Paul Goble
Staunton, December 19 – The program of the National Democratic Alliance, which calls for the immediate separation of the North Caucasus from the rest of the country and the division of the federation into seven “ethnic Russian republics” is “the beginning of the end of the Russian Federation,” according to a Moscow commentator.
In an article on Forum-MSK.ru yesterday, Maksim Kalashnikov says that the new union’s idea, which he says “corresponds completely with the plans of INSOR,” the liberal think tank that has provided ideas for President Dmitry Medvedev, represents “the confederalization of the country, a CIS-2, and a new 1991” (forum-msk.org/material/politic/4984630.html).
Moreover, the Russian commentator says, this plan will lead to “the complete destruction of hopes for the conversation of the Russian Federation into a full-blooded unitary ethnic Russian state,” all in order to permit “the current ‘elite’ to remain unpunished and hide abroad” with “the trillions of dollars” they have stolen.
In support of his contention, Kalashnikov appends to his brief remarks three documents, the Manifesto of the National-Democratic Alliance adopted in March, the declaration about the formation of the National-Democratic Movement of the Russian Civic Union slated to be adopted this weekend, and a commentary on the need to separate the North Caucasus.
Although Kalashnikov almost certainly overstates the importance of these declarations – they are at most the views of one part of the Russian political class and not an indication of the steps Moscow is likely to take in the near future – he is clearly right to point to them as an indication of the directions some in the Russian capital are now considering.
In the draft manifesto scheduled to be adopted this weekend, the National Democrats declare that they believe in “the indivisibility of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘democracy,’” in the “naturalness” of nationalism and democracy in Russian history, and in the “necessiry of a synthesis of civic, ethnic, and cultural nationalism.”
They thus call for the formation of a genuine Russian national state based on democracy, a free market economy, and genuine federalism and regionalism. In addition, they urge the formation of a socially-responsible state, the tightening of immigration rules, the defense of the environment and culture, and the transition to a professional army.
With regard to the status of the republics of the North Caucasus, the draft manifesto says that “the price which Russia is paying today for holding these territories is too high” and that the subsidies these republics are receiving need to be cut, the borders need to be changed to separate out ethnic Russian regions, and that the borders between them and Russia must be strengthened.
In a commentary that first appeared on the Nazdem.org site, Moscow commentator Aleksey Shiropayev expands on these points and concludes that Russia must separate out the North Caucasus and give that region its independence if Russia is to have a chance to develop as it should in the future.
“It is obvious,” he writes, that there were “three geo-political factors which made Russia an empire:” Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus. After 1991, only the Caucasus remained inside the borders of the state centered on Moscow. And that must change or Russia will remain in terrible straits.
Shiropayev recalls that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn who “dreamed about the transformation of Russia into a Russian national state” wanted to get rid of Central Asia, although even the great Russian writer hoped to retain Ukraine and Belarus as “a continuation of the so-called ‘Russian world.’”
The current Kremlin rulers, Shiropayev continues, “much better than Solzhenitsyn understand the imperial essence of Russian pretensions in Ukraine. They fight for Ukraine precisely as a necessary component of the internationalist Eurasian empire, covering this struggle with demagogic comments about ‘the Russian world.’”
But the Moscow commentator points out, “Ukraine just like Central Asia already is all the same foreign territory.” And that in turn means that “the main thing which gives an imperial character to Russia is now the North Caucasus,” defined he points out by the ethnic territories not by the lines of the North Caucasus Federal District.
“Let us remember,” Shirpoyev says, “with what began the restoration of the imperial paradigm after the destruction of the USSR – with the Chechen war unleashed by Yeltsin under hurrah-patriotic slogans.” It was precisely that war which “put an end to the hopes for the transformation of Russia into a normal federation consisting of equal subjects.
One must note, he continues, that “as a result of the Chechen wars, which have cost so much blood of ethnic Russian soldiers, both the Kremlin and Chechnya have achieved mutually profitable results: the central powers that be have ‘demonstrated’ the necessity of their existence as guarantors of the much-ballyhooed integrity of the country.”
