Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – Medvedev and Putin have often been described as playing the familiar roles of good cop-bad cop, but a better image, one that says more about where Russia is and where it may be going is to see the context between Putin as Medvedev as between “superman and the computer geek,” according to a Russian nationalist commentator.
In a comment for Ruskline.ru today, Sergey Lebedev, a Moscow political scientist who writes frequently on ethnic issues, says that the attraction of the good cop-bad cop model is understandable given that Putin is preserved as “the severe chekist” while Medvedev is shown as a young guy “in jeans” (ruskline.ru/news_rl/2010/11/08/supermen_protiv_kompyuterwika/).
Russians, Lebedev argues, “love strong and severe rulers, severe but just, ‘father-commanders,’” thus giving Putin the advantage. But at the same time, “the image of ‘the first boy in the village,’ also elicits sympathy but popular consciousness requires the image of a tsar – if not in the literal sense, then at a minimum as a wise and strict ruler.”
Consequently, however much Medvedev may please the younger generation, Putin in this regard, has chosen a more correct image. The premier shows that he is physically strong, always goes about in food form and thus indicates that his approaching 60 does not have any importance.”
Putin clearly “wants to show that there will not be any new ‘Brezhnevism’ with us;” that instead, there will be “people who play sports and deal with technology but who are at the same time wise and severe father commanders.” And regardless of what “the liberal media” say about “the bloody KGB,” Russians still relate to “’the siloviki’ with traditional respect.”
Medvedev who is younger comes from a different world. He presents himself as “the image of the ‘post-modern’ ruler of the 21st century.” But over time, he is taking on a more “severe and dignified” form. “An egghead computer guy will enjoy popularity among other eggheads who will always be in opposition to any power and any political regime.”
But Lebedev insists, “’chekists-supermen’ will always impress the broad masses.”
Those who want to understand this should remember what happened in the Name of Russia project. Then people indicated that they preferred rulers who were “just but severe,” with Ivan the Terrible and Joseph Stalin taking the lead despite all the blood they had shed because they had won the respect of the population.
“Medvedev and Putin,” Lebedev concludes, “have formed two images which together can win all the votes of the electors, both the majority and the minority in Russia.” That is why they have formed the tandem because “people who don’t like ‘the chekist’ Putin can vote for the ‘computer geek’ Medvedev.”
Meanwhile, “those who consider that Medvedev is too young and does not have any special achievements,” in contrast, vote for ‘the chekist’ Putin.” Although Lebedev doesn’t say so, it is clear that he believes that in a clash between the two, the chekist rather than the computer geek would win the support of the population, whatever Russians may be telling pollsters now.
Monday, November 8, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Internet Helping to Define Identity of Russia’s Muslims, New Study Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – The Internet has played a disproportionate role in the rise of Islam within the Russian Federation, a role that reflects the inability so far of Russia’s Muslims to break into the traditional print or national electronic media and one that has both positive and negative consequences for the umma, according to a new book.
Aynur Sibgatullin, the author of the widely-respected study on the role of the Internet in the development of the Tatar national movement, has now published a virtual guidebook to the Muslim segment of the Russian-language Internet, “The Islamic Internet” (in Russian; Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod: Medina Publishers, 2010).
In a review of that volume on the Islamrf.ru portal today, Larisa Usmanova says that while “not one has to be convinced that the Internet is an effective instrument in the education and instruction of the rising generation,” few have fully understood the role it plays in the formation of national and religious identities (www.islamrf.ru/news/library/rezenzii/14098/).
Sibgatullin’s book makes a significant contribution to that understanding, she continues, but in the first instance, it deserves attention because it is “the first handbook or guide to the Russian-language ‘Islamic Internet’ and the first substantial investigation of this Russian-language segment of the global information network.”
The author’s first book, “The Tatar Internet,” traced the role and significance of the Internet “in the national consolidation of one of the most numerous national minorities of the Russian Federation,” a minority in which Islam is “traditionally considered the religious component of the identity of the Tatar nation.”
His new book, Usmanova says, extends that research and broadens it out, simultaneously providing insights and dispelling myths about the role of the Internet. Perhaps Sibgatullin’s most immediately striking finding is that the Russian-language Islamic Internet is not as large as many people assume.
