Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – Roman Silantyev, the controversial Russian specialist on Islam, says that “more than 90 percent” of the money Muslims abroad sent to promote an Islamic rebirth in the Russian Federation, as diverted by those who received it for other selfish and corrupt ways, a development he says Moscow can only be pleased by.
Because that meant that fewer Islamist radicals were trained, he insists in a new article on the Antiterror.ru site, this misappropriation was “extremely useful” for Russia (www.smi-antiterror.ru/personality/professionals.htm?postId=17@cmsVBVideoPost&mode=1&id=11@cmsVBVideoBlog).
Silantyev, a protégé of Patriarch Kirill, has been studying the Muslim community of Russia for many years, and his views merit attention because they will receive it there. But his conclusions must be placed within the context of the broader message he has been delivering concerning Russia’s Muslims for most of the last decade.
On the one hand, here as in earlier articles and books, he seeks to present the leaders of the Muslim spiritual directorates (MSDs) as fundamentally corrupt and unreliable, a portrait that the leaders themselves reject and that most other specialists on Islam in the Russian Federation suggest is one-sided at a minimum.
And on the other, Silantyev again here as in earlier studies places the blame for the rise of radicalism among Muslims in the Russian Federation on foreigners. While no one disputes that Islamic centers and governments abroad have played a role, few experts downplay the domestic roots of radicalism as much as he does.
Silantyev begins his essay by asking rhetorically, “Can theft ever be useful?” And he suggests that corruption can be “extremely useful” for Russia. If, of course, extremists and terrorists are involved in it.” And he devotes the rest of his 1500-word article to an attempt to show that this is exactly what has been going on.
According to the specialist, Russia’s special services and “scholars of the most varied specialties” have been following the financing of Islamist terrorists and extremists by Muslim centers abroad for many years. According to one FSB official, 60 “Islamist extremist organizations,” “about 100 commercial firms,” and “ten banking groups have been involved.
Among the groups involved are Al Haramein, Islamic Relief, Taib, Al-Igas, the Assembly of Muslim Youth, the Organization for the Islamic Salvation of Chechnya, the Rebirth of the Islamic Heritage, the Society of Social Reforms, the Charity Society of Qatar, and the World Organization of Islamic Salvation.
The “exact sums” that these groups offered is “of course, unknown,” Silantyev says, but he adds that “it is possible to talk about their order of magnitude.” According to him, this has been approached a total of 10 billion US dollars and portions of it have gone to about ten thousand people and groups.
He provides some specific figures from the 1990s, noting that even earlier money began to flow to Muslims in the Soviet Union and then in Russia from Saudi Arabia, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, Turkey and Libya, which believed that Muslims long under communist rule needed to be assisted in recovering their faith.
Until the middle of 1992, Silantyev says, “the main and single partner” of such foreign foundations was the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia, which was headed then (and now) by Talgat Tajuddin, who has styled himself “the supreme mufti of Holy Rus.”
Tajuddin received money to build mosques, to print and disseminate literature, to send Muslims on the haj and to provide them with Islamic educations both inside Russia and in Muslim countries abroad. At the time, many of Tajuddin’s enemies accused him of misusing some of the funds he received.
The foreign foundations which were providing money often did so for less than unselfish reasons, Silantyev continues, viewing the money as a kind of investment which would provide them with benefits in the longer term by changing Moscow’s attitudes toward Muslims both within the borders of Russia and abroad.
“Up to two-thirds” of the Islamic foundations sending money to Russia’s Muslims had “as daughter structures extremist organizations” which were interested in “establishing control over the Islamic elite of Russia, penetrating into the higher echelons of power and forming an influential lobby,” and even supporting secession in various Muslim parts of the country.
This became too much for Tajuddin, and as a result, the funds from abroad largely stopped flowing to him and began to flow instead to those imams who were in opposition to the mufti. That continued until 1999 when the Russian special services began to shut down these channels.
The “improbably high level of trust of the Arab sponsors,” Silantyev continues, “created ideal conditions” for some Muslims in Russia to misuse the money, keeping it away from its intended purposes and into their own pockets instead. And this diversion was exacerbated by the large number of hands through which such funds passed.
“Thank God,” Silantyev concludes, “more than 90 percent of the means intended to produce the Wahhabizaiton of Russian Muslims” were diverted one way or another. As a result, “instead of dozens or even hundreds of centers for the preparation of terrorists,” this money was used by other Muslims to buy “expensive cars and apartments.”
