Paul Goble
Vienna, November 15 – A statement by a Kazakhstan minister that his country will eventually shift from a Cyrillic-based alphabet to a Latin-based script and reports that some scholars in Dushanbe are considering dropping another four Russian letters from the Tajik alphabet suggest that a new battle of the alphabets may again be shaping up in Central Asia.
Russian commentators have reacted by suggesting that this is yet another effort by nationalists in those countries to reduce the role of the Russian language and hence of the influence of Russian culture, but in fact the controversy over any such change is far more complicated than that.
Many advocates of such a shift away to a Latin script to Cyrillic believe that the former more fully captures the sound values of their languages than does the latter, a position with which many linguists around the world agree, and are pushing it as a means of preserving their native tongues.
But while they seldom attract much attention, many in Central Asia are opposed to such a change either because of the enormous expenditures that their countries would have to bear or even more because every alphabet change of this kind renders parts of the population functionally illiterate and less interested in reading than they were before.
Consequently, what might look as a simple struggle between the national aspirations of the peoples of this region and the desires of both ethnic Russian communities there and especially Moscow to maintain Russian influence is likely to proceed in a more complicated, even convoluted way than many expect.
Aleksandr Shustov, a Russian commentator who opposes any shift away from the “Russian” alphabet in Central Asia, nonetheless provides one of the most comprehensive recent discussions of the state of play of alphabet change in the four Central Asian Turkic republics (www.stoletie.ru/rossiya_i_mir/kto_pishet_alfavit_dla_kazahstana_2010-11-15.htm).
Last week, Shustov reports, Kazakhstan Culture and Mass Communications Minsiter Mukhtar Kul-Mukhammed said that at some point in the future “life itself” would cause Kazakhstan to drop the Cyrillic alphabet and turn to a Latin script like the one Kazakhs had used in the 1920s and 1930s.
Kul-Mukhamedov’s comments came as he announced the Conception of State Language Policy for 2011-2020, a context that suggests he sees this shift happening sometime over the next decade but not necessarily in the next year or two. At the same time, he insisted that this would not be a political step because “an alphabet does not have a national face.”
Shustov clearly disagrees as his discussion of the history of alphabets in Central Asia over the last century makes clear. Prior to 1917, he notes, the small literate population there used the Arabic script. Then the Soviets introduced a Latin script to promote unite and in the late 1930s the Cyrillic to tie these peoples more closely to the family of Soviet peoples.
When the USSR fell apart, many Central Asians talked about alphabet changes, and both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan moved in that direction. But Shustov suggests that their respective efforts were far from successful, costing more than the two regimes had expected and thus serving as a warning to others.
Kazakh officials began talking about shifting from a Cyrillic script to a Latin one in October 2006 when President Nursultan Nazarbayev suggested that this question deserved consideration. A year later, he created a special working group in that country’s education and science ministry to work up proposals in that regard.
But the commission does not appear to have been that active, Shustov suggests, possibly a reflection of the difficulties he says such a step would entail. Kazakhstan has a larger ethnic Russian population than do the other Central Asian countries and consequently an alphabet change would exacerbate divisions between the Kazakhs and the Russians there.
Shustov even argues that “a paradoxical result of an [alphabet] reform could be the further strengthening of the role of Russian which under conditions of the introduction of an unfamiliar Latin script would remain almost the only understandable and accessible to all the peoples of Kazakhstan means of inter-ethnic communication.”
At the conclusion of his essay, Shustov notes that the only Central Asian country which does not appear to have been caught up in this new alphabet struggle is Kyrgyzstan, but that reflects, he says, less interest there than the poverty of that country and its inability to bear the costs of any such change.
In his essay, the Russian commentator does not talk about Tajikistan, a Persian-speaking country in the region. But in some ways, what the Tajiks are talking about regarding alphabet reform may be the most interesting. In 1998, the Tajiks dropped four Russian letters from the Tajik alphabet, and now, one senior linguist in Dushanbe is calling for the elimination of four more (islamsng.com/tjk/news/485).
In the November 6 issue of “Dzhumkkhuriyat,” Sayfiddin Nazarzoda, the director of the Tajikistan Academy of Sciences Institute of the Tajik Language and Literature, said that Dushanbe was considering dropping four more Cyrillic letters from its national alphabet. That would leave Tajik with an alphabet of 31 letters rather than the 35 it has now.
