Paul Goble
Staunton, November 28 – The Russian Civic Union, an umbrella organization uniting groups like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, the National Democratic Alliance, and the Russian Popular Democratic Union, has declared that only a return to genuine federalism can keep Russia intact but that even that step won’t prevent the independence of the North Caucasus.
The new group, which has published a manifesto (www.apn.ru/special/article23357.htm), held a founding conference (www.apn.ru/news/article23358.htm), and led to the formation of branches in the regions (www.ingria.info/?lenta&news_action=show_news&news_id=5197) over the past ten days, has taken positions on many issues.
But perhaps its most important positions concern Russian federalism or more precisely the ways in which Vladimir Putin, first as president and then as prime minister, has undermined or even destroyed that system. And now, one of the chief ideologists of the new movement has offered a detailed discussion on precisely that.
In an essay posted on APN.ru, Dmitry Feoktistov argues that “free regions are the basis of a free nation” and that “national democracy by its very essence is a national liberation and anti-colonial ideology,” one that supports the rights of all nations and peoples, including the ethnic Russians (www.apn.ru/publications/article23375.htm).
Many people now are asking, he says, “who today in the Russian Federation forms the metropolitan center and who forms the colonies.” That is “a serious question with a simple answer – the metropolitan today consists of ‘citizens of Kremlin nationality’ – that is, the Kremlin, the bureaucrats, the siloviki together with the oligarchs and the ethnocratic elites.”
“In the first instance, the Russian people must be recognized as colonized since the ethnic minorities retain the right at least to national pride, but the ethnic Russians are deprived of that.” Because that is so, the new union says that “national democracy today is the ideology of the national liberation of ethnic Russians and other indigenous peoples of Russia.”
One reason federalism is so important is to provide a basis for overcoming the impoverished state of the regions. “Without the strengthening of the principles of federalism and the establishment of a real equality of regions, one cannot even think about national liberation” in the current context.
Many in the regions recognize that they must act to achieve this end, Feoktistov argues, and he points to “the fact that in recent years, the center of gravity of opposition activity has gradually shifted from the center to the regions,” including most prominently the Far East, Kaliningrad and Yekaterinburg.
But “unfortunately,” he continues, “most often these protests slowly die out since there has not existed up to now in the country forces prepared to unify these initiatives, to assist their development, and to give a final goal for their activity.” The new national-democratic Union, he argues, can play that role.
It will strive to promote federalism, a federalism “based on the principles of regionalism and equality.” Such a system does not now exist as “today even a stupid individual would fail to recognize that after Putin’s coming to power in Russia a crisis of federative relations began rapidly to develop.”
Putin’s “vertical,” Feoktistov goes on to say, has destroyed “not only the political but the economic and social autonomy of the regions.” And the result of that is “a threat to the disappearance of a single cultural-political space of the Russian nation and consequently of the united ethnic Russian nation itself.”
The members of the new Union, he argues, “are convinced that for the preservation of a single ethnic Russian space and the securing of its further development, the system must take into account regional interests and ensure the restoration of full-blooded federative institutions,” arrangements that must be based on real equality.
Feoktistov says that he is mystified that Moscow pays almost ten times per capita as much to Chechnya as it does to Irkutsk. The only explanation for this is that “the Kremlin is forced to pay the North Caucasus for loyalty because no other levers of control over it currently exist.”
But “the policy of the Putin administration in the Caucasus has failed” because it has converted “this region into a budgetary black hole and delayed action mine” and has not managed to bring peace and stability. Instead, violence there is worse now than it was in the past, and this despite all the money Moscow is throwing at the problem.
In the manifesto of the new Union, Feoktistov says, “we speak about the necessity of reviewing the staqtus of the republics of the North Caucasus.” The group “is not calling for separating the Caucasus from Russia” because “we are certain that this has already happened de facto.”
It is “a fait accompli,” and there is “no doubt” that at some point in the future even Moscow officials will have to recognize that reality rather than continuing to act as if Russia cannot afford to continue to throw money at the problems there. Indeed, the question now is “how much time, force and blood” will Russian continue to waste there.
“Many say that to give up the Caucasus means to spit on the graves of those who fought in Chechnya. This is not so,” Feoktistov says.” “To pay tribute to the former militants” as Putin and Moscow are now doing at present “is to spit” all those who were sacrificed there over the last 15 years
And Feoktistov concludes by saying that he would like to remind skeptics “about one example, France and Algeria. Over the course of almost 150 years, France controlled Algeria, but when that control came into conflict with [French] national interests, Algeria received its independence. The world did not end, and France did not fall apart.”