And at the same time, Shiropayev points out, “Chechnya has obtained the chance for unlimited subsidies as a parasite on the Russian regions of the RF.” But there is “just one small detail: neither the one nor the other has any relationship to ethnic Russian interests.” Indeed, both contradict them.
“The Kremlin needs the North Caucasus for its presence within Russia justifies the existence of an enormous repressive Chekist-cop machine and what is the main thing the very existence of the Kremlin as the center of power.” In fact, “the Moscow-centric Russian statehood” of today rests on the North Caucasus.
And likewise, “the North Caucasus needs the Kremlin as a source of aid, concessions, and all possible special legal arrangements” and that is not to mention the unbelievably enormous “corrupt schemes “which connect the capital’s bureaucracy and the North Caucasus elites.”
Given all that, Shiropayev says, “it is obvious that the main question for Russia, the Russian question, cannot be resolved which the imperial character of Russian statehood is preserved. And it will be preserved while the North Caucasus remains within Russia,” an arrangement the Kremlin and the North Caucasus are vitally interested in seeing continue.
“The starting point for the reconstitution of the Russian Federation” must thus be placing the national republics of the North Caucasus outside its borders. “It is finally time to openly and honestly acknowledge the cultural, mental, and psychological incompatibility of the Russian people and other peoples of Russia with the phenomenon of the North Caucasus.
“We are OTHER and we want to live in another way, in a European way, and not according to the laws of the mountain taips. It is time to deprive the Kadyrovs of the possibility of living as parasites on the Russian and other peoples of Russia. And it is time to deprive the Putins of the possibilities of speculating on imperial patriotism.”
In fine, Shiropayev says, “it is time to put an end to the criminal union of the Chekists and the wild men.”
Sunday, December 19, 2010
Window on Eurasia: To Block Rise of Islam in Russia, Moscow Sets Up ‘Puppet’ Muftiate, Gainutdin Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 19 – To block the rise of Islam in the Russian Federation, the Russian state has set up a state-controlled muftiate much as the Soviet authorities did, according to Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), a statement that has sparked predictable outrage among many Muslim leaders.
But another comment by Gainutdin to the effect that the degradation of the Russian nation into alcoholism and sloth is the reason that Moscow has had to allow so many Muslim immigrants to come to do the work of the country has generated even more anger among a broader range of people.
In an interview to the Tatar Service of Radio Liberty that has been reproduced in numerous Russian Federation news portals, Gainutdin says that the Russian state is trying to block the unification of Muslims from below and to “put down Islam in Russia” by setting up its own “marionette” muftiates (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38754).
Gainutdin points out that a year ago, the powers that be in Moscow had blocked efforts by Talgat Tajuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), Ismail Berdiyev, the head of the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus and himself to organize a unified MSD for Russia as a whole.”
Such a step, the SMR chief said they were told, “did not correspond to the policy of the state.”
But a few weeks ago, state-controlled “pocket” muftis, “dirty people” who Gainutdin says are working against the gro wth of Islam in Russia, formed a new fourth centralized MSD not as a step toward real unity but in order to “put down Islam” in Russia or at least “to stop its growth.”
In his Tatar Service interview, Gainutdin also suggested that the disorders in Moscow and other Russian cities have been “organized by forces who are against the growth of Islam,” that they “clearly show a negative attitude” toward Islam on the part of the powers that be, and that Muslims in Russia now feel “very strong pressure” from the state.
Indeed, Gainutdin continues, “the catastrophe as a result of which so many people have landed in hospitals and the bloody uprisings themselves are the result of the activities of forces who are attempting to reduce the role of Muslims in Russia.”
Not surprisingly given past practice, almost the entire rest of the senior leadership of the Russian Muslim community denounced Gainutdin for these remarks, with most dismissing them as untrue and others suggesting that they will only further enflame the already tense situation in Russia (www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/1358016.html and www.nr2.ru/moskow/313548.html).
But Gainutdin’s comments in Moscow about the Russian population generated far broader and more severe criticism. The SMR head said that “the influx of migrants into the country was a forced measure,” the result of a situation in which “the indigenous population does not want to work” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38779).
