Paul Goble
Staunton, November 19 – In order to radically expand the number of Russian Orthodox churches and to ensure that urban Russians will have a church to go to within walking distance, the Moscow Patriarchate has launched a program to build modular churches first in Moscow and hten elsewhere.
But while such prefab churches will allow the Russian Orthodox Church to expand its physical presence, many Russians are concerned that these new buildings will compromise the architectural landscape, and others are convinced that having more churches is no guarantee that there will be more Christians.
Patriarch Kirill earlier had reached an agreement with former Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov to provide 200 plots of land on which the church could erect these pre-fabricated churches, and last week the hierarch appears to have made progress in ensuring that Luzhkov’s successor, Sergey Sobyanin, will follow through (www.vremya.ru/2010/208/51/264947.html).
The Moscow Patriarchate currently has 790 churches and chapels in the Russian capital, although roughly half of them are located inside one or another institution and thus are not readily accessible to most Muscovites. The Patriarchate has insisted it needs almost 600 more to ensure that every resident can walk to an Orthodox church.
Although the major bottleneck in the city of Moscow to the construction of new churches is the availability of plots of land on which they can be constructed, another serious roadblock is the cost of Orthodox churches, which typically cost far more than do the religious facilities used by Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and others.
That price differential is not only because the Orthodox Church has very specific requirements that other faiths do not impose, but also because the Church and its adherents take great pride in the beauty and unique character of their church buildings. And the Patriarchate has often pointed to these costs as a reason other faiths have build more religious sites recently.
To overcome those problems, the Patriarchate has come up with the idea of modular churches, prefabricated, one-size-fits-all religious facilities that can be thrown up rapidly. If this program works in Moscow, it is likely that the church hierarchy will extend it to other parts of the country.
That will increase the profile of the Church but only at the cost of standardization, something that the Moscow Patriarchate has traditionally been opposed. But it will have other consequences as well: such rapid church building will certainly cause the leaders of other faiths, especially Muslims, to step up their demands for equal treatment.
And this kind of religious construction boom, one intended to ensure that buildings go up rather than Christianity be promoted, will raise still more questions about what the Moscow Patriarchate is really about, a religious organization or a business and political structure interested more in wealth and influence than in Christianity.
In an interview with the Portal-credo.ru religious affairs portal, Valeriya Novodvorskaya, the leader of the Democratic Union Party, said that the expansion in the number of churches provides no guarantee that there will be a growth in the number of Christian believers – indeed, it may have the opposite effect (www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=80856).
Indeed, she said, the church’s current building plans recalled the way in which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union behaved before 1991: It constantly build more obkoms and gorkoms but “as things turned out, happily, there were many fewer” communists than this number of committees might have suggested.
In Moscow at present, there are “more than enough” churches for the number of believers. Indeed, if one visits any of them on all but the most important church festivals, Novodvorskaya continued, they are typically almost empty. Until they are full, why should the church build more?
And as for the argument that most Orthodox churches are in the center of the city rather than in outlying districts where most residents actually lived, the outspoken liberal critic said, “there aren’t enough ‘sleeping’ regions in order to justify the construction of 200 [new Orthodox] churches.”
She added that she was far more concerned by the absence of European and Christian values in the Russian Federation than by the lack of enough church buildings, and she suggested that both the Moscow Patriarchate and ordinary Russians should want to see that change rather than simply more into an era of modular Christianity.
Friday, November 19, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Past Manipulations of Buryatia Spark Fears among Its Residents about the Future
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 19 – A recent article in an Ulan-Ude newspaper about how Moscow has played with the name and borders of the Buryat Republic in the past has sparked concerns in that Buddhist region in the Trans-Baikal that Russia’s moves against the use of the title of president by republic leaders may presage yet another diminution of the status of the Buryats.
