Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – The share of residents in the Russian Federation who did not take part either directly or indirectly in the just-completed national census more than doubled from the 2002 enumeration, rising from five percent to 11 percent, with only slightly more than half of all Russians assumed the new count as accurate, according to the results of a new poll.
The All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), a survey organization widely thought to have close ties with the powers that be, interviewed 1600 people in 46 federal subjects October 30-31 concerning their experiences with the census that had concluded in most places the week before (wciom.ru/index.php?id=195&uid=13982).
According to the VTsIOM survey, 65 percent of those surveyed said they had been personally contacted by census takers, 11 percent fewer than said they had been interviewed during the course of the 2002 count. Twenty-two percent more had their census information provided by relatives, but the share which did not take part at all rose from five percent to 11 percent.
Elderly people were more likely to be interviewed than younger ones and residents of the Urals and Siberia more than those of other regions, VTsIOM found. Those whose data was supplied by relatives tended to be younger – especially in the 18 to 24-year-old cohort --and from the southern regions of the country.
Of those contacted, 92 percent told VTsIOM that they had been surveyed at their residences. Four percent said they had visited census offices over all, with that figure rising to 11 percent in Moscow and in St. Petersburg. And two percent of those questioned by VTsIOM said they had provided their census information over the telephone.
According to the VTsIOM sample, 58 percent of Russian residents said that they “do not doubt” that the census results will “reliably reflect the situation in the country,” but 29 percent took the opposition point of view with skeptics especially numerous in the two capitals (43 percent), and those who did not participate (68 percent).
Given the problems that surfaced after the 2002 count, which failed to meet international standards for a census by failing to contact personally at least 90 percent of the estimated sample, it is notable that the VTsIOM poll suggests that Russian census takers again failed to meet that standard.
Indeed, many people in the blogosphere have expressed skepticism about all these numbers, and the fact that suspicions are so high in Moscow and St. Petersburg and among those who declared to VTsIOM that they did not take part guarantees that as more results from this enumeration come out over the next two years, many of them will be disputed.
Given how important the census is for everything ranging from budget transfers to intra-Russia haj quotas, those disputes are likely to cast a shadow over this count just as dark as the one that still hangs over the 2002 census. And that in turn means that many in the Russian Federation will continue to believe that the last accurate census was the last, 1989, Soviet one.
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Window on Eurasia: ‘Every Second Russian is a Skinhead at Heart,’ Moscow Editor Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – Russia has relatively few active skinheads (150) and neo-Nazi groups (150) for a country of its size, a Russian Internet editor says, but Moscow’s failure to address ethnic issues has created a situation in which polls suggest “every second Russian is a skinhead at heart,” thus providing implicit support for the nationalists of the radical right.
In a comment posted on the Osobaya bukhva site today, Viktor Tsvetkov notes that the Russian Federation is not the only country having problems with tolerance and multi-culturalism or the integration of ethnically and religious distinct immigrant groups into the broader society (www.specletter.com/politika/2010-11-09/kazhdyi-vtoroi-rossijanin-v-dushe-skinhed.html).
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent suggestion that multi-culturalism “isn’t working,” that Germans are attached to Christian values,” and that “those who do not accept them have no place here” had particular resonance in Russia because of the large number of Muslims both indigenous and immigrant there.
In Europe, “after World War II, nationalism was banned from big politics for a long time, but now,” Tsvetkov points out, “formerly taboo slogans are being taken up” again and without the shame or restraint of every times. Europeans still say they “love” or “tolerate” all people just as they did, but increasingly they are demanding that immigrants do all the adapting.
It would be strange if Russia did not face a similar challenge. “The roots of the conflict are very similar: the clash of various cultures and mutual lack of understanding on the background of economic problems.” And it would be equally strange if Russians did not react in many of the same ways Europeans are, the Osobaya bukhva editor says.
But there is an important difference. Russia has never been a mono-ethnic country, and many of the minorities that so many ethnic Russians are now angry about are indigenous nations rather than immigrants. Moreover, Russian attitudes appear to be leading the country into an absolute “dead end” given the failure of the powers that be to address it adequately.
Tsvetskov points to the ethnic clashes in the military unit near Perm and the shooting of a North Caucasian dancing in the middle of the night in Stavropol to show that officials clearly don’t know what to do. In the first case, they tried to suppress information about it, and in the second, they ignored the multiple factors at work.
This “short-sightedness and indifference” is obvious to everyone, the editor continued. “Doesn’t the Defense Ministry know that where people from the Caucasus republics assemble in a group, they will begin to live as their parents taught them and not as their father-commanders ordered?” And doesn’t the Stavropol militia recognize the way in which dancing in the middle of the night could affect people?