To deal with that, Gainutdin suggested, “Russia was forced to invite in migrants” because “they don’t get drunk, they are disciplined, and they love to work. If they receive their pay, they send it home to feed their families” rather than spend it on themselves as Russian workers often do.
“Today,” he continued, “Russian villages are being destroyed, they are disappearing. One need not search for the fault in migrants” as many of the protesters do. These immigrants are “in fact our slaves; they come to work for us. We ourselves out to work and create good things for our Fatherland.”
“Over the course of 20 years, we have educated [in the Russian Federation] a generation of young people which does not love to work but rather likes to watch pornography, drink, take drugs, and party in clubs – not one of those who goes out into the field to sow and then bring in the harvest.”
In this situation, Gainutdin concluded, “those nationalists which call for driving out of Russia all migrants and all who are ‘not ours’ have begun the task of destroying the Russian Federation,” comments that various leaders religious and otherwise attacked in the sharpest terms (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38779).
In support of their criticism on both points, some of the leaders provided some interesting details. Tajuddin, for example, insisted that Gainutdin’s words “do not correspond to the truth,” something he said was obvious to anyone who looked at what had been happening among Muslims over the last generation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38780).
“I have occupied the position of chairman of the Central MSD more than 30 years,” the mufti continued, “and I can speak about how everything has changed over this period. We Muslims of Russia had only 94 , and the Muslims of the USSR about 300 mosques” at the end of Soviet times.
“Now there are more than 7500 mosques. That is a growth of more than 70 times. In Bashkortostan alone, there were 16 and are now 1016, [and] in Tatarstan, there were 15 and are now 1300.” Given that growth in the number of mosques, Tajuddin asked rhetorically, how can one speak about pressure against Islam in Russia?
Staunton, December 19 – To block the rise of Islam in the Russian Federation, the Russian state has set up a state-controlled muftiate much as the Soviet authorities did, according to Ravil Gainutdin, the head of the Council of Muftis of Russia (SMR), a statement that has sparked predictable outrage among many Muslim leaders.
But another comment by Gainutdin to the effect that the degradation of the Russian nation into alcoholism and sloth is the reason that Moscow has had to allow so many Muslim immigrants to come to do the work of the country has generated even more anger among a broader range of people.
In an interview to the Tatar Service of Radio Liberty that has been reproduced in numerous Russian Federation news portals, Gainutdin says that the Russian state is trying to block the unification of Muslims from below and to “put down Islam in Russia” by setting up its own “marionette” muftiates (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38754).
Gainutdin points out that a year ago, the powers that be in Moscow had blocked efforts by Talgat Tajuddin, the head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD), Ismail Berdiyev, the head of the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus and himself to organize a unified MSD for Russia as a whole.”
Such a step, the SMR chief said they were told, “did not correspond to the policy of the state.”
But a few weeks ago, state-controlled “pocket” muftis, “dirty people” who Gainutdin says are working against the gro wth of Islam in Russia, formed a new fourth centralized MSD not as a step toward real unity but in order to “put down Islam” in Russia or at least “to stop its growth.”
In his Tatar Service interview, Gainutdin also suggested that the disorders in Moscow and other Russian cities have been “organized by forces who are against the growth of Islam,” that they “clearly show a negative attitude” toward Islam on the part of the powers that be, and that Muslims in Russia now feel “very strong pressure” from the state.
Indeed, Gainutdin continues, “the catastrophe as a result of which so many people have landed in hospitals and the bloody uprisings themselves are the result of the activities of forces who are attempting to reduce the role of Muslims in Russia.”
Not surprisingly given past practice, almost the entire rest of the senior leadership of the Russian Muslim community denounced Gainutdin for these remarks, with most dismissing them as untrue and others suggesting that they will only further enflame the already tense situation in Russia (www.regnum.ru/news/kavkaz/1358016.html and www.nr2.ru/moskow/313548.html).
But Gainutdin’s comments in Moscow about the Russian population generated far broader and more severe criticism. The SMR head said that “the influx of migrants into the country was a forced measure,” the result of a situation in which “the indigenous population does not want to work” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38779).
