Paul Goble
Staunton, December 20 – Even Russians who are now talking about the need to let the North Caucasus go are suggesting that the borders of some or all of the existing non-Russian republics need to be changed to protect the ethnic Russian communities who still live there, but few have provided details on what a map of a “post-Russian” North Caucasus might look like.
Today, however, a Russian blogger has offered just such a map, one that in place of the “complex mosaic” of federation subjects would have two krays (with capitals in Krasnodar and Pyatigorsk) and three independent states, Alaniya, a Confederation of Chechnya and Ingushetia, and a Daghestani Federation (hiker1.livejournal.com/51068.html).
While most Russian commentators say allowing any part of the North Caucasus to become independent would threaten the territorial integrity of the country as a whole, Hiker1 says that ever more ordinary Russians have changed their view on that, largely in response to developments over the past year.
The most important of these in this regard, he continues, was the reaction of the powers that be to the forest fires that swept over much of the country. Most officials in Moscow and elsewhere “demonstrated a complete indifference” to saving the land from the fires, evidence that “our own land is no longer holy and valuable for us.”
And that official indifference to the land was in sharp contrast to the actions of the powers that be with regard to the North Caucasus. There, Hiker1 writes, “the powers that be have stubbornly attempted to keep within Russia some microscopic borderlands that are in revolt by pouring in far more money.”
“The absurdity of a situation” in which some places in the North Caucasus “recall Dubai” as a result of the influx of Russian money but nonetheless continue to fight and to demand special treatment in Russian cities, Hiker1 argues, means that Moscow must take steps, including changing the territorial divisions of that region and granting independence to parts of it.
In his post, Hiker1 provides a map showing how he believes the North Caucasus should be redivided, and then he discusses both the benefits Russia and Russians would reap from such new arrangements and the special provisions Moscow must insist on in the course of making this change to ensure Russia’s security.
Hiker1 suggests that there would be 15 “positive consequences” for Russia from the independence of Daghestan and a combined Chechnya and Ingushetia. First, their independence would cost Russia “only 0.3 percent” of its territory while putting outside “almost all peoples ‘who aren’t being integrated.’” There would be few Russian migrants because there are few Russians left there.
Second, the independence of these republics would lead to “a reduction in Islamophobia and anti-Caucasian attitudes in Russia.” Third, Chechen separatism would shift away from the Islamic projects toward national ones and national ones which would be ever less anti-Russian than those in the past.
Fourth, the removal of these two republics from Russia would force Moscow to be more honest about the country’s ongoing demographic decline. Fifth, by ending the conflicts there, this step would save Russia enormous amounts of budget funds that could be better spent on Russian needs.
Sixth, the independence of these two republics would force Moscow to give preference to the use of the sea route between Astrakhan oblast and Resht in Iran rather than rail lines through Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Seventh, with Chechnya-Ingushetia and Daghestan outside its borders, Russia would find it easier to get a visa-free regime with the European Union.
Eighth, the West would lose a major source of leverage on Russia. Ninth, Russians could turn their attention to more important domestic issues. Tenth, Russia by changing some of the borders of these two state could insure that it would retain most of the oil fields on the left bank of the Terek.
Eleventh, Russia would be able to end the “uncontrolled flow” of economic migrants and refugees from these two countries into Russian cities. Twelfth, “the struggle with ethnic criminal groups” would become easier. Thirteenth, Russia could avoid future conflicts on its own territory by drawing borders so they would be on foreign soil.
Fourteenth, by eliminating from its citizenry people who are not inclined to integrate, Russia would be able to eliminate the propiska system and thereby promote migration. And fifteenth, Russia would not have to face any more of the “Islamic revolts” it has had to deal with in the military in recent years.
With regard to Osetia, Hiker1 says that combining part of North Osetia with South Osetia which is already independent would help Russia deal with “the headache” it has had since the August 2008 war. On the one hand, “Alaniya, surrounded by such neighbors as Ingushetia and Georgia would simply be fated to have allied relations with Russia.”
