Paul Goble
Staunton, November 30 – The problems of Stavropol kray, very much on public view because of last weekend’s ethnic clashes there, “have an importance far beyond the borders of one subject of the [Russian] Federation or even one [federal] district, according to a leading Russian specialist on the Caucasus.
In an essay featured on the “Novaya politika” portal yesterday, Sergey Markedonov, who is currently at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that Stavropol is the key to Moscow’s position in the North Caucasus, the region that remains Russia’s main domestic problem (novopol.ru/-stavropolyu-nujna-integratsiya-text93089.html).
While the non-Russian republics in the North Caucasus have always attracted more attention, “whether we want it to be or not, Stavropol is considered as a kind of base subject of the entire district and also as an advanced post of Russian statehood” on whose development hinges the development of the entire region and more.
A major reason for this is that after the end of Soviet times and “the waves of inter-ethnic conflicts” in the North Caucasus, “many [there] saw in [Stavropol kray] ‘a safe harbor.’” It became “a second home” for ethnic Russians fleeing the violence in Chechnya and Ingushetia, with 78,000 such people there officially but with the real number perhaps twice that.
But, as Markedonov points out, “not only ethnic Russians preferred Stavropol to the complicated life in the North Caucasus republics.” Over the last two decades, various Caucasian peoples, including Chechens, Dargins, and Avars, settled in “the eastern and southern districts” of the kray.
The clashes of last weekend and even the one that took place in Stavropol on September 18th might not appear that important in and of themselves. But the unwillingness of officials to acknowledge the ethnic dimension of these fights and to engage in serious analysis and in the development of countermeasures is extremely worrisome, Markedonov says.
Given the ethnic mosaic in Stavropol and the role of that region in the North Caucasus, he continues, “the powers that be should have been ready for possible ethnic excesses” and been in a position to “react in a timely fashion to challenges from the localities.” But that has not yet happened.
One aspect of last weekend’s clashes that provides the basis for serious reflection, Markedonov says, are reports that some of those who came from Chechnya bragged that they were part of the protection guards for Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and thus were beyond the reach of law enforcement anywhere.
Granted that Chechnya is “a special case,” but allowing its denizens to flaunt themselves in this way and oppose the authority of officials in other regions “is extremely dangerous.” Such actions and claims will invariably produce xenophobia among others, leading to the kind of violence that officials may not be able to contain.
The only viable “nationality policy” in this region must involve “integration” of all groups into a single society. If that is not achieved, then “we will have a segregated regional community.” Indeed, if one is honest, “we already have it in many parts of the kray.” But that must be overcome and both ethnic Russians and North Caucasians must feel they are part of one.
Some years ago, Markedonov continues, Stavropol’s most famous former resident, Mikhail Gorbachev remarked that “the powers that be ‘had arrived in Sumgait three hours too late.’” That delay in sending forces to prevent an ethnic pogrom ultimately “cost a nuclear superpower its life.”
“Today,” the Russian analyst says, “the Russian powers that be do not have the right to any new delay. Consequently, Stavropol must become the subject of all-sided atten tion by the state and society.” Any failure to focus on it, draw the necessary conclusions, and act upon them, he implies, could have an equally fateful result.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Wikileaks Case Highlights Crisis in Journalism, Soldatov and Borogan Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 30 – What Wikileaks is doing has little in common with journalism or activism, two leading Russian specialists on the intelligence community say, but the case does highlight the increasingly serious crisis in journalism not only in the Russian Federation but internationally.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan of the Agentura.ru portal say that the “phenomenal” attention that Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange are attracting underscores that the public around the world wants “serious information about serious events” but point out that Wikileaks and Assange are not providing that.
Indeed, “despite the declarations of Assange that Wikileaks is a group consisting of journalists and activists, the activities of Wikileaks cannot in any way be equated with journalism,” Soldatov and Borogan say. And this group has little in common with journalistic activists in the past either (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10606).
What Wikileaks has done is publish online a massive number of reports “without checking of the facts, without putting them in context, and without analyzing them.” Assange says that is beyond the capacity of his organization, “but for the community of professionals, this is a task that can be fulfilled completely.”
Soldatov and Borgan point out that “newspapers publish articles on the basis of documents but not documents without commentaries and not because they lack the bravery to behave as Assange has.” Rather it is because people who read their reports are interested in the analysis the journalist provides.
