Paul Goble
Staunton, November 12 – Many people were unhappy that the just completed Russian census did not include a question of religious affiliation, something that the Moscow Patriarchate and some other religious leaders opposed doing because such a question would have limited their ability to equate ethnicity and religion.
Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church has routinely insisted that a minimum of 80 percent of the population of the Russian Federation is Orthodox because ethnic Russians formed roughly that percentage in the 2002 census and argued that the total number of Muslims in that country cannot be more than the 14 percent historically “Islamic” nationalities formed in that count.
Such an approach clearly distorts the situation in two ways. On the one hand, it ignores the sizeable percentage of the population that is atheist or agnostic, the result of the impact of Soviet anti-religious efforts and the forces of modernization which have detached many in that country from their traditional faiths.
And on the other, it ignores those from one faith or one “ethnic religion” who have converted to another, the very possibility of which some in the Moscow Patriarchate have sought to deny or at least minimize, especially in the case of ethnic Russians who for one reason or another have converted to Islam.
Lacking census data, analysts have adopted a variety of strategies in order to determine the relative size of the communities of followers of Russian Orthodoxy, Christianity more generally, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. And one of the most intriguing to date is offered by a Muslim official from Khabarovsk (www.islam.ru/pressclub/analitika/mnogopar/).
Because people who join online social networks are given the opportunity to declare their religious affiliation, Khamza Kuznetsov and his colleagues from the regional Muslim organization Al-Furkan say, the records of the Russian “V kontakte” social network provide important clues on the religious attachments of Russian citizens now.
In the line about “religious views,” Kuzentsov says, they counted numerous variants for each of the four traditional religions as well as declarations like “I believe,” “I don’t believe,” “atheist,” and “not.” At the same time, he acknowledges only a relatively small percentage of Russians using this network bothered to fill in this line.
As of October 25, he says, there were 51,747,055 people registered on the “V kontakte” network for the Russian Federation Most of them were young, many of the respondents “hid” their responses to the questions the organizers of the network posed, and still others simply ignored the “religious views” line.
Nonetheless, nearly 10 million – roughly one in five of the total – provided information on religious affiliation or lack thereof that the Al Furkan analysts were able to gain access to. They found that 3,381,643 declared themselves Orthodox, 1,269,376 Christian, 839.300 Muslim, 93,086 Jewish, 197,037 Buddhist, 815,523 atheists, and 3,203,989 believers in God in general.
That means that in this network, there are about 5.5 times as many Christians, although only four times as many Orthodox, as Muslims. And if one projects those figures on the Russian Federation as a whole, that would mean, Kuznetsov suggests, that there are approximately 21 million Muslim believers, not counting 11 million Muslim immigrant workers.
For Khabarovsk kray, the figures derived from “V kontakte” were 7,566 Orthodox, 3,427 Christians, 403 Muslims, 143 Jews, 26 Buddhists, and 4,990 atheists. Extrapolating from these numbers, Kuznetsov suggested, there are approximately 15,000 indigenous Muslims in the kray, not counting perhaps 8,000 Muslim immigrant workers.
As Kuznetsov acknowledges, “some will doubt the utility of these data or say that theswe figures do not reflect the real situation, but on the whole, these numbers [because representatives of various religions have equal access to the Internet] give an opportunity at least approximately to present a confessional picture of the country,” something few other measures do.
Kuznetsov, himself an ethnic Russian who converted to Islam, argues that his approach is useful in estimating the number of people like himself. Using “V kontakte” data, he suggests that there is one ethnic Russian Muslim for every 700 citizens of the Russian Federation. That would mean there are approximately 200,000 ethnic Russian Muslims.
While such converts may be more inclined to make use of social networks than others and thus the ratio may be smaller, the number Kuznetsov proposes, one far higher than any Russian Muslim activist has ever offered, is certain to disturb many Russians and Russian officials who fear “Russian Muslims” could carry out terrorist acts more easily than others.
Friday, November 12, 2010
Window on Eurasia: More Russians Now Moving to Ukraine than Ukrainians to Russia, World Bank Suggests
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 12 – Russians moving to Ukraine and Ukrainians moving to Russia dominate what is “the second most active channel of peaceful migration,” ranking behind only the influx of workers from Mexico into the United States, according to a new World Bank report on “Migration and Monetary Transfers.”