At the present time, he found, there are only about 400 “developed Internet resources devoted to Islam, among which are information portals and personal blogs, as well as sites prepared by mosques, Internet magazines, and social networks,” with the three most visited being www.islam.ru, www.islamnews.ru, and www.muslim.ru.
According to Sibgatullin, there are two main reasons why the Internet has played such an important role in the lives of Russia’s Muslims. On the one hand, the Russian government’s national and religious policies have restricted the amount of information about Islam in central news outlets of various kinds.
And on the other, the author suggests, the Internet has proved attractive as a result of “the growing interest in Islam precisely among young people who as a whole prefer the Internet to other information sources.” Other faiths, like Orthodoxy for example, generally appeal to an older and less Internet savvy cohort.
The Russian-language Islamic Internet is only about a decade old. In 2000, there were a tiny number of Muslim resources with the leading one then and now being the news and analysis portal, Islam.ru. Only in the last few years has the number of sites increased dramatically, and many of those have proved to be stillborn.
Among the characteristics of the Islamic Internet in Russia, Sibgatullin says, are that it is “not purely commercial” which often means it is not well financed and that it is both involved in missionary work and intended for practicing Muslims rather than anyone else, often slighting their need for studying the faith.
Most Islamic sites are primitive and poorly developed with few photographs and little interactivity, the author says. They also often feature “an unattractive language and style of presentation,” and they are currently far behind the sites of the Russian Orthodox Internet and foreign Islamic sites as well in this regard.
According to Usmanova, the book’s author devotes particular attention to “a special phenomenon of the world wide web – the formation in the Islamic Internet of a special virtual community with the name ‘Cyber-Muslims.’” Such people get more from the Internet than just information; they gain an identity by surfing the web.
“This phenomenon,” Usmanova points out, “has already been noted in national segments of the web, in particular in the Russian language the term ‘Cyber-Russian’ has appeared to designate those users who clearly express their national identity by means of the possibilities that the Internet offers.”
Such virtual groups should attract more investigators because these communities really are different, Usmanova notes, and she provides an intriguing example in the case of the Muslim net. “In virtual groups, communication between men and women is conducted on an absolutely equal basis, which is not entirely typical for traditional, ‘non-virtual’ Islam.”
Staunton, November 8 – The Internet has played a disproportionate role in the rise of Islam within the Russian Federation, a role that reflects the inability so far of Russia’s Muslims to break into the traditional print or national electronic media and one that has both positive and negative consequences for the umma, according to a new book.
Aynur Sibgatullin, the author of the widely-respected study on the role of the Internet in the development of the Tatar national movement, has now published a virtual guidebook to the Muslim segment of the Russian-language Internet, “The Islamic Internet” (in Russian; Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod: Medina Publishers, 2010).
In a review of that volume on the Islamrf.ru portal today, Larisa Usmanova says that while “not one has to be convinced that the Internet is an effective instrument in the education and instruction of the rising generation,” few have fully understood the role it plays in the formation of national and religious identities (www.islamrf.ru/news/library/rezenzii/14098/).
Sibgatullin’s book makes a significant contribution to that understanding, she continues, but in the first instance, it deserves attention because it is “the first handbook or guide to the Russian-language ‘Islamic Internet’ and the first substantial investigation of this Russian-language segment of the global information network.”
The author’s first book, “The Tatar Internet,” traced the role and significance of the Internet “in the national consolidation of one of the most numerous national minorities of the Russian Federation,” a minority in which Islam is “traditionally considered the religious component of the identity of the Tatar nation.”
His new book, Usmanova says, extends that research and broadens it out, simultaneously providing insights and dispelling myths about the role of the Internet. Perhaps Sibgatullin’s most immediately striking finding is that the Russian-language Islamic Internet is not as large as many people assume.
At the present time, he found, there are only about 400 “developed Internet resources devoted to Islam, among which are information portals and personal blogs, as well as sites prepared by mosques, Internet magazines, and social networks,” with the three most visited being www.islam.ru, www.islamnews.ru, and www.muslim.ru.
According to Sibgatullin, there are two main reasons why the Internet has played such an important role in the lives of Russia’s Muslims. On the one hand, the Russian government’s national and religious policies have restricted the amount of information about Islam in central news outlets of various kinds.
And on the other, the author suggests, the Internet has proved attractive as a result of “the growing interest in Islam precisely among young people who as a whole prefer the Internet to other information sources.” Other faiths, like Orthodoxy for example, generally appeal to an older and less Internet savvy cohort.
