Paul Goble
Staunton, December 2 – Despite President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent celebration of the roles women are playing in Russian political life, female politicians in that country say that their share of positions at most levels has fallen, with some arguing that the only way to reverse the situation is to introduce gender quotas in parliament and perhaps other institutions.
Today’s “Novyye izvestiya” notes that “only three of the almost 30 positions in the government” are women. And of the 83 leaders of the federal subjects, until recently, there was only one – Valentina Matvienko – although now there are is a second, with Natalya Komarova headed for Yugra (http://www.newizv.ru/news/2010-12-02/137368/).
In the Duma is concerned, the situation is no better. The Just Russia Party contingent has the largest share of women, 29 percent of its members. The ruling United Russia, in contrast, has only 14 percent, with the KPRF having seven percent, and the LDPR having ten percent. And in the regions, the situation is equally bad: In eight of them, there are no female deputies at all.
Despite these disappointing numbers, Elena Panina, the secretary of United Russia’s Moscow section, told the paper that she does not consider this pattern reflects any form of “political discrimination.” Rather she said, the low female share “corresponds to the realities of daily life.”
“Women in politics have become fewer,” she suggested, “because life is becoming harsher.” No one is keeping women out, but “in order to get involved in politics, one must have a certain amount of freedom. And if you are overloaded with concerns of home, family and the need to earn your keep, then there is no time to get involved in political activity.”
But Galina Mikhaleva, the head of the women’s fraction of the opposition Yabloko party disagreed. She said that “discrimination exists.” How can one claim otherwise, she said when Russia today ranks 80th among the countries of the world in terms of female representation in politics, “right alongside Togo.”
The reasons for this, she said, include “the patriarchal traditions which have historically existed in Russia and also the Soviet inheritance when formally women had rights, but all of them remained only on paper and in slogans.” Today, women have no chance to move upward for another reason: all seven of the registered parties are headed by men.
While her own party, Yabloko, remains “a happy exception” to the sexism of other political organizations, the situation as a whole is dispiriting. That is all the more so because the 1990s were a kind of “golden age” for women in Russian political life with so many women playing a major public role.
One of the women who rose to prominence at that time, Irina Khakamada, who was a leader of the Union of Right Forces, explained why she believes the number of women in politics has fallen. “Now, politics in Russia is connected with very large amounts of money and is corrupt,” in contrast to the 1990s, when “independent women” could play a public role.
Now, she said, the Duma is little more than a staged affair, and consequently, there is little or no room for independent female participation. Just Russia’s Svetlana Goryacheva agreed that the current situation of female representation in positions of power is “sad,” although she said a few female deputies continued to play a big role despite their small numbers.
But Khakamada suggested that ever more frequently those women who do get into the Duma are chosen for their looks or their fame in sports or some other activity because the Russian legislation has been “transformed into a showplace” rather than a parliament. As a result, it consists of businessmen, “experienced bureaucrats, and “for attraction beautiful girls.”
Many Russian women who aspire to a great political role look to Scandinavia and Western Europe where the share of women in office is vastly higher. But many of them, like Khakamada, are convinced that Russian politics would have to become more transparent and competitive and women more professionally prepared to achieve similar numbers.
Mikhaleva, for her part, argued that a quota system needs to be introduced. Victims of discrimination must be helped with such “positive discrimination.” That exists in some other countries such as Germany. “For Russia,” she said, “I would like [the female quota] to be 50 percent, but even 30 percent would be good,” and a vast improvement on the current levels.
But there appears to be little chance of that anytime soon. “For real proportional representation of women in the power sphere, there needs to be a real political force which supports such an ideology,” Viktor Militaryev, the vice president of the Moscow Institute of National Strategy said. “But at present, Russia does not have any such force.”
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Last Bicameral Regional Legislature in Russia Shut Down, Ending Yet Another of the ‘Checks and Balances’ of 1990s
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 2 – This week, the Sverdlovsk oblast government eliminated its bicameral legislature, the last federal subject to take a step which reverses the efforts of some regional leaders in the 1990s to create a system of “checks and balances” rather than to have one that permits more or less untrammeled executive authority.
And while this action, like those which preceded it in other regions over the last several years, including Tyva in April 2010, has attracted less attention than other aspects of the construction of Vladimir Putin’s much-ballyhooed “power vertical” and homogenization of regional government structures, it is likely to have potentially far-reaching consequences.