To deal with that, Gainutdin suggested, “Russia was forced to invite in migrants” because “they don’t get drunk, they are disciplined, and they love to work. If they receive their pay, they send it home to feed their families” rather than spend it on themselves as Russian workers often do.
“Today,” he continued, “Russian villages are being destroyed, they are disappearing. One need not search for the fault in migrants” as many of the protesters do. These immigrants are “in fact our slaves; they come to work for us. We ourselves out to work and create good things for our Fatherland.”
“Over the course of 20 years, we have educated [in the Russian Federation] a generation of young people which does not love to work but rather likes to watch pornography, drink, take drugs, and party in clubs – not one of those who goes out into the field to sow and then bring in the harvest.”
In this situation, Gainutdin concluded, “those nationalists which call for driving out of Russia all migrants and all who are ‘not ours’ have begun the task of destroying the Russian Federation,” comments that various leaders religious and otherwise attacked in the sharpest terms (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38779).
In support of their criticism on both points, some of the leaders provided some interesting details. Tajuddin, for example, insisted that Gainutdin’s words “do not correspond to the truth,” something he said was obvious to anyone who looked at what had been happening among Muslims over the last generation (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38780).
“I have occupied the position of chairman of the Central MSD more than 30 years,” the mufti continued, “and I can speak about how everything has changed over this period. We Muslims of Russia had only 94 , and the Muslims of the USSR about 300 mosques” at the end of Soviet times.
“Now there are more than 7500 mosques. That is a growth of more than 70 times. In Bashkortostan alone, there were 16 and are now 1016, [and] in Tatarstan, there were 15 and are now 1300.” Given that growth in the number of mosques, Tajuddin asked rhetorically, how can one speak about pressure against Islam in Russia?
Window on Eurasia: Disorders Prompting Moscow Patriarchate to Distance Itself from Regime
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 19 – The disorders in the streets of Moscow and other cities of the Russian Federation are calling into question the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian regime, with the church distancing itself from the state and the state no longer able to count on the unquestioned obedience of the church.
Yesterday, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department on Relations between the Church and Society and a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, made a remarkable declaration to a Moscow roundtable on recent developments of inter-ethnic relations in the Russian Federation (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=38770).
Specifically, he said, “it is evident that the majority of the population of the country is dissatisfied with the existing social distortions, the actions of particular representatives of diasporas, the gap between the people and the taking of decisions, corruption, illegality, and the total lawlessness of local powers that be.”
“If the powers that be would listen to the people, then and only then would the people acquire a firm footing. The powers that be today must listen not to the elites but to the people, and the elites, if they have a sufficient level of intellect and expertise must be able to convince the people that what they propose are really useful for the people.”
And, in the words of the Interfax report, Chaplin argued that “if however the elites cannot convince the people in the correctness of their recommendations, then they ought to move to the side.” Indeed, he continued, those elites who “already in the 1990s attempted to construct nationality policy … do not have long to do so.”
They have perhaps “about six months,” the archpriest suggested.
Two other churchmen have extended this argument. In a commentary for Portal-Credo.ru, a site not known for its sympathy to Kirill, Bishop Grigori suggests that “the disorders in Russia [are] a stimulus for the liberation [of the Russian Orthodox Church] from Sergianism,” the system in which the Soviet state allowed the church to reemerge in exchange for total loyalty.
According to Grigori, the inability and unwillingness of the Russian bureaucracy to respond to the needs of the population has forced the latter into the streets to try to gain influence over the powers that be. But that shortcoming also has called into question the relationship of the Church to the state (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1816).
“Mechanisms of direct democracy put on the agenda questions of moral authority, including the authority of religious organizations and religious leaders,” the bishop says. Not surprisingly, the Moscow Patriarchate initially reacted to the disorders as it typically has as little more than a spokesman for the state. But it could not remain there for long.
Several church leaders, the bishop pointed out, noted that the church “has no problems in its relations with the powers that be but that there are problems unfortunately in the relationship [of the powers that be] with society.” In Grigori’s opinion, “for the secular powers that be: this is a clear signal” that its relationship with the Church is changing.