By definition, “a reader cannot devote to the study of a problem as much time as a journalist does,” the two investigative journalists say, and “therefore the reader trusts the conclusions and analysis of the journalist.” Indeed, “in order not to become the victim of manipulation,” the reader checks the byline because “each journalist has a reputation.”
The two journalists provide the following example of the difference in approach between Wikileaks and journalism. In its Iraq dossier, Wikileaks provides thousands of reports by American military personnel suggesting that Iran is providing arms to the Iraqi insurgents. But such reporting is insufficient.
“It is obvious that there is no possibility of trusting this information without checking.” If, for example, they say, the FSB in the mid-1990s had declared or even prepared documents saying that they had found traces of Western special service activity in Chechnya, any serious journalist would want to check such self-interested declarations.
But in the case of Wikileaks, Soldatov and Borogan continue, neither those who put the documents on line nor many of their readers seem willing to examine the content of these documents with the kind of care and skepticism that standard journalism not only encourages but requires.
A few commentators have suggested that the activities of Wikileaks should be equated with journalist activists like Seymour Hersh who wrote about torture in Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad or Anna Politkovskaya who described the execution of innocent Chechens by a Russian spetsnaz officer.
But there is a big difference. Journalists like Hersh and Politkovskaya were interested in exposing specific kinds of abuses in order to stop them. They and others like them engaged in painstaking journalistic investigative work, and they spawned followers who took up the cause to end the abuses they uncovered.
The activity of Wikileaks “has not yet led to anything like that.” Instead, at least to judge from Assange’s comments, the group’s activities have too many and too diffuse goals to lead one to expect that Wikileaks publications will lead to the formation of any group or groups to address whatever problems are shown.
What makes the current case “interesting,” Soldatov and Borogan say, is “that not only ordinary users of the net but also leading Western publications have supported Wikileaks.” They suggest it is hardly worth talking about the Russian media given its failure to make any use of FSB documents that were posted on lubyanskaypravda.com last summer.
According to the two Russian writers, what appears to be happening is a response to the decline in the number of and support for investigative reporters in Western countries and the frustration of many of them in that regard. Media outlets have cut staffs, and expensive investigative reporters are often the first to go.
As a result of this trend, the number of investigative articles is declining, “and the Wikileaks site, it would appear, is filling this gap.” For some angry journalists, supporting Wikileaks is saying to their former bosses, “you didn’t want to deal with us, so you will deal with people like Assange.”
That may make some feel good, Soldatov and Borogan continue, but if one reflects on just how many documents Wikileaks has published so far, it is striking that “the picture of the world has changed not all that much.” And that in turn gives rise to a sense that something else is going on here.
“In the case of Wikileaks,” the two Russian investigators say, “quantity has passed into quality” which makes the site “a sensation” and its founder “a star.” And that explains why so many people are following not what is posted online as much as the biography of Assange himself, “yet another testimony to the serious crisis in which journalism now finds itself.”
Staunton, November 30 – What Wikileaks is doing has little in common with journalism or activism, two leading Russian specialists on the intelligence community say, but the case does highlight the increasingly serious crisis in journalism not only in the Russian Federation but internationally.
In an article in today’s “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan of the Agentura.ru portal say that the “phenomenal” attention that Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange are attracting underscores that the public around the world wants “serious information about serious events” but point out that Wikileaks and Assange are not providing that.
Indeed, “despite the declarations of Assange that Wikileaks is a group consisting of journalists and activists, the activities of Wikileaks cannot in any way be equated with journalism,” Soldatov and Borogan say. And this group has little in common with journalistic activists in the past either (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10606).
What Wikileaks has done is publish online a massive number of reports “without checking of the facts, without putting them in context, and without analyzing them.” Assange says that is beyond the capacity of his organization, “but for the community of professionals, this is a task that can be fulfilled completely.”
Soldatov and Borgan point out that “newspapers publish articles on the basis of documents but not documents without commentaries and not because they lack the bravery to behave as Assange has.” Rather it is because people who read their reports are interested in the analysis the journalist provides.
By definition, “a reader cannot devote to the study of a problem as much time as a journalist does,” the two investigative journalists say, and “therefore the reader trusts the conclusions and analysis of the journalist.” Indeed, “in order not to become the victim of manipulation,” the reader checks the byline because “each journalist has a reputation.”