But not everyone in Tajikistan is enthusiastic about the idea, Giesiddin Kodirov, the deputy director of that institute, told the media that “no letters will be excluded from the Tajik alphabet and that no new ones will appear.” Nazarzoda’s proposal, he suggested, “is only part of a scholarly study” and not yet state policy.
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Ultra-Right Laity Creating Serious Problems for Moscow Patriarchate and for Russia, Moscow Paper Warns
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 16 – Just as at the end of the Imperial period, ultra-right Orthodox lay organizations are creating problems for the Moscow Patriarchate and for the Russian government even though such organizations sometimes enjoy support within the religious and political hierarchies, a Moscow newspaper has warned.
In an editorial yesterday, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” that the phenomenon of “Orthodox against Orthodox or more precisely of ultra-Orthodox against those whom they consider ‘liberals’ and ‘modernists’ is becoming an ever more pronounced “trend” in Russian religious life over the last few months (www.ng.ru/editorial/2010-11-15/2_red.html).
And most recently, the paper’s editors continue, this conflict has spilled over from verbal exchanges in the religious media and blogosphere into “mass actions of Orthodox radicals who are balancing on the borders of scandal and pogroms” including open insubordination of some in the church hierarchy who believe they can rely on popular support against the Patriarchate.
Such insubordination and the attacks of lay radicals on representatives of mainstream Orthodox figures undermine the cohesion of the Church hierarchy, as do the other events of recent weeks that “Nezavisimaya” points to in this editorial. But the specifics are less important than the reasons these tensions have arisen and the consequences they have for Russian society.
Within the clerical hierarchy, there are some who share the views of the lay radicals, opposing such things as ecumenism or greater tolerance toward social diversity, and there are others who do not share those views but see the rise of Orthodox lay activism as a useful ally in their efforts to promote an expanded role for the Church in Russian life.
Consequently, while the Moscow Patriarchate has taken a hard line against any open insubordination within the clergy, it has been unwilling or perhaps unable to take an equally tough line toward those in the laity who at every point argue that they are acting on behalf of Orthodoxy.
And at the same time, with rare exceptions, the Russian powers that be have been reluctant to speak out against all but the very most extreme of the ultra-Orthodox lest the regime lose the support it has received in recent years from the Moscow Patriarchate whose relations with these lay groups is at the very least complicated.
The exact numbers of the ultra-Orthodox are a matter of dispute, but in many areas, they form a significant portion of public activism, if only because they more than others appear quite prepared to try to intimidate their opponents as they tried in the case of Deacon Andrey Kurayev recently in Chisinau where he had to be rescued by the civil authorities.
And there is a risk, given the hostility of many of the ultra-Orthodox to all minorities including Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and Jews, that some of these ultra-Orthodox movements might act on those feelings, much as before World War I when such people engaged in pogroms and other activities that discredited church and state and undermined public order.
While many of the ultra-Orthodox may simply be deeply conservative and have no plans to take any such steps, there are some very troubling signs. At least some of their associates look back to the Black Hundreds as a role model, re-issuing its materials and attacking anyone who criticizes such groups for their criminal activities.
For all these reasons, the problems “Nezavisimaya” points to could soon prove to be far more serious than the editors of that paper suggest, especially if both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be fail to denounce such groups and dissociate themselves from them and equally if others concerned with human rights assume there is nothing to worry about.
Vienna, November 16 – Just as at the end of the Imperial period, ultra-right Orthodox lay organizations are creating problems for the Moscow Patriarchate and for the Russian government even though such organizations sometimes enjoy support within the religious and political hierarchies, a Moscow newspaper has warned.
In an editorial yesterday, “Nezavisimaya gazeta” that the phenomenon of “Orthodox against Orthodox or more precisely of ultra-Orthodox against those whom they consider ‘liberals’ and ‘modernists’ is becoming an ever more pronounced “trend” in Russian religious life over the last few months (www.ng.ru/editorial/2010-11-15/2_red.html).
And most recently, the paper’s editors continue, this conflict has spilled over from verbal exchanges in the religious media and blogosphere into “mass actions of Orthodox radicals who are balancing on the borders of scandal and pogroms” including open insubordination of some in the church hierarchy who believe they can rely on popular support against the Patriarchate.
Such insubordination and the attacks of lay radicals on representatives of mainstream Orthodox figures undermine the cohesion of the Church hierarchy, as do the other events of recent weeks that “Nezavisimaya” points to in this editorial. But the specifics are less important than the reasons these tensions have arisen and the consequences they have for Russian society.