As Tsvetkov notes, Galina Kozhevnikova, the deputy head of the SOVA information-analytic center which tracks ethnic and religious affairs, points out that while the number of skinheads and radical groups is small, “more than half of Russians support neo-Nazi ideas” when it comes to dealing with minorities.
Thus, she continued, “this is a question not of the number of little groups but of the number of people who share neo-nazi views and support xenophobia as a whole because the neo-Nazis in the absence of such attitudes could not exist; they need to operate on the silent support of society” at large.”
Given that environment, Tsvetkov says, “can anyone be surprised by the appearance of demands of our citizens to create ‘an ethnic Russian republic’?” Or at the collection of signature in support of separating out Stavropol kray from the North Caucasus Federal District? “all this is based not on a heightened sense of national self-consciousness but on simple fear.”
Economists and demographers say that Russia needs more immigrants, but Tsvetkov says, there are no visible efforts by the government now to socialize the arrivals and help them fit in, a task especially difficult when Russians don’t want to consider them as people even though they want to hear them cite Pushkin from memory.
“The arguments of those who continue to support the idea of ‘Russia as a family of peoples’ are becoming ever fewer. Anger and lack of understanding, in contrast, are becoming ever greater and greater.” As a result, people are asking “what unites all of us besides state borders?”
And ever more often, Tsvetkov says, “one can hear the response: ‘Nothing.’”
Some Russians are trying to do something about this, but it is unclear whether they can succeed and reverse the current trend. Last week in Sochi, the Multi-National Russia Youth Forum came up with the idea that it is necessary to adopt and apply an “ethical code for multi-national Russia.”
Such a document, the editor continued, would declare Russian society to be “a single social community consisting of representatives of various ethnoses and start out from a recognition of the unqualified right of the individual to freedom of choice of his own ethnic and religious identities.”
Putting that in simpler terms, Tsvetkov says, “it is being suggested that we identify ourselves first of all as citizens of the Russian Federation and then as Russians (Tatars, Buryats and so on), Orthodox (Muslims, Buddhists, and so on)” – a proposal that he suggested represented “a noble undertaking.”
But there are good reasons to think such calls face an uphill battle. “Artificial constructs of citizenship by their significance do not compare with natural forms of identity including nationality and religion” – something that the collapse of the USSR highlighted for all in the post-Soviet region.
“Of course,” Tsvetkov continues, “it is possible to recall the Western model of the supremacy of law over all cultural distinctions and contradictions. However after the acknowledgement of Merkel and the French cleansings of the Roma, this experience too does not look so convincing.”
Keeping things together by force is always a possibility but that approach entails serious costs. Thus, “the method of convincing people remains.” But that is a hard task, especially if the powers that be prefer to ignore what is going on and “every other Russian” sympathizes with those who would oppress religious and ethnic minorities.
Tsetkov’s article is only one of the cries from the heart following the November 4 National Unity Day demonstrations conducted across the Russian Federation by ultra-nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis, some of whom carried Nazi slogans like “Arbeit Macht Frei” (blog.humanrightsfirst.org/2010/11/charged-week-in-russia-skinheads.html).
And while these protests too were relatively small given the size of the country, they are disturbing because they underscore the point Tsvetkov makes: The active extremists are not all that numerous, but the share of the population that sympathizes with at least some of their messages is much larger and seems certain to play a role in Russia’s future.
Staunton, November 9 – Russia has relatively few active skinheads (150) and neo-Nazi groups (150) for a country of its size, a Russian Internet editor says, but Moscow’s failure to address ethnic issues has created a situation in which polls suggest “every second Russian is a skinhead at heart,” thus providing implicit support for the nationalists of the radical right.
In a comment posted on the Osobaya bukhva site today, Viktor Tsvetkov notes that the Russian Federation is not the only country having problems with tolerance and multi-culturalism or the integration of ethnically and religious distinct immigrant groups into the broader society (www.specletter.com/politika/2010-11-09/kazhdyi-vtoroi-rossijanin-v-dushe-skinhed.html).
But German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s recent suggestion that multi-culturalism “isn’t working,” that Germans are attached to Christian values,” and that “those who do not accept them have no place here” had particular resonance in Russia because of the large number of Muslims both indigenous and immigrant there.
In Europe, “after World War II, nationalism was banned from big politics for a long time, but now,” Tsvetkov points out, “formerly taboo slogans are being taken up” again and without the shame or restraint of every times. Europeans still say they “love” or “tolerate” all people just as they did, but increasingly they are demanding that immigrants do all the adapting.