Sunday, November 28, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Muscovites Protest against Construction of New Orthodox Churches
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 28 – In the latest version of the NIMBY principle, Muscovites are demonstrating against the construction of more than 100 of the 200 new Russian Orthodox churches the Moscow Patriarchate plans to build with the assistance of the capital’s government because such buildings would deprive residents in many cases of public parks.
Although the objections of Muscovites to the construction of any new mosques have attracted more attention, anger among residents of the Russian capital about the Moscow Patriarchate’s plans to build churches “within walking distance” of every Muscovite has provoked a “not in my back yard” reaction in more parts of the city.
This development is likely to prove doubly important. On the one hand, the powers that be in Moscow by deferring to popular opposition to mosques have encouraged Russians who object to new churches to protest. And on the other, regardless of what the city does regarding churches, officials are likely to face more protests over a variety of other issues as well.
Last Thursday, “Novyye izvestiya” reported that residents in Strogino had launched a protest against the construction of a new Russian Orthodox church on the only hill in a park where their children can go sledding. “We are not against God,” the demonstrators said; “we are for nature” (www.ansar.ru/society/2010/11/27/8751).
Both to mobilize opinion and to show the powers that be that the people are overwhelmingly opposed to the church, residents organized Internet voting about the project on their region’s website, forum.strogi.net/. More than 60 percent were opposed, 13 percent were for, and 25 percent said they supported the project as long as it doesn’t harm residents.
Were this a unique case, it might not matter too much. But according to the Moscow Patriarchate’s plan as approved by the city authorities in August, some 200 Orthodox churches are to be built in residential areas in the capital as part of the Church’s efforts to attract more people to the faith.
However, as various Moscow newspapers have suggested, more is at work here than just a desire to spread the Gospel. The Church is very much interested in gaining access to property and to the tax free status such property enjoys if but only if there is a religious facility built and constructed on it, experts say.
At the same time, the financial interests of residents are very much at risk. Anton Paleyev, the chairman of the Moscow city duma committee that oversees relations with religions, noted that an individual who buys an apartment overlooking a park is certain to be upset if instead of a park there is a church and the crowds such a facility might attract.
Because property issues are involved and because most of the decisions involving the Strogino site were made in secret, Moscow newspapers report that the people of that Moscow district both plan to hold more demonstrations and to appeal to prosecutors to investigate what they say are illegalities in the approval process (www.ansar.ru/society/2010/11/26/8729).
Similar activities are being planned in many other Moscow neighborhoods, the Russian media report, raising the intriguing possibility that a new step forward in the formation of civil society in that city will involve activism motivated by religious concerns, the kind of activism that many who track NGOs often ignore (forum-msk.org/material/kompromat/4788797.html).
Staunton, November 28 – In the latest version of the NIMBY principle, Muscovites are demonstrating against the construction of more than 100 of the 200 new Russian Orthodox churches the Moscow Patriarchate plans to build with the assistance of the capital’s government because such buildings would deprive residents in many cases of public parks.
Although the objections of Muscovites to the construction of any new mosques have attracted more attention, anger among residents of the Russian capital about the Moscow Patriarchate’s plans to build churches “within walking distance” of every Muscovite has provoked a “not in my back yard” reaction in more parts of the city.
This development is likely to prove doubly important. On the one hand, the powers that be in Moscow by deferring to popular opposition to mosques have encouraged Russians who object to new churches to protest. And on the other, regardless of what the city does regarding churches, officials are likely to face more protests over a variety of other issues as well.
Last Thursday, “Novyye izvestiya” reported that residents in Strogino had launched a protest against the construction of a new Russian Orthodox church on the only hill in a park where their children can go sledding. “We are not against God,” the demonstrators said; “we are for nature” (www.ansar.ru/society/2010/11/27/8751).
Both to mobilize opinion and to show the powers that be that the people are overwhelmingly opposed to the church, residents organized Internet voting about the project on their region’s website, forum.strogi.net/. More than 60 percent were opposed, 13 percent were for, and 25 percent said they supported the project as long as it doesn’t harm residents.
Were this a unique case, it might not matter too much. But according to the Moscow Patriarchate’s plan as approved by the city authorities in August, some 200 Orthodox churches are to be built in residential areas in the capital as part of the Church’s efforts to attract more people to the faith.
However, as various Moscow newspapers have suggested, more is at work here than just a desire to spread the Gospel. The Church is very much interested in gaining access to property and to the tax free status such property enjoys if but only if there is a religious facility built and constructed on it, experts say.