Within the clerical hierarchy, there are some who share the views of the lay radicals, opposing such things as ecumenism or greater tolerance toward social diversity, and there are others who do not share those views but see the rise of Orthodox lay activism as a useful ally in their efforts to promote an expanded role for the Church in Russian life.
Consequently, while the Moscow Patriarchate has taken a hard line against any open insubordination within the clergy, it has been unwilling or perhaps unable to take an equally tough line toward those in the laity who at every point argue that they are acting on behalf of Orthodoxy.
And at the same time, with rare exceptions, the Russian powers that be have been reluctant to speak out against all but the very most extreme of the ultra-Orthodox lest the regime lose the support it has received in recent years from the Moscow Patriarchate whose relations with these lay groups is at the very least complicated.
The exact numbers of the ultra-Orthodox are a matter of dispute, but in many areas, they form a significant portion of public activism, if only because they more than others appear quite prepared to try to intimidate their opponents as they tried in the case of Deacon Andrey Kurayev recently in Chisinau where he had to be rescued by the civil authorities.
And there is a risk, given the hostility of many of the ultra-Orthodox to all minorities including Catholics, Protestants, Muslims and Jews, that some of these ultra-Orthodox movements might act on those feelings, much as before World War I when such people engaged in pogroms and other activities that discredited church and state and undermined public order.
While many of the ultra-Orthodox may simply be deeply conservative and have no plans to take any such steps, there are some very troubling signs. At least some of their associates look back to the Black Hundreds as a role model, re-issuing its materials and attacking anyone who criticizes such groups for their criminal activities.
For all these reasons, the problems “Nezavisimaya” points to could soon prove to be far more serious than the editors of that paper suggest, especially if both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian powers that be fail to denounce such groups and dissociate themselves from them and equally if others concerned with human rights assume there is nothing to worry about.
Window on Eurasia: New Problems Arise with Formation of National Units in Daghestan
Paul Goble
Vienna, November 16 – Plans to form MVD units consisting of members of local nationalities in Daghestan appear to have slowed because of a lack of funding for infrastructure such as housing, an indication that this program may neither have the priority that its backers had suggested or achieve its goals as soon or as completely as they had hoped.
General Nikolay Rogozhkin, Russia’s deputy minister of internal affairs, announced yesterday the completion of what he described as the first stage of the formation of a specialized motorized MVD battalion whose soldiers are drawn from the non-Russian nationalities of Daghestan (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177011/).
Rogozhkin said that the MVD had “completed the formation of this separate 300-man battalion, that it is “included in the military staff of the Daghestani Ministry of Internal Affairs to guarantee security in Makhachkala and other regions of the republic,” and that it has already begun to fulfill its “military tasks.”
According to the general, most of those in the battalion are natives of Daghestan “who have passed through military service in the Russian army and other forces,” and “we consider that namely the Daghetanis will give a worth response to the bandit underground which is trying to terrorize the local population.”
At the end of September, the Russian interior ministry said it was taking this step at the request of Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov, who argued that local people because of their knowledge of languages, cultures, and geography would be better able to counter the rising tide of militant violence in his republic.
In the six weeks since that time, however, many have expressed concerns that such units could become nothing more than units likely to fall under the control of this or that leader of a particular ethnic region, of which Daghestan has a large number. If that occurred, these commentators have warned, the situation in Daghestan could grow much worse.
And others, especially in Moscow and in the Russian forcer structures have warned that the formation of ethnic units in more republics – they have already been formed in Chechnya – could lead to the disintegration of the Russian military and point to the collapse of the country as a unified whole.
However that may be, the process of forming such units even in Daghestan appears to have slowed. The original plan for two battalions of 700 Daghestanis each has now been reduced at least for the time being to a single one with only 300 soldiers, ostensibly because there is insufficient housing for any larger grouping.
Meanwhile, also in Daghestan, another ethnically based force is taking shape and also with the support of Makhachkala, and this one is based on the Cossacks, a group that in that North Caucasus republic has attracted some Daghestanis, particularly the Nogays, but has always been viewed as a Russian force (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177031/).
Zirkula Ilyasov, Daghestan’s first deputy minister for nationality policy, religious affairs and foreign relations, insists that the Cossacks in Daghestan “always were, above everything else, a cementing tie between all nationalities,” an assertion that some would dispute and that other would read in their own way.
He announced this week that the republic government now has registered “about 1300 Cossacks” who are organized in 23 Cossack societies and that Makhachkala is offering them subsidies and land as part of a five-year program to revive the Cossack community there. Moreover, republic ataman Nikolay Spirin now serves as a government advisor.