It would be strange if Russia did not face a similar challenge. “The roots of the conflict are very similar: the clash of various cultures and mutual lack of understanding on the background of economic problems.” And it would be equally strange if Russians did not react in many of the same ways Europeans are, the Osobaya bukhva editor says.
But there is an important difference. Russia has never been a mono-ethnic country, and many of the minorities that so many ethnic Russians are now angry about are indigenous nations rather than immigrants. Moreover, Russian attitudes appear to be leading the country into an absolute “dead end” given the failure of the powers that be to address it adequately.
Tsvetskov points to the ethnic clashes in the military unit near Perm and the shooting of a North Caucasian dancing in the middle of the night in Stavropol to show that officials clearly don’t know what to do. In the first case, they tried to suppress information about it, and in the second, they ignored the multiple factors at work.
This “short-sightedness and indifference” is obvious to everyone, the editor continued. “Doesn’t the Defense Ministry know that where people from the Caucasus republics assemble in a group, they will begin to live as their parents taught them and not as their father-commanders ordered?” And doesn’t the Stavropol militia recognize the way in which dancing in the middle of the night could affect people?
As Tsvetkov notes, Galina Kozhevnikova, the deputy head of the SOVA information-analytic center which tracks ethnic and religious affairs, points out that while the number of skinheads and radical groups is small, “more than half of Russians support neo-Nazi ideas” when it comes to dealing with minorities.
Thus, she continued, “this is a question not of the number of little groups but of the number of people who share neo-nazi views and support xenophobia as a whole because the neo-Nazis in the absence of such attitudes could not exist; they need to operate on the silent support of society” at large.”
Given that environment, Tsvetkov says, “can anyone be surprised by the appearance of demands of our citizens to create ‘an ethnic Russian republic’?” Or at the collection of signature in support of separating out Stavropol kray from the North Caucasus Federal District? “all this is based not on a heightened sense of national self-consciousness but on simple fear.”
Economists and demographers say that Russia needs more immigrants, but Tsvetkov says, there are no visible efforts by the government now to socialize the arrivals and help them fit in, a task especially difficult when Russians don’t want to consider them as people even though they want to hear them cite Pushkin from memory.
“The arguments of those who continue to support the idea of ‘Russia as a family of peoples’ are becoming ever fewer. Anger and lack of understanding, in contrast, are becoming ever greater and greater.” As a result, people are asking “what unites all of us besides state borders?”
And ever more often, Tsvetkov says, “one can hear the response: ‘Nothing.’”
Some Russians are trying to do something about this, but it is unclear whether they can succeed and reverse the current trend. Last week in Sochi, the Multi-National Russia Youth Forum came up with the idea that it is necessary to adopt and apply an “ethical code for multi-national Russia.”
Such a document, the editor continued, would declare Russian society to be “a single social community consisting of representatives of various ethnoses and start out from a recognition of the unqualified right of the individual to freedom of choice of his own ethnic and religious identities.”
Putting that in simpler terms, Tsvetkov says, “it is being suggested that we identify ourselves first of all as citizens of the Russian Federation and then as Russians (Tatars, Buryats and so on), Orthodox (Muslims, Buddhists, and so on)” – a proposal that he suggested represented “a noble undertaking.”
But there are good reasons to think such calls face an uphill battle. “Artificial constructs of citizenship by their significance do not compare with natural forms of identity including nationality and religion” – something that the collapse of the USSR highlighted for all in the post-Soviet region.
“Of course,” Tsvetkov continues, “it is possible to recall the Western model of the supremacy of law over all cultural distinctions and contradictions. However after the acknowledgement of Merkel and the French cleansings of the Roma, this experience too does not look so convincing.”
Keeping things together by force is always a possibility but that approach entails serious costs. Thus, “the method of convincing people remains.” But that is a hard task, especially if the powers that be prefer to ignore what is going on and “every other Russian” sympathizes with those who would oppress religious and ethnic minorities.
Tsetkov’s article is only one of the cries from the heart following the November 4 National Unity Day demonstrations conducted across the Russian Federation by ultra-nationalists, skinheads, and neo-Nazis, some of whom carried Nazi slogans like “Arbeit Macht Frei” (blog.humanrightsfirst.org/2010/11/charged-week-in-russia-skinheads.html).
And while these protests too were relatively small given the size of the country, they are disturbing because they underscore the point Tsvetkov makes: The active extremists are not all that numerous, but the share of the population that sympathizes with at least some of their messages is much larger and seems certain to play a role in Russia’s future.