The two journalists provide the following example of the difference in approach between Wikileaks and journalism. In its Iraq dossier, Wikileaks provides thousands of reports by American military personnel suggesting that Iran is providing arms to the Iraqi insurgents. But such reporting is insufficient.
“It is obvious that there is no possibility of trusting this information without checking.” If, for example, they say, the FSB in the mid-1990s had declared or even prepared documents saying that they had found traces of Western special service activity in Chechnya, any serious journalist would want to check such self-interested declarations.
But in the case of Wikileaks, Soldatov and Borogan continue, neither those who put the documents on line nor many of their readers seem willing to examine the content of these documents with the kind of care and skepticism that standard journalism not only encourages but requires.
A few commentators have suggested that the activities of Wikileaks should be equated with journalist activists like Seymour Hersh who wrote about torture in Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad or Anna Politkovskaya who described the execution of innocent Chechens by a Russian spetsnaz officer.
But there is a big difference. Journalists like Hersh and Politkovskaya were interested in exposing specific kinds of abuses in order to stop them. They and others like them engaged in painstaking journalistic investigative work, and they spawned followers who took up the cause to end the abuses they uncovered.
The activity of Wikileaks “has not yet led to anything like that.” Instead, at least to judge from Assange’s comments, the group’s activities have too many and too diffuse goals to lead one to expect that Wikileaks publications will lead to the formation of any group or groups to address whatever problems are shown.
What makes the current case “interesting,” Soldatov and Borogan say, is “that not only ordinary users of the net but also leading Western publications have supported Wikileaks.” They suggest it is hardly worth talking about the Russian media given its failure to make any use of FSB documents that were posted on lubyanskaypravda.com last summer.
According to the two Russian writers, what appears to be happening is a response to the decline in the number of and support for investigative reporters in Western countries and the frustration of many of them in that regard. Media outlets have cut staffs, and expensive investigative reporters are often the first to go.
As a result of this trend, the number of investigative articles is declining, “and the Wikileaks site, it would appear, is filling this gap.” For some angry journalists, supporting Wikileaks is saying to their former bosses, “you didn’t want to deal with us, so you will deal with people like Assange.”
That may make some feel good, Soldatov and Borogan continue, but if one reflects on just how many documents Wikileaks has published so far, it is striking that “the picture of the world has changed not all that much.” And that in turn gives rise to a sense that something else is going on here.
“In the case of Wikileaks,” the two Russian investigators say, “quantity has passed into quality” which makes the site “a sensation” and its founder “a star.” And that explains why so many people are following not what is posted online as much as the biography of Assange himself, “yet another testimony to the serious crisis in which journalism now finds itself.”
Window on Eurasia: Orthodox Faithful Turning Away from Russian Hierarchy and to ‘Orthodox Ashrams,’ Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 30 – The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is losing its hold on many Orthodox believers who are put up by the bureaucratized hierarchy, its obsession with wealth and property for the leadership, and its overly close links “with an unpopular government,’ according to a Russian analyst.
The fashion for supporting the church regardless of the way its leaders behave has passed, Semyon Reznichenko says, and ever more Orthodox are choosing either to become members of other denominations, a choice that accounts for much of the growth of the latter, or organizing new independent Orthodox groups (www.apn.ru/publications/article23380.htm).
“The upper hierarchy is solving its own problems,” Reznichenko says, “but it is not giving an answer that is acceptable for the majority of believers.” They are simply too diverse socially, ideologically, educationally, and generationally. And that “sometimes creates the impression that a single ROC exists only on paper.”
That daunting diversity, which has been exacerbated by the lack of “genuine parish life,” is causing some Orthodox faithful to seek to unify themselves “’from below.’” Such a pattern is nothing new, Reznichenko writes. Instead, this pattern has long been characteristic for religions of the East like Sufism and Buddhism.
The Russian commentator suggests that the best way to describe these Orthodox parallels is to use the terms “ashram” and “guru” for the groups and their leaders. Among those he points to are the late Father Daniil Sysoyev, who advocated “a radical internationalism” and “active missionary work.”
After his murder, his followers experienced some difficulties. But they have kept hteir unity. More than that, “in the ashram are today such bright personalities as the widow of the leader, publicist and writer Yuliya Sysoyeva and the specialist on anti-Protestant polemics, Father Oleg Stenyayev.
