Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – Few Muslims in the Russian Federation have any doubt that they face a rising tide of anti-Islamic extremism, but they and especially their intellectual leaders disagree as to its source, with some pointing to international trends, others to national ones and still a third to local causes.
In an essay posted online today, Islam.ru’s Daniyal Isayev asks three leading Islamic intellectuals in the Russian Federation for their explanations as to why hostility toward Russia’s Muslims is growing and whether there is any one institution or group of people responsible for the outrages against that community (www.islam.ru/pressclub/islamofobia/vzifodtries/).
There is no agreement on this point, Isayev notes, and he suggests that “the most interesting” variants of the answer are provided by Maksim Shevchenko, a Muslim commentator on Moscow’s First Chanel, Abudlla Rinat Mukhametov, the deputy chief editor of Islam.ru, and Aslambek Ezhayev, head of the Umma Publishing Company.
Shevchenko, as he has on other occasions, suggests that the rise of anti-Muslim attitudes and acitons is part of a general preparation for a major war in the Middle East, one that Israel plans to launch “in the first instance” against Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon. In support of this, Israel is trying to whip up opinion around the world against Muslims.
The Israelis and their allies, he continues, “want to explain to the world and in particular to Russia” that all Muslims are enemies, terrorists, and murderers. By “blackening the reputation” of Muslims and “demonizing them,” the Israelis and their allies are driving a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in Russia.
Mukhametov in contrast argues that the causes of growing Islamophobia in Russia are Russian. The editor has argued in other places that Moscow is pursuing a three-part strategy toward the Islamic community – adaption of its members to life, the dilution of Islamic culture,m and restraint on the growth of the umma in Russia.
At present, he argues, the last is the dominant approach, one that on a more or less constant basis, “certain siloviki and bureaucrats” think can be transformed into “a final solution of the Muslim question” and thus promote hostility between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Russian Federation.
That invariably leads to an exchange of attacks between these two communities, a trend that can be played up by those who want to exclude Islam from Russian life and have little concern either for tolerance or for the provisions of the Russian Constitution or the observance of Russian law.
But Ezhayev argues that one can best understand the sources of Islamophobia by focusing not on the international scene or even on the all-Russian one. Instead, he argues, one should focus on the North Caucasus, the Middle Volga and Siberia where some officials are convinced that Russia’s Muslims are under the influence of foreign extremist groups.
The “nightmare” scenario for such officials, he continues, is the idea that “an ever larger number of Muslims in the country are oriented not toward Talgat Tajuddin or Muhammedgali Husin but toward international Muslim scholars like Yusuf al-Qadawi, Abdullah ibn Jibrin, Said Nursi and others.”
Because these officials and especially the siloviki are responsible for security in their areas and because they are inclined to see a foreign hand behind all the greatest threats, they thus take actions against Muslims suspected of such links and that in turn feeds on xenophobic attitudes among the Russian population more generally.
Thus, Ezhayev implies, the professional responsibilities of these officials lead them to take individual actions which collectively feed into something larger rather than any one of these actions being a derivative of a more general policy, a reality that the Muslim publisher says the Islamic community must both recognize and make use of.
Isayev agrees, but he also thinks that international trends and all-Russian ones are playing a role and should be taken into consideration as the growing umma in the Russian Federation seeks to find its way toward a more tolerant relationship with the non-Muslim majority of that country.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Window on Eurasia: Russians have More Reasons than Ever for Public Protests, Experts Say
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – The likelihood that Russians will engage in public protests in the coming months is increasing, experts in that country say, given the range of social and economic problems people there are experiencing, the intensification of many of these problems in particular places, and their sense that Moscow has failed to respond adequately or even at all.
In today’s Moscow “New Times,” a survey of expert opinion provides a veritable checklist of problems that appear likely to trigger protests in one place or another in the coming months and thus confront the Russian powers that be with a new set of problems in the run-up to the elections in 2011 and 2012 (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/29648).
