Paul Goble
Staunton, December 10 – Russia’s new naval doctrine, as shown by its plans for shipbuilding over the next decade, is not directed against the United States and the West as was the Soviet Union’s but rather is intended in the first instance to protect its economic interests on the continental shelf and to ensure that the sea lanes for delivering oil and gas remain open.
More and more details are coming out about Russia’s new naval doctrine, one that will redirect that country’s efforts away from the geo-political challenges of the past to the geo-economic ones of the future but that sets the stage in particular places for serious naval competitions involving the rising naval power of China, Japan and India.
The editors of the military affairs site, “Voennoye obozreniye,” surveyed leading Russian military experts about how they see Russia’s naval policy developing over the next decade. The experts identified four “main directions” in a plan that calls for adding 36 submarines and 40 surface ships (topwar.ru/2646-reforma-flota-glavnaya-ugroza-na-dalnem-vostoke.html).
First, the experts said, the plan is intended to allow Moscow to protect its access to oil and gas reserves as well as other mineral deposits on the continental shelf off of Russia’s shores, something that many Russian commentators have already pointed to in their discussion of that country’s Arctic strategy.
Second, they added, the new plan is intended to provide support for the security of sea lanes by countering piracy. What they did not say but what clearly lies behind their conclusion is that the decline in the US naval presence that has guaranteed such security over the past 50 years makes such a national strategy essential from Moscow's point of view.
Third, the experts continued, the new Russian naval plan is intended to help create a military balance in parts of the world where other means available to Moscow are not available – and in the first instance in areas near China, which constitutes the most important rising naval power in the world.
And fourth, they said, Russia’s new navy will be intended to have a “political demonstration” effect, to show the flag and demonstrate Russia’s ability to exert its influence in such regions as Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, all areas where Moscow wants to be taken seriously as a major power
. The new plan, the experts said, is based on the assumption that the United States will no longer play the role of “the most probable opponent.” And because of that assumption, Moscow will stop building highly specialized ships such as “aircraft killers” and instead build more general purpose ships
(“Voyennoye obozreniye” does not report but other Russian outlets are saying, citing anonymous sources in the defense ministry, Russia does not plan to build any aircraft carriers before 2020, thus limiting its power projection capacity at least relative to those states that have them (www.ng.ru/nvo/news/2010/12/10/1291978741.html).)
But if the US is now longer the chief challenge, it is very clear what country is. That is China, and Russia is preparing to deal with it as a naval power by building up its Pacific Ocean fleet to the point that it will pass the traditionally dominant Northern Fleet as the most powerful Russian naval force.
Russia’s two other fleets, the Black Sea and the Baltic, will also see their roles change, the editors of “Voyennoye obozreniye” say. The former will see “the most radical renewal” of its complement of ships, while the latter will see its role reduced to that of a coastal flotilla, with many of its ships transferred to the Black Sea fleet.
In the course of the ongoing discussion of Russia’s naval operations, one extremely curious detail emerged. Russian commanders are now using Tatars to communicate among naval operators to ensure that the Japanese and the Americans do not understand Russian intentions just as the US used Navaho speakers during World War II (islamportal.ru/novosti/105/1311/).
Friday, December 10, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Opposition to Cuts in Social Services Greater in Non-Russian Republics than in Russian Regions
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 10 – Opposition to reductions in government support of social services, cuts required by changes in the rules for budgetary institutions, is greater in many non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation than it is in most predominantly ethnic oblasts and krays, according to a survey of developments around the country.
That is because, Yury Sukhanov argues on the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal yesterday, in the predominantly ethnic Russian areas, these changes are viewed as “purely social” but in non-Russian ones, they are seen as the latest manifestation of “a colonial policy” and even a form of “genocide” (svpressa.ru/society/article/35211/).
And while Sukhanov does not make this point, this pattern shows how ethno-national concerns can reinforce social class ones especially during times of crisis and at the same time how social class issues can easily acquire an ethnic dimension in non-Russian communities around the country – or in short, how ethnicity and class can reinforce one another.
The “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist begins by noting that “in recent weeks, circumstances in Tatarstan have become more tense,” with various Tatar nationalist organizations organizing demonstrations and denouncing the Russian state as “the metropolis” and “a Russian empire” which has held the Tatars in “colonial dependence” for centuries.