And on the other, he continues, “the countries of the West” which might object at the beginning “would be [ultimately] forced to recognize the new state,” something they have not done with South Osetia alone. Moreover, Russia would only gain by acquiring “the image of a peacekeeper country and not an aggressor.”
According to Hiker1, the other ethnic groups in the North Caucasus would not be given independence or have their own republics, although he suggests that many of them, including the Armenians, Shapsugs, Cossacks, Kabardins, Circassians, Balkars, Abazas, Karachays, and Nogays should get “national districts” in Kuban and Pyatigorsk krays.
Such arrangements, he continues, would have certain positive features: First, “in a single subject of the Russian Federation are united related peoples, the Circassians and Kabardins and also the Balkars and Karachays,” thus reducing demands for the formation of larger republics of one kind or another.
Second, “the lowering of the status of the territorial unit from republic to districts will be compensated for by the return of elections for the heads of local self-administration.” Third, this arrangement will allow all these peoples “the free development of language and culture within the borders of the district.” And fourth, these arrangements will “reduce the risk of violating the rights of ‘non-titular’ peoples, something which now takes place in all national republics.”
To ensure security for Russia in this new situation, Hiker1 says, Russia would retain four military bases on the territories of the new independent states, secure agreements from the parties not to seek recognition of or compensation for past genocides, and arrange for peaceful exchange of populations in border areas.
Moreover, he says, Moscow should “include all three new states in the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty and include Osetia-Alania in the free trade area. And Russia should send border guards to the new states just as it did in the case of Tajikistan until relatively recently.
Even with all these arrangements, Hiker1 says, there may be problems. There could be some growth in separatist attitudes elsewhere in Russia although he suggests that this threat is less likely than many assume. Moreover, there could be some expanded or unpredictable refugee flows, although there too a carefully considered Russian policy can limit that difficulty.
Finally, he notes, there is the danger of the intensification of the Circassian question, given that there are more than 800,000 Circassians in Russia and more than six million of them living in Turkey and the Middle East. Moscow must ensure that any “return” not undermine the existing ethnic balance.
According to Hiker1, “the idea of ‘Greater Circassia’ probably will remain a marginal one, but this question must not be ignored,” lest inattention create a situation in which demographic changes have the most serious political consequences.
It is not clear just who Hiker1 is, but the detail with which he discusses these issues suggests that he may be part of or at least has close friends in the security agencies where position papers on such issues likely are being prepared in case the powers that be decide to yield to the logic of the position he advances.
Both that logic and the sophistication of his discussion about an issue that is one of the most sensitive in the Russian Federation at the present time mean that they merit attention even if Moscow does not change the map of the North Caucasus or if the North Caucasians ultimately change it in some other way.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russian Separatism Now ‘Main Threat’ to Russia’s Territorial Integrity, Markedonov Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 20 – The “main threat” to the territorial integrity of Russia at present does not come from “separatist and particularist attitudes of ‘the borderlands’” but from “the movement of the ethnic majority” -- the Russians -- according to one of Moscow’s most thoughtful commentators on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.
In an essay posted online last week, Sergey Markedonov says that it is time to carefully “analyze ‘the Manezh phenomenon,” given that such “mass pogrom actions” and the reactions of experts and officials to them highlights the emergence of “a new social-political force,” which one can call “’Russian separatism’” (www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=11193).
While this force is growing, he says, it has “still not become institutionalized. It does not have its own parties,” but “sympathy for Russian separatism exists in the ranks of the law enforcement structures, the special services, and the administrations of various levels.” Consequently, it is something that bears watching and analysis.
The term “Russian separatism” may seem strange given that the obvious quesiton is “from whom are the Russians who are the ethnic majority to separate,” Markedonov says, and consequently, most people are inclined to refer to what is going on “in the most extreme case” as “extremism or xenophobia!”