Another “guru” is Deacon Andrey Kurayev, whose relations with the hierarchy have been complicated at best but who has attracted a following through his writing and speaking. Still a third involves followers of the Archpriest Kucher who deifies the last tsar, Nicholas II, and condemns all those responsible for the destruction of the monarchy.
One of the largest “ashrams” is that consisting of the followers of former Bishop Diomid of Chukotka. Although denounced as a splitter by the Moscow Patriarchate, Diomid and his fundamentalist followers who oppose any opening to other confessions continue to attract many Russian Orthodox believers to their services and activities.
And still other “ashrams” are focused on cures or fighting social ills like drugs. Among these are the followers of Archpriest Borisov in Moscow who provides free meals to the poor and the interest clubs organized by Father Sergii Rybko to encourage discussion about religious and political issues.
This “ashramization” of Russian Orthodoxy is already having an impact, although it is below the radar screen of most commentators. It is contributing to a radical decentralization, “above all a decentralization in minds and souls” because the authority of “the guru” and his “ashram” is higher than that of the official church.
As the Patriarchate has been at pains to point out, this trend can lead to the rise of “totalitarian sects” like the one at Bogolyubov monastery near Vladimir. But more often, ashrams provide believers precisely that religious life that they seek and that is often absent in the official hierarchy.
According to Reznichenko, “the empire in Russia is receding into the past. And together with that is receding a unified imperial church.” Consequently, he argues, “the real future of Russian Orthodoxy lies with the ashrams” rather than with the Moscow Patriarchate and its power obsessions.
Indeed, the religious affairs commentator concludes, “the appearance of the Orthodox ashram is one of the indicators that Russians are trying to restore their collective way of living. Those collectives which can really help [Russians] survive. To survive in ever more difficult conditions.”
Staunton, November 30 – The Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is losing its hold on many Orthodox believers who are put up by the bureaucratized hierarchy, its obsession with wealth and property for the leadership, and its overly close links “with an unpopular government,’ according to a Russian analyst.
The fashion for supporting the church regardless of the way its leaders behave has passed, Semyon Reznichenko says, and ever more Orthodox are choosing either to become members of other denominations, a choice that accounts for much of the growth of the latter, or organizing new independent Orthodox groups (www.apn.ru/publications/article23380.htm).
“The upper hierarchy is solving its own problems,” Reznichenko says, “but it is not giving an answer that is acceptable for the majority of believers.” They are simply too diverse socially, ideologically, educationally, and generationally. And that “sometimes creates the impression that a single ROC exists only on paper.”
That daunting diversity, which has been exacerbated by the lack of “genuine parish life,” is causing some Orthodox faithful to seek to unify themselves “’from below.’” Such a pattern is nothing new, Reznichenko writes. Instead, this pattern has long been characteristic for religions of the East like Sufism and Buddhism.
The Russian commentator suggests that the best way to describe these Orthodox parallels is to use the terms “ashram” and “guru” for the groups and their leaders. Among those he points to are the late Father Daniil Sysoyev, who advocated “a radical internationalism” and “active missionary work.”
After his murder, his followers experienced some difficulties. But they have kept hteir unity. More than that, “in the ashram are today such bright personalities as the widow of the leader, publicist and writer Yuliya Sysoyeva and the specialist on anti-Protestant polemics, Father Oleg Stenyayev.
Another “guru” is Deacon Andrey Kurayev, whose relations with the hierarchy have been complicated at best but who has attracted a following through his writing and speaking. Still a third involves followers of the Archpriest Kucher who deifies the last tsar, Nicholas II, and condemns all those responsible for the destruction of the monarchy.
One of the largest “ashrams” is that consisting of the followers of former Bishop Diomid of Chukotka. Although denounced as a splitter by the Moscow Patriarchate, Diomid and his fundamentalist followers who oppose any opening to other confessions continue to attract many Russian Orthodox believers to their services and activities.
And still other “ashrams” are focused on cures or fighting social ills like drugs. Among these are the followers of Archpriest Borisov in Moscow who provides free meals to the poor and the interest clubs organized by Father Sergii Rybko to encourage discussion about religious and political issues.
This “ashramization” of Russian Orthodoxy is already having an impact, although it is below the radar screen of most commentators. It is contributing to a radical decentralization, “above all a decentralization in minds and souls” because the authority of “the guru” and his “ashram” is higher than that of the official church.
