Paul Goble
Staunton, November 10 – The development of regionalism, according to a Yekaterinburg expert, is “the only path to democracy in Russia,” an observation that challenges both the powers that be and the opposition in Moscow but one that reflects renewed interest in that idea not only in the Urals region but in other parts of the country as well.
In an interview given to the National Democratic Alliance, Fedor Krasheninnikov, director of the Yekaterinburg Institute of Development and Modernization of Social Ties, argues that the “main task” Russians have now is to “return to the democracy” which “Putin’s authoritarianism” has undermined (nazdem.info/texts/178).
But coming up with ideas and a strategy is hard to do at the national level because the powers that be are generally able to prevent the kind of country-wide communication that genuine political parties and other movements require for success. And that means that regionally-based groups have a special role to play.
Thus, the Urals regional expert and activist continues, “regionalism in Russia is certainly the only path to a multi-party system and democracy because the very idea that in such an enormous country, people from the Pacific ocean to the Baltic Sea could unit around any concrete things is an absurdity.”
Attempting to come up with a program for such an enormous space, he continues, leads to a collection of “general phrases” rather than a statement of real interests. “For the majority of people,”Krasheninnikov says, “the interests of their region is the maximum for which they are prepared really to live with.”
When people start talking about “’the fate of the Motherland’ and such like,” that is “already in the realm of mythology – that is, a contemporary individual perhaps is ready at one point to repeat the slogans he has heard somewhere, but emotionally he is far from attached to them.”
For most Russians, “in reality, the Kurile islands or the day to day life of Daghestan is to put it mildly a matter of indifference. And this is not so bad if people love their district and their town and seek for it a better life [because] this is the only path of getting the entire country out of the dead end it finds itself in now.”
Consequently, regionalism should be supportered rather than opposed in the name of “’the united and indivisible’” country. The reason for that is obvious: “small states are completely able to find a place for themselves in the world economy and guarantee their citizens a worthy level of life.”
Living well and happily and having health children for whom there are good life chances are, Krasheninnikov continues, “far more important [to the people] than [all talk by their leaders about] some sort of incomprehensible geopolitical ambitions of an enormous, poor and angry country.”
Asked about the relationship of democracy and “civilized nationalism,” Krasheninnikov said that for himself “as for every Russian intellectual, this is a complicated and to a great extent personal issue.” But now he said he was convinced that “the idea of enlightened European liberal nationalism through occupy its place among the basic ideas of society.”
“Unfortunately,” he continued, “for long years, nationalism in our country was part of the imperial chauvinist complex of ideas” and closely linked to authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Today, Russian nationalism must break from that, from “great power chauvinism, from dislike of Europe and the United States, and from obscurantism and clericalism.”
Regions like the Greater Urals, he says, can play a big role in that. People in that region he said ar “more severe and concrete” than people elsewhere. They do not love beautiful words nad value people for their deeds.” Many of its residents trace their ancestry back to exiles and they are skeptical about the state and want to do things on their own.
Such attitudes can in and of themselves be a bulwark against the centralizing views of both the powers that be in Moscow and opposition parties there who often are just as hostile to the regions as are those they oppose at the center. And these attitudes can be a basis for shifting away from the imperialism of so many in Moscow.
Urals people, Krasheninnikov continues, cannot understand “the hysteria around the Caucasus” or “round Ukraine and the Baltic states.” For them, “the Mediterranean shores of Turkey are much closer than Crimea, Abkhazia and other former all-union resorts. And by the way, in the referendum about the preservation of the USSR in 1991,” they voted against.
After the Soviet Union disintegrated, the people of the region pushed for the formation of a Urals Republic not as many think as the first step toward independence from Russia but rather as a means of ensuring that Russia would not remain hypercentralized and thus not become a flourishing democracy.
Now, Krasheninnikov, when people see how their rights are being ignored by Moscow,
the idea of a Urals Republic “is experiencing a certain renaissance.” But unfortunately, the
achievements of Uraltsy in the early 1990s have been lost and the challenges they face now are greater (news.politsovet.ru/n_even.asp?article=32784, www.rus-obr.ru/days/8479).
What is at stake, he concludes, is not just the fate of the Urals but that of Russia as a whole. “We have already seen how twice the zombies of empire have risen from the grave – after 1917 Lenin and Stalin revivedit, and after 1991, Yeltsin and Putin did. One must not allow it to happen a third time.”