At the same time, the financial interests of residents are very much at risk. Anton Paleyev, the chairman of the Moscow city duma committee that oversees relations with religions, noted that an individual who buys an apartment overlooking a park is certain to be upset if instead of a park there is a church and the crowds such a facility might attract.
Because property issues are involved and because most of the decisions involving the Strogino site were made in secret, Moscow newspapers report that the people of that Moscow district both plan to hold more demonstrations and to appeal to prosecutors to investigate what they say are illegalities in the approval process (www.ansar.ru/society/2010/11/26/8729).
Similar activities are being planned in many other Moscow neighborhoods, the Russian media report, raising the intriguing possibility that a new step forward in the formation of civil society in that city will involve activism motivated by religious concerns, the kind of activism that many who track NGOs often ignore (forum-msk.org/material/kompromat/4788797.html).
Window on Eurasia: Ottoman Should Become Language of Caucasus Emirate, Activist Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 28 – Ottoman Turkish rather than Russian or Arabic should become the language of the Caucasus Emirate once that state is formed because it can not only unite the peoples of that region but link them to the broader Turkic world and make their study of Arabic, the language of the Koran, easier, according to one emirate supporter.
While many supporters of the Emirate want to retain Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication and others hope to jump immediately to Arabic, Said-Magomed Tokayev writes, Ottoman Turkish for a variety of reasons is a far better choice for the peoples of the future state (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/11/27/76817.shtml).
The choice of language is “an interesting question,” Tokayev writes, exceeded in political importance only by the selection of the name Caucasus Emirate. For a millennium, people have talked about the Caucasus as a region at the dividing point between Asia and Europe, but “no one ever called by this name any state formation.”
Of course, he concedes, declaring the existence of something is one thing, and creating it is quite another. But if the Emirate is to come into existence, there must be “a correct and precisely developed ideology which will be mentally close for the peoples populating such a single state.”
There have been discussions about what the language of inter-ethnic communication should be in that state, Tokayev notes. And at present, “there are not a few supporters of preserving [this status] for the Russian language,” an idea that is based on “completely logical arguments.”
But Tokayev says, it is his view that this issue requires answering a variety of questions, including “historical, religious, ethnic, linguistic, political, geostrategic and other” ones, and he suggests that a consideration of these leads him to conclude that it would be “completely logical” and more useful to adopt the Ottoman language as the common language of the Emirate.
“Our fathers and grandfathers in the Caucasus for many centuries communicated with each other in Kumyk,” he says, a pattern connected with the rule of the Ottoman khalifate, “which left a deep trace in the culture and language of the peoples of the Caucasus,” contributing vocabulary to all the languages of that region.
Indeed, Tokay continues, “even the name Ichkeria [which is what Chechen nationalists call their republic] is a Turkish word which means ‘internal’ in translation from the Kumyk language.”
After Russia conquered the Caucasus in the 19th century, he writes, “the Russian administration replaced Kumyk with Russian as the international language, introducing it by means of schools and trade. From the point of view of the empire, this was a correct step.” And if the Caucasians want a single state, they too much find a single language.
The Russian Empire used force to impose this change, but the Caucasus Emirate will not find such a method very “effective.” But “nevertheless, in uniting the Caucasus into a single state, we are obligated to adopt and introduce a state language for a single state, in our case, the Caucasus Emirate.”
In addition to those who support retaining Russian, there are others in the Emirate movement who want to go over to Arabic, “arguing with justice that there cannot be any better language of the Koran.” But despite that, “there is reason to consider another variant as well, namely the Ottoman,” Tokayev argues.
Arabic is important because of its religious uses, but Tokayev suggests that there should be two state languages for every resident of the Caucasus Emirate – a local ethnic one and Ottoman, “a state language” and also “a language for communication among the peoples of the Caucasus.”
The basic reasons for that are first of all, “more than half of the Ottoman language consists of Arabisms, which means that whoever masters Ottoman is already halfway to mastering Arabic.” Moreover, those who speak one of the six Turkic languages of the region are already able to move to Arabic.
Second, Ottoman was earlier spoken in “today’s Turkey, Central Asia, Arab countries, Persia, the Caucasus, the Middle Volga (Idel-Ural), and the Crimea. Peoples who lived on this enormous territory understood one another thanks to the Ottoman language.” Moreover, while using Ottoman, they never lost their own languages but only saw them “enriched.”
Thus, by adopting Ottoman, the Caucasus Emirate can reach out to all these peoples with all the benefits that will entail.