As the Patriarchate has been at pains to point out, this trend can lead to the rise of “totalitarian sects” like the one at Bogolyubov monastery near Vladimir. But more often, ashrams provide believers precisely that religious life that they seek and that is often absent in the official hierarchy.
According to Reznichenko, “the empire in Russia is receding into the past. And together with that is receding a unified imperial church.” Consequently, he argues, “the real future of Russian Orthodoxy lies with the ashrams” rather than with the Moscow Patriarchate and its power obsessions.
Indeed, the religious affairs commentator concludes, “the appearance of the Orthodox ashram is one of the indicators that Russians are trying to restore their collective way of living. Those collectives which can really help [Russians] survive. To survive in ever more difficult conditions.”
Window on Eurasia: Greatest Threats to Russian National Security are Domestic Not Foreign, Academy of Sciences Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 29 – Corruption in the bureaucracy, the exhaustion of industrial plant, demographic decline, and the preservation of the raw materials export model of development are “the basic threats” to the national security of the Russian Federation, according to a survey of experts conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences.
Together with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia, specialists at the Moscow institute queried 131 scholars, public figures, and officials of national security agencies concerning their views about the national security threats Russia now faces. In the report, they are called “theoreticians, social figures, and government employees.”
While they were asked to rate the current level of security, the ability of the government to deal with particular threats, and the prospects for improving the situation, few of the experts, Alfia Yenikeyeva reports on STRF.ru concluded that the situation was either “good” or “catastrophic” (www.strf.ru/material.aspx?CatalogId=222&d_no=35162).
Instead, most registered moderate levels of concerns, although social figures tended to express greater concern than did officials and representatives of law enforcement organs, a pattern that were it reported for any other country would surprise nobody but one that in the Russian case is especially disturbing.
Mikhail Gorshkov, the director of the Institute of Sociology and one of the co-authors of this study, say that “such a picture is characteristic of contemporary Russian in which representatives of the power structures display optimism on the situation in various spheres, but scholars and public figures oppose this with critical positions.”
“The greatest concern” among social figures involved public health, low levels of protection of individuals from criminal activities, and “also threats connected with terrorism and the worsening quality of life of citizens.” They viewed the situation in energy, military and state security as relatively favorable.
That division, Igor Zadorin, head of the TSIRKON research group, said, reflects a growing trend among such people to focus on domestic issues when questions of security are raised. For them, the top 10 problems are all domestic, beginning with “the problem of corruption in the powers and administrative structures.”
Corruption in Russia, the experts said, “has acquired such dimensions that it undermines national security practically in all directions by making extremely ineffective any measures for blocking threats practically in all spheres of the life of society.” Only if it is overcome, those surveyed said, could one hope to speak about modernization.
Another threat ranking near the top of the list of threats is “demodernization” of the country. Many of those surveyed said that “if such a trend continues, then [Russia] will face collapse,” Vladimir Petukhov, the director of the Center of Complex Social Research of the Institute of Sociology said.
Few of the experts have much faith that there will be positive changes, and those who do think so are certain they will be “extremely insignificant.” Only about a quarter expect even “a small improvement in the coming three to five years. No one expects significant changes. And twice as many – nearly half – think the situation will only get worse.
Some of this pessimism, Gorshkov said, is linked with the 2008-2009 economic crisis which highlighted the problems of the current social-economic system and its dependence on world trends. Another part is connected with instability in the North Caucasus and social problems. But “the main” cause is the growth in corruption.
Assessments of the work of the security agencies by outsiders was higher than might be expected, but Zadorin suggested that a major reason for that is the closed nature of their work, something that makes any outside assessment difficult. But the study “unexpectedly” found another reason as well.
Many of the experts and social activists said that the institutions of civil society had a major impact on national security, something Zadorin said was “entirely new.” He explained it as being less an indication that these institutions were affecting the siloviki than by the fact that increasingly, such people assess national security in terms of domestic problems.
Staunton, November 29 – Corruption in the bureaucracy, the exhaustion of industrial plant, demographic decline, and the preservation of the raw materials export model of development are “the basic threats” to the national security of the Russian Federation, according to a survey of experts conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences.
Together with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Russia, specialists at the Moscow institute queried 131 scholars, public figures, and officials of national security agencies concerning their views about the national security threats Russia now faces. In the report, they are called “theoreticians, social figures, and government employees.”