Window on Eurasia: Moscow’s Moves against Tatarstan Sovereignty Opening the Way for Radical Islamists, Kazan Expert Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 9 – Moscow’s decision to ban the use of the term president for the leaders of the non-Russian republics and its insistence that Tatarstan drop references to the sovereignty of that republic have not only created an identity crisis in that republic but led some of its leaders to suggest that Tatarstan should position itself as a Muslim republic.
And while even that step, Kazan political scientist Sergey Sergeyev says, almost certainly has been coordinated with some Russian leaders, it constitutes a serious threat because radical Islam in Russia typically grows in the shadow of “official Islam” and, “as is well known, it is impossible to escape from [such] a shadow” (www.regnum.ru/news/1344066.html).
Just before the November holidays, the Duma passed a law banning the use of the term president for republic leaders, and Moscow dispatched Valery Zorkin, the chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court to Kazan apparently to press for further changes in Tatarstan’s constitution.
In contrast to his earlier remarks and the expectations of many, Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of Tatarstan’s State Council, indicated that Kazan is now prepared to go along with Moscow, but at the same time, former republic president, Mintimir Shaimiyev, who now serves as advisor to the current republic head, talked about a bigger role for Islam in Tatar life.
These two themes came together in a comment by Gusman Iskhakov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. He suggested that the elimination of the institution of the presidency of Tatarstan was leading to “a crisis of Tatar identity” and noted that “now our culture and religion are flourishing” (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-11-03/#34572).
To sort this out, the Regnum.ru news agency turned to Sergeyev, who has often served as a commentator on Tatarstan affairs for that and other Moscow outlets in the past. The political scientist said that he was surprised Mukhametshin had surrendered so quickly, but he said Shaimiyev’s comments were utterly consistent with his past statements.
Only a few weeks ago, the head of the Tatarstan State Council had declared that “to do away with the presidency” was the personal right of the leaders of those republics who wanted to take that step but that this does not affect Tatarstan, which he said would find it “hard” to change its constitution.
What appears to have taken place, Sergeyev continued, is the kind of exchange that Moscow and Kazan have often engaged in: Moscow has agreed to allow the head of Tatarstan to retain his powers if the latter agrees to adopt the center’s requirement that he not label himself as president.
Moscow has reason to be grateful to Tatarstan for the smooth transition from Shaimiyev to Rustam Minnikhanov and for delivering the required percentage of votes for United Russia – although, Sergeyev continued, the 70 percent Kazan came up with doesn’t seem so impressive now that some North Caucasians are promising to deliver 120 percent in the future!
More significant, the Kazan political scientist said, are the words of Shaimiyev about Islam as “one of the vectors of Tatarstan politics” and Tatarstan as the center of the moderate Russian Islam which the center has suggested it is quite prepared to support, especially in contrast to the radical Islamism found elsewhere.
Sergeyev said that he was “practically certain” that Moscow had agreed in advance with Shaimiyev’s declaration, given that Kazan is now oriented “not to Saudi Arabia but to Singapore” and given that a Tatar Muslim will find it easier to talk with Muslim leaders than does “the Russian [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov.”
That does not mean, however, that what Shaimiyev is talking about is without real dangers, Sergeyev said. On the one hand, this interest in religious identity “can be a sublimation of the activity of Tatar leaders because their possibilities in the political sphere are being limited.”
And on the other, there is a danger that this will open the way for “radical Islam which develops in Russia as a shadow of ‘official Islam’ and with which ‘official Islam’ struggles as with a competitor. But, as is well known,” Sergeyev continues, “it is impossible to escape from [one’s] shadow.”
*****
Many others are now discussing the impact of doing away with republic presidencies, and on Ryazan blogger, Vladimir Frolov, has pointed out an interesting aspect of the new Russian legislation: it bans the use of the word president but it doesn’t restrict how the republic leaders might style themselves otherwise (frolovchik.livejournal.com/84339.html).
As a result, he said, the Russian Federation may soon see an explosion in the number of titles regional leaders use. “In Ryzan, Smolensk, Tver and Vladimir oblasts,” he suggests, the leaders may call themselves “grand dukes.” In Rostov, Krasnodar, Orenburg, Chita, and Amur oblasts and Primorsky kray, perhaps “atamans.”
Meanwhile, the leaders of Tatarstan and Kalmykia might call themselves “khans,” and the heads of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan could identify as “emirs,” and the leader of Yakutia-Sakha as “a toyon.” Few of these are likely but the possibilities are as Frolov suggests almost endless as the latest unintended consequence of Russian legislation.