On the one hand, the destruction of the bicameral system in the regions further reduces the power of the legislatures relative to that of the executive branch and also and perhaps more importantly reduces the significance of territorial units on which the upper house of these chambers were based.
And on the other, the completion of this homogenization drive could set the stage for a move to eliminate the Federation Council in the National Assembly, a body that is based on exactly the same principles that the upper houses of the regional legislatures were and one that might be eliminated as unnecessary at some point in the future.
The history of bicameralism in Sverdlovsk oblast is especially instructive in that regard. In 1994, when Eduard Rossel was governor, that federal subject created a two-house legislative assembly, with both houses based on single member districts and the upper house on larger administrative ones (www.duma.midural.ru/about).
Supporters of bicameralism there, a commentary on Expert.ru yesterday noted, “asserted that it permitted a balancing of interests of territories, political movements, social organizations, organs of local self-administration, and entrepreneurs” and that it reflected Rossel’s commitment to “checks and balances” ( www.expert.ru/2010/12/1/poslednij-iz-dvuhpalatnyih/).
But when Rossel was replaced last year as governor by Aleksandr Misharin, whose approach more closely corresponds to Putin’s, the system was clearly doomed, and this week’s action, which also changed the number of deputies, their terms of office, and the definition of a quorum, appears to have become inevitable.
As an article in “Kommersant” notes, Misharin believes the new arrangement is both more efficient and cost effective, and he successfully pushed it through, despite opposition from the KPRF and LDPR. But significantly, their members objected less to the end of bicameralism than to the other changes (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1549322).
Staunton, December 2 – This week, the Sverdlovsk oblast government eliminated its bicameral legislature, the last federal subject to take a step which reverses the efforts of some regional leaders in the 1990s to create a system of “checks and balances” rather than to have one that permits more or less untrammeled executive authority.
And while this action, like those which preceded it in other regions over the last several years, including Tyva in April 2010, has attracted less attention than other aspects of the construction of Vladimir Putin’s much-ballyhooed “power vertical” and homogenization of regional government structures, it is likely to have potentially far-reaching consequences.
On the one hand, the destruction of the bicameral system in the regions further reduces the power of the legislatures relative to that of the executive branch and also and perhaps more importantly reduces the significance of territorial units on which the upper house of these chambers were based.
And on the other, the completion of this homogenization drive could set the stage for a move to eliminate the Federation Council in the National Assembly, a body that is based on exactly the same principles that the upper houses of the regional legislatures were and one that might be eliminated as unnecessary at some point in the future.
The history of bicameralism in Sverdlovsk oblast is especially instructive in that regard. In 1994, when Eduard Rossel was governor, that federal subject created a two-house legislative assembly, with both houses based on single member districts and the upper house on larger administrative ones (www.duma.midural.ru/about).
Supporters of bicameralism there, a commentary on Expert.ru yesterday noted, “asserted that it permitted a balancing of interests of territories, political movements, social organizations, organs of local self-administration, and entrepreneurs” and that it reflected Rossel’s commitment to “checks and balances” ( www.expert.ru/2010/12/1/poslednij-iz-dvuhpalatnyih/).
But when Rossel was replaced last year as governor by Aleksandr Misharin, whose approach more closely corresponds to Putin’s, the system was clearly doomed, and this week’s action, which also changed the number of deputies, their terms of office, and the definition of a quorum, appears to have become inevitable.
As an article in “Kommersant” notes, Misharin believes the new arrangement is both more efficient and cost effective, and he successfully pushed it through, despite opposition from the KPRF and LDPR. But significantly, their members objected less to the end of bicameralism than to the other changes (www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1549322).
Window on Eurasia: Restitution of Religious Property Seen Transforming Russian Orthodox Church and Russia More Generally
Paul Goble
Staunton, December 2 – The restitution to the Russian Orthodox Church of property seized in Soviet times, a measure that President Dmitry Medvedev has just signed into law, is likely to transform the church itself and make it a model for other groups in Russia’s emerging civil society, according to a leading Moscow authority on religious affairs.
In an article in “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Roman Lunkin, the director of the Moscow Institute of Religion and Law, argues that the restitution of property seized by the Bolsheviks will subordinate the church to legal norms and force the hierarchy to take a more active role in public discussions (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10602).