“One can only guess how things might have turned out,” he adds, “if the domestic partners of Al Qaeda had had cleaner hands.”
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Push to Use Cossacks in North Caucasus Reflects Center’s Desperation, Historian Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 8 – Moscow’s recent efforts to recruit Cossacks to help enforce law and order in the North Caucasus highlights how desperate the situation there now is, given that the Cossacks are not now, in large part because of Moscow’s failure to help, in a position to offer real assistance, according to a review of the situation by a Russian historian.
In an article posted online yesterday, Yury Soshin says that there are far fewer Cossacks who could help provide security than officials like Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential plenipotentiary, appears to believe and that some Cossacks see his call now as resembling Stalin’s appeals in the difficult days of 1941 (www.apn.ru/publications/article23426.htm).
Even worse, calls to use the Cossacks in support of the Russian state, Soshin says, could not only generate more anger and opposition among non-Russians in that region given the image the Cossacks have but also lead to more cynicism among the Cossacks about Moscow, further reducing any utility they might have and potentially turning them into an independent force.
At the end of October, Khloponin took part in a celebration of the 20th anniversary in Pyatigorsk of the rebirth of the Terek Cossack Force. At that assembly, Terek Ataman Vasily Bondarevk celebrated the role of the Yermolog 694th Motorized Rifle Brigade consisting of Cossack volunteers in the first post-Soviet Chechen war.
All present applauded, but no one mentioned, Soshin says, that “the formation and military activity of the Yermolog battalion is in essence the single real act [by the Terek Cossacks] over the course of the entire 20 years” of its renewed existence. Nor did they mention that the unit was quickly disbanded “without explanation” just after it was created.
Instead, the participants and speakers acted as if the Terek Cossacks represent a really serious force. Khloponin for his part suggested that “the reborn Terek Cossacks must become a support for peace and stability in the Caucasus” and “an example for everyone in the task of strengthening Russian statehood in the region.”
For that to take place, the plenipotentiary representative acknowledged, it will be “necessary to conduct broadscale organizational work,” something that Khloponin said was currently at an “unsatisfactory” level. As a result, he said, there are few Cossacks in local governments, both because of opposition from them and because of a lack of initiative.
Khloponin promised to change both, and his ideas in that regard were supported by other Russian officials, including Aleksandr Beglov, chairman of the Cossack Affairs Council in the Presidential Administration who read greetings from President Dmitry Medvedev, and Stavropol Governor Valery Gayevsky.
Two weeks later, Soshin continues, these ideas were reiterated at a Cossack meeting in Kabardino-Balkaria, but neither meeting, the historian insists, moved beyond declarative language or changed the situation of the Cossacks, whom Moscow would like to use at no cost to itself but who are not in a position to do much at least not yet.
Moscow faces a terrible dilemma: “the situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is close to a catastrophe.” Indeed, as far as Khloponin is concerned, “the situation is not under his control.” But as far as the Cossacks are concerned, “they have heard many promises,” but they have not seen much action from the Russian powers that be.
And that is worrisome, Soshin says, because “the Terek Cossacks are dying.” In some places which were Cossack areas, there are no Cossacks left, and in others, they have lost all sense of who and what they are. At best, they take part in cultural activities but certainly not serious military ones.
If one takes Stavropol kray as an example, the historian points out, “neither the powers that be nor the Cossacks are able to block the spread of terrorism and the de-russificaiton of the south eastern districts of the kray.” Nor is either in a position to restore “elementary order” for the people there.
Instead, Soshin says, “the population of the kray again as before the last Chechen war is beginning to life in fear,” sensing that the powers that be are “throwing [them] under the power of Kadyrov,” whatever they declare in public.
In this situation, what do the powers that be “want from the Cossacks?” Military support? If so, he says, they will have to do more than allow Cossack units to exist for more than two months which was all the Yermolov battalion was allowed in 1995 and provide support and training for Cossack officers and men.
Moscow has done that for the Chechens but not the Cossacks, Soshin says, and the center shows no sign of actually changing, whatever it says. And if the Russian powers that be hope for more from the Cossacks, then they need to address “a number of questions,” none of which have been answered as of now.
What are the Cossacks? What should their units do? What should be the relationship of Cossack units to regular Russian military formations? And who should control their specific actions and defend the Cossacks against what Soshin calls “the human rights hysteria” they often encounter.
And Soshin concludes with these words: there are many questions, but the basic conclusion is the following: the situation in the North Caucasus is getting worse with each passing week. If not now, then soon it will be possible to speak about the agony [of Russian power there].”