In May 1923, Yevgeny Khamaganov writes in “Vechernyy Ulan-Ude-Nedeli,” Moscow set up the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1937, it split the territory of the republic into five parts – an autonomous republic, two districts, and two parts in Irkutsk and Chita oblasts – and changed its name (buryat-mongolia.info/?p=1217).
As the Buryat journalist points out, both the establishment and the dismemberment of Buryat statehood within the Russian Federation was accompanied by “backstage intrigues,” the details of which remain in some cases unclear and in others in dispute to this day. Nonetheless, the basic outlines of what has happened are clear – and for Buryats, disturbing.
The history of Buryat statehood began in April 1917 when an All-Buryat congress took place in Chita and called for the formation of a Buryat Mongol state within Russia. The meeting formed a Central National Committee of Buryat Mongols of Eastern Siberia with its headquarters in Chita rather than Verkhneudinsk.
That body, during the Russian civil war, was renamed the Buryat Mongol People’s Duma. It was controlled by anti-bolshevik leader Ataman Semyonov, the first of many instances where the Buryats were used by outsiders whose policies toward that nation were determined by their geopolitical concerns rather than the national interests of the Buryats.
Later, Semyonov and his nominal subordinate Baron Ungern-Sternberg, set up a Dauria government of Buryats which attempted to unify Buryat-Mongolia with Khalkha-Mongolia and Internal Mongolia of China, an idea that was pushed by the Japanese who were the chief backers of Semyonov.
As the Russian Civil War wound down, Moscow created the Far Eastern Republic as a bugger between Soviet Russia and Japan. When that buffer was no longer required, a debate broke out between Russian communists who didn’t want to give the Buryats any autonomous formation and Buryats who insisted on them. Moscow backed the latter.
But its reasons for doing so appear to have been the product of a desire to attract and possibly absorb Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva into the USSR, something that Moscow did de facto in the case of the former by the 1930s and de jure in the case of latter at the end of World War II. Indeed the name Buryat-Mongol exactly paralleled Karelo-Finia in that regard.
But when the central Soviet government no longer needed this tool and when in fact Stalin’s suspicions were aroused that Mongols abroad might use a Buryat-Mongol republic within the USSR against him, perhaps by blocking the Transbaikal, he changed its name and divided its territory into five parts.
The Soviet leader staged a show trial accusing the Buryat leader of pan-Mongolism on behalf of Japan, and after the war, he conducted a second massive purge of the republic’s officials supposedly because they had wanted to see Japan win the war in the Far East and regain their statehood. He didn’t deport the Buryats only because “there was nowhere to send them.”
In a postscript to his article, Khamaganov underlines that “up to now,” Buryatia remains of interest to foreign powers like China and the United States” and argues that because of that, “it is possible that [Buryats] may become witnesses” of another turn of the historical cycle, especially given Moscow’s moves against the national republics.
The Ulan-Ude journalist’s article provides few pieces of information that are not known to Western specialists, but it is important both as an indication of Buryat sensitivities, especially given the reactions of some of those who posted comments on it on the Buryat-Mongolia.info site.
One said that whatever else might be done, “Buryatia should [re]take its real name – BURYAT MONGOLIA.” Another implied that Ireland’s acquisition of independence from Great Britain should be a model for Buryatia. And a third said that Buryatia should once again become an integral republic, reclaiming all the parts Moscow took from it in the past.
But perhaps the most interesting comment was offered by one Buryat who asked “Does it not seem to you than soon an end is coming to all autonomies and not only to the titles of their ‘leaders’? THERE plans have already been worked up for a long time and attempts have been made to realize them as in the case of the [Buryat] autonomous districts.”
Moreover, he continues, Moscow officials “have tried several times to liquidate the republics – the Altay Republic, Adygeya … Now, we see that the Muscovites have begun to act more cleverly – at first they take the titles away from the heads of the republics and over time they will liquidate the autonomies as well.”