On the one hand, he argues, such developments will lead to the democratization of the church, “regardless of what its leaders may want” and thus promote the transformation of an institution which has “not recommended itself as a defender of democracy” and whose leadership has often been openly opposed to “the values of democratic society.”
And on the other, Lunkin suggests, such changes in the church, which as the result of the restitution of property will be the largest property owner among the institutions of civil society, will serve as a model for other parts of civil society and thus help to promote more pressure by them for the establishment of democratic norms in the Russian Federation.
According to the specialist on religious law, “the arguments around the law on church restitution … illustrate the completely new situation in which the Russian Orthodox Church finds itself,” a situation “when it was drawn into a discussion of its own role in society” coupled with demands that its rights be recognized and enshrined in law.
The new law, Lunkin continues, has negative as well as positive ones, all of which “put the Church in the center of social life” and many of which have been largely ignored both by those who support the idea of the return of property to the Church and other religious organizations and those who oppose any such undertaking.
First of all, the analyst says, “the law strengthens the largest civic institution in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church,” adding to its position as “an enormous corporation, independent of state power with its own property and naturally with its own interests.” Indeed, “for the first time in history, the ROC has received the possibility to be strong because of its independence.”
Second, “the law precisely describes the relations between the state and religious organizations [like the ROC] in the property sphere.” Moreover, these definitions were worked out over many years not unilaterally by the state but rather as a result of intensive lobbying by the church hierarchy and its supporters.
In short, the ROC was able to promote its interests and rights, and with the adoption of the law, it “will be able to defend its rights,” something that will make it “an example for all citizens of Russia” not only of what public activism and lobbying can achieve but also of the benefits they may be able to get by engaging in similar actions.
And third, even though few are talking about this possibility yet, “one can with a great degree of probability predict,” Lunkin suggests, “that the law will promote” changes in the church itself to allow it to play the role of “an active participant in the civic and social life” of all Russians.
Because of its role as the owner of vast amounts of property, Lunkin says, “th eChkurch whether it wants to or not will have to enter into dialogue with various social forces especially if one takes into account that Patriarch Kirill has declared social-missionary tasks” to be among the ROC’s most important priorities.
With its new possessions, he says, the Church will be forced at all levels “to more seriously think about how to support itself, how to attract parishioners and not only to life on the basis of the means of rich and not very rich sponsors.” And because much of the property being returned is of interest to others, it will have to continue a dialogue with them.
Under contemporary conditions, Lunkin continues, “churches do not survive without attracting parishioners to social, cultural and educational work. The ROC cannot life in the situation of a constantly closed corporation sometimes in open conflict with society” and thus must find a basis for dialogue with society, something it has not always done.
That means that the ROC will be forced to more “open dialogue” with civil society, something the hierarchy may be reluctant to engage in but a set of actions that priests and some of the lower ranking members of the hierarchy recognize they must expand, especially given their new property holdings.
Indeed, Lunkin says, “the law on restitution will undoubtedly accelerate this process.”
All this is likely to come as a surprise to many in the human rights community, few of its members are yet ready to view the Church “objectively” but rather continue to “view it through the prism of anti-clerical ideology,” especially given the scandals arising in Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg in recent months.
“But in essence,” the religious affairs specialist says, “all these scandals are destroying the monolithic image of the ROC” and making both society as a whole and the parts of the Church aware that sometimes they can enjoy the support of the powers that be and sometimes not, often depending on what they do.
Up to now, the ROC has not been able to modernize itself, but now the restitution of property may force it to do so whether the hierarchy wants this or not. Moreover, the new provisions of the law are likely to have the effect of limiting the “telephone” arrangements that the hierarchy has had with the powers that be.
And because of that, lower ranking churchmen and even groups of parishioners will be in a better position to ensure that their rights and the rights of the Church are protected rather than standing idly by while the hierarchy arranges things for itself and its members at the expense of the church more generally.
These positive consequences of the new legislation do not mean that the law is perfect, Lunkin says. Many of its provisions are inadequately precise and will lead to more debate, something that may be useful or may be exploited in negative ways. But because the new law brings the Church into a more transparent legal space, it is on balance a step forward.
Staunton, December 2 – The restitution to the Russian Orthodox Church of property seized in Soviet times, a measure that President Dmitry Medvedev has just signed into law, is likely to transform the church itself and make it a model for other groups in Russia’s emerging civil society, according to a leading Moscow authority on religious affairs.