But what is striking and perhaps for many counter-intuitive is that the number of Russian Federation citizens moving to Ukraine exceeds the number of Ukrainian citizens moving in the opposite direction, with the former ranking second behind the Mexican-US channel and the latter ranking third (www.nr2.ru/moskow/308489.html).
According to the World Bank report, there are currently 12.2 million migrants in the Russian Federation, many of them Ukrainians, and 5.3 million migrants in Ukraine, a large share of them Russian citizens, flows that have sparked widespread discussion and some conflicts in both countries.
The fact that more Russians are moving to Ukraine than Ukrainians to Russia, however, does not strike some experts with whom the “Novy region” news agency spoke. Yevgeny Minchenko, a political scientist, said that there are many reasons which explain the motivations of both groups.
First of all, “Kyiv is a more compact and comfortable city,” and compared with Moscow, there is “significantly less aggression. Moreover and perhaps especially important, Ukrainians retain “a high level of tolerance for Russians,” all the more so because so many people in the Ukrainian capital use Russian as their first language.
In addition, Minchenko continued, Russians are pleased by the absence of “people from the Caucasus” in Ukraine, at least compared with major Russian Federation cities, and they like the fact that “in Ukraine competition in politics and business at least for now is being preserved,” qualities that he says are especially attractive for middle managers and consultants.
At present, the political scientist continued, “the demand for business and political consulting is “an order higher than in Russia,” and Russian consultants are often viewed as “more professional” than their local competitors and thus often win the best contracts and positions.
In Russia, “the fashion for American political consultants has passed, but our specialists enjoy demand,” Minchenko said. “Plus in Ukraine, it is quite easy to open one’s own business,” although at present there are fears that the tax code changes that the new government plans may change that. If so, there could be a reversal of the flow of these migrants.
And Minchenko adds one final reason Russians are moving to Ukraine. Many who are doing so, he said, are attracted by Ukrainian women and many of the migrants marry them. “Among my acquaintances,” Minchenko said, “there is an enormous number of mixed marriages,” especially with women from Kyiv.
But not all analysts agree with the World Bank’s findings or with Minchenko’s explanations. Aleksey Mitrofanov, a Russian politician, suggested that the World Bank’s report was based on “a primitive method of accounting” and should not be taken seriously because it misstates reality.
For example, he said, imagine that “an individual three years ago comes from Ukraine to work in Russia. He worked there and in this year returned to his Motherland. By [the Bank’s] statistics, he is included in migration from Russia to Ukraine,” even though in fact, he is a Ukrainian going home.
“Ukrainians, just like Caucasians and Tatars, return to their little motherland,” he insisted, moving to make money but then desirous of going home. That is a contrast to the situation in Russia where once an individual leaves his village, he tries to forget it “like a bad dream” and never plans to go back.
Mitrofanov suggested that the number of political consultants involved in this migration exchange was microscopically small and he disputed the notion that doing business in Ukraine was easier. Moreover, he suggested, one needs to recognize that many of the “Russians” going to Ukraine have “Ukrainian roots” and so are also simply returning to their motherland.
.
Staunton, November 12 – Russians moving to Ukraine and Ukrainians moving to Russia dominate what is “the second most active channel of peaceful migration,” ranking behind only the influx of workers from Mexico into the United States, according to a new World Bank report on “Migration and Monetary Transfers.”
But what is striking and perhaps for many counter-intuitive is that the number of Russian Federation citizens moving to Ukraine exceeds the number of Ukrainian citizens moving in the opposite direction, with the former ranking second behind the Mexican-US channel and the latter ranking third (www.nr2.ru/moskow/308489.html).
According to the World Bank report, there are currently 12.2 million migrants in the Russian Federation, many of them Ukrainians, and 5.3 million migrants in Ukraine, a large share of them Russian citizens, flows that have sparked widespread discussion and some conflicts in both countries.
The fact that more Russians are moving to Ukraine than Ukrainians to Russia, however, does not strike some experts with whom the “Novy region” news agency spoke. Yevgeny Minchenko, a political scientist, said that there are many reasons which explain the motivations of both groups.
First of all, “Kyiv is a more compact and comfortable city,” and compared with Moscow, there is “significantly less aggression. Moreover and perhaps especially important, Ukrainians retain “a high level of tolerance for Russians,” all the more so because so many people in the Ukrainian capital use Russian as their first language.