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russia Likely to Fall Apart -- and for Many of the Same Reasons the USSR Did, Moscow Analyst Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 10 – The disintegration of the Soviet empire is not over, according to a Moscow analyst, and the forces which broke that state apart 20 years ago are now shaking the largest surviving “fragment” in ways that suggest the Russian Federation will disintegrate in much the same way in the relatively near future.
In a two-part article, journalist and commentator Andrey Gusev surveys the factors which played a key role in the demise of the USSR and then considers the ways in which similar factors are having a parallel impact on the Russian Federation now (shkolazhizni.ru/archive/0/n-41016/ and shkolazhizni.ru/archive/0/n-41017/).
“It is useless to struggle with historical processes,” Gusev argues, noting that “the 21st century is not the time of empires” and adding for good measure that “the final stage” of the disintegration of the Soviet empire has “still not completed,” although its end is “not all that far in terms of time.”
In 1986, “a knockout blow” was delivered to the Soviet Unioin when Arab countries increased the production of oil and the price of a barrel fell from 32 US dollars to eight dollars. Now, the price of oil is much higher, but if it fell to 60 US dollars a barrel, the Russian federal budget would move into deficit and if it declined to 40, “the effect” on Russia would be similar.
But that is only one of the parallels between the Soviet Union before its collapse and the Russian Federation now. There is the matter of corruption of the elites, the extraordinary difference in incomes between Moscow and the provinces, demographic collapse, the situation in the North Caucasus, ethnic and religious imbalances, and the number of dissidents.
In addition to the demographic decline of the Russian nation, there is the reality that the influx of Chinese in the Far East means that the share of Russians there is approaching 50 percent. “The Soviet Union collapsed when the share of ethnic Russians in the population fell to 50 percent. Now, in the Far East, the situation is very similar.”
The situation in the North Caucasus, Gusev continues, is also reminiscent of problems that the Soviet Union faced and that are today in many ways worse. “Sooner or later the Muslim forcdes in the Caucasus will unite,” and when this happens, there will be “a domino effect” elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Indeed, Gusev suggests, “if in the south of the current Russian territory as a result of explosive events were to appear a monolithic Islamic state, then this would become the signal for separatisms throughout all of Russia,” a possibility most people in Moscow and in the West are loathe to acknowledge.
Also important as a factor in the demise of the USSR and the threat to the continued existence of the Russian Federation are the number of political dissidents. Such people played a major role in the destruction of the Soviet Union,” Gusev says, and “there is no doubt the growth in the number of prisoners of conscience in contemporary Russia may lead to a similar result.”
Moreover, just as at the end of Soviet times, the current Russian leadership appears to be living “in a certain virtual world where the real problems of the state are subordinated to happy illusions.” That led Moscow leaders then and now to act like Marie Antoinette and suggest that if the people lack bread, they should eat cake instead.
Talking about the future of the Russian Federation in this way is certain to be dismissed in exactly the same way that Andrey Amalrik was when he wrote his classic “Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?” The USSR passed that date, but it collapsed in 1991 and many then saw the dissident as a prophet.
Just how Russia will collapse is uncertain. Many scenarios have been offered. “Howver, just as in the times of the USSR, these predictions are taken seriously by very few with most people preferring to bury their heads in the sand and call the authors of such scenarios short-sighted marginals.”
But if one looks at the facts, Gusev suggests, the prediction of disintegration does not appear so far-fetched. The federal districts look like potential countries, and places like the North Caucasus, Kaliningrad and the Kuriles are already Russia’s “internal abroad,” just as the Baltic states were 30 years ago.
Indeed, any objective consideration of the situation, Gusev says, leads to the conclusion that “Russia is approaching the completion of its history as an integral state” and that by 2050 Moscovia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East will be their own state formations, separate and autonomous from Moscow.
But there are three things to remember about this process. First, the end of the Russian empire won’t mean the end of the Russian language world. Second, the disintegration of the Russian state may in fact create conditions in which Russians will flourish more than they do now. And third, these new states will be less threatening to their residents than Russia is now.
This outcome might be prevented if the Russian Federation were to become a genuine federation, but the very worst outcome for “the salvation of Russia” would be “the formation of a unitary police state.” Such an approach would likely keep things together for a certain time, but in the end, it would dissolve in violent clashes.