Then Sukhanov publishes his interviews with Ramay Yuldashev, one of the leaders of the Tatar national movement, and Layd Shemiyer, a leader of the inter-regional movement Mari Ushem of the Union of Maris, a Finno-Ugric people who live next door to and intermixed with the Turkic Tatars in the Middle Volga.
The two make clear that the demands of the Tatars are “political,” but both of them point out to Sukhanov that recent changes in government programs have only intensified the nationalist feelings of the Tatars as well as those of “other republics, above all in the Middle Volga region.”
That leads Sukhanov to conclude that “the unpopular measures which the federal government is taking, starting with the elimination of elections for heads of regions and ending with all possible ‘monetarizing’ of recent times, are viewed not so much in a social but rather in a national aspect.”
Indeed, he says, many in the non-Russian regions and some in the predominantly Russian regions view this as yet another move by “’Moscow occupiers.’” In this, at least for the non-Russians, Sukhanov continues, the situation is like the Ukrainian view of Stalin’s collectivization campaign: they see it not as social policy but as an act of genocide.
In some cases, the Moscow journalist points out, those negatively affected can find money of their own or money from supporters to compensate for federal cutbacks. But in others, they can’t either because they are too poor or too small to do so. And when they can’t, they will, like the Tatars, view this as an intentional act by the central powers that be.
Consequently, as Moscow seeks to monetarize ever more benefits or to reduce them in the face of rising budgetary problems, the non-Russians of the Russian Federation appear likely to become ever more angry, viewing them not as policies applied to all citizens of the Russian Federation but directed explicitly against non-Russian communities and republics.
Staunton, December 10 – Opposition to reductions in government support of social services, cuts required by changes in the rules for budgetary institutions, is greater in many non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation than it is in most predominantly ethnic oblasts and krays, according to a survey of developments around the country.
That is because, Yury Sukhanov argues on the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal yesterday, in the predominantly ethnic Russian areas, these changes are viewed as “purely social” but in non-Russian ones, they are seen as the latest manifestation of “a colonial policy” and even a form of “genocide” (svpressa.ru/society/article/35211/).
And while Sukhanov does not make this point, this pattern shows how ethno-national concerns can reinforce social class ones especially during times of crisis and at the same time how social class issues can easily acquire an ethnic dimension in non-Russian communities around the country – or in short, how ethnicity and class can reinforce one another.
The “Svobodnaya pressa” journalist begins by noting that “in recent weeks, circumstances in Tatarstan have become more tense,” with various Tatar nationalist organizations organizing demonstrations and denouncing the Russian state as “the metropolis” and “a Russian empire” which has held the Tatars in “colonial dependence” for centuries.
Then Sukhanov publishes his interviews with Ramay Yuldashev, one of the leaders of the Tatar national movement, and Layd Shemiyer, a leader of the inter-regional movement Mari Ushem of the Union of Maris, a Finno-Ugric people who live next door to and intermixed with the Turkic Tatars in the Middle Volga.
The two make clear that the demands of the Tatars are “political,” but both of them point out to Sukhanov that recent changes in government programs have only intensified the nationalist feelings of the Tatars as well as those of “other republics, above all in the Middle Volga region.”
That leads Sukhanov to conclude that “the unpopular measures which the federal government is taking, starting with the elimination of elections for heads of regions and ending with all possible ‘monetarizing’ of recent times, are viewed not so much in a social but rather in a national aspect.”
Indeed, he says, many in the non-Russian regions and some in the predominantly Russian regions view this as yet another move by “’Moscow occupiers.’” In this, at least for the non-Russians, Sukhanov continues, the situation is like the Ukrainian view of Stalin’s collectivization campaign: they see it not as social policy but as an act of genocide.
In some cases, the Moscow journalist points out, those negatively affected can find money of their own or money from supporters to compensate for federal cutbacks. But in others, they can’t either because they are too poor or too small to do so. And when they can’t, they will, like the Tatars, view this as an intentional act by the central powers that be.
Consequently, as Moscow seeks to monetarize ever more benefits or to reduce them in the face of rising budgetary problems, the non-Russians of the Russian Federation appear likely to become ever more angry, viewing them not as policies applied to all citizens of the Russian Federation but directed explicitly against non-Russian communities and republics.