In addition, Minchenko continued, Russians are pleased by the absence of “people from the Caucasus” in Ukraine, at least compared with major Russian Federation cities, and they like the fact that “in Ukraine competition in politics and business at least for now is being preserved,” qualities that he says are especially attractive for middle managers and consultants.
At present, the political scientist continued, “the demand for business and political consulting is “an order higher than in Russia,” and Russian consultants are often viewed as “more professional” than their local competitors and thus often win the best contracts and positions.
In Russia, “the fashion for American political consultants has passed, but our specialists enjoy demand,” Minchenko said. “Plus in Ukraine, it is quite easy to open one’s own business,” although at present there are fears that the tax code changes that the new government plans may change that. If so, there could be a reversal of the flow of these migrants.
And Minchenko adds one final reason Russians are moving to Ukraine. Many who are doing so, he said, are attracted by Ukrainian women and many of the migrants marry them. “Among my acquaintances,” Minchenko said, “there is an enormous number of mixed marriages,” especially with women from Kyiv.
But not all analysts agree with the World Bank’s findings or with Minchenko’s explanations. Aleksey Mitrofanov, a Russian politician, suggested that the World Bank’s report was based on “a primitive method of accounting” and should not be taken seriously because it misstates reality.
For example, he said, imagine that “an individual three years ago comes from Ukraine to work in Russia. He worked there and in this year returned to his Motherland. By [the Bank’s] statistics, he is included in migration from Russia to Ukraine,” even though in fact, he is a Ukrainian going home.
“Ukrainians, just like Caucasians and Tatars, return to their little motherland,” he insisted, moving to make money but then desirous of going home. That is a contrast to the situation in Russia where once an individual leaves his village, he tries to forget it “like a bad dream” and never plans to go back.
Mitrofanov suggested that the number of political consultants involved in this migration exchange was microscopically small and he disputed the notion that doing business in Ukraine was easier. Moreover, he suggested, one needs to recognize that many of the “Russians” going to Ukraine have “Ukrainian roots” and so are also simply returning to their motherland.
.
Window on Eurasia: Kremlin Blocks Unification of Moscow City and Oblast, Effectively Killing Putin’s Amalgamation Plan -- at Least for Now
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 12 – Moscow city and Moscow oblast officials will work more closely and coordinate their activities, according to Russian press reports, but there is “no talk in the Kremlin” about combining them into a single federal subject as many had expected when Sergey Sobyanin replaced Yury Luzhkov as the city’s mayor.
And while coordination between the two may serve many of the same purposes, especially given that Sobyanin is likely to play the dominant role over oblast governor Boris Gromov, the decision of the leadership not to go forward effectively kills further regional amalgamation efforts until at least after the 2012 presidential vote.
Beyond Moscow, that affects St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast first of all and then those smaller non-Russian republics Vladimir Putin had sought to unite with larger and predominantly ethnic Russian regions. But it may be read as a victory for President Dmitry Medvedev even though the media stressed Putin opposes uniting the city and oblast as well.
As “Vedomosti” reported today, Mayor Sobyanin and Governor Gromov met in the latter’s residence, the first time that has happened for many years but something that they pledged to make a regular event. And the two agreed to “synchronize” their efforts, especially in the transporation area (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/249429/moskva_bez_oblasti).
But what they did not discuss was “the fusion” of the city and oblast, despite widespread expectations among commentators in recent weeks that precisely that issue would be on the table. “On the contrary,” the Moscow paper reported, “several Kremlin officials asserted that this question is closed.”
Besides his obvious ambition, Sobyanin had been widely assumed interested in combining the two federal subjects because his “main achievement” while governor of Tyumen was the conversion of the Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts into donor subjects in a quiet way that did not disturb business interests.
The Kremlin officials with whom “Vedomosti” talked said that the Moscow mayor would not be given permission to absorb the oblast. According to the paper, “both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are skeptical about the idea of combining” these federal subjects.
“This is a collegial decision,” the Kremlin sources added, “the theme of fusion is not to be raised anymore.” But if both Medvedev and Putin agreed on this point, their reasons almost certainly were very different. Medvedev appears to believe that redrawing borders within the Russian Federation gains little or nothing and is not worth pursuing for its own sake.
Putin in contrast is the primary advocate of regional amalgamation. His reported opposition to this in the case of Moscow city and Moscow oblast may thus have more to do with a political calculation that the formation of such a mega-region could end by making Sobyanin a formidable political force in his own right, perhaps the third most powerful official in Russia.