Third, while Ottoman is not the official language of Turkey, it is taught in law faculties of that country because the terminology it supplies for legal and political issues is so rich. Consequently, the future Caucasus Emirate could only benefit by gaining access to that vocabulary.
And fourth – and Tokayev says this is “the chief argument” in its favor – the adoption of Ottoman will not only link students with the pre-Russian pasts of their own peoples but make it easier for them to learn Arabic in the future not only because of the Arabisms in Ottoman but also because Ottoman uses the Arabic script.
Staunton, November 28 – Ottoman Turkish rather than Russian or Arabic should become the language of the Caucasus Emirate once that state is formed because it can not only unite the peoples of that region but link them to the broader Turkic world and make their study of Arabic, the language of the Koran, easier, according to one emirate supporter.
While many supporters of the Emirate want to retain Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication and others hope to jump immediately to Arabic, Said-Magomed Tokayev writes, Ottoman Turkish for a variety of reasons is a far better choice for the peoples of the future state (kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2010/11/27/76817.shtml).
The choice of language is “an interesting question,” Tokayev writes, exceeded in political importance only by the selection of the name Caucasus Emirate. For a millennium, people have talked about the Caucasus as a region at the dividing point between Asia and Europe, but “no one ever called by this name any state formation.”
Of course, he concedes, declaring the existence of something is one thing, and creating it is quite another. But if the Emirate is to come into existence, there must be “a correct and precisely developed ideology which will be mentally close for the peoples populating such a single state.”
There have been discussions about what the language of inter-ethnic communication should be in that state, Tokayev notes. And at present, “there are not a few supporters of preserving [this status] for the Russian language,” an idea that is based on “completely logical arguments.”
But Tokayev says, it is his view that this issue requires answering a variety of questions, including “historical, religious, ethnic, linguistic, political, geostrategic and other” ones, and he suggests that a consideration of these leads him to conclude that it would be “completely logical” and more useful to adopt the Ottoman language as the common language of the Emirate.
“Our fathers and grandfathers in the Caucasus for many centuries communicated with each other in Kumyk,” he says, a pattern connected with the rule of the Ottoman khalifate, “which left a deep trace in the culture and language of the peoples of the Caucasus,” contributing vocabulary to all the languages of that region.
Indeed, Tokay continues, “even the name Ichkeria [which is what Chechen nationalists call their republic] is a Turkish word which means ‘internal’ in translation from the Kumyk language.”
After Russia conquered the Caucasus in the 19th century, he writes, “the Russian administration replaced Kumyk with Russian as the international language, introducing it by means of schools and trade. From the point of view of the empire, this was a correct step.” And if the Caucasians want a single state, they too much find a single language.
The Russian Empire used force to impose this change, but the Caucasus Emirate will not find such a method very “effective.” But “nevertheless, in uniting the Caucasus into a single state, we are obligated to adopt and introduce a state language for a single state, in our case, the Caucasus Emirate.”
In addition to those who support retaining Russian, there are others in the Emirate movement who want to go over to Arabic, “arguing with justice that there cannot be any better language of the Koran.” But despite that, “there is reason to consider another variant as well, namely the Ottoman,” Tokayev argues.
Arabic is important because of its religious uses, but Tokayev suggests that there should be two state languages for every resident of the Caucasus Emirate – a local ethnic one and Ottoman, “a state language” and also “a language for communication among the peoples of the Caucasus.”
The basic reasons for that are first of all, “more than half of the Ottoman language consists of Arabisms, which means that whoever masters Ottoman is already halfway to mastering Arabic.” Moreover, those who speak one of the six Turkic languages of the region are already able to move to Arabic.
Second, Ottoman was earlier spoken in “today’s Turkey, Central Asia, Arab countries, Persia, the Caucasus, the Middle Volga (Idel-Ural), and the Crimea. Peoples who lived on this enormous territory understood one another thanks to the Ottoman language.” Moreover, while using Ottoman, they never lost their own languages but only saw them “enriched.”
Thus, by adopting Ottoman, the Caucasus Emirate can reach out to all these peoples with all the benefits that will entail.
Third, while Ottoman is not the official language of Turkey, it is taught in law faculties of that country because the terminology it supplies for legal and political issues is so rich. Consequently, the future Caucasus Emirate could only benefit by gaining access to that vocabulary.
And fourth – and Tokayev says this is “the chief argument” in its favor – the adoption of Ottoman will not only link students with the pre-Russian pasts of their own peoples but make it easier for them to learn Arabic in the future not only because of the Arabisms in Ottoman but also because Ottoman uses the Arabic script.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
