dushanbe’s assumption that it has sufficient resources to counter any Shiite-Sunni clashes (www.centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1293039240).
But that assumption may no longer be justified, Kabirov says. There have already been clashes in various regions of that Central Asian countries between Sunni and Shiia Muslims, clashes that have increased in number and intensity as Shiite missionaries, exploiting Dushanbe’s approach, have “flooded into Tajikistan” and pushed a pro-Iranian line.
According to Kabirov, the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous oblast, Khatlon and Sogdian oblasts and “even Dushanbe” are now centers of Iranian Shiites there. “It is sufficient to note,” Kabirov continues, “that a year or two ago, Shiites were on the order of 11 percent of all Muslims of Tajikistan. Today this number has more than tripled to 33.4 percent.”
The Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) of Tajikistan, “just like the official powers that be,” has proved itself incapable of blocking the spread of Iranian-backed Shiism there. And as a result, the intensification of clashes between Sunnis and Shiias is now “practically out of control.”
Given this, Kabirov argues, “the Iranians or their local followers” are increasingly the dominant players in Tajik religious life among young people, and they routinely “send the young for instruction in the religious schools of Iran,” something Rakhmon opposes but has not succeeded in ending.
Kabirov adds ominously: Cultural exchanges between Iran and Tajikistan are no longer really that. Instead, Iran sends Shiite missionaries to Tajikistan, and they send Tajiks to Iran to study in order to be their future “colleagues.” Thus, “in our state is slowly but truly being formed a certain invisible army which can become a decisive weapon in future great games.”
And he asks whether this is what Rakhmon intended or now intends.
The rapid shift from Sunni to Shiia among Tajikistan’s Muslims reflects a particular feature of post-Soviet Muslim communities. Because the communist regime prevented Muslims from knowing much about their faith, few Muslims even after 1991 could define with any degree of precision differences between Shiia and Sunni.
Indeed, in many post-Soviet republics, including Tajikistan, Shiia mosques often are referred to by the population as “Iranian mosques,” and Sunni mosques are identified as “national” or “Turkish” or “Saudi” depending on who paid for them and who is the head of the local Muslim community.
In addition to making the shift from one of the trends of Islam to another easier, however, that pattern has another consequence, one which may play an especially large role in a place like Tajikistan. To the extent that those who now choose to identify as Shiia view themselves as going to “Iranian” mosques, at least some of them will tend to identify with Tehran.
That will have the effect of further weakening national identities and the state structures on which they rely and make it far easier for Iran to gain influence in a region where most observers had assumed over the last two decades that it had been largely shut out, a potentially serious development given the problems in neighboring Afghanistan.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Stability is ‘Largest Potemkin Village of All,’ Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 23 – The Russian powers that be have built “the largest Potemkin village” ever with their largely successful effort to promote the notion that their country is “politically stable,” but while they may have fooled others and themselves, the reality behind this façade, a Russian analyst says, is that today’s Russia is “unstable and unpredictable.”
In a commentary on Vlasti.net yesterday, Olesya Yakhno says that this becomes obvious if one compares the actual events on the Manezh Square with the entirely inadequate responses of Russia’s senior leaders, responses that show they are almost completely out of touch with Russian realities (vlasti.net/news/113094).
If one considers “objective realities, she says, it is difficult to insist that the Manezh clashes were something “unpredictable.” Football fanatics had organized a protest earlier on the same issue; the family and friends of Yegor Sviridov had held a meeting in his honor. And, she points out, there have been similar outbursts and criminal actions elsewhere.
But “all the same, no one, including the powers that be expected such an enormous manifestation of ‘Russian spontaneity’ especially at the walls of the Kremlin,” Yakhno says, the latest example of an unfortunate phenomenon that has been the case in Russia since imperial times.
Indeed, she argues, “in Russian history it was always this way. Neither the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 nor that of the Soviet Union in 1991 were predicted, either inside the country or beyond its borders.” Instead, these key turning points in Russian history emerged seemingly out of nowhere.
The question thus arises: Is Russia on the verge of something similar now? “In the course of the last decade, the Russian powers that be have actively been involved in the construction of Potemkin Villages,” ones that suggest that Russians are well off, that their country is regaining its power, and “of course” that it is “politically stable.”
“In general, the result of such PR-constructions has turned out to be completely successful,” Yakhno continues. Both inside Russia and beyond its borders exist a certain hyperbolic conception of the Russian power vertical (especially in the Western media) and of the absolute conviction that the Russian powers that be are all-powerful and control everything.”
“And the Russian powers that be themselves thought (think?) that they are capable of modeling and controlling any situation in politics, economics and society.” Indeed, even when they do speak of problems, as for example when Dmitry Medvedev talked about “political stagnation,” the implicit notion is that these are things the powers that be can deal with.
According to Yakhno, “in many regards, these are the costs of administered democracy. Administration [of this kind] leads to an absence of communications. And the absence of communications to the loss of a sense of reality among the powers that be” and among those who follow only them. That in turn means they “do not feel the danger.”
“The de-politicization of the masses and the suppression of everything alive in the political process, goals that the powers that be have been actively pursuing for a decade, in the final analysis all the same did not deaden the feelings about justice among the Russian people,” as the elites appeared to have expected.
Instead, things went in just the opposite way. The actions of the powers that be “led to aggression because [what the powers that be have done] excluded the possibility of softer forms of expression of protest and disagreement with one or another action.” Had there been the possibility of open politics, there wouldn’t have been this kind of explosion.