But “nation building is not only subordinate to the logic of figures and simple arithmetic,” he continues. Since 1991, ethnic Russians have formed the overwhelming share of the population of the Russian Federation, but they have not been able to realize their specifically ethno-national goals. In this regard, they resemble the Ichkeria variant of the Chechens.
The number of non-Russians inside the Russian Federation is growing, “but for the state which wants to preserve itself in its current borders” – and Dmitry Medvedev has said this is almost “the main state task” – “the absolute priority is integration but not assimilation and forced russification.”
That in turn means that “the optimal Russian nationality policy is not the construction of an ‘ethnic Russian state’ but the formation of a political nation, defined as a civil society and not as a biological phenomenon.” That does not mean that the ethnic majority should despise itself as happened 20 years ago but rather that it not seek to create its own state.
Were it to do so, the existing state would either dissolve or mean that Russia would reject efforts at modernization and “preserve its backwardness.” It would mean that Russia “could not become a superpower” but rather would face “permanent separatism and segmentation” as other groups sought to escape from subordination.
“The integration of our fell citizens under the slogan ‘Russia for the Russian’ is simply impossible.” It would not be acceptable to the Tatars or Bashkirs, let alone the Tuvins and Chechens, Markedonov says. And consequently, “by separating from our unique ‘internal abroad,’ we would be separating from Russia many territories” which Russians consider Russian.
The idea now spreading through the blogosphere of “separating out the Caucasus” – that is, giving it independence, “does not on closer acquaintance withstand criticism,” the Moscow analyst says. First of all, that would not end migration or the war. Both would continue because “our Caucasus is not the Algeria of the early 1960s.” There is “no one” to reach agreement with.
Moreover, such a move would inevitably raise the question about the fate of the large number of ethnic Russians living there and about non-Russians who are proud of their involvement in Russian institutions like the military.
“But the problem is not only about territories and spaces,” he continues. If the North Caucasus were “separated out” as the Russian nationalists say they want, they would in fact “separate themselves from Russia” and their actions would lead to “a series of ethnic conflicts not only in the borderlands but in the center of the country.”
In short, “the center itself would be separating itself from the borderlands,” he argues. “’Russia for the Russians’ in this way would become an instrument for the destruction of the state” in much the same way but on a far larger scale than the slogan “’Georgia for the Georgians’ in the early 1990s threatened to destroy that republic.
“In this connection, one should note also that the logical extension of ‘the Russian project’ would become ‘the Moscow project,’ Moscow for the Muscovites.’” Indeed, some Russian separatists make use of that term without appearing to recognize that it threatens exactly what they say they want to achieve.
Of course, Markedonov says, “the self-determination of Russians and ‘Russian separatism’ are phenomena not of today [alone]. If we want, we can uncover the predecessors of this trend both in the Russian Empire and in the USSR,” where efforts to promote the Russian community led to the destruction of both.
But now, “the realization of the ‘Russia for the Russians’ project would become the sad end of the new Russia,” Markedonov says. One can talk about the discrimination of Russians in the republics, and one should “end the privatization of power by corrupt regional clans.” But one must not take the next step.
“To struggle with one politicized ethnicity with the help of another, with one ethno-nationalism with the help of another means to destroy the country by putting out a fire with the help of kerosene. In this sense,” Markedonov concludes, “Russian separatism is something just as dangerous as the Dudayev experiment of the early 1990s.”
Staunton, December 20 – The “main threat” to the territorial integrity of Russia at present does not come from “separatist and particularist attitudes of ‘the borderlands’” but from “the movement of the ethnic majority” -- the Russians -- according to one of Moscow’s most thoughtful commentators on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts.
In an essay posted online last week, Sergey Markedonov says that it is time to carefully “analyze ‘the Manezh phenomenon,” given that such “mass pogrom actions” and the reactions of experts and officials to them highlights the emergence of “a new social-political force,” which one can call “’Russian separatism’” (www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=11193).