While they were asked to rate the current level of security, the ability of the government to deal with particular threats, and the prospects for improving the situation, few of the experts, Alfia Yenikeyeva reports on STRF.ru concluded that the situation was either “good” or “catastrophic” (www.strf.ru/material.aspx?CatalogId=222&d_no=35162).
Instead, most registered moderate levels of concerns, although social figures tended to express greater concern than did officials and representatives of law enforcement organs, a pattern that were it reported for any other country would surprise nobody but one that in the Russian case is especially disturbing.
Mikhail Gorshkov, the director of the Institute of Sociology and one of the co-authors of this study, say that “such a picture is characteristic of contemporary Russian in which representatives of the power structures display optimism on the situation in various spheres, but scholars and public figures oppose this with critical positions.”
“The greatest concern” among social figures involved public health, low levels of protection of individuals from criminal activities, and “also threats connected with terrorism and the worsening quality of life of citizens.” They viewed the situation in energy, military and state security as relatively favorable.
That division, Igor Zadorin, head of the TSIRKON research group, said, reflects a growing trend among such people to focus on domestic issues when questions of security are raised. For them, the top 10 problems are all domestic, beginning with “the problem of corruption in the powers and administrative structures.”
Corruption in Russia, the experts said, “has acquired such dimensions that it undermines national security practically in all directions by making extremely ineffective any measures for blocking threats practically in all spheres of the life of society.” Only if it is overcome, those surveyed said, could one hope to speak about modernization.
Another threat ranking near the top of the list of threats is “demodernization” of the country. Many of those surveyed said that “if such a trend continues, then [Russia] will face collapse,” Vladimir Petukhov, the director of the Center of Complex Social Research of the Institute of Sociology said.
Few of the experts have much faith that there will be positive changes, and those who do think so are certain they will be “extremely insignificant.” Only about a quarter expect even “a small improvement in the coming three to five years. No one expects significant changes. And twice as many – nearly half – think the situation will only get worse.
Some of this pessimism, Gorshkov said, is linked with the 2008-2009 economic crisis which highlighted the problems of the current social-economic system and its dependence on world trends. Another part is connected with instability in the North Caucasus and social problems. But “the main” cause is the growth in corruption.
Assessments of the work of the security agencies by outsiders was higher than might be expected, but Zadorin suggested that a major reason for that is the closed nature of their work, something that makes any outside assessment difficult. But the study “unexpectedly” found another reason as well.
Many of the experts and social activists said that the institutions of civil society had a major impact on national security, something Zadorin said was “entirely new.” He explained it as being less an indication that these institutions were affecting the siloviki than by the fact that increasingly, such people assess national security in terms of domestic problems.
Window on Eurasia: Stavropol Clash Shows Russians Can No Longer Depend on Officials to Protect Them, Nationalists Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 29 – The violent clash between Chechens and Cossacks in Zelenokumsk in Stavropol over the weekend, a fight set off by an attempted rape and one that involved wounds from an exchange of gunfire, has further exacerbated tensions between ethnic Russians and “persons of Caucasus nationality” across the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, it has led many to conclude that “a second Kondopoga” – a reference to the clashes in Karelia four years ago – is possible in any region of Russia where there are Caucasus migrant workers and their families (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177700/ and ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/11/29/komu_zahochetsya_imet_u_sebya_v_regione_vtoruyu_kondopogu/).
And on the other, and far more seriously, it has led an increasing number of anti-immigrant Russian nationalist groups like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) to declare that officials can no longer be trusted to control the situation and that Russians must take things into their own hands (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/18442/).
Among the groups in the Russian community most prepared to do so – and often with the blessing or at least without the opposition of Russian Federation officialdom – are the Cossacks. And while many Cossack leaders appear committed to working closely with the authorities – they see this as their duty – some Cossack activists are ready to freelance.
Postings on the blog of one Cossack in Stavropol suggest that the latter may be becoming increasingly influential. He said that the official media “lie without shame” and that the Cossacks and other “nationally conscious” Russians must act on their own to protect themselves, their property and their families (voysko.blog.ru/).
Such feelings are only going to be exacerbated by the efforts of the powers that be there to label the conflict an ordinary crime, all the more so since these officials have reportedly called in militia units from neighboring districts and, according to some reports, even put soldiers in the MVD internal troops on alert.
As various bloggers have said, “everyone in Stavropol” fully understands that this conflict had “an inter-ethnic subtext,” whatever the powers that be say. And unless the authorities acknowledge that reality, anything they say is likely to feed into the growing sense that ethnic Russians must mobilize to defend themselves.