“The December pogroms at the gates of the Kremlin, the symbol of Russian statehood” have led people to ask many questions, Yakhno says. In the first instance, Russians asked whether these events worked for Medvedev or for Putin. But “in this situation, neither responded” as a leader might be expected to.
In their assessments, the Vlasti.net commentator says, “neither from Medvedev nor from Putin did we hear about the extent of the problem.” Instead, they talked about “hooliganism, extremism, and nationalism,” suggesting that they retain their “faith in the all-powerfulness of administrative and force solutions.”
During his direct line talk, Putin manifested “all the themes and style of Russia of the period of the beginning of the 2000s, talking about Khodorkovsky and accusing Nemtsov, Ryzhkov and so on. He said little about more recent problems and “almost nothing” about what was behind the Manezh violence.
Medvedev in his turn also ignored the Russian present by speaking “from the point of view of the future,” about how the system can be modernized via the efforts of the state rather than any discussion of the genuine involvement of the Russian people in solving the problems their country faces.
By talking in these ways, both members of the tandem worked hard to preserve “the very largest Potemkin Village,” the one that suggests “Russian political stability” exists. But in fact, Yakhno concludes, “Russia today is unstable and unpredictable,” and it is “already that way today.”
Staunton, December 23 – The Russian powers that be have built “the largest Potemkin village” ever with their largely successful effort to promote the notion that their country is “politically stable,” but while they may have fooled others and themselves, the reality behind this façade, a Russian analyst says, is that today’s Russia is “unstable and unpredictable.”
In a commentary on Vlasti.net yesterday, Olesya Yakhno says that this becomes obvious if one compares the actual events on the Manezh Square with the entirely inadequate responses of Russia’s senior leaders, responses that show they are almost completely out of touch with Russian realities (vlasti.net/news/113094).
If one considers “objective realities, she says, it is difficult to insist that the Manezh clashes were something “unpredictable.” Football fanatics had organized a protest earlier on the same issue; the family and friends of Yegor Sviridov had held a meeting in his honor. And, she points out, there have been similar outbursts and criminal actions elsewhere.
But “all the same, no one, including the powers that be expected such an enormous manifestation of ‘Russian spontaneity’ especially at the walls of the Kremlin,” Yakhno says, the latest example of an unfortunate phenomenon that has been the case in Russia since imperial times.
Indeed, she argues, “in Russian history it was always this way. Neither the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 nor that of the Soviet Union in 1991 were predicted, either inside the country or beyond its borders.” Instead, these key turning points in Russian history emerged seemingly out of nowhere.
The question thus arises: Is Russia on the verge of something similar now? “In the course of the last decade, the Russian powers that be have actively been involved in the construction of Potemkin Villages,” ones that suggest that Russians are well off, that their country is regaining its power, and “of course” that it is “politically stable.”
“In general, the result of such PR-constructions has turned out to be completely successful,” Yakhno continues. Both inside Russia and beyond its borders exist a certain hyperbolic conception of the Russian power vertical (especially in the Western media) and of the absolute conviction that the Russian powers that be are all-powerful and control everything.”
“And the Russian powers that be themselves thought (think?) that they are capable of modeling and controlling any situation in politics, economics and society.” Indeed, even when they do speak of problems, as for example when Dmitry Medvedev talked about “political stagnation,” the implicit notion is that these are things the powers that be can deal with.
According to Yakhno, “in many regards, these are the costs of administered democracy. Administration [of this kind] leads to an absence of communications. And the absence of communications to the loss of a sense of reality among the powers that be” and among those who follow only them. That in turn means they “do not feel the danger.”
“The de-politicization of the masses and the suppression of everything alive in the political process, goals that the powers that be have been actively pursuing for a decade, in the final analysis all the same did not deaden the feelings about justice among the Russian people,” as the elites appeared to have expected.
Instead, things went in just the opposite way. The actions of the powers that be “led to aggression because [what the powers that be have done] excluded the possibility of softer forms of expression of protest and disagreement with one or another action.” Had there been the possibility of open politics, there wouldn’t have been this kind of explosion.
“The December pogroms at the gates of the Kremlin, the symbol of Russian statehood” have led people to ask many questions, Yakhno says. In the first instance, Russians asked whether these events worked for Medvedev or for Putin. But “in this situation, neither responded” as a leader might be expected to.
In their assessments, the Vlasti.net commentator says, “neither from Medvedev nor from Putin did we hear about the extent of the problem.” Instead, they talked about “hooliganism, extremism, and nationalism,” suggesting that they retain their “faith in the all-powerfulness of administrative and force solutions.”
During his direct line talk, Putin manifested “all the themes and style of Russia of the period of the beginning of the 2000s, talking about Khodorkovsky and accusing Nemtsov, Ryzhkov and so on. He said little about more recent problems and “almost nothing” about what was behind the Manezh violence.
Medvedev in his turn also ignored the Russian present by speaking “from the point of view of the future,” about how the system can be modernized via the efforts of the state rather than any discussion of the genuine involvement of the Russian people in solving the problems their country faces.
By talking in these ways, both members of the tandem worked hard to preserve “the very largest Potemkin Village,” the one that suggests “Russian political stability” exists. But in fact, Yakhno concludes, “Russia today is unstable and unpredictable,” and it is “already that way today.”
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