“States, just like individuals or civilizations … are born, live sometimes many centuries and then alas age and die,” Gusev concludes. Sometime in the future, when historians consider the disintegration of Russia, they will be able to list the causes. One can only hope that they will not see these things pointing to the opening of a new Time of Troubles.
Staunton, November 10 – The disintegration of the Soviet empire is not over, according to a Moscow analyst, and the forces which broke that state apart 20 years ago are now shaking the largest surviving “fragment” in ways that suggest the Russian Federation will disintegrate in much the same way in the relatively near future.
In a two-part article, journalist and commentator Andrey Gusev surveys the factors which played a key role in the demise of the USSR and then considers the ways in which similar factors are having a parallel impact on the Russian Federation now (shkolazhizni.ru/archive/0/n-41016/ and shkolazhizni.ru/archive/0/n-41017/).
“It is useless to struggle with historical processes,” Gusev argues, noting that “the 21st century is not the time of empires” and adding for good measure that “the final stage” of the disintegration of the Soviet empire has “still not completed,” although its end is “not all that far in terms of time.”
In 1986, “a knockout blow” was delivered to the Soviet Unioin when Arab countries increased the production of oil and the price of a barrel fell from 32 US dollars to eight dollars. Now, the price of oil is much higher, but if it fell to 60 US dollars a barrel, the Russian federal budget would move into deficit and if it declined to 40, “the effect” on Russia would be similar.
But that is only one of the parallels between the Soviet Union before its collapse and the Russian Federation now. There is the matter of corruption of the elites, the extraordinary difference in incomes between Moscow and the provinces, demographic collapse, the situation in the North Caucasus, ethnic and religious imbalances, and the number of dissidents.
In addition to the demographic decline of the Russian nation, there is the reality that the influx of Chinese in the Far East means that the share of Russians there is approaching 50 percent. “The Soviet Union collapsed when the share of ethnic Russians in the population fell to 50 percent. Now, in the Far East, the situation is very similar.”
The situation in the North Caucasus, Gusev continues, is also reminiscent of problems that the Soviet Union faced and that are today in many ways worse. “Sooner or later the Muslim forcdes in the Caucasus will unite,” and when this happens, there will be “a domino effect” elsewhere in the Russian Federation.
Indeed, Gusev suggests, “if in the south of the current Russian territory as a result of explosive events were to appear a monolithic Islamic state, then this would become the signal for separatisms throughout all of Russia,” a possibility most people in Moscow and in the West are loathe to acknowledge.
Also important as a factor in the demise of the USSR and the threat to the continued existence of the Russian Federation are the number of political dissidents. Such people played a major role in the destruction of the Soviet Union,” Gusev says, and “there is no doubt the growth in the number of prisoners of conscience in contemporary Russia may lead to a similar result.”
Moreover, just as at the end of Soviet times, the current Russian leadership appears to be living “in a certain virtual world where the real problems of the state are subordinated to happy illusions.” That led Moscow leaders then and now to act like Marie Antoinette and suggest that if the people lack bread, they should eat cake instead.
Talking about the future of the Russian Federation in this way is certain to be dismissed in exactly the same way that Andrey Amalrik was when he wrote his classic “Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?” The USSR passed that date, but it collapsed in 1991 and many then saw the dissident as a prophet.
Just how Russia will collapse is uncertain. Many scenarios have been offered. “Howver, just as in the times of the USSR, these predictions are taken seriously by very few with most people preferring to bury their heads in the sand and call the authors of such scenarios short-sighted marginals.”
But if one looks at the facts, Gusev suggests, the prediction of disintegration does not appear so far-fetched. The federal districts look like potential countries, and places like the North Caucasus, Kaliningrad and the Kuriles are already Russia’s “internal abroad,” just as the Baltic states were 30 years ago.
Indeed, any objective consideration of the situation, Gusev says, leads to the conclusion that “Russia is approaching the completion of its history as an integral state” and that by 2050 Moscovia, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East will be their own state formations, separate and autonomous from Moscow.
But there are three things to remember about this process. First, the end of the Russian empire won’t mean the end of the Russian language world. Second, the disintegration of the Russian state may in fact create conditions in which Russians will flourish more than they do now. And third, these new states will be less threatening to their residents than Russia is now.
This outcome might be prevented if the Russian Federation were to become a genuine federation, but the very worst outcome for “the salvation of Russia” would be “the formation of a unitary police state.” Such an approach would likely keep things together for a certain time, but in the end, it would dissolve in violent clashes.