It tells the powers that be that they cannot bet on the “ruling Church” because that will not add to their authority and that the Church which doesn’t want to sacrifice its relationship with the state nonetheless is concerned about losing any remaining moral authority it has with the population by supporting what is a weak and ineffective power.
The bargain Sergii, the first patriarch of Soviet times, achieved was premised on the existence of a strong state, Grigori continues. But “when state power itself is in doubt, then it won’t happen that even officially supported churchmen will throw themselves into battle in its defense.” Instead, they will look to their own interests, including moral ones.
“Dependence on state power and moral authority are mutually exclusive things,” the bishop points out, noting that “No one will in fact argue with this. Simply the Sergian understand of the Church presupposed reliance not on the people but on state power,’ an arrangement that requires the state to keep up its end of this bargain.
Another perspective, albeit an even more radical one, is offered by Archpriest Gennady Belovolov, a Saint Petersburg pastor, for Ruskline.ru. In an essay entitled “Between loyalty and disobedience,” he points out that “the question of the relationship of an Orthodox beliver to the current Russian powers that be is complicated and varied for many reasons.”
The Orthodox could never be completely loyal to Soviet power because it “forcibly replaced” God’s anointed on earth, the tsar. Now, in the wake of Soviet power, “we must understand that democracy is a product of human passions and sins, and one shouldn’t expect miracles” (www.ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/12/16/mezhdu_loyalnostyu_i_nepovinoveniem/).
But nonetheless, the archpriest says, Russians and the Church have the right ”to demand some minimum from this power, that it observe certain rules of the game, that it not interfere with the ability of the people to life, toil and pray …We understand that without power, society will dissolve into chaos, but the powers must not push society into that condition.”
As the Gospels teach, “all power is from God,” but this power may be a blessing or a curse. “And if we ask ourselves: is the current power one or the other, then what will be the answer?” Is it a blessing to the people or something else? And “can an Orthodox say that the current power is a blessing of God to our land?”
Yet another church commentator, Archpriest Aleksii Lebedev suggests that the Moscow Patriarchate has not yet made the decision to make the change from a helpmate to the state to a source of moral authority and will continue to show that “stones for it are dearer than human souls” (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1817).
But within the Russian Orthodox and even within the Patriarchate, at least some are thinking about such a shift so that “if the winds change, they will be able to say that ‘we always’ thought so,’ and to show as an example the words if not of Patriarch Kirill then those of fathers Vsevolod Chaplin and Andrey Kurayev.”
However, the clearest indication that things are changing is to be found in a document adopted by the hierarchy this past week. It asserts that the Russian Orthodox Church continues to oppose having churchmen run for office but that in cases of “extreme church necessity,” they can do so (rus.ruvr.ru/2010/12/17/37104210.html).
Such a formulation suggests that the Church will decide when that is rather than anyone else, a shift in position that opens the way to a very different role for the hierarchy within Russian society and one that suggests the civil powers that be may face competition from a corner they never anticipated.
Staunton, December 19 – The disorders in the streets of Moscow and other cities of the Russian Federation are calling into question the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian regime, with the church distancing itself from the state and the state no longer able to count on the unquestioned obedience of the church.
Yesterday, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department on Relations between the Church and Society and a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, made a remarkable declaration to a Moscow roundtable on recent developments of inter-ethnic relations in the Russian Federation (www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=38770).
Specifically, he said, “it is evident that the majority of the population of the country is dissatisfied with the existing social distortions, the actions of particular representatives of diasporas, the gap between the people and the taking of decisions, corruption, illegality, and the total lawlessness of local powers that be.”
“If the powers that be would listen to the people, then and only then would the people acquire a firm footing. The powers that be today must listen not to the elites but to the people, and the elites, if they have a sufficient level of intellect and expertise must be able to convince the people that what they propose are really useful for the people.”
And, in the words of the Interfax report, Chaplin argued that “if however the elites cannot convince the people in the correctness of their recommendations, then they ought to move to the side.” Indeed, he continued, those elites who “already in the 1990s attempted to construct nationality policy … do not have long to do so.”
They have perhaps “about six months,” the archpriest suggested.