Window on Eurasia: Russia’s Muslims More Likely to Say They Believe in God than are Russia’s Orthodox Christians, Survey Finds
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 10 – Three out of four Russians identify themselves as followers of one or another faith, but only 58 percent of these say they believe in God, a pattern that one Moscow expert says indicates that “religion for many Russians has only symbolic importance” as a marker of identity.
But even more important, Marina Mcheldova pointed out at a Kazan conference this week on how federalism can prevent ethno-confessional conflicts, there are major differences among the major faiths of Russia in this regard, a finding that is certain to exacerbate discussion about the relative size of religious groups there (islamportal.ru/novosti/104/1305/).
On the basis of research that she and other scholars at the Center for Religion in Contemporary Society at the Moscow Institute of Sociology have conducted over the past two years, 84 percent of Russian citizens who identify themselves as Muslims say they believe in God, while only 72 percent of who identify as Russian Orthodox Christians do.
But because only 49 percent of all Russians surveyed identified themselves as followers of any religion – a finding undercutting claims by various leaders that Russia is again a religious country -- those findings will do little to end the argument about “ethnic Muslims” and “ethnic Orthodox,” those who declare a faith to manifest ethnicity rather than for any other purpose.
On the one hand, the difference between Muslims and Orthodox Christians in this regard may simply reflect the reality that in Russia today, declaring oneself a Muslim is in many places far less politically correct than saying one is an Orthodox Christian, thus reducing the number of those who declare themselves to be Muslims if they are not believers.
And on the other, as many Orthodox commentators have suggested, the relative simplicity of Islam as a religion compared to Orthodox Christianity may be involved. For most Muslims, the declaration that one is a follower of Islam is equivalent to a declaration of faith in God, while for at least some Orthodox in Russia, the same is not necessarily the case.
Meanwhile, an article by Dmitry Treshchanin and Pavel Pryanikov on the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal provides another set of statistics on Russian religious life that also are certain to spark additional controversy: a comparison of the number of facilities by religion in Moscow and between Moscow and other major cities around the world (svpressa.ru/society/article/35231/).
The two summarize their findings in the following lapidary way: “There are 100 times as many churches per capita in Moscow than in Shanghai but six times fewer than the number per capita in New York. And there is a special deficit in Moscow of mosques,” given the number of Muslims there.
But as in all things, especially religious, the devil is in the details.
Patriarch Kirill insists that Moscow has far too few churches. According to him, the Russian capital needs at least 591 more of them in order to bring the ratio per capita up to the all-Russian average and make it possible for all Muscovites to have an Orthodox church within walking distance.
At the same time, Muslim leaders have argued that their faithful should have “no fewer than 100” additional mosques, given that they now have only six. Otherwise, they say, the Islamic faithful will either have to continue to pray “in the streets” or go into Orthodox churches for Muslim prayers.
Drawing on an official city government fact book, Treshchanin and Pryanikov say there are currently 840 religious institutions representing more than 40 different confessions in the Russian capital. Of these, 670 churches and 26 chapels belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, with another nine belonging to the Old Believers.
The Muslims have six mosques, according to the city, “plus an unknown number of ‘prayer houses.’ The Jews have 38 cultural centers and seven synagogues. The Buddhists have five “cult” centers, the Armenian Apostolic Church has two, the Catholics three, and the Lutherans three. Other Protestant groups have 37 prayer houses.
Using the findings of the VTsIOM polling agency, the two journalists make the assumption that 75 percent of the population across the country professes Orthodox, five percent Islam, and less than one percent any of the other faiths, figures that they acknowledge are problematic both overall and especially for Moscow.
But using them, they come up with the following figures that compare the number of religious facilities among the faiths and also the number of the faithful for each of them. In Moscow, they report, there are 751 Christian facilities or one for every 12,000 residents of the Russian capital.
For Muslims in that city, there are six, or one for every 97,000 of the faithful; for Jews, seven, or one for every 15000 followers of Judaism; and for Buddhists five centers, or one for every 20,000. Given that there is a greater proportion of Muslims and a smaller one of Buddhists in the Russian capital, these ratios probably understate the per capita situation.
But as Treshchanin and Pryanikov say, the problem is even more complicated than that. Only slightly more than half of all Russians regularly attend religious services. The overwhelming majority – 83 percent, according to VTsIOM -- do so either only on holidays or “from time to time.”