The Russian-language Islamic Internet is only about a decade old. In 2000, there were a tiny number of Muslim resources with the leading one then and now being the news and analysis portal, Islam.ru. Only in the last few years has the number of sites increased dramatically, and many of those have proved to be stillborn.
Among the characteristics of the Islamic Internet in Russia, Sibgatullin says, are that it is “not purely commercial” which often means it is not well financed and that it is both involved in missionary work and intended for practicing Muslims rather than anyone else, often slighting their need for studying the faith.
Most Islamic sites are primitive and poorly developed with few photographs and little interactivity, the author says. They also often feature “an unattractive language and style of presentation,” and they are currently far behind the sites of the Russian Orthodox Internet and foreign Islamic sites as well in this regard.
According to Usmanova, the book’s author devotes particular attention to “a special phenomenon of the world wide web – the formation in the Islamic Internet of a special virtual community with the name ‘Cyber-Muslims.’” Such people get more from the Internet than just information; they gain an identity by surfing the web.
“This phenomenon,” Usmanova points out, “has already been noted in national segments of the web, in particular in the Russian language the term ‘Cyber-Russian’ has appeared to designate those users who clearly express their national identity by means of the possibilities that the Internet offers.”
Such virtual groups should attract more investigators because these communities really are different, Usmanova notes, and she provides an intriguing example in the case of the Muslim net. “In virtual groups, communication between men and women is conducted on an absolutely equal basis, which is not entirely typical for traditional, ‘non-virtual’ Islam.”
Window on Eurasia: Protestant Congregations Now Vastly Outnumber Orthodox Ones in Russian Far East
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 8 – Protestant congregations now outnumber Russian Orthodox ones in Russia’s Far East, a development that both reflects and reinforces the distinctive regional identity and anti-Moscow sentiments of many of the people in that enormous region, according to religious specialists.
Today, the Trans-Baikal news agency reported that “the most ‘Protestant’ regions of the Far East are Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays.” In the former, there are 178 Protestant communities compared to 89 parishes of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church (zabinfo.ru/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=71103&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 ).
Among the leading denominations there are Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Evangelicals, and Seventh Day Adventists, the news service says, but there are “dozens of others” as well. Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists also lag far behind in numbers: there are six mosques, seven synagogues, and four pagodas.
The situation in Khabarovsk kray is “very similar: of the 163 religious organizations, 96 are Protestant,” twice as many as the Orthodox. Moreover, this Protestant advantage is growing: Not only are ever more Protestant groups organizing and building churches, but the Orthodox
Church, lacking funds and followers, has been shutting down parishes.
Moreover, this report suggests, although its authors do not make this point, that it is no longer the case that Protestant congregations are significantly smaller than Orthodox ones, at least in terms of attendance, activity, and contributions, something that the Moscow Patriarchate has stressed in the past.
This pattern of the rise of Protestantism and the decline of Orthodoxy holds for other parts of Siberia as well. In Krasnoyarsk, there are now 111 Protestant groups, in Irkutsk, 97, and in Sverdlovsk, 94. “The most widespread,” Zabinfo.ru continues, are charismatic churches such as the Pentecostals.
Pastor Konstantin Bendas, administrator of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that “this phenomenon has a long history. Orthodoxy came to these territories quite late. In Siberia and the Far East, representatives of confessions not tolerated in the Russian Empire were exiled.”
Moreover, he continued, “many fled from oppression – the Molokane, the Dukhobors, the Mennonites, the Stundists and so on. In Soviet times, those religious leaders who were able to escape execution were exiled to the Far East. And in this way, the elite of Russian Protestants was concentrated precisely there.”
In a comment on this report, the editors of Religiopolis.org suggest that this trend, which they acknowledge has deep historical roots, also reflects certain contemporary realities, including the ethnic diversity of the region, immigration and outmigration, and a tradition of independent action (www.religiopolis.org/news/1373-dalnij-vostok-rossii-otkazalsja-ot-pravoslavija.html).
“The social openness” of Protestantism and its commitment to public action, Religiopolis.org argues, means that its various denominations are more attractive to the people of Siberia and the Russian Far East than is the more inward-focused Russian Orthodox Church at least at the present time.