Karin Kleman, the director of the Institute of Social Action, said that reasons for protest are mounting and now are “above the roof,” pointing to such problems as low pay, rising prices for consumer goods, and unchecked corruption. And Aleksandr Krasnoshtan, an organizer in Arkhangelsk, noted the growing fears among the elderly about their futures.
Added to that, the editors of the weekly said, are the fears of younger people that Moscow is about to increase their retirement age, a step that polls show 79 percent of Russians are “categorically against.” Many think the powers that be want to increase the minimum retirement age so that the regime won’t have to pay pensioners: they will die before reaching it!
Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has proposed increasing the pension age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 62 for men, arguing that at present Russia has “a low pension age.” But that Marie Antoinette-like comment has infuriated many, and Social and Health Mminsiter Tatyana Golikova was forced to deny that any plans for such a step were under discussion.
As in France and other Western countries, Russians face a problem with financing existing retirement plans, but as the demonstrations in Paris have shown, boosting the retirement age or even talking about it can push typically passive groups into the street. Consequently, many experts think that Moscow won’t do anything until after the 2012 elections.
But Russian workers have more immediate worries involving low wages and the non-payment even of those. The Association of Service Trade Union Workers, which unites some eight million people, plans to stage a strike action, given that Moscow has failed to deliver on its promises to raise salaries for its members.
Other Russian workers are even worse off. Their employers aren’t paying them. As of September 1st, Russian officials report, there was a backlog in unpaid wages of 3.35 billion rubles (100 million US dollars). These officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, hav suggested that this is not so bad, but others profoundly disagree.
While the situation is not so terrible compared to the 1990s or even 2007, it is much worse than it was only a few months ago, and wage arrears and the number of people who are suffering as a result has risen significantly since the start of the summer, the comparison that most people involved are likely to make.
If more workers protest with strike actions, few of the experts with whom “New Times” spoke will be surprised, but its journalists noted that “it is curious that protest attitudes are growing not only among workers but also among employers,” who are upset by rising costs and the absence of government compensation for these.
Another potential source of public protests are the company towns which have attracted attention when people have gone into the streets but have largely been ignored and typically neglected altogether after Moscow officials make promises that they have not been willing or able to follow through with.
Only one company town – Toliatti – has received as much as 80 percent of the money it was promised. Most have received far less and a large number have received nothing at all. Workers there either have to make do with part-time employment at low wages or when possible take their pensions. And as a result, conditions in many such cities are getting worse.
The Finance Minbsitry has decided to refrain from direct budgetary support of such places for the period 2011 to 2013, “New Times” reports, although it has kept aside 30 billion rubles (100 million US dollars) to pay out in the case of “extraordinary circumsatances” – a euphemism for when “people again block the roads” and thus an invitation to them to do so.
Finally, “New Times” considers a social problem that could have more immediate political consequences if those suffering from it decide to act. That involves the living conditions of military officers, both those still serving and those who have been forced to take their pensions as a result of the downsizing of the armed services.
Many in both groups have been promised housing, but what they have been given, Oleg Shvedkov, the head of the All-Russian Professional Union of Military Employees, says, is anything but satisfactory, a betrayal of regime promises, a source of anger, and quite possibly, the basis for public protests by this group as well.
The powers that be clearly expect that they will be able to prevent these groups from linking up or turning political, but the range and intensity of problems in Russian society is such that even scattered protests without a unifying leadership will present the regime with a serious problem especially in the run-up to the elections ahead.
Staunton, November 1 – The likelihood that Russians will engage in public protests in the coming months is increasing, experts in that country say, given the range of social and economic problems people there are experiencing, the intensification of many of these problems in particular places, and their sense that Moscow has failed to respond adequately or even at all.