“States, just like individuals or civilizations … are born, live sometimes many centuries and then alas age and die,” Gusev concludes. Sometime in the future, when historians consider the disintegration of Russia, they will be able to list the causes. One can only hope that they will not see these things pointing to the opening of a new Time of Troubles.
Window on Eurasia: Voronezh MVD Collecting Detailed Information on Muslims
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 10 – Interior Ministry officials in Voronezh oblast are now collecting detailed information about the Islamic community there, a development that frightens many Muslims around the Russian Federation not only because of its invasiveness but also because Voronezh has often been a bellwether for the policies of other Russian regions.
The religious affairs organization, Portal-Credo.ru, reported yesterday that the deputy chief of one of the departments of the Voronezh militia had sent a letter to the leader of the local Muslim organization requesting details about the activities of the community and its individual members (portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=80721).
Arguing that the collection of such information about Muslims, as opposed to other religious groups, was necessary for “the study of the operational situation of the Central District of the city of Voronezh,” the milita asked where the community meets and for “personal data about those who conduct religious services and their membership in various trends of Islam.”
In addition, the militia asked the local Muslim leadership to provide information about the foreign ties of Muslims there, about the education the leadership had received in Russia and abroad, and in particular, judging from the way the question was asked Portal-Credo.ru suggests, about ethnic Russians who have become Muslims.
The militia said it wanted to know “the number of persons from among the indigenous population who traditionally confessed Christianity,” a convoluted formulation that indicates that the powers that be are especially frightened by the number of ethnic Russian Muslims and that they accept the notions of “ethnic Orthodox” and “ethnic Muslim.”
However much such an inquiry might appear to be justified on grounds of national security, it clearly violates the provisions of the Russian constitution and suggests that at least some in Moscow have decided to pursue a policy of open discrimination against Muslims, something that almost certainly will backfire.
In the less than 24 hours since this story was posted by Portal-Credo.ru, it has been picked up by almost all major Muslim websites in the Russian Federation, many of whom have suggested that this represents an attack on the rights of Russia’s Muslims and promised to try to force the Voronezh officials to back down.
It is possible, even likely that this effort is a testing of what people will put up with, all the more so given that this test took place far from the Russian capital and during the November holidays when most Russians were focusing on other issues. But unless Moscow disowns the Voronezh effort, other regions may copy it, and inter-religious tensions will only increase.
Staunton, November 10 – Interior Ministry officials in Voronezh oblast are now collecting detailed information about the Islamic community there, a development that frightens many Muslims around the Russian Federation not only because of its invasiveness but also because Voronezh has often been a bellwether for the policies of other Russian regions.
The religious affairs organization, Portal-Credo.ru, reported yesterday that the deputy chief of one of the departments of the Voronezh militia had sent a letter to the leader of the local Muslim organization requesting details about the activities of the community and its individual members (portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=80721).
Arguing that the collection of such information about Muslims, as opposed to other religious groups, was necessary for “the study of the operational situation of the Central District of the city of Voronezh,” the milita asked where the community meets and for “personal data about those who conduct religious services and their membership in various trends of Islam.”
In addition, the militia asked the local Muslim leadership to provide information about the foreign ties of Muslims there, about the education the leadership had received in Russia and abroad, and in particular, judging from the way the question was asked Portal-Credo.ru suggests, about ethnic Russians who have become Muslims.
The militia said it wanted to know “the number of persons from among the indigenous population who traditionally confessed Christianity,” a convoluted formulation that indicates that the powers that be are especially frightened by the number of ethnic Russian Muslims and that they accept the notions of “ethnic Orthodox” and “ethnic Muslim.”
However much such an inquiry might appear to be justified on grounds of national security, it clearly violates the provisions of the Russian constitution and suggests that at least some in Moscow have decided to pursue a policy of open discrimination against Muslims, something that almost certainly will backfire.
In the less than 24 hours since this story was posted by Portal-Credo.ru, it has been picked up by almost all major Muslim websites in the Russian Federation, many of whom have suggested that this represents an attack on the rights of Russia’s Muslims and promised to try to force the Voronezh officials to back down.
It is possible, even likely that this effort is a testing of what people will put up with, all the more so given that this test took place far from the Russian capital and during the November holidays when most Russians were focusing on other issues. But unless Moscow disowns the Voronezh effort, other regions may copy it, and inter-religious tensions will only increase.
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