Staunton, December 10 – Three out of four Russians identify themselves as followers of one or another faith, but only 58 percent of these say they believe in God, a pattern that one Moscow expert says indicates that “religion for many Russians has only symbolic importance” as a marker of identity.
But even more important, Marina Mcheldova pointed out at a Kazan conference this week on how federalism can prevent ethno-confessional conflicts, there are major differences among the major faiths of Russia in this regard, a finding that is certain to exacerbate discussion about the relative size of religious groups there (islamportal.ru/novosti/104/1305/).
On the basis of research that she and other scholars at the Center for Religion in Contemporary Society at the Moscow Institute of Sociology have conducted over the past two years, 84 percent of Russian citizens who identify themselves as Muslims say they believe in God, while only 72 percent of who identify as Russian Orthodox Christians do.
But because only 49 percent of all Russians surveyed identified themselves as followers of any religion – a finding undercutting claims by various leaders that Russia is again a religious country -- those findings will do little to end the argument about “ethnic Muslims” and “ethnic Orthodox,” those who declare a faith to manifest ethnicity rather than for any other purpose.
On the one hand, the difference between Muslims and Orthodox Christians in this regard may simply reflect the reality that in Russia today, declaring oneself a Muslim is in many places far less politically correct than saying one is an Orthodox Christian, thus reducing the number of those who declare themselves to be Muslims if they are not believers.
And on the other, as many Orthodox commentators have suggested, the relative simplicity of Islam as a religion compared to Orthodox Christianity may be involved. For most Muslims, the declaration that one is a follower of Islam is equivalent to a declaration of faith in God, while for at least some Orthodox in Russia, the same is not necessarily the case.
Meanwhile, an article by Dmitry Treshchanin and Pavel Pryanikov on the “Svobodnaya pressa” portal provides another set of statistics on Russian religious life that also are certain to spark additional controversy: a comparison of the number of facilities by religion in Moscow and between Moscow and other major cities around the world (svpressa.ru/society/article/35231/).
The two summarize their findings in the following lapidary way: “There are 100 times as many churches per capita in Moscow than in Shanghai but six times fewer than the number per capita in New York. And there is a special deficit in Moscow of mosques,” given the number of Muslims there.
But as in all things, especially religious, the devil is in the details.
Patriarch Kirill insists that Moscow has far too few churches. According to him, the Russian capital needs at least 591 more of them in order to bring the ratio per capita up to the all-Russian average and make it possible for all Muscovites to have an Orthodox church within walking distance.
At the same time, Muslim leaders have argued that their faithful should have “no fewer than 100” additional mosques, given that they now have only six. Otherwise, they say, the Islamic faithful will either have to continue to pray “in the streets” or go into Orthodox churches for Muslim prayers.
Drawing on an official city government fact book, Treshchanin and Pryanikov say there are currently 840 religious institutions representing more than 40 different confessions in the Russian capital. Of these, 670 churches and 26 chapels belong to the Russian Orthodox Church, with another nine belonging to the Old Believers.
The Muslims have six mosques, according to the city, “plus an unknown number of ‘prayer houses.’ The Jews have 38 cultural centers and seven synagogues. The Buddhists have five “cult” centers, the Armenian Apostolic Church has two, the Catholics three, and the Lutherans three. Other Protestant groups have 37 prayer houses.
Using the findings of the VTsIOM polling agency, the two journalists make the assumption that 75 percent of the population across the country professes Orthodox, five percent Islam, and less than one percent any of the other faiths, figures that they acknowledge are problematic both overall and especially for Moscow.
But using them, they come up with the following figures that compare the number of religious facilities among the faiths and also the number of the faithful for each of them. In Moscow, they report, there are 751 Christian facilities or one for every 12,000 residents of the Russian capital.
For Muslims in that city, there are six, or one for every 97,000 of the faithful; for Jews, seven, or one for every 15000 followers of Judaism; and for Buddhists five centers, or one for every 20,000. Given that there is a greater proportion of Muslims and a smaller one of Buddhists in the Russian capital, these ratios probably understate the per capita situation.
But as Treshchanin and Pryanikov say, the problem is even more complicated than that. Only slightly more than half of all Russians regularly attend religious services. The overwhelming majority – 83 percent, according to VTsIOM -- do so either only on holidays or “from time to time.”
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