Historically relations between the Cossacks and most Daghetanis have been good, Enver Kisriyev, a Caucasus specialist at the Russian Academy of Sciences says, but since the collapse of the USSR, the Cossacks there have pushed for the separation of the northern regions of Daghestan and their inclusion in a revived Cossack host territory, something Daghestanis oppose.
A significant portion of those territories had been populated by ethnic Russians in the past, but most of the Russians have left and the Cossacks would like to move in. That has touched a nerve, Kisriyev says, but he argues that he does not expect any conflicts, especially if the activities of the Cossacks are closely coordinated by the government.
But Kisriyev’s expectations may be too optimistic given that ethnic battalions in the MVD are formed at exactly the same time. There is a risk that such units could come into conflict with each other either by accident or by the design of ethnic leaders, and even the prospect of such a possibility must be worrisome in Makhachkala and Moscow.
Vienna, November 16 – Plans to form MVD units consisting of members of local nationalities in Daghestan appear to have slowed because of a lack of funding for infrastructure such as housing, an indication that this program may neither have the priority that its backers had suggested or achieve its goals as soon or as completely as they had hoped.
General Nikolay Rogozhkin, Russia’s deputy minister of internal affairs, announced yesterday the completion of what he described as the first stage of the formation of a specialized motorized MVD battalion whose soldiers are drawn from the non-Russian nationalities of Daghestan (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177011/).
Rogozhkin said that the MVD had “completed the formation of this separate 300-man battalion, that it is “included in the military staff of the Daghestani Ministry of Internal Affairs to guarantee security in Makhachkala and other regions of the republic,” and that it has already begun to fulfill its “military tasks.”
According to the general, most of those in the battalion are natives of Daghestan “who have passed through military service in the Russian army and other forces,” and “we consider that namely the Daghetanis will give a worth response to the bandit underground which is trying to terrorize the local population.”
At the end of September, the Russian interior ministry said it was taking this step at the request of Daghestani President Magomedsalam Magomedov, who argued that local people because of their knowledge of languages, cultures, and geography would be better able to counter the rising tide of militant violence in his republic.
In the six weeks since that time, however, many have expressed concerns that such units could become nothing more than units likely to fall under the control of this or that leader of a particular ethnic region, of which Daghestan has a large number. If that occurred, these commentators have warned, the situation in Daghestan could grow much worse.
And others, especially in Moscow and in the Russian forcer structures have warned that the formation of ethnic units in more republics – they have already been formed in Chechnya – could lead to the disintegration of the Russian military and point to the collapse of the country as a unified whole.
However that may be, the process of forming such units even in Daghestan appears to have slowed. The original plan for two battalions of 700 Daghestanis each has now been reduced at least for the time being to a single one with only 300 soldiers, ostensibly because there is insufficient housing for any larger grouping.
Meanwhile, also in Daghestan, another ethnically based force is taking shape and also with the support of Makhachkala, and this one is based on the Cossacks, a group that in that North Caucasus republic has attracted some Daghestanis, particularly the Nogays, but has always been viewed as a Russian force (www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/177031/).
Zirkula Ilyasov, Daghestan’s first deputy minister for nationality policy, religious affairs and foreign relations, insists that the Cossacks in Daghestan “always were, above everything else, a cementing tie between all nationalities,” an assertion that some would dispute and that other would read in their own way.
He announced this week that the republic government now has registered “about 1300 Cossacks” who are organized in 23 Cossack societies and that Makhachkala is offering them subsidies and land as part of a five-year program to revive the Cossack community there. Moreover, republic ataman Nikolay Spirin now serves as a government advisor.
Historically relations between the Cossacks and most Daghetanis have been good, Enver Kisriyev, a Caucasus specialist at the Russian Academy of Sciences says, but since the collapse of the USSR, the Cossacks there have pushed for the separation of the northern regions of Daghestan and their inclusion in a revived Cossack host territory, something Daghestanis oppose.
A significant portion of those territories had been populated by ethnic Russians in the past, but most of the Russians have left and the Cossacks would like to move in. That has touched a nerve, Kisriyev says, but he argues that he does not expect any conflicts, especially if the activities of the Cossacks are closely coordinated by the government.
But Kisriyev’s expectations may be too optimistic given that ethnic battalions in the MVD are formed at exactly the same time. There is a risk that such units could come into conflict with each other either by accident or by the design of ethnic leaders, and even the prospect of such a possibility must be worrisome in Makhachkala and Moscow.
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