That is why the powers that be have been ‘appealing to the Cossacks and attempting to use them in order to ‘stabilize’ the situation.” But such appeals, the Russian historian says, are not inspiring. Instead, they recall, as one participant in the Pyatigorsk meeting put it, the appeals Stalin made to Russians when Hitler’s forces were pushing back the Soviet army.
Staunton, December 8 – Moscow’s recent efforts to recruit Cossacks to help enforce law and order in the North Caucasus highlights how desperate the situation there now is, given that the Cossacks are not now, in large part because of Moscow’s failure to help, in a position to offer real assistance, according to a review of the situation by a Russian historian.
In an article posted online yesterday, Yury Soshin says that there are far fewer Cossacks who could help provide security than officials like Aleksandr Khloponin, the Presidential plenipotentiary, appears to believe and that some Cossacks see his call now as resembling Stalin’s appeals in the difficult days of 1941 (www.apn.ru/publications/article23426.htm).
Even worse, calls to use the Cossacks in support of the Russian state, Soshin says, could not only generate more anger and opposition among non-Russians in that region given the image the Cossacks have but also lead to more cynicism among the Cossacks about Moscow, further reducing any utility they might have and potentially turning them into an independent force.
At the end of October, Khloponin took part in a celebration of the 20th anniversary in Pyatigorsk of the rebirth of the Terek Cossack Force. At that assembly, Terek Ataman Vasily Bondarevk celebrated the role of the Yermolog 694th Motorized Rifle Brigade consisting of Cossack volunteers in the first post-Soviet Chechen war.
All present applauded, but no one mentioned, Soshin says, that “the formation and military activity of the Yermolog battalion is in essence the single real act [by the Terek Cossacks] over the course of the entire 20 years” of its renewed existence. Nor did they mention that the unit was quickly disbanded “without explanation” just after it was created.
Instead, the participants and speakers acted as if the Terek Cossacks represent a really serious force. Khloponin for his part suggested that “the reborn Terek Cossacks must become a support for peace and stability in the Caucasus” and “an example for everyone in the task of strengthening Russian statehood in the region.”
For that to take place, the plenipotentiary representative acknowledged, it will be “necessary to conduct broadscale organizational work,” something that Khloponin said was currently at an “unsatisfactory” level. As a result, he said, there are few Cossacks in local governments, both because of opposition from them and because of a lack of initiative.
Khloponin promised to change both, and his ideas in that regard were supported by other Russian officials, including Aleksandr Beglov, chairman of the Cossack Affairs Council in the Presidential Administration who read greetings from President Dmitry Medvedev, and Stavropol Governor Valery Gayevsky.
Two weeks later, Soshin continues, these ideas were reiterated at a Cossack meeting in Kabardino-Balkaria, but neither meeting, the historian insists, moved beyond declarative language or changed the situation of the Cossacks, whom Moscow would like to use at no cost to itself but who are not in a position to do much at least not yet.
Moscow faces a terrible dilemma: “the situation in the North Caucasus Federal District is close to a catastrophe.” Indeed, as far as Khloponin is concerned, “the situation is not under his control.” But as far as the Cossacks are concerned, “they have heard many promises,” but they have not seen much action from the Russian powers that be.
And that is worrisome, Soshin says, because “the Terek Cossacks are dying.” In some places which were Cossack areas, there are no Cossacks left, and in others, they have lost all sense of who and what they are. At best, they take part in cultural activities but certainly not serious military ones.
If one takes Stavropol kray as an example, the historian points out, “neither the powers that be nor the Cossacks are able to block the spread of terrorism and the de-russificaiton of the south eastern districts of the kray.” Nor is either in a position to restore “elementary order” for the people there.
Instead, Soshin says, “the population of the kray again as before the last Chechen war is beginning to life in fear,” sensing that the powers that be are “throwing [them] under the power of Kadyrov,” whatever they declare in public.
In this situation, what do the powers that be “want from the Cossacks?” Military support? If so, he says, they will have to do more than allow Cossack units to exist for more than two months which was all the Yermolov battalion was allowed in 1995 and provide support and training for Cossack officers and men.
Moscow has done that for the Chechens but not the Cossacks, Soshin says, and the center shows no sign of actually changing, whatever it says. And if the Russian powers that be hope for more from the Cossacks, then they need to address “a number of questions,” none of which have been answered as of now.
What are the Cossacks? What should their units do? What should be the relationship of Cossack units to regular Russian military formations? And who should control their specific actions and defend the Cossacks against what Soshin calls “the human rights hysteria” they often encounter.