In today’s Moscow “New Times,” a survey of expert opinion provides a veritable checklist of problems that appear likely to trigger protests in one place or another in the coming months and thus confront the Russian powers that be with a new set of problems in the run-up to the elections in 2011 and 2012 (www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/29648).
Karin Kleman, the director of the Institute of Social Action, said that reasons for protest are mounting and now are “above the roof,” pointing to such problems as low pay, rising prices for consumer goods, and unchecked corruption. And Aleksandr Krasnoshtan, an organizer in Arkhangelsk, noted the growing fears among the elderly about their futures.
Added to that, the editors of the weekly said, are the fears of younger people that Moscow is about to increase their retirement age, a step that polls show 79 percent of Russians are “categorically against.” Many think the powers that be want to increase the minimum retirement age so that the regime won’t have to pay pensioners: they will die before reaching it!
Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin has proposed increasing the pension age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 62 for men, arguing that at present Russia has “a low pension age.” But that Marie Antoinette-like comment has infuriated many, and Social and Health Mminsiter Tatyana Golikova was forced to deny that any plans for such a step were under discussion.
As in France and other Western countries, Russians face a problem with financing existing retirement plans, but as the demonstrations in Paris have shown, boosting the retirement age or even talking about it can push typically passive groups into the street. Consequently, many experts think that Moscow won’t do anything until after the 2012 elections.
But Russian workers have more immediate worries involving low wages and the non-payment even of those. The Association of Service Trade Union Workers, which unites some eight million people, plans to stage a strike action, given that Moscow has failed to deliver on its promises to raise salaries for its members.
Other Russian workers are even worse off. Their employers aren’t paying them. As of September 1st, Russian officials report, there was a backlog in unpaid wages of 3.35 billion rubles (100 million US dollars). These officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, hav suggested that this is not so bad, but others profoundly disagree.
While the situation is not so terrible compared to the 1990s or even 2007, it is much worse than it was only a few months ago, and wage arrears and the number of people who are suffering as a result has risen significantly since the start of the summer, the comparison that most people involved are likely to make.
If more workers protest with strike actions, few of the experts with whom “New Times” spoke will be surprised, but its journalists noted that “it is curious that protest attitudes are growing not only among workers but also among employers,” who are upset by rising costs and the absence of government compensation for these.
Another potential source of public protests are the company towns which have attracted attention when people have gone into the streets but have largely been ignored and typically neglected altogether after Moscow officials make promises that they have not been willing or able to follow through with.
Only one company town – Toliatti – has received as much as 80 percent of the money it was promised. Most have received far less and a large number have received nothing at all. Workers there either have to make do with part-time employment at low wages or when possible take their pensions. And as a result, conditions in many such cities are getting worse.
The Finance Minbsitry has decided to refrain from direct budgetary support of such places for the period 2011 to 2013, “New Times” reports, although it has kept aside 30 billion rubles (100 million US dollars) to pay out in the case of “extraordinary circumsatances” – a euphemism for when “people again block the roads” and thus an invitation to them to do so.
Finally, “New Times” considers a social problem that could have more immediate political consequences if those suffering from it decide to act. That involves the living conditions of military officers, both those still serving and those who have been forced to take their pensions as a result of the downsizing of the armed services.
Many in both groups have been promised housing, but what they have been given, Oleg Shvedkov, the head of the All-Russian Professional Union of Military Employees, says, is anything but satisfactory, a betrayal of regime promises, a source of anger, and quite possibly, the basis for public protests by this group as well.
The powers that be clearly expect that they will be able to prevent these groups from linking up or turning political, but the range and intensity of problems in Russian society is such that even scattered protests without a unifying leadership will present the regime with a serious problem especially in the run-up to the elections ahead.
Window on Eurasia: Medvedev’s Failure to Respond to Kadyrov a Serious Problem for the Kremlin and for Russia, Moscow Commentator Says
Paul Goble
Staunton, November 1 – On the day Ramzan Kadyrov ceased to be president of Chechnya – as a result of his own initiative, he is now “head” of that republic – a Moscow commentator has asked what it means for President Dmitry Medvedev and for the Russian political system as a whole that the Kremlin has failed to respond to Kadyrov’s latest statements.