Zabinfo.ru asked the Moscow Patriarchate for comment, but its representatives found it “difficult” to do so. Vladimir Vigilyansky, the head of the Patriarchate’s press service, said that he “does not comment on inter-relationships with ‘sectarians and Protestants,’” a remark that says far more than he may perhaps have intended.
But the rise of Protestantism in Siberia and the Russian Far East threatens not just the Moscow Patriarchate and its pretensions to speak for all ethnic Russians who it says are Orthodox by birth. It also represents a challenge to Moscow’s political control of the region, given that Siberian regionalism and Protestant religion can and do reinforce one another.
Indeed, one of the major arguments of the Siberian nationalist movement is that Siberia, never knew serfdom and has a Protestant work ethic closer to that of the United States than to that found in European Russia. The rise of Protestant communities across the region will only reinforce that, especially if the Moscow Patriarchate remains so hostile to this development.
Staunton, November 8 – Protestant congregations now outnumber Russian Orthodox ones in Russia’s Far East, a development that both reflects and reinforces the distinctive regional identity and anti-Moscow sentiments of many of the people in that enormous region, according to religious specialists.
Today, the Trans-Baikal news agency reported that “the most ‘Protestant’ regions of the Far East are Primorsky and Khabarovsk krays.” In the former, there are 178 Protestant communities compared to 89 parishes of the Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church (zabinfo.ru/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=71103&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0 ).
Among the leading denominations there are Pentecostals, Presbyterians, Evangelicals, and Seventh Day Adventists, the news service says, but there are “dozens of others” as well. Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists also lag far behind in numbers: there are six mosques, seven synagogues, and four pagodas.
The situation in Khabarovsk kray is “very similar: of the 163 religious organizations, 96 are Protestant,” twice as many as the Orthodox. Moreover, this Protestant advantage is growing: Not only are ever more Protestant groups organizing and building churches, but the Orthodox
Church, lacking funds and followers, has been shutting down parishes.
Moreover, this report suggests, although its authors do not make this point, that it is no longer the case that Protestant congregations are significantly smaller than Orthodox ones, at least in terms of attendance, activity, and contributions, something that the Moscow Patriarchate has stressed in the past.
This pattern of the rise of Protestantism and the decline of Orthodoxy holds for other parts of Siberia as well. In Krasnoyarsk, there are now 111 Protestant groups, in Irkutsk, 97, and in Sverdlovsk, 94. “The most widespread,” Zabinfo.ru continues, are charismatic churches such as the Pentecostals.
Pastor Konstantin Bendas, administrator of the Russian United Union of Evangelical Christians, says that “this phenomenon has a long history. Orthodoxy came to these territories quite late. In Siberia and the Far East, representatives of confessions not tolerated in the Russian Empire were exiled.”
Moreover, he continued, “many fled from oppression – the Molokane, the Dukhobors, the Mennonites, the Stundists and so on. In Soviet times, those religious leaders who were able to escape execution were exiled to the Far East. And in this way, the elite of Russian Protestants was concentrated precisely there.”
In a comment on this report, the editors of Religiopolis.org suggest that this trend, which they acknowledge has deep historical roots, also reflects certain contemporary realities, including the ethnic diversity of the region, immigration and outmigration, and a tradition of independent action (www.religiopolis.org/news/1373-dalnij-vostok-rossii-otkazalsja-ot-pravoslavija.html).
“The social openness” of Protestantism and its commitment to public action, Religiopolis.org argues, means that its various denominations are more attractive to the people of Siberia and the Russian Far East than is the more inward-focused Russian Orthodox Church at least at the present time.
Zabinfo.ru asked the Moscow Patriarchate for comment, but its representatives found it “difficult” to do so. Vladimir Vigilyansky, the head of the Patriarchate’s press service, said that he “does not comment on inter-relationships with ‘sectarians and Protestants,’” a remark that says far more than he may perhaps have intended.
But the rise of Protestantism in Siberia and the Russian Far East threatens not just the Moscow Patriarchate and its pretensions to speak for all ethnic Russians who it says are Orthodox by birth. It also represents a challenge to Moscow’s political control of the region, given that Siberian regionalism and Protestant religion can and do reinforce one another.
Indeed, one of the major arguments of the Siberian nationalist movement is that Siberia, never knew serfdom and has a Protestant work ethic closer to that of the United States than to that found in European Russia. The rise of Protestant communities across the region will only reinforce that, especially if the Moscow Patriarchate remains so hostile to this development.
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