In an article in “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Roman Lunkin, the director of the Moscow Institute of Religion and Law, argues that the restitution of property seized by the Bolsheviks will subordinate the church to legal norms and force the hierarchy to take a more active role in public discussions (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10602).
On the one hand, he argues, such developments will lead to the democratization of the church, “regardless of what its leaders may want” and thus promote the transformation of an institution which has “not recommended itself as a defender of democracy” and whose leadership has often been openly opposed to “the values of democratic society.”
And on the other, Lunkin suggests, such changes in the church, which as the result of the restitution of property will be the largest property owner among the institutions of civil society, will serve as a model for other parts of civil society and thus help to promote more pressure by them for the establishment of democratic norms in the Russian Federation.
According to the specialist on religious law, “the arguments around the law on church restitution … illustrate the completely new situation in which the Russian Orthodox Church finds itself,” a situation “when it was drawn into a discussion of its own role in society” coupled with demands that its rights be recognized and enshrined in law.
The new law, Lunkin continues, has negative as well as positive ones, all of which “put the Church in the center of social life” and many of which have been largely ignored both by those who support the idea of the return of property to the Church and other religious organizations and those who oppose any such undertaking.
First of all, the analyst says, “the law strengthens the largest civic institution in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church,” adding to its position as “an enormous corporation, independent of state power with its own property and naturally with its own interests.” Indeed, “for the first time in history, the ROC has received the possibility to be strong because of its independence.”
Second, “the law precisely describes the relations between the state and religious organizations [like the ROC] in the property sphere.” Moreover, these definitions were worked out over many years not unilaterally by the state but rather as a result of intensive lobbying by the church hierarchy and its supporters.
In short, the ROC was able to promote its interests and rights, and with the adoption of the law, it “will be able to defend its rights,” something that will make it “an example for all citizens of Russia” not only of what public activism and lobbying can achieve but also of the benefits they may be able to get by engaging in similar actions.
And third, even though few are talking about this possibility yet, “one can with a great degree of probability predict,” Lunkin suggests, “that the law will promote” changes in the church itself to allow it to play the role of “an active participant in the civic and social life” of all Russians.
Because of its role as the owner of vast amounts of property, Lunkin says, “th eChkurch whether it wants to or not will have to enter into dialogue with various social forces especially if one takes into account that Patriarch Kirill has declared social-missionary tasks” to be among the ROC’s most important priorities.
With its new possessions, he says, the Church will be forced at all levels “to more seriously think about how to support itself, how to attract parishioners and not only to life on the basis of the means of rich and not very rich sponsors.” And because much of the property being returned is of interest to others, it will have to continue a dialogue with them.
Under contemporary conditions, Lunkin continues, “churches do not survive without attracting parishioners to social, cultural and educational work. The ROC cannot life in the situation of a constantly closed corporation sometimes in open conflict with society” and thus must find a basis for dialogue with society, something it has not always done.
That means that the ROC will be forced to more “open dialogue” with civil society, something the hierarchy may be reluctant to engage in but a set of actions that priests and some of the lower ranking members of the hierarchy recognize they must expand, especially given their new property holdings.
Indeed, Lunkin says, “the law on restitution will undoubtedly accelerate this process.”
All this is likely to come as a surprise to many in the human rights community, few of its members are yet ready to view the Church “objectively” but rather continue to “view it through the prism of anti-clerical ideology,” especially given the scandals arising in Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg in recent months.
“But in essence,” the religious affairs specialist says, “all these scandals are destroying the monolithic image of the ROC” and making both society as a whole and the parts of the Church aware that sometimes they can enjoy the support of the powers that be and sometimes not, often depending on what they do.
Up to now, the ROC has not been able to modernize itself, but now the restitution of property may force it to do so whether the hierarchy wants this or not. Moreover, the new provisions of the law are likely to have the effect of limiting the “telephone” arrangements that the hierarchy has had with the powers that be.
And because of that, lower ranking churchmen and even groups of parishioners will be in a better position to ensure that their rights and the rights of the Church are protected rather than standing idly by while the hierarchy arranges things for itself and its members at the expense of the church more generally.
These positive consequences of the new legislation do not mean that the law is perfect, Lunkin says. Many of its provisions are inadequately precise and will lead to more debate, something that may be useful or may be exploited in negative ways. But because the new law brings the Church into a more transparent legal space, it is on balance a step forward.
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