In “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Matvey Ganapolsky points to two comments from Grozny that one might have expected the Kremlin would have to respond to in some way. In the first, Kadyrov himself said he would like to see Vladimir Putin return to the Russian presidency for life and that with Putin’s support, he “can do everything” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10507).
And in the second more recent statement from the Chechen capital, Dukhuvakh Abdurakhmanov, speaker of that republic’s parliament, which is dominated by Kadyrov supporters, declared that “if United Russia needs to receive 115 to 120 percent of the vote, we can achieve that result.”
On the one hand, Ganapolsky notes, both Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov would undoubtedly explain their extravagant remarks as being nothing more than an expression of their enthusiasm for Putin. And on the other, the Moscow elite generally views Kadyrov’s remarks as being like those of Vladimir Zhirinovsky – “very loud but not dangerous.”
But given Constitutional requirements and Medvedev’s recent and “instantaneous” response to now former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s words and to the offensive comments of the Russian defense minister, the Kremlin’s silence after the remarks of the two Chechen leaders is deafening.”
One might have expected Medvedev to respond to Kadyrov’s suggestion quickly and sharply in order to meet the demands of his office and to demonstrate his own independence, even though everyone knows that Kadyrov is a special case because of his role in the North Caucasus and because he is “the most loyal Putin supporter” around.
But this, Ganapolsky continues, is “only part of the problem.” Clearly someone needs to rein in any regional leader who talks about aggressively taking out his “personal enemies,” words that might have been ignored were it not for the murders of journalists Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova, to which some have linked Kadyrov.
And it would seem to be even more important for the Russian president, as “guarantor” of the Russian Constitution to speak out given that there are currently court cases “where Mr. Kadyrov is defending his honorable name” against those who have suggested that he has done more than speak out against his enemies.
Accordingly, Ganapolsky says, “the declarations of Ramzan Kadyrov and the absence of a reaction to them on the part of President Medvedev are thus " no small matter. Above all,” to be sure, “for Medvedev himself” because of his special role in ensuring that the constitution and the laws are obeyed by all.
The president, the “Yezhednevny zhurnal” commentator says, “is an individual who swore on the text [of the Constitution]that … he in the first instance has one goal – with all his force and might to defend this [document]’ against those who would challenge its provisions or undermine its meaning.
Medvedev must “defend each of its letters,” a truth that Ganapolsky say is “so evident” that what the current president has done in the case of Kadyrov shows that he is not being true to his oath of office or to the people of Russia whose rights the Constitution includes guarantees against abuse.
At the same time, “one must remember” what political life in Russia is really like. “If Kadyrov permits himself such anti-constitutional declarations and is not restrained because of his friendship with Putin … then it turns out that to be a successful leader of a subject of the Federation means not to follow the Constitution but to be close to the [real] ruler.”
Ganapolsky’s argument is damning not only to Medvedev and to Putin and Kadyrov; it is damning of the entire Russian political system as it has emerged over the last two decades. And because it is so sweeping in its implications, it almost certainly will be dismissed as a voice crying in the wilderness.
But by writing it, Ganapolsky has posed a challenge to Medvedev which, if he fails to take it up and move against Kadyrov, will likely presage his political decline, and at the same time, by suggesting that what Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov have done should be cause for dismissal, the Moscow commentator is inviting the powers that be to consider their removal.
That alone makes this article immediately important because while there have been rumors of unhappiness in Moscow about Kadyrov before and while there has been some speculation that the Chechen leader should be removed, Ganapolsky has more sharply and clearly stated the consequences for all involved of not doing so -- and quickly.