Staunton, November 19 – A recent article in an Ulan-Ude newspaper about how Moscow has played with the name and borders of the Buryat Republic in the past has sparked concerns in that Buddhist region in the Trans-Baikal that Russia’s moves against the use of the title of president by republic leaders may presage yet another diminution of the status of the Buryats.
In May 1923, Yevgeny Khamaganov writes in “Vechernyy Ulan-Ude-Nedeli,” Moscow set up the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1937, it split the territory of the republic into five parts – an autonomous republic, two districts, and two parts in Irkutsk and Chita oblasts – and changed its name (buryat-mongolia.info/?p=1217).
As the Buryat journalist points out, both the establishment and the dismemberment of Buryat statehood within the Russian Federation was accompanied by “backstage intrigues,” the details of which remain in some cases unclear and in others in dispute to this day. Nonetheless, the basic outlines of what has happened are clear – and for Buryats, disturbing.
The history of Buryat statehood began in April 1917 when an All-Buryat congress took place in Chita and called for the formation of a Buryat Mongol state within Russia. The meeting formed a Central National Committee of Buryat Mongols of Eastern Siberia with its headquarters in Chita rather than Verkhneudinsk.
That body, during the Russian civil war, was renamed the Buryat Mongol People’s Duma. It was controlled by anti-bolshevik leader Ataman Semyonov, the first of many instances where the Buryats were used by outsiders whose policies toward that nation were determined by their geopolitical concerns rather than the national interests of the Buryats.
Later, Semyonov and his nominal subordinate Baron Ungern-Sternberg, set up a Dauria government of Buryats which attempted to unify Buryat-Mongolia with Khalkha-Mongolia and Internal Mongolia of China, an idea that was pushed by the Japanese who were the chief backers of Semyonov.
As the Russian Civil War wound down, Moscow created the Far Eastern Republic as a bugger between Soviet Russia and Japan. When that buffer was no longer required, a debate broke out between Russian communists who didn’t want to give the Buryats any autonomous formation and Buryats who insisted on them. Moscow backed the latter.
But its reasons for doing so appear to have been the product of a desire to attract and possibly absorb Outer Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva into the USSR, something that Moscow did de facto in the case of the former by the 1930s and de jure in the case of latter at the end of World War II. Indeed the name Buryat-Mongol exactly paralleled Karelo-Finia in that regard.
But when the central Soviet government no longer needed this tool and when in fact Stalin’s suspicions were aroused that Mongols abroad might use a Buryat-Mongol republic within the USSR against him, perhaps by blocking the Transbaikal, he changed its name and divided its territory into five parts.
The Soviet leader staged a show trial accusing the Buryat leader of pan-Mongolism on behalf of Japan, and after the war, he conducted a second massive purge of the republic’s officials supposedly because they had wanted to see Japan win the war in the Far East and regain their statehood. He didn’t deport the Buryats only because “there was nowhere to send them.”
In a postscript to his article, Khamaganov underlines that “up to now,” Buryatia remains of interest to foreign powers like China and the United States” and argues that because of that, “it is possible that [Buryats] may become witnesses” of another turn of the historical cycle, especially given Moscow’s moves against the national republics.
The Ulan-Ude journalist’s article provides few pieces of information that are not known to Western specialists, but it is important both as an indication of Buryat sensitivities, especially given the reactions of some of those who posted comments on it on the Buryat-Mongolia.info site.
One said that whatever else might be done, “Buryatia should [re]take its real name – BURYAT MONGOLIA.” Another implied that Ireland’s acquisition of independence from Great Britain should be a model for Buryatia. And a third said that Buryatia should once again become an integral republic, reclaiming all the parts Moscow took from it in the past.
But perhaps the most interesting comment was offered by one Buryat who asked “Does it not seem to you than soon an end is coming to all autonomies and not only to the titles of their ‘leaders’? THERE plans have already been worked up for a long time and attempts have been made to realize them as in the case of the [Buryat] autonomous districts.”