Staunton, November 9 – Moscow’s decision to ban the use of the term president for the leaders of the non-Russian republics and its insistence that Tatarstan drop references to the sovereignty of that republic have not only created an identity crisis in that republic but led some of its leaders to suggest that Tatarstan should position itself as a Muslim republic.
And while even that step, Kazan political scientist Sergey Sergeyev says, almost certainly has been coordinated with some Russian leaders, it constitutes a serious threat because radical Islam in Russia typically grows in the shadow of “official Islam” and, “as is well known, it is impossible to escape from [such] a shadow” (www.regnum.ru/news/1344066.html).
Just before the November holidays, the Duma passed a law banning the use of the term president for republic leaders, and Moscow dispatched Valery Zorkin, the chairman of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court to Kazan apparently to press for further changes in Tatarstan’s constitution.
In contrast to his earlier remarks and the expectations of many, Farid Mukhametshin, the chairman of Tatarstan’s State Council, indicated that Kazan is now prepared to go along with Moscow, but at the same time, former republic president, Mintimir Shaimiyev, who now serves as advisor to the current republic head, talked about a bigger role for Islam in Tatar life.
These two themes came together in a comment by Gusman Iskhakov, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. He suggested that the elimination of the institution of the presidency of Tatarstan was leading to “a crisis of Tatar identity” and noted that “now our culture and religion are flourishing” (www.islam.ru/rus/2010-11-03/#34572).
To sort this out, the Regnum.ru news agency turned to Sergeyev, who has often served as a commentator on Tatarstan affairs for that and other Moscow outlets in the past. The political scientist said that he was surprised Mukhametshin had surrendered so quickly, but he said Shaimiyev’s comments were utterly consistent with his past statements.
Only a few weeks ago, the head of the Tatarstan State Council had declared that “to do away with the presidency” was the personal right of the leaders of those republics who wanted to take that step but that this does not affect Tatarstan, which he said would find it “hard” to change its constitution.
What appears to have taken place, Sergeyev continued, is the kind of exchange that Moscow and Kazan have often engaged in: Moscow has agreed to allow the head of Tatarstan to retain his powers if the latter agrees to adopt the center’s requirement that he not label himself as president.
Moscow has reason to be grateful to Tatarstan for the smooth transition from Shaimiyev to Rustam Minnikhanov and for delivering the required percentage of votes for United Russia – although, Sergeyev continued, the 70 percent Kazan came up with doesn’t seem so impressive now that some North Caucasians are promising to deliver 120 percent in the future!
More significant, the Kazan political scientist said, are the words of Shaimiyev about Islam as “one of the vectors of Tatarstan politics” and Tatarstan as the center of the moderate Russian Islam which the center has suggested it is quite prepared to support, especially in contrast to the radical Islamism found elsewhere.
Sergeyev said that he was “practically certain” that Moscow had agreed in advance with Shaimiyev’s declaration, given that Kazan is now oriented “not to Saudi Arabia but to Singapore” and given that a Tatar Muslim will find it easier to talk with Muslim leaders than does “the Russian [Foreign Minister Sergey] Lavrov.”
That does not mean, however, that what Shaimiyev is talking about is without real dangers, Sergeyev said. On the one hand, this interest in religious identity “can be a sublimation of the activity of Tatar leaders because their possibilities in the political sphere are being limited.”
And on the other, there is a danger that this will open the way for “radical Islam which develops in Russia as a shadow of ‘official Islam’ and with which ‘official Islam’ struggles as with a competitor. But, as is well known,” Sergeyev continues, “it is impossible to escape from [one’s] shadow.”
*****
Many others are now discussing the impact of doing away with republic presidencies, and on Ryazan blogger, Vladimir Frolov, has pointed out an interesting aspect of the new Russian legislation: it bans the use of the word president but it doesn’t restrict how the republic leaders might style themselves otherwise (frolovchik.livejournal.com/84339.html).
As a result, he said, the Russian Federation may soon see an explosion in the number of titles regional leaders use. “In Ryzan, Smolensk, Tver and Vladimir oblasts,” he suggests, the leaders may call themselves “grand dukes.” In Rostov, Krasnodar, Orenburg, Chita, and Amur oblasts and Primorsky kray, perhaps “atamans.”
Meanwhile, the leaders of Tatarstan and Kalmykia might call themselves “khans,” and the heads of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Daghestan could identify as “emirs,” and the leader of Yakutia-Sakha as “a toyon.” Few of these are likely but the possibilities are as Frolov suggests almost endless as the latest unintended consequence of Russian legislation.
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