And Soshin concludes with these words: there are many questions, but the basic conclusion is the following: the situation in the North Caucasus is getting worse with each passing week. If not now, then soon it will be possible to speak about the agony [of Russian power there].”
That is why the powers that be have been ‘appealing to the Cossacks and attempting to use them in order to ‘stabilize’ the situation.” But such appeals, the Russian historian says, are not inspiring. Instead, they recall, as one participant in the Pyatigorsk meeting put it, the appeals Stalin made to Russians when Hitler’s forces were pushing back the Soviet army.
Window on Eurasia: New All-Russian Muslim Body Seeks to Unite Umma, Expand Role of Islam in Russia
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 8 – Today in Moscow, Muslim leaders from various part of the country announced the creation of a new all-Russian Islamic organization, the Russian Association of Islamic Agreement (RAIS) in order to overcome divisions within the Islamic community there and to push for an expanded role for Islam in Russia.
The new organization thus becomes the fourth Islamic group with all-Russian rather than narrowly regional pretensions like most of the 60 plus MSDs, the others are the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) in Moscow, and the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus.
The new organization, Khuzin said, has been set up because of “the growing requirement and importance of the consolidation of the Muslim community of Russia” and the need to overcome “intra-Muslim conflicts and the unhealthy competeition among Muslim leaders and organizations” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38583).
According to media reports, the founding meeting of the new organization was attended by the leaders of the MSDs of Stavropol, Perm, Mordvinia, the Urals and Ryazan oblast, and RAIS will be headed by Stavropol Mufti Mukhammed Rakhimov. But no details are yet available on what other MSDs or individual parishes may join or how RAIS will be structured.
But one thing is clear already: RAIS and its leaders intend to be a coordinating center among and perhaps ultimately a replacement for the three other “super MSDs” and that the new group will seek to develop ties with other religious organizations in the Russian Federation including the Orthodox Church and with Muslims abroad.
According to Russian news reports, RAIS “declares the achievement of the unity of Muslims through agreement and the continuation of the traditions of Russian traditionally enlightened Islam.” And to that end, it “intends to conduct” negotiations to reach agreement with the other three super MSDs (www.newsru.com/religy/08dec2010/musulorg.html).
Among its major goals, RAIS leaders said today, is “the deepening of dialogue with representatives of the traditional religions of Russia, ‘above all with the fraternal Russian Orthodox Church,’ the development of dialogue with Muslim countries of the post-Soviet space, who are united in the Consultative Council under the leadership of Allashukhur Pasha-zade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus.”
In addition, RAIS commits itself to the preparation of ‘reliable and devoted to the Fatherland’ religious leaders, pedagogues, and theologians, the establishment of a national Islamic theological school, [and] the publication and popularization of the works of Russian theologians, Islamic specialists historians and writers” in order to secure “the establishment of a single and unified Islamic educational space in Russia.”
“The creators of the All-Russian muftiate [as some news agencies are calling this group] also consider their tasks to include the construction of mosques in correspondence with the traditions of the peoples of Russia and ‘taking into account the mentality and specific features of the regions of the country,’ the creation of a foundation to assist religious leaders, members of their families and journalists who have died at the hands of extremists and terrorists.”
These global goals are clearly intended to attract the support not only of many Muslim leaders but also of the Russian powers that be who have repeatedly expressed their interest in supporting “traditional Russian Islam” as a bulwark against extremist coming in from abroad and who are likely to welcome a new group that lacks the baggage many of the other MSDs have.
But at the same time, RAIS in a declaration published today is also taking up positions that will put it at odds with both other Muslim leaders and some among the Russian powers that be and many Orthodox Russians who are concerned by the rise of Islam and the appearance of mosques in Russian cities (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=documents&div=1061).
On the one hand, RAIS sharply criticizes the SMR for failing to build mosques in Moscow and other central Russian cities over the last decade and especially for blocking efforts by the Central MSD in Ufa and the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus to put up mosques in the Russian capital.
And on the other, RAIS makes it clear that it expects the Russian powers that be to live up to their promises to provide space for at least eight more mosques in Moscow in the immediate future, something that city officials have been under pressure from activists in the population not to do.
Whether RAIS will achieve any or all of its goals very much remains to be seen: it will face enormous resistance from some other Muslim leaders who see any new group as a threat to their power and perquisites and from some in the Russian government who have more or less consistently opposed the formation of a single entity that could speak for all Russia’s Muslims.