Two other churchmen have extended this argument. In a commentary for Portal-Credo.ru, a site not known for its sympathy to Kirill, Bishop Grigori suggests that “the disorders in Russia [are] a stimulus for the liberation [of the Russian Orthodox Church] from Sergianism,” the system in which the Soviet state allowed the church to reemerge in exchange for total loyalty.
According to Grigori, the inability and unwillingness of the Russian bureaucracy to respond to the needs of the population has forced the latter into the streets to try to gain influence over the powers that be. But that shortcoming also has called into question the relationship of the Church to the state (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1816).
“Mechanisms of direct democracy put on the agenda questions of moral authority, including the authority of religious organizations and religious leaders,” the bishop says. Not surprisingly, the Moscow Patriarchate initially reacted to the disorders as it typically has as little more than a spokesman for the state. But it could not remain there for long.
Several church leaders, the bishop pointed out, noted that the church “has no problems in its relations with the powers that be but that there are problems unfortunately in the relationship [of the powers that be] with society.” In Grigori’s opinion, “for the secular powers that be: this is a clear signal” that its relationship with the Church is changing.
It tells the powers that be that they cannot bet on the “ruling Church” because that will not add to their authority and that the Church which doesn’t want to sacrifice its relationship with the state nonetheless is concerned about losing any remaining moral authority it has with the population by supporting what is a weak and ineffective power.
The bargain Sergii, the first patriarch of Soviet times, achieved was premised on the existence of a strong state, Grigori continues. But “when state power itself is in doubt, then it won’t happen that even officially supported churchmen will throw themselves into battle in its defense.” Instead, they will look to their own interests, including moral ones.
“Dependence on state power and moral authority are mutually exclusive things,” the bishop points out, noting that “No one will in fact argue with this. Simply the Sergian understand of the Church presupposed reliance not on the people but on state power,’ an arrangement that requires the state to keep up its end of this bargain.
Another perspective, albeit an even more radical one, is offered by Archpriest Gennady Belovolov, a Saint Petersburg pastor, for Ruskline.ru. In an essay entitled “Between loyalty and disobedience,” he points out that “the question of the relationship of an Orthodox beliver to the current Russian powers that be is complicated and varied for many reasons.”
The Orthodox could never be completely loyal to Soviet power because it “forcibly replaced” God’s anointed on earth, the tsar. Now, in the wake of Soviet power, “we must understand that democracy is a product of human passions and sins, and one shouldn’t expect miracles” (www.ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/12/16/mezhdu_loyalnostyu_i_nepovinoveniem/).
But nonetheless, the archpriest says, Russians and the Church have the right ”to demand some minimum from this power, that it observe certain rules of the game, that it not interfere with the ability of the people to life, toil and pray …We understand that without power, society will dissolve into chaos, but the powers must not push society into that condition.”
As the Gospels teach, “all power is from God,” but this power may be a blessing or a curse. “And if we ask ourselves: is the current power one or the other, then what will be the answer?” Is it a blessing to the people or something else? And “can an Orthodox say that the current power is a blessing of God to our land?”
Yet another church commentator, Archpriest Aleksii Lebedev suggests that the Moscow Patriarchate has not yet made the decision to make the change from a helpmate to the state to a source of moral authority and will continue to show that “stones for it are dearer than human souls” (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=1817).
But within the Russian Orthodox and even within the Patriarchate, at least some are thinking about such a shift so that “if the winds change, they will be able to say that ‘we always’ thought so,’ and to show as an example the words if not of Patriarch Kirill then those of fathers Vsevolod Chaplin and Andrey Kurayev.”
However, the clearest indication that things are changing is to be found in a document adopted by the hierarchy this past week. It asserts that the Russian Orthodox Church continues to oppose having churchmen run for office but that in cases of “extreme church necessity,” they can do so (rus.ruvr.ru/2010/12/17/37104210.html).
Such a formulation suggests that the Church will decide when that is rather than anyone else, a shift in position that opens the way to a very different role for the hierarchy within Russian society and one that suggests the civil powers that be may face competition from a corner they never anticipated.
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