Moreover, he continues, Moscow officials “have tried several times to liquidate the republics – the Altay Republic, Adygeya … Now, we see that the Muscovites have begun to act more cleverly – at first they take the titles away from the heads of the republics and over time they will liquidate the autonomies as well.”
Window on Eurasia: Regional Amalgamation from Below Could Challenge Moscow
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 19 – Officials from six predominantly ethnic Russian regions in the Central Federal District have been quietly discussing consolidating into a single unit, something Moscow would like if it were running the process but a measure that could challenge the center’s control if it takes place spontaneously from below.
On the one hand, such steps taken from below could spark a parade of specific unifications or demands for unifications that Moscow does not want, much as the efforts to create broader Russian entities like the ill-starred Urals Republic in the early 1990s or the calls more recently for the amalgamation of Circassian units into a single republic.
And on the other hand, because this process is again beginning within predominantly Russian regions, it could result in changing the balance away from the predominantly Russian regions, at least in numbers, exactly the reverse of the intention Vladimir Putin had when he began the current push for regional amalgamation in 2004.
Representatives of Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orlov and Tambov oblasts met in Voronezh to discuss unification out of a belief, Aleksey Chichkin says in an essay on the Stoletiye.ru portal, they cannot hope to improve their social-economic situation unless they combine (www.stoletie.ru/russkiiy_proekt/chtob_ne_propast_poodinochke_2010-11-16.htm).
This session, Chichkin continues, as not covered in the local media “for obvious reasons: so that no one could ‘suspect’ the powers that be there in seeking to change the administrative map of Central European Russia” because of the extreme sensitivity of such issues in the Russian Federation.
But as the Stoletiye.ru commentator points out, this region actually has a long history of border changes with territories being shifted from one to another, many of which transfers occurred under Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and which reflected the same kind of “anti-Russian” policy that led Moscow to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine.
Khrushchev’s approach, which was not rectified by his successors, Chichkin notes, left these central Russian oblast with fewer natural resources and hence economic possibilities and made them more dependent on energy and raw material deliveries from Siberia and non-Russian republics as well as on the central powers that be to ensure such transfers.
As the result of the Soviet policies of 50 or more years ago, parts of Omsk, and Chkalov (Orenburg), oblasts as well as portions of Altay kray and the Gorno-Altay AO were transferred to Kazakhstan. And parts of Krasnodar kray were given to Adygeya and parts of Stavropol kray to Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkara, Chechen-Ingushetia, and Daghestan.
Moreover, Chichkin points out, “many of the large oblasts” in Central Russia, including Boronezh and the Central Black Earth ones, “were split up into smaller” oblasts and further reduced in size by the transfer of many of the districts along their borders to build up neighboring oblasts, all shifts that left these predominantly ethnic Russian areas weaker.
In the center of this, Moscow in January 1954 created Lipetsk oblast out of districts from Voronezh, Tambov, Ryazan, Kursk and Orlov oblasts, an action that a Tambov economist says “reduced not only the territory but the social-economic vitality of the ‘donor’ oblasts” and virtually ensured that neither those giving nor those receiving could make it on their own.
In short, Chichkin continues, “the Russophobic line of the Kremlin after 1953 was conducted in many regions and therefore it is not surprising that after the disintegration of the USSR and, as a result of this policy, the social economic crisis became a chronic feature throughout this region” of the Russian Federation.
Poverty, as well as the geographic and social-economic similarity of these six oblasts, as well as their memory of being part of a single unit in the 1920s and 1930s when they formed a major part of the Central Black Earth kray, has “stimulated” thinking now about forming a single and much larger territory.
Just what it would look like if it happens is unclear. The governors involved “are keeping quiet in public,” and experts disagree, although many of them, Chichkin argues, believe that some form of “inter-oblast” administration is necessary, either as a first step toward amalgamation or as an end in itself.