“Especially at the present time,” another Kremlin official said, any talk of combining units is not to be allowed. “Until the presidential elections, no one wants to create a megaregion or increase dramatically the power of Sobyanin.” But that leaves open the question of what will happen after 2012, the paper said.
According to one group of Kremlin insiders, “the question [of combining at least these two federal subjects] is closed forever.” Taking that step in their minds would be counter-productive. But “according to another” group, “the question after the elections could be raised again.”
At the same time, one “federal official,” not further identified, told the paper that “fantastic projects are being considered,” including one that would divide up Moscow oblast in “a capital” subject and “the remainder.” But it seems unlikely that such a project could gain ground because of the constitutional requirements for a referendum.
Indeed, “Vedomosti” suggested, the only thing that might push the two federal subjects to combine sooner would be the adoption of LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s bill to allow the Duma and the Federation Council to change the borders of a region or regions without particular reference to what the people or leaders of those regions want or think.
Staunton, November 12 – Moscow city and Moscow oblast officials will work more closely and coordinate their activities, according to Russian press reports, but there is “no talk in the Kremlin” about combining them into a single federal subject as many had expected when Sergey Sobyanin replaced Yury Luzhkov as the city’s mayor.
And while coordination between the two may serve many of the same purposes, especially given that Sobyanin is likely to play the dominant role over oblast governor Boris Gromov, the decision of the leadership not to go forward effectively kills further regional amalgamation efforts until at least after the 2012 presidential vote.
Beyond Moscow, that affects St. Petersburg and Leningrad oblast first of all and then those smaller non-Russian republics Vladimir Putin had sought to unite with larger and predominantly ethnic Russian regions. But it may be read as a victory for President Dmitry Medvedev even though the media stressed Putin opposes uniting the city and oblast as well.
As “Vedomosti” reported today, Mayor Sobyanin and Governor Gromov met in the latter’s residence, the first time that has happened for many years but something that they pledged to make a regular event. And the two agreed to “synchronize” their efforts, especially in the transporation area (www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/249429/moskva_bez_oblasti).
But what they did not discuss was “the fusion” of the city and oblast, despite widespread expectations among commentators in recent weeks that precisely that issue would be on the table. “On the contrary,” the Moscow paper reported, “several Kremlin officials asserted that this question is closed.”
Besides his obvious ambition, Sobyanin had been widely assumed interested in combining the two federal subjects because his “main achievement” while governor of Tyumen was the conversion of the Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamal-Nenets autonomous districts into donor subjects in a quiet way that did not disturb business interests.
The Kremlin officials with whom “Vedomosti” talked said that the Moscow mayor would not be given permission to absorb the oblast. According to the paper, “both President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are skeptical about the idea of combining” these federal subjects.
“This is a collegial decision,” the Kremlin sources added, “the theme of fusion is not to be raised anymore.” But if both Medvedev and Putin agreed on this point, their reasons almost certainly were very different. Medvedev appears to believe that redrawing borders within the Russian Federation gains little or nothing and is not worth pursuing for its own sake.
Putin in contrast is the primary advocate of regional amalgamation. His reported opposition to this in the case of Moscow city and Moscow oblast may thus have more to do with a political calculation that the formation of such a mega-region could end by making Sobyanin a formidable political force in his own right, perhaps the third most powerful official in Russia.
“Especially at the present time,” another Kremlin official said, any talk of combining units is not to be allowed. “Until the presidential elections, no one wants to create a megaregion or increase dramatically the power of Sobyanin.” But that leaves open the question of what will happen after 2012, the paper said.
According to one group of Kremlin insiders, “the question [of combining at least these two federal subjects] is closed forever.” Taking that step in their minds would be counter-productive. But “according to another” group, “the question after the elections could be raised again.”
At the same time, one “federal official,” not further identified, told the paper that “fantastic projects are being considered,” including one that would divide up Moscow oblast in “a capital” subject and “the remainder.” But it seems unlikely that such a project could gain ground because of the constitutional requirements for a referendum.
Indeed, “Vedomosti” suggested, the only thing that might push the two federal subjects to combine sooner would be the adoption of LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s bill to allow the Duma and the Federation Council to change the borders of a region or regions without particular reference to what the people or leaders of those regions want or think.
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