Given that many Chechens and others from the Caucasus are armed and that an increasing number of Russian nationalist groups have access to weapons as well, this collapse in trust in the ability and willingness of the authorities to guarantee law and order almost certainly will lead to more clashes and less law and order elsewhere.
What remains to be seen is what the center will do next. Its options are limited: It could increase repression to the point that no one in the population will engage in violence. It could try to separate the ethnic communities. Or it could seek to address the underlying social and political problems of the two groups.
If Moscow chooses either of the first two options, there will be more violence in more Russian regions at least in the short term and possibly longer. But if it is to try the third, then Moscow will have to change its approach not only on nationality policy but on the handling of domestic affairs more generally.
Prospects for that do not seem bright, and consequently, an increasing number of North Caucasians living outside their home areas and Russian nationalists angry at changes in the demographic face of their regions are likely to enter a new arms race, one that likely means each succeeding Kondopoga will be more violent and more deadly than the last.
Staunton, November 29 – The violent clash between Chechens and Cossacks in Zelenokumsk in Stavropol over the weekend, a fight set off by an attempted rape and one that involved wounds from an exchange of gunfire, has further exacerbated tensions between ethnic Russians and “persons of Caucasus nationality” across the Russian Federation.
On the one hand, it has led many to conclude that “a second Kondopoga” – a reference to the clashes in Karelia four years ago – is possible in any region of Russia where there are Caucasus migrant workers and their families (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177700/ and ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/11/29/komu_zahochetsya_imet_u_sebya_v_regione_vtoruyu_kondopogu/).
And on the other, and far more seriously, it has led an increasing number of anti-immigrant Russian nationalist groups like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) to declare that officials can no longer be trusted to control the situation and that Russians must take things into their own hands (www.dpni.org/articles/lenta_novo/18442/).
Among the groups in the Russian community most prepared to do so – and often with the blessing or at least without the opposition of Russian Federation officialdom – are the Cossacks. And while many Cossack leaders appear committed to working closely with the authorities – they see this as their duty – some Cossack activists are ready to freelance.
Postings on the blog of one Cossack in Stavropol suggest that the latter may be becoming increasingly influential. He said that the official media “lie without shame” and that the Cossacks and other “nationally conscious” Russians must act on their own to protect themselves, their property and their families (voysko.blog.ru/).
Such feelings are only going to be exacerbated by the efforts of the powers that be there to label the conflict an ordinary crime, all the more so since these officials have reportedly called in militia units from neighboring districts and, according to some reports, even put soldiers in the MVD internal troops on alert.
As various bloggers have said, “everyone in Stavropol” fully understands that this conflict had “an inter-ethnic subtext,” whatever the powers that be say. And unless the authorities acknowledge that reality, anything they say is likely to feed into the growing sense that ethnic Russians must mobilize to defend themselves.
Given that many Chechens and others from the Caucasus are armed and that an increasing number of Russian nationalist groups have access to weapons as well, this collapse in trust in the ability and willingness of the authorities to guarantee law and order almost certainly will lead to more clashes and less law and order elsewhere.
What remains to be seen is what the center will do next. Its options are limited: It could increase repression to the point that no one in the population will engage in violence. It could try to separate the ethnic communities. Or it could seek to address the underlying social and political problems of the two groups.
If Moscow chooses either of the first two options, there will be more violence in more Russian regions at least in the short term and possibly longer. But if it is to try the third, then Moscow will have to change its approach not only on nationality policy but on the handling of domestic affairs more generally.
Prospects for that do not seem bright, and consequently, an increasing number of North Caucasians living outside their home areas and Russian nationalists angry at changes in the demographic face of their regions are likely to enter a new arms race, one that likely means each succeeding Kondopoga will be more violent and more deadly than the last.
Window on Eurasia: Russian Banks May Aid Non-Russian Media Outlets in Moscow
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 29 – The Moscow city official responsible for dealing with the Russian capital’s ethnic minorities says that “major [Russian] banks” now have “a commercial interest” in supporting the non-Russian media there, a development that could lead to a new flowering of newspapers and other outlets directed at these communities.
Dzhamil Sadykhbekov, chief editor of the newspaper, “Strana Sodruzhestva,” told a recent meeting of journalists, experts and officials at the Moscow House of Nationalities about this possibility, something that could boost the number – already 60 -- and effectiveness – not high -- of such publications (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5114/109/).