The experts in the area point to the advantages of combining agricultural processing industries, creating new work places in agriculture and industry, and reducing the burden of administration by having one center rather than six. But that may be the rock on which this founders: if these six did combine, many officials would likely lose their jobs.
Staunton, November 19 – Officials from six predominantly ethnic Russian regions in the Central Federal District have been quietly discussing consolidating into a single unit, something Moscow would like if it were running the process but a measure that could challenge the center’s control if it takes place spontaneously from below.
On the one hand, such steps taken from below could spark a parade of specific unifications or demands for unifications that Moscow does not want, much as the efforts to create broader Russian entities like the ill-starred Urals Republic in the early 1990s or the calls more recently for the amalgamation of Circassian units into a single republic.
And on the other hand, because this process is again beginning within predominantly Russian regions, it could result in changing the balance away from the predominantly Russian regions, at least in numbers, exactly the reverse of the intention Vladimir Putin had when he began the current push for regional amalgamation in 2004.
Representatives of Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Lipetsk, Orlov and Tambov oblasts met in Voronezh to discuss unification out of a belief, Aleksey Chichkin says in an essay on the Stoletiye.ru portal, they cannot hope to improve their social-economic situation unless they combine (www.stoletie.ru/russkiiy_proekt/chtob_ne_propast_poodinochke_2010-11-16.htm).
This session, Chichkin continues, as not covered in the local media “for obvious reasons: so that no one could ‘suspect’ the powers that be there in seeking to change the administrative map of Central European Russia” because of the extreme sensitivity of such issues in the Russian Federation.
But as the Stoletiye.ru commentator points out, this region actually has a long history of border changes with territories being shifted from one to another, many of which transfers occurred under Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and which reflected the same kind of “anti-Russian” policy that led Moscow to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine.
Khrushchev’s approach, which was not rectified by his successors, Chichkin notes, left these central Russian oblast with fewer natural resources and hence economic possibilities and made them more dependent on energy and raw material deliveries from Siberia and non-Russian republics as well as on the central powers that be to ensure such transfers.
As the result of the Soviet policies of 50 or more years ago, parts of Omsk, and Chkalov (Orenburg), oblasts as well as portions of Altay kray and the Gorno-Altay AO were transferred to Kazakhstan. And parts of Krasnodar kray were given to Adygeya and parts of Stavropol kray to Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkara, Chechen-Ingushetia, and Daghestan.
Moreover, Chichkin points out, “many of the large oblasts” in Central Russia, including Boronezh and the Central Black Earth ones, “were split up into smaller” oblasts and further reduced in size by the transfer of many of the districts along their borders to build up neighboring oblasts, all shifts that left these predominantly ethnic Russian areas weaker.
In the center of this, Moscow in January 1954 created Lipetsk oblast out of districts from Voronezh, Tambov, Ryazan, Kursk and Orlov oblasts, an action that a Tambov economist says “reduced not only the territory but the social-economic vitality of the ‘donor’ oblasts” and virtually ensured that neither those giving nor those receiving could make it on their own.
In short, Chichkin continues, “the Russophobic line of the Kremlin after 1953 was conducted in many regions and therefore it is not surprising that after the disintegration of the USSR and, as a result of this policy, the social economic crisis became a chronic feature throughout this region” of the Russian Federation.
Poverty, as well as the geographic and social-economic similarity of these six oblasts, as well as their memory of being part of a single unit in the 1920s and 1930s when they formed a major part of the Central Black Earth kray, has “stimulated” thinking now about forming a single and much larger territory.
Just what it would look like if it happens is unclear. The governors involved “are keeping quiet in public,” and experts disagree, although many of them, Chichkin argues, believe that some form of “inter-oblast” administration is necessary, either as a first step toward amalgamation or as an end in itself.
The experts in the area point to the advantages of combining agricultural processing industries, creating new work places in agriculture and industry, and reducing the burden of administration by having one center rather than six. But that may be the rock on which this founders: if these six did combine, many officials would likely lose their jobs.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
Posts