While this force is growing, he says, it has “still not become institutionalized. It does not have its own parties,” but “sympathy for Russian separatism exists in the ranks of the law enforcement structures, the special services, and the administrations of various levels.” Consequently, it is something that bears watching and analysis.
The term “Russian separatism” may seem strange given that the obvious quesiton is “from whom are the Russians who are the ethnic majority to separate,” Markedonov says, and consequently, most people are inclined to refer to what is going on “in the most extreme case” as “extremism or xenophobia!”
But “nation building is not only subordinate to the logic of figures and simple arithmetic,” he continues. Since 1991, ethnic Russians have formed the overwhelming share of the population of the Russian Federation, but they have not been able to realize their specifically ethno-national goals. In this regard, they resemble the Ichkeria variant of the Chechens.
The number of non-Russians inside the Russian Federation is growing, “but for the state which wants to preserve itself in its current borders” – and Dmitry Medvedev has said this is almost “the main state task” – “the absolute priority is integration but not assimilation and forced russification.”
That in turn means that “the optimal Russian nationality policy is not the construction of an ‘ethnic Russian state’ but the formation of a political nation, defined as a civil society and not as a biological phenomenon.” That does not mean that the ethnic majority should despise itself as happened 20 years ago but rather that it not seek to create its own state.
Were it to do so, the existing state would either dissolve or mean that Russia would reject efforts at modernization and “preserve its backwardness.” It would mean that Russia “could not become a superpower” but rather would face “permanent separatism and segmentation” as other groups sought to escape from subordination.
“The integration of our fell citizens under the slogan ‘Russia for the Russian’ is simply impossible.” It would not be acceptable to the Tatars or Bashkirs, let alone the Tuvins and Chechens, Markedonov says. And consequently, “by separating from our unique ‘internal abroad,’ we would be separating from Russia many territories” which Russians consider Russian.
The idea now spreading through the blogosphere of “separating out the Caucasus” – that is, giving it independence, “does not on closer acquaintance withstand criticism,” the Moscow analyst says. First of all, that would not end migration or the war. Both would continue because “our Caucasus is not the Algeria of the early 1960s.” There is “no one” to reach agreement with.
Moreover, such a move would inevitably raise the question about the fate of the large number of ethnic Russians living there and about non-Russians who are proud of their involvement in Russian institutions like the military.
“But the problem is not only about territories and spaces,” he continues. If the North Caucasus were “separated out” as the Russian nationalists say they want, they would in fact “separate themselves from Russia” and their actions would lead to “a series of ethnic conflicts not only in the borderlands but in the center of the country.”
In short, “the center itself would be separating itself from the borderlands,” he argues. “’Russia for the Russians’ in this way would become an instrument for the destruction of the state” in much the same way but on a far larger scale than the slogan “’Georgia for the Georgians’ in the early 1990s threatened to destroy that republic.
“In this connection, one should note also that the logical extension of ‘the Russian project’ would become ‘the Moscow project,’ Moscow for the Muscovites.’” Indeed, some Russian separatists make use of that term without appearing to recognize that it threatens exactly what they say they want to achieve.
Of course, Markedonov says, “the self-determination of Russians and ‘Russian separatism’ are phenomena not of today [alone]. If we want, we can uncover the predecessors of this trend both in the Russian Empire and in the USSR,” where efforts to promote the Russian community led to the destruction of both.
But now, “the realization of the ‘Russia for the Russians’ project would become the sad end of the new Russia,” Markedonov says. One can talk about the discrimination of Russians in the republics, and one should “end the privatization of power by corrupt regional clans.” But one must not take the next step.
“To struggle with one politicized ethnicity with the help of another, with one ethno-nationalism with the help of another means to destroy the country by putting out a fire with the help of kerosene. In this sense,” Markedonov concludes, “Russian separatism is something just as dangerous as the Dudayev experiment of the early 1990s.”
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