Staunton, November 1 – On the day Ramzan Kadyrov ceased to be president of Chechnya – as a result of his own initiative, he is now “head” of that republic – a Moscow commentator has asked what it means for President Dmitry Medvedev and for the Russian political system as a whole that the Kremlin has failed to respond to Kadyrov’s latest statements.
In “Yezhednevny zhurnal,” Matvey Ganapolsky points to two comments from Grozny that one might have expected the Kremlin would have to respond to in some way. In the first, Kadyrov himself said he would like to see Vladimir Putin return to the Russian presidency for life and that with Putin’s support, he “can do everything” (www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=10507).
And in the second more recent statement from the Chechen capital, Dukhuvakh Abdurakhmanov, speaker of that republic’s parliament, which is dominated by Kadyrov supporters, declared that “if United Russia needs to receive 115 to 120 percent of the vote, we can achieve that result.”
On the one hand, Ganapolsky notes, both Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov would undoubtedly explain their extravagant remarks as being nothing more than an expression of their enthusiasm for Putin. And on the other, the Moscow elite generally views Kadyrov’s remarks as being like those of Vladimir Zhirinovsky – “very loud but not dangerous.”
But given Constitutional requirements and Medvedev’s recent and “instantaneous” response to now former Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s words and to the offensive comments of the Russian defense minister, the Kremlin’s silence after the remarks of the two Chechen leaders is deafening.”
One might have expected Medvedev to respond to Kadyrov’s suggestion quickly and sharply in order to meet the demands of his office and to demonstrate his own independence, even though everyone knows that Kadyrov is a special case because of his role in the North Caucasus and because he is “the most loyal Putin supporter” around.
But this, Ganapolsky continues, is “only part of the problem.” Clearly someone needs to rein in any regional leader who talks about aggressively taking out his “personal enemies,” words that might have been ignored were it not for the murders of journalists Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova, to which some have linked Kadyrov.
And it would seem to be even more important for the Russian president, as “guarantor” of the Russian Constitution to speak out given that there are currently court cases “where Mr. Kadyrov is defending his honorable name” against those who have suggested that he has done more than speak out against his enemies.
Accordingly, Ganapolsky says, “the declarations of Ramzan Kadyrov and the absence of a reaction to them on the part of President Medvedev are thus " no small matter. Above all,” to be sure, “for Medvedev himself” because of his special role in ensuring that the constitution and the laws are obeyed by all.
The president, the “Yezhednevny zhurnal” commentator says, “is an individual who swore on the text [of the Constitution]that … he in the first instance has one goal – with all his force and might to defend this [document]’ against those who would challenge its provisions or undermine its meaning.
Medvedev must “defend each of its letters,” a truth that Ganapolsky say is “so evident” that what the current president has done in the case of Kadyrov shows that he is not being true to his oath of office or to the people of Russia whose rights the Constitution includes guarantees against abuse.
At the same time, “one must remember” what political life in Russia is really like. “If Kadyrov permits himself such anti-constitutional declarations and is not restrained because of his friendship with Putin … then it turns out that to be a successful leader of a subject of the Federation means not to follow the Constitution but to be close to the [real] ruler.”
Ganapolsky’s argument is damning not only to Medvedev and to Putin and Kadyrov; it is damning of the entire Russian political system as it has emerged over the last two decades. And because it is so sweeping in its implications, it almost certainly will be dismissed as a voice crying in the wilderness.
But by writing it, Ganapolsky has posed a challenge to Medvedev which, if he fails to take it up and move against Kadyrov, will likely presage his political decline, and at the same time, by suggesting that what Kadyrov and Abdurakhmanov have done should be cause for dismissal, the Moscow commentator is inviting the powers that be to consider their removal.
That alone makes this article immediately important because while there have been rumors of unhappiness in Moscow about Kadyrov before and while there has been some speculation that the Chechen leader should be removed, Ganapolsky has more sharply and clearly stated the consequences for all involved of not doing so -- and quickly.
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