As reported by Zagidat Sirazhdinova in “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” the meeting focused on two major issues “are national newspapers necessary in principle in the current realities” of Moscow life and how they and other media outlets can “struggle with xenophobia and migrantophobia.”
Vera Malkova, a specialist at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, told the group that in her view, the amount of negative coverage of non-Russians in the Moscow media had “somewhat declined,” the result of efforts by editors like Pavel Gusev of “Moskovsky komsomolets” to promote tolerance and prevent explosions.
Margarita Lyange, the head of the Guild of Inter-Ethnic Journalism, however, pointed to another “extreme” towards which she said the Russia media is now trending: treatment of ethnic issues only in overly positive “festival” colors as was “characteristic of the Soviet epoch lest outlets be accused of inciting inter-ethnic tensions.
And Ekaterina Arutyunova, another participant in the meeting, pointed to an even bigger problem. Xenophobia in Russia is now “so great that even positive publications, which feature exclusively information” excite ethnic passions and are received “negatively” regardless of what the journalists do.
“The psychological distance from that which one could call ‘the alien’ is normal, but in this case,” she said, “it is already xenophobia.” Consequently, Arutyunova continued, ethnic media are necessary to provide places for the discussion of many problems and also to serve as a place where people can let off tensions before they lead to open conflict.
That would be just fine, some other participants said, if the ethnic media were of high quality. Unfortunately, some of them suggested, that is not now the case. Instead, “the ethnic press … recalls the wall newspapers of the Soviet epoch” rather than genuine journalism with serious reporting on serious issues.
But Sirazhdinova says, some of those working in these outlets disagreed. Amil Sarkarov, the editor of Moscow’s “Lezginskiye izvestiya,” said that publications like his own which happens to be in Russian “can show the real picture of inter-ethnic relations in the [Russian] capital.”
Staunton, November 29 – The Moscow city official responsible for dealing with the Russian capital’s ethnic minorities says that “major [Russian] banks” now have “a commercial interest” in supporting the non-Russian media there, a development that could lead to a new flowering of newspapers and other outlets directed at these communities.
Dzhamil Sadykhbekov, chief editor of the newspaper, “Strana Sodruzhestva,” told a recent meeting of journalists, experts and officials at the Moscow House of Nationalities about this possibility, something that could boost the number – already 60 -- and effectiveness – not high -- of such publications (gazeta-nv.ru/content/view/5114/109/).
As reported by Zagidat Sirazhdinova in “Nastoyashcheye vremya,” the meeting focused on two major issues “are national newspapers necessary in principle in the current realities” of Moscow life and how they and other media outlets can “struggle with xenophobia and migrantophobia.”
Vera Malkova, a specialist at the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, told the group that in her view, the amount of negative coverage of non-Russians in the Moscow media had “somewhat declined,” the result of efforts by editors like Pavel Gusev of “Moskovsky komsomolets” to promote tolerance and prevent explosions.
Margarita Lyange, the head of the Guild of Inter-Ethnic Journalism, however, pointed to another “extreme” towards which she said the Russia media is now trending: treatment of ethnic issues only in overly positive “festival” colors as was “characteristic of the Soviet epoch lest outlets be accused of inciting inter-ethnic tensions.
And Ekaterina Arutyunova, another participant in the meeting, pointed to an even bigger problem. Xenophobia in Russia is now “so great that even positive publications, which feature exclusively information” excite ethnic passions and are received “negatively” regardless of what the journalists do.
“The psychological distance from that which one could call ‘the alien’ is normal, but in this case,” she said, “it is already xenophobia.” Consequently, Arutyunova continued, ethnic media are necessary to provide places for the discussion of many problems and also to serve as a place where people can let off tensions before they lead to open conflict.
That would be just fine, some other participants said, if the ethnic media were of high quality. Unfortunately, some of them suggested, that is not now the case. Instead, “the ethnic press … recalls the wall newspapers of the Soviet epoch” rather than genuine journalism with serious reporting on serious issues.
But Sirazhdinova says, some of those working in these outlets disagreed. Amil Sarkarov, the editor of Moscow’s “Lezginskiye izvestiya,” said that publications like his own which happens to be in Russian “can show the real picture of inter-ethnic relations in the [Russian] capital.”
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