But the appearance of this new institution, especially given the willingness of Muslim leaders like Khuzin to use this occasion to push hard for Muslim unity in Russia as well as for a greater role for Islam there suggests that this new player, possibly with the support of some officials, could change the balance of power in Russian Islam over the next weeks and months.
Staunton, December 8 – Today in Moscow, Muslim leaders from various part of the country announced the creation of a new all-Russian Islamic organization, the Russian Association of Islamic Agreement (RAIS) in order to overcome divisions within the Islamic community there and to push for an expanded role for Islam in Russia.
The new organization thus becomes the fourth Islamic group with all-Russian rather than narrowly regional pretensions like most of the 60 plus MSDs, the others are the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate (MSD) in Ufa, the Union of Muftis of Russia (SMR) in Moscow, and the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus.
The new organization, Khuzin said, has been set up because of “the growing requirement and importance of the consolidation of the Muslim community of Russia” and the need to overcome “intra-Muslim conflicts and the unhealthy competeition among Muslim leaders and organizations” (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=news&div=38583).
According to media reports, the founding meeting of the new organization was attended by the leaders of the MSDs of Stavropol, Perm, Mordvinia, the Urals and Ryazan oblast, and RAIS will be headed by Stavropol Mufti Mukhammed Rakhimov. But no details are yet available on what other MSDs or individual parishes may join or how RAIS will be structured.
But one thing is clear already: RAIS and its leaders intend to be a coordinating center among and perhaps ultimately a replacement for the three other “super MSDs” and that the new group will seek to develop ties with other religious organizations in the Russian Federation including the Orthodox Church and with Muslims abroad.
According to Russian news reports, RAIS “declares the achievement of the unity of Muslims through agreement and the continuation of the traditions of Russian traditionally enlightened Islam.” And to that end, it “intends to conduct” negotiations to reach agreement with the other three super MSDs (www.newsru.com/religy/08dec2010/musulorg.html).
Among its major goals, RAIS leaders said today, is “the deepening of dialogue with representatives of the traditional religions of Russia, ‘above all with the fraternal Russian Orthodox Church,’ the development of dialogue with Muslim countries of the post-Soviet space, who are united in the Consultative Council under the leadership of Allashukhur Pasha-zade, the head of the Administration of Muslims of the Caucasus.”
In addition, RAIS commits itself to the preparation of ‘reliable and devoted to the Fatherland’ religious leaders, pedagogues, and theologians, the establishment of a national Islamic theological school, [and] the publication and popularization of the works of Russian theologians, Islamic specialists historians and writers” in order to secure “the establishment of a single and unified Islamic educational space in Russia.”
“The creators of the All-Russian muftiate [as some news agencies are calling this group] also consider their tasks to include the construction of mosques in correspondence with the traditions of the peoples of Russia and ‘taking into account the mentality and specific features of the regions of the country,’ the creation of a foundation to assist religious leaders, members of their families and journalists who have died at the hands of extremists and terrorists.”
These global goals are clearly intended to attract the support not only of many Muslim leaders but also of the Russian powers that be who have repeatedly expressed their interest in supporting “traditional Russian Islam” as a bulwark against extremist coming in from abroad and who are likely to welcome a new group that lacks the baggage many of the other MSDs have.
But at the same time, RAIS in a declaration published today is also taking up positions that will put it at odds with both other Muslim leaders and some among the Russian powers that be and many Orthodox Russians who are concerned by the rise of Islam and the appearance of mosques in Russian cities (www.interfax-religion.ru/islam/?act=documents&div=1061).
On the one hand, RAIS sharply criticizes the SMR for failing to build mosques in Moscow and other central Russian cities over the last decade and especially for blocking efforts by the Central MSD in Ufa and the Coordinating Center of Muslims of the North Caucasus to put up mosques in the Russian capital.
And on the other, RAIS makes it clear that it expects the Russian powers that be to live up to their promises to provide space for at least eight more mosques in Moscow in the immediate future, something that city officials have been under pressure from activists in the population not to do.
Whether RAIS will achieve any or all of its goals very much remains to be seen: it will face enormous resistance from some other Muslim leaders who see any new group as a threat to their power and perquisites and from some in the Russian government who have more or less consistently opposed the formation of a single entity that could speak for all Russia’s Muslims.
But the appearance of this new institution, especially given the willingness of Muslim leaders like Khuzin to use this occasion to push hard for Muslim unity in Russia as well as for a greater role for Islam there suggests that this new player, possibly with the support of some officials, could change the balance of power in Russian Islam over the next weeks and months.
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