Paul Goble
Staunton, November 24 – Russian parliamentarians overwhelmingly believe that it is possible and even necessary to improve the territorial organization of their country, but most of them are reacting with caution to a proposal being developed by the Kremlin and the government to organize the country not as now in 83 subjects but around 20 major urban centers.
That is the conclusion the editors of the Regions.ru portal reach on the basis of their survey of parliamentary opinion about the plan, described in “Vedomosti” last week, a project the details of which are still sketchy but one that would address the problems of linking Russia’s regions more closely together (www.regions.ru/news/2325909/).
Russia’s enormous expanse and the distance between the cities and towns has been “a headache” for the country’s leadership “for several decades,” Regions.ru says in introducing the views of some of those deputies with whom its journalists spoke. At the end of Soviet times, Moscow sought to combine villages and towns, “liquidating” those with the fewest prospects.
Consequently, it should not come as any surprise that “this process now involves cities as well. The pluses from the concentration of population points and resources are obvious.” But equally obvious are “the minuses,” because such a program would leave Russia a very different country than it is today.
When Soviet officials combined and eliminated villages, the news service continues, the issue was discussed primarily in terms of morality. Now, “in the era of globalization,” people are discussing it more in terms of its “social-demographic dimension” and asking whether by creating large vacant areas this project could “threaten the country’s national security.”
Vladimir Gusev, a senator from Saratov who is the first deputy chairman of the Federation Council economics committee, told Regions.ru that he viewed the new program “without enthusiasm.” Perhaps some places need to be combined, but dismissing others as without prospects is wrong: “wherever people live, there are always prospects.”
Vadim Gustov, who represents Vladimir oblast in the Federation Council, took a somewhat different position. He said he favors amalgamating Russian regions, but this must be done carefully and slowly. “Of the existing 83 regions, one must not try to make ten all at once.” But he dismissed the notion that a smaller number than now would destroy Russia’s uniqueness.
Meanwhile, Nikolay Ryzhkov, who represents Belgorod oblast in the Federation Council and chairs that body’s commission on natural monopolies, said that while it was obvious there were a lot of regions in the country, one should approach any change in their borders or numbers very “carefully.”
Eliminating the so-called “matryoshka” units is one thing, but if the new plan threatens the existence of the non-Russian republics, he said, there could be trouble. (Just how much has been suggested by Rashit Akhmetov, editor of “Zvezda Povolzhya,” who argues it could lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation (etatar.ru/top/38560).)
But Aleksandr Moskalets, a United Russia Duma deputy, argues that the proposed changes in the political map of Russia were “completely possible” and that “both the government and legal system of [Russia] are prepared for this.” Moreover, he expressed confidence that this reorganization would bring order to the regions, save money and promote modernization.
And another United Russia Deputy, Yevgeny Bogomolny, vice chairman of the Duma committee on property, said no one should be concerned about some sort of “possible ‘de-colonization’ of the territory of Russia” if this plan is implemented. Rather, people should see it as another step forward made possible by improved transportation and communications links.
Agglomerations once created, he argued, “would allow for an increase in migration flows within the country, lead to the creation of new productive units, to the equalization of social-economic conditions [among the regions] and to a fuller use of the human potential” of Russians and hence a better life for all.
Bogomolny said that people should be ready to admit that there are cities in the country which are living “not in the 20th century but in the 19th” and building new ones alongside them with all kinds of modern infrastructure rather than trying to update existing ones is a cost effective strategy.
Valery Zubov, a Just Russia deputy in the Duma, said he viewed the plan as completely justified because of “the real problems” that the current “imperfect territorial organization of Russia” create or exacerbate. But like others, he said that any change must be done gradually rather than all at once and must involve residents at each stage.
And finally, Valery Seleznev, an LDPR Duma deputy, said he backed amalgamating regions, especially those in border areas of the country like Astrakhan and Volgograd oblasts and Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays, as long as everyone pays attention to the areas in between as well.
Those areas, he continued, should be developed through land grants and other forms of government assistance so that outside of the 20 new agglomerations the plan calls for, the Russian people will gain a productive agricultural sector, one capable of feeding the cities and exporting food as well.
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia and Ukraine Making Costly Mistake by Positioning Themselves as Orthodox States, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 24 – Russia and Ukraine, by falling for the temptation to position themselves as Orthodox countries, are creating serious problems for themselves both at home and abroad and perhaps equally important giving up the opportunity to expand ties with Turkey and other Muslim states against the United States and Europe, a Moscow commentator says.
In an essay on Politcom.ru today, Oleg Gorbunov, a journalist who also serves as the head of the Vektor Youth Political Club, argues that the governments of these two Slavic states need not sacrifice their Orthodox identities but should pay attention to the Muslim dimension of their countries and its role in their security (www.politcom.ru/11074.html).
“At first glance,” he says, Russia and Ukraine would appear to be very different in this regard. In the Russian Federation, there are from 15 to 20 million Muslims while in Ukraine, there are fewer than a million and only one part of that country, Crimea, has a significant compact Muslim community.
But if one considers the situation more closely, Gorbunov continues, their commonalities in this regard become obvious. Both countries have chosen “a European path of development” and are interested in stressing their Christian roots. At the same time, both have Muslim communities that increasingly stand apart from the titular nationalities.
“One must not forget that both communities include within themselves enormous protest potential, in the form of unemployed young people and a generally low standard of living.” And their rapid demographic growth compared to “the demographic winter” of Russians and Ukrainians means that the Muslims in both these countries will become more important.
Offending these groups, he continues, is thus dangerous. But “no less a danger” for the Russians and Ukrainians is that no one in either country has come up with “a way out of the situation,” alternatively presenting apocalyptic projections and ignoring the problems of the Muslim community altogether.
The domestic consequences of doing so are obvious, but relations with the Muslim world abroad entail serious ones as well. For both Moscow and Kyiv, ties with the Muslim world and especially the Middle East and Central Asia are critical because of their role as exporters of “natural and labor resources.”
Moreover, and “unfortunately, Gorbunov argues, “no less evidence are the efforts of groups of states to set Russia and other largely Orthodox states at odds with the Muslim world,” a game “from which only those players on the side will gain.” And consequently, both Russia and Ukraine need to view themselves not just as Orthodox but as poly-confessional countries.
“Historically,” the Moscow commentator continues, “Muslim peoples were an inalienable part of our countries from the moment when ethnic Russian society became non-ethnic Russia after its expansion in the 16th century.” That has put Moscow in a very different position than Europe and North America.
“If Europe organized ‘crusades’ in the Middle Ages,’ he says, “then the United States is doing this now,” a pattern that if Russia and Ukraine recognize and include in their foreign policy calculations will allow them to pose as the champions of an increasingly important part of the world.
Moreover, Gorbunov argues, Moscow and Kyiv need to recognize that “the Islamic world is more complicated that the media present it.” It is not only varied but features some increasingly secular states and involves efforts to combine Islamic shariat law with Western standards. And the Muslim world is increasingly rich because of natural resources.
“All the global players are trying to build their relations with the Muslim countries on ‘an individual basis,’ while at the same time not respecting Islamic culture and customs.” European and American businessmen deal with the Muslim countries as if “with gloves on” lest they be contaminated by Islam.
And Europe and the United States would like to see Russia and Ukraine adopt the same approach because that would prevent Moscow and Kyiv from reaping the benefits of a different policy toward the Muslim world, a policy in which both Slavic countries would form alliances more easily than any Western country can.
For example, Gorbunov writes, Russia and Ukraine can work together with Muslim countries to ensure that the Crimean Tatars will be supplied only with Muslim leaders who respect the idea, which lies at the basis of both Russia and Ukraine, that “an Islamic community [can] exist in a secular state.”
Perhaps especially important, he concludes, “this is not simply an occasion for dialogue; it is a new strategic direction for cooperation between Russia and Ukraine.” And Gorbunov suggests that “organizing a Muslim dialogue around the Black Sea region” could be the first stage in this re-orientation of Russian and Ukrainian policy.
Staunton, November 24 – Russia and Ukraine, by falling for the temptation to position themselves as Orthodox countries, are creating serious problems for themselves both at home and abroad and perhaps equally important giving up the opportunity to expand ties with Turkey and other Muslim states against the United States and Europe, a Moscow commentator says.
In an essay on Politcom.ru today, Oleg Gorbunov, a journalist who also serves as the head of the Vektor Youth Political Club, argues that the governments of these two Slavic states need not sacrifice their Orthodox identities but should pay attention to the Muslim dimension of their countries and its role in their security (www.politcom.ru/11074.html).
“At first glance,” he says, Russia and Ukraine would appear to be very different in this regard. In the Russian Federation, there are from 15 to 20 million Muslims while in Ukraine, there are fewer than a million and only one part of that country, Crimea, has a significant compact Muslim community.
But if one considers the situation more closely, Gorbunov continues, their commonalities in this regard become obvious. Both countries have chosen “a European path of development” and are interested in stressing their Christian roots. At the same time, both have Muslim communities that increasingly stand apart from the titular nationalities.
“One must not forget that both communities include within themselves enormous protest potential, in the form of unemployed young people and a generally low standard of living.” And their rapid demographic growth compared to “the demographic winter” of Russians and Ukrainians means that the Muslims in both these countries will become more important.
Offending these groups, he continues, is thus dangerous. But “no less a danger” for the Russians and Ukrainians is that no one in either country has come up with “a way out of the situation,” alternatively presenting apocalyptic projections and ignoring the problems of the Muslim community altogether.
The domestic consequences of doing so are obvious, but relations with the Muslim world abroad entail serious ones as well. For both Moscow and Kyiv, ties with the Muslim world and especially the Middle East and Central Asia are critical because of their role as exporters of “natural and labor resources.”
Moreover, and “unfortunately, Gorbunov argues, “no less evidence are the efforts of groups of states to set Russia and other largely Orthodox states at odds with the Muslim world,” a game “from which only those players on the side will gain.” And consequently, both Russia and Ukraine need to view themselves not just as Orthodox but as poly-confessional countries.
“Historically,” the Moscow commentator continues, “Muslim peoples were an inalienable part of our countries from the moment when ethnic Russian society became non-ethnic Russia after its expansion in the 16th century.” That has put Moscow in a very different position than Europe and North America.
“If Europe organized ‘crusades’ in the Middle Ages,’ he says, “then the United States is doing this now,” a pattern that if Russia and Ukraine recognize and include in their foreign policy calculations will allow them to pose as the champions of an increasingly important part of the world.
Moreover, Gorbunov argues, Moscow and Kyiv need to recognize that “the Islamic world is more complicated that the media present it.” It is not only varied but features some increasingly secular states and involves efforts to combine Islamic shariat law with Western standards. And the Muslim world is increasingly rich because of natural resources.
“All the global players are trying to build their relations with the Muslim countries on ‘an individual basis,’ while at the same time not respecting Islamic culture and customs.” European and American businessmen deal with the Muslim countries as if “with gloves on” lest they be contaminated by Islam.
And Europe and the United States would like to see Russia and Ukraine adopt the same approach because that would prevent Moscow and Kyiv from reaping the benefits of a different policy toward the Muslim world, a policy in which both Slavic countries would form alliances more easily than any Western country can.
For example, Gorbunov writes, Russia and Ukraine can work together with Muslim countries to ensure that the Crimean Tatars will be supplied only with Muslim leaders who respect the idea, which lies at the basis of both Russia and Ukraine, that “an Islamic community [can] exist in a secular state.”
Perhaps especially important, he concludes, “this is not simply an occasion for dialogue; it is a new strategic direction for cooperation between Russia and Ukraine.” And Gorbunov suggests that “organizing a Muslim dialogue around the Black Sea region” could be the first stage in this re-orientation of Russian